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ABSTRACT 
The thesis aims to produce a reconsideration of the queer spaces articulated in 1980s and 
1990s literary criticism through the corporealising theory of gender and sexuality in the 
recent development of Australian material feminism and Rita Felski‟s idea of transient time. 
It particularly focuses on interpretations of transgender characters in critical readings of 
Renaissance drama and contemporary fiction. The academic fields investigated are thus late 
twentieth-century Renaissance criticism of gender and sexuality, late twentieth-century queer 
interpretations of transgenderism and transgender characters in contemporary literature, 
contemporary transgender studies and material feminist theory. 
Chapter 1 introduces a queer space articulated by discourses of gender and sexuality 
in 1980s and 1990s criticism of Renaissance drama. It concludes that the historical 
methodology of the critics is flawed and that the idea of Renaissance queerness is built as a 
contrast to late twentieth-century queerness. 
Chapter 2 is a reconsideration of the Renaissance anatomical sources used by the 
canonical critics introduced in the previous chapter. It establishes that the queer idea of sex 
and gender developed through these should rather be read in light of the more corporeal 
Renaissance discourse of monstrosity. 
Chapter 3 reconsiders the transgender characters in Shakespeare‟s Twelfth Night and 
As You Like It and introduces a reading of Middleton and Dekker‟s The Roaring Girl from a 
point of view that introduces Renaissance sexual monstrosity as a formation of corporealised 
though flexible gender subjectivity.  
Chapter 4 introduces a late twentieth-century queer space partly articulated in 
relation to the Renaissance queer space. It critiques the theoretical foundations of late 
twentieth-century queer theory, introducing transgender responses to „queering‟ readings of 
transgender bodies, as well as queer theorists‟ own attempts to narrativise themselves as 
points of incoherence in Butler‟s model and introduces a corporealising material feminist 
perspective of gender subjectivity as a more accommodating alternative. 
Chapter 5 reconsiders queer readings of transgender characters in Angela Carter‟s 
The Passion of New Eve. It concludes that the novel has been evaluated from a queer 
perspective and that it offers a more interesting comment on sex and gender if read from a 
material feminist point of view. 
Chapter 6 discusses John Cameron Mitchell‟s Hedwig and the Angry Inch as one 
transgender narrative that has been critiqued by transgender academia and Gore Vidal‟s 
Myra Breckinridge as a transgender narrative that has been approved. It analyses and 
critiques the reasons for the texts‟ reception and formulates a new poetics of corporeal 
gender based on the idea of nomadic gender subjectivity developed in the works of the 
Australian school of material feminists. 
The thesis finally exchanges a queer reading of transgender characters for a nomadic 
corporeal reading that better accommodates the historical discourses surrounding the 
Renaissance material, the literary content of the contemporary fiction, and the idea of 
transgender identity as it is considered in transgender studies. 
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[INTRODUCTION] Queer Space and Transient Time 
 
Judith Halberstam argues in In a Queer Time and Place that the staking or definition 
of a „queer time‟ and a „queer space‟ is ambitious to the point of being hubristic (1). 
Yet, Halberstam recognises that there are a number of specific discourses conceived 
in relation to queer spatiality and temporality. She notes that specified „queer time 
and space are useful frameworks for assessing political and cultural change in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries‟ (2005, 4). This change usually takes 
place through de-stabilisation of social norms: the production of queer time and 
space involves „queerying‟ preceding normalised notions of time and space and 
creating new challenging queer versions (Halberstam, 2005, 6).
1
 One might ask, 
though, whether queer time and space can avoid becoming normalised once they 
have been named as a specific „time‟ and „space‟. The queerying practices described 
in this thesis put normalised queer spaces under scrutiny and investigate the 
possibilities of a spatial and temporal thinking that does not reiterate normalising 
procedures. In doing so, I attempt to articulate a conception of time and space that 
can accommodate continuous flows of „political and cultural change‟. This initially 
involves reviewing the construction of spatial and temporal interaction. 
Queer Identity Space 
So, why is the concept of space so important to queer theory? Michel Foucault 
establishes in „Of Other Spaces‟ that the conception of the human being, including 
knowledge, the psyche and its basic discursive classifications are spatial in Western 
culture (23). The spatialisation of knowledge appeared as one of the facets of the 
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constitution of knowledge as a science (Foucault, 1996b, 346).
2
 This infers that 
discourses of knowledge became categorised into specific scientific laws, 
mechanisms and groups and territorialised into defined areas of belonging. Fields of 
scientific knowledge are constructed through inclusion of certain concepts and 
exclusion of others (Foucault, 2002, 139). Such inclusive and exclusive 
classifications make up the foundational structure of identity formation in queer 
theory. Queer theorists like Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Nikki Sullivan and to some 
degree also Judith Halberstam continuously discuss who and what should be 
included or excluded under the umbrella of the queer and how to locate the various 
sexual- and gender subcategories. Identity for these authors is a matter of 
classification.
3
 They relate to sexual- and gender identities as areas of belonging; 
territories that are guarded by their inhabitants who are marked by certain identity 
traits. My thesis thus refers to the formation of queer identity in terms of „identity 
spaces‟. These are internalised sites of subjective self-definition and self-
categorisation, from which personal inclusion and exclusion of identifying 
experiences may take place. 
However, identity spaces are not limited to subjective categories. As Judith 
Halberstam recognises in In a Queer Time and Space, identities are also attached to 
specific social sites and discourses. As an example, she mentions that reproductive 
and biological discourses often have been excluded from queer domains because they 
are connected to „bourgeois rules of respectability‟ (5) and ideas of the 
heteronormative nuclear family (5). Certain specific sites, like the highway, the stage 
or the internet are considered to somehow represent queer identity,
4
 whereas others 
like the gender-specific communal bathrooms of many public places are spaces 
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connected to queer resistance.
5
 These queer spaces are points of shared experience 
that become linked to queer identity. They become channels through which queer 
concerns are communicated. 
Identity spaces are examples of what Foucault terms „heterotopias‟: they are 
sites of complex spatial and temporal juxtaposition (1986, 24). Heterotopias can take 
varied forms, but they have certain functions in common: they operate like hubs, 
linking „in a single real space several spaces‟ (Foucault, 1986, 25), and connecting 
seemingly disparate moments or „slices in time‟ (1986, 26). Halberstam notes that 
queer theory relates to past-time space in terms of shared narrative: there are certain 
critical queer „moments‟ and momentary spaces that are narrated in order to 
represent queer emergence (10-11).
6
 Foucault would refer to these as „crisis 
heterotopias‟: they are sites of shared memory, connected to specific subjective 
formations (1986, 24).  
Identity spaces are not formed merely on personal memories and shared 
moments, but also on historical narratives and events. Historical discourses are 
heterotopias or „heterochronies‟; accumulations of time that are connected to specific 
spaces, debates or periods (Foucault, 1986, 26). These spaces highlight the fact that 
heterotopias are exclusive and inclusive not merely in what is connected to them, but 
in who is allowed to enter: „To get in one must have a certain permission and make 
certain gestures‟ (Foucault, 1986, 5). As Sandy Stone argues in „The Empire Strikes 
Back – A Posttranssexual Manifesto‟, „“Making” history, whether autobiographic, 
academic, or clinical is partly a struggle to ground an account in some natural 
inevitability‟ (2006, 229). Historicist discourse does not merely choose the concepts 
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of historical interest, but the groups of people that it is of interest to. This is how 
historical narrative becomes identity narrative, and how historical periods or events 
take part in the emergence of identity spaces: historical formations become imbued 
with values that are part of specific identity discourses (Foucault, 1986, 26).
7
  
  My thesis considers several queer identity spaces that function as 
heterotopias. The first one is both temporally and spatially defined: it is located on 
the English stage during the reigns of Elizabeth I and James I. My first three chapters 
examine the ways in which queer historicist critics like Jonathan Goldberg, Valerie 
Traub and Dympna Callaghan use discourses of Renaissance gender and sexuality to 
articulate more general discussions on gender- and sexual identity (Goldberg, 1994; 
Traub, 1992b; Callaghan, 2000b). The English Renaissance, and especially the 
English Renaissance stage is portrayed as something resembling a queer utopia, 
where sexuality did not function as an identity category and gender was not a binary 
construction, but a fluid scale (Callaghan, 2000b, 27-48; Orgel, 1996, 18-30) .
8
 The 





 on the Renaissance stage and the „breeched 
heroines‟
11
 in William Shakespeare‟s Twelfth Night, As You Like It and The 
Merchant of Venice are portrayed as sites of gendered and sexual conflict.
12
 They are 
used as ideally queer platforms, through which academic discussions and identity 
formations may emerge.  
As my subsequent three chapters affirm, the idea of the modern 
transgendered body is also used as a queer identity space. Transgender characters in 
gender transgressive fiction and contemporary queer theory are depicted as figures of 




 Despite the fact that contemporary transgender discourse 
often poses itself against the gender deconstruction advocated in queer theory,
14
 
these figures become heralds of queerness. Critics of novelists such as Angela Carter 
and Jeanette Winterson use the authors‟ transgender characters as indicators of queer 
conceptual constructs.
15
 The transgender elements in these novels thus function as 
critical spaces devoted to queer agendas. 
Queer Historicism 
The thesis is conceptually divided into two parts: the first three chapters discuss 
formations of queer identity in Renaissance drama and the subsequent three chapters 
engage with late twentieth-century gender transgressive fiction. This historical 
juxtaposition is not unusual. Neither is it an arbitrary choice. Historicising practices 
and interpretations of the Renaissance have been connected to late twentieth-century 
formations of gender and sexuality in a number of works, by authors as diverse as 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Kate Chedgzoy, Carla Freccero, Marjorie Garber, 
Catherine Belsey, Thomas Laqueur, and to some degree also by Angela Carter.
16
 
What I establish here is not a new conception of the time periods nor the connection 
between them: it is a reconsideration of a continually reiterated and appropriated 
temporal juxtaposition.  
I investigate why twentieth-century critics of gender and sexuality are drawn 
to Renaissance drama and how this relationship is sustained. Kate Chedgzoy‟s 
Shakespeare’s Queer Children claims to celebrate „the pleasure and empowerment 
which the dispossessed and marginalised can derive from the appropriation of 
Shakespeare‟ (1995, 6). Among other texts, she refers to Angela Carter‟s Wise 
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Children, in which Shakespearean comedy provides an overt intertextual, although 
unpronounced format. Chedgzoy argues that social structure in Wise Children takes 
the form of a family romance,
17
 in which a highly performative modern theatrical 
world poses as Shakespearean drama‟s unrecognised child. This is further 
highlighted by the fact that the protagonist twins are the illegitimate daughters of a 
hailed Shakespearean actor (1995, 72). Chedgzoy‟s book attempts to strengthen the 
familial bond between modern culture and Renaissance drama, through adherence to 
a reiterated affirmative queerness (1995, 1-5). 
Catherine Belsey‟s Desire similarly argues that there are shared erotic 
patterns in pre-Enlightenment and postmodern narratives of desire (1994, 7-12). 
Belsey claims that her book establishes a sense of erotic continuity and shared trans-
historical experience (1994, 3).
 18
 Marjorie Garber also argues that Shakespearean 
comedy is frequently used to form historical bases for gender transgressive themes in 
fictional and non-fictional literary production. As Garber‟s Vested Interests outlines 
the function of transvestism in modern fiction, it continually refers to the breeched 
heroines in Twelfth Night and As You Like It as templates from which „the 
transvestite‟s progress‟ (1992, 67) originates. She acknowledges that the reference to 
these characters produces „ruminations on the questions of constructed and essential 
gender identity‟ (1992, 76) from which subsequent texts continually draw. The 
Shakespearean transvestite becomes a „reflecting mirror‟ (Garber, 1992, 76) that 
perpetuates a sense of origin and sameness. 
However, reflections refer to dissimilarity as well as similarity, and another 
stream of queer Renaissance criticism emphasises the difference between early 
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modern gender and sexuality and its modern equivalents. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
emphasises the impossibility of regarding Renaissance conceptions of gender and 
sexuality with anything resembling accuracy in Epistemology of the Closet. She 
argues that the very structure of these past concepts is so radically different that it is 
useless to refer to a Renaissance conception of queerness or transgender (1990, 90). 
Rather, Sedgwick dedicates herself to outlining the differences between past and 
present sexual and gender constructs (1990, 67-90).
19
 Thomas Laqueur‟s Making Sex 
similarly emphasises the conceptual chasm separating early modern and 
contemporary inter-relatedness of sex, gender and sexuality, although he argues that 
modern society should reconsider itself in relation to early modern examples (1990, 
69-70).  
Marjorie Garber acknowledges that these appropriations of queer 
Renaissance space take part in an identity „progress narrative‟ (1992, 70). 
Shakespeare‟s transvestite characters, the Elizabethan stage and early modern society 
are being „fetishized‟ for the purpose of a queer discursive formation (Garber, 1992, 
72). Garber does not present this as a problem and I do not think that it needs to be 
unless the relationship between past and present stagnates.  Jacques Rancière argues 
in The Names of History that history and historicising practices by their very nature 
function as a „founding narrative‟ (42). According to Rancière, historical analysis is a 
means of social empowerment: in a manner similar to the formation of 
commonwealth law, political agendas require historical precedent to gain authority; 
the choice of an historical event creates a foundation and establishes the agenda‟s 
particular interpretation of that event. This process conjures an illusion of both 
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historical and political truth, since the agenda and its founding event act as narrative 
bases for one another.
20
 
However, as William B. Turner acknowledges in A Genealogy of Queer 
Theory, the immediate problem with the queer historicist treatment of history is the 
fact that the founding narrative – the genealogy of queerness – undermines the basic 
tenets of queer methodology. The concept of a unified and linear history is one of 
queer theory‟s main areas of contestation (Turner, 2000, 24). The historicist queer 
critics passionately argue against the presence of binary constructs in Renaissance 
discourse, but their own historical approach is entirely binary. Whether the 
relationship between past and present is defined by similarity or difference, the queer 
Renaissance critics uphold a relationship between a knowable „now‟ and a desirable 
fetishised „then‟.  
The queer historicists primarily adhere to the new historicist school of 
criticism, which claims to move away from what they obscurely refer to as classical 
historicism.
21
 Although their analyses of the period factor in different social 
discourses, the underlying narrative construct is never reconsidered. Jonathan 
Goldberg‟s introduction to Queering the Renaissance summarises the entire 
traditional history of the Renaissance by referring to Jacob Burckhardt‟s 
interpretation of the period as the origin of Enlightenment consciousness and 
modernity; „a site for the creation of an “individual”‟ (1994, 1).
22
 Goldberg „contests‟ 
the conclusion of this thesis as a celebration of Burckhardt‟s nineteenth-century 
individualism, but he does not linger on the historicist methodology entailed in its 
formation (1994, 1). 
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There is more than one traditional historicist methodology. Elizabeth Grosz‟s 
The Nick of Time refers to classical readings of history by listing three stages 
extracted from Friedrich Nietzsche‟s „On the Utility and Liability of History for 
Life‟. There is „Monumental History‟, which is „composed of the images and stories 
of individual great men and noble singular deeds, those that stand out from the 
mediocrity and pettiness of everyday life‟ (2004, 120). This type of history is 
invoked in the historicising practices that overtly aim to bind the present to past 
glories in order to shed light on contemporary issues and to elevate contemporary 
practices. Grosz argues that Nietzsche‟s second type of history, the „Antiquarian 
History‟, consciously diverges from the self-sufficient focus on the present in 
„Monumental History‟ and thus emphasises „a respect and reverence for the past‟ 
(2004, 121). Relics from previous times become infinitely precious and the past is 
portrayed as a thoroughly inimitable and radically other treasure-trove of virtue. The 
third stage of history is a „Critical History‟ that „doesn‟t simply revere the past and 
memorialize its greatest figures, objects and events, but that distances and dissolves 
the forces of the past in order to enable their reconfiguration in action in the present‟ 
(Grosz, 2004, 122). This final type of history is the basis for historicising practices in 
academia. It distinguishes and measures past power struggles, suffering and injustice, 
in order to transform these into cautionary lessons for a more „developed‟ present 
society. 
 The queer formations of the English Renaissance retain dogmatic and 
nostalgic ideas from all three of Nietzsche‟s classical histories. The Renaissance is 
hailed for its glorious queerness. Goldberg argues that the queer readings are more 
authentic or „reverent‟ than Burckhardt‟s. Laqueur suggests that modern society 
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should learn from the gender constructs of the past. The „Monumental‟ Renaissance 
transvestites become heroic figures that serve as templates for exemplary queerness 
and their social interactions and power struggles are carefully measured in order to 
develop an exemplary queer modern society. 
Grosz sustains that all three classical historicising practices develop a skewed 
idea of being and time. She agrees with Nietzsche that history‟s development into a 
scholarly discipline has severed the ties between the past and the present (2004, 123). 
This division is acutely present in the new historicist construction of the queer 
Renaissance.
23
 The past is perceived as an object of study, a model of a queer gender 
formation, a conceptual origin – a safely consistent, although ultimately unknowable 
construct to be considered from the continually developing present. The past is 
presented as simulacra – sets of texts or memories – whereas the present is real. The 
events of the past fit into the construction of this present, but they never truly become 
an integral part of it. They are not allowed to generate and expand with it.  
Trans(ient) Time and Identity Spatiality 
Foucault notes in „Of Other Spaces‟ that contemporary theory has sometimes 
mistakenly been thought to entail a denial of the inherent inclusion of time within the 
notion of space. He strongly argues against this interpretation: critical theory does 
not attempt to detach space from time, but it involves „a certain manner of dealing 
with what we call time and what we call history‟ (1986, 22, my emphasis). Foucault 
argues that a space-time continuum is presupposed in the Western conception of 
reality and Western discursive practices: „space itself has a history in Western 
experience, and it is not possible to disregard the fatal intersection of time with 
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space‟ (1986, 22). Space as it is conceived in Western thought is necessarily 
temporal (Foucault, 1986, 22). Elizabeth Grosz makes a similar argument in The 
Nick of Time. However, she establishes that the conception of time as an individual 
axis in a four-dimensional conception of reality is misleading. Time is a part of the 
spatial construct, but it is not an arrow pointing in a separate direction from space 
(2004, 4-5).  
 The Nick of Time does not attempt to solve the question of what time actually 
is. Grosz argues that the conception of time is an ancient mystery: „perhaps the most 
enigmatic, the most paradoxical, elusive and “unreal” of any form of material 
existence‟ (2004, 4).
24
 Instead, she investigates the possibilities of an empowering 
conception of time and she starts with the body and the body‟s temporal 
development: „We will not be able to understand its experimental nature unless we 
link subjectivity and the body directly to temporal immersion‟ (2004, 5). Her study 
thus becomes an exploration of „the ontology of time, duration, or becoming, the 
ontological implications for living beings of their immersion in the always forward 
movement of time‟ (2004, 4). It is the continually shaped and reshaped experience of 
being in time.  
 Similarly to this, Rita Felski‟s Doing Time refers to an idea of being sexed 
and gendered in time. Sex and gender imply certain biological and social 
imperatives, which are not unconnected, but function or interact on multiple temporal 
planes simultaneously (2000, 17). A gendered and sexed temporality like this is not 
necessarily debilitating. The biological constructs are not fields of stagnant or 
normative routine. Elizabeth Grosz argues that the „biological organisation‟ of life 
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opens up continual possibilities of change and multi-dimensionality both on an 
individual and a cultural level (2004, 1). Judith Halberstam notes that one of the 
queerest constructs in life is the „middle-class logic of reproductive temporality‟ 
(2005, 4). Grosz also notes the normalising nature of this logic and its potential for 
„queering‟: reproduction is the result of connection, immersion and transformation of 
the flesh. Darwinian evolutionary theory shows that the main advantage of the 
reproductive function is that it opens up the possibility of mutations and infinite new 
physical formations (Grosz, 2004, 7-8).  
This corporeal being in time is not measurable through a single linear 
narrative construct. It functions on multiple continually transforming planes 
simultaneously. This poses a pivotal question: how can a sustainable, yet 
conceptually delimiting reading of history be developed from such a multi-layered 
time? Elizabeth Grosz argues that history can be outlined through the transient 
although disruptive means of „the untimely‟ (2004, 113): the ruptures in the forwards 
movement of time – what she calls the „nicks‟ of time (2004, 5). These are the 
distinguishable moments, spaces, repetitions and events that form the connectivity of 
time. Rita Felski refers to the historical narrative they produce as a transient 
synchronous nonsynchronicity (2000, 23). It is a nomadic narrative, continually 
connecting inter-temporal spaces and bodies.  
Adopting this type of historical narration, my thesis holds on to the idea that 
the Shakespearean transvestites and transgender characters in general may be 
empowering and enabling literary constructs, despite the territorial treatments of 
transgender empowerment mentioned above.
25
 As Marjorie Garber shows in Vested 
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Interests, certain transgender characters have become „untimely‟ events: they are not 
presented as bodies, but as „cultural symptoms‟ (Garber, 1992, 70); they can be seen 
as operating like Foucauldian heterotopias, ruptures in space and time.
26
 In response 
to this abstraction of the transgender concept, Jean Baudrillard states that „we are all 
agnostics, transvestites of art or sex‟ (2002, 22). Rita Felski argues that „[t]his 
elevation of transsexual to a universal metaphor has a provocative force. It seeks to 
challenge our conventional distinctions between male and female, normal and 
deviant, real and fake‟ (2000, 149). 
However, Felski notes that although we may all be transsexuals in an abstract 
sense, „we certainly don‟t all feel transsexual‟ (2000, 149). The transgender space 
engenders intense negotiations between the value of historical and cultural 
connection and the necessary specificity of corporeal and cultural experience. This 
does not necessarily undermine the connectivity of the construct, but rather 
strengthens it.  The transgender body becomes a central link in the multiplying 
dimensions of sexual and gender identity construction, social connectivity and inter-
temporal juxtaposition. As such it produces spaces of cultural and political change, 
along with cultural and political connection and creation.  
A space such as the transgender body may thus be considered as more than 
just an identity space: it is a function that enables connective identity spatiality. 
Foucault argues that „our epoch is one in which space takes for us the form of 
relations among sites‟ (1986, 23). Foucault‟s heterotopias are thus constituted more 
like connective complexes than specific spaces: „we live inside a set of relations that 
delineates sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not 
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superimposable on one another‟ (1986, 23). These complexes are crucial, however, 
in the communicability of any type of identification. Foucault argues that they can be 
defined via the various functions they perform and the „cluster of relations‟ that are 
carried through them (1986, 23-24). The multitude of identity spaces that are 
conceived and re-conceived through the transgender body furnish it with a continual 
flux of connotations and locations. This site is not identifiable by a point in space, 
but by its formation of spatiality. 
 
In its discussion of transgender spatiality, the thesis engages with gender and 
sexuality in relation to transgender discourse. For clarification, I thus include a list of 
technical terminology below.  
Sexual Categories27 
Sex: („female‟ or „male‟) is a person‟s physical sexual markers. It refers to biological 
factors, such as genitalia, chromosomes, and sexual hormones (OED, „sex n
1
‟). 
Gender: („feminine‟ or „masculine‟) is also known as social- or cultural sex. It 
signifies the role a person takes on in society, or the sex a person is considered to be 
by his/her surroundings (OED, „gender‟). This construct is often divided into five 
subcategories: 
Gender Assignment: The gender a person is legally assigned (Whittle,  
2000, 7) 
Gender Role: The gender a person is culturally assigned (Whittle, 2000, 7) 
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Gender Identity: Infers a person‟s self identified gender (Whittle, 2000, 7) 
Gender Expression: A person‟s means to express a particular gender, for 
example through clothes, body language, make-up and  hair-dos (Lund, „Ord 
& Uttryck‟). 
Gender Attribution: Other people‟s gendering reactions to the person‟s 
over-all gender performance (Whittle, 2000, 7) 
Sexuality: Infers which sex a person gets sexually aroused by, whether a person is 
homo-, bi-, hetero- or (other)sexual (OED, „sexuality‟). Sexual orientation may be 
determined based either on the biological sex, the gender identity or the gender role 
of a person (Lund, „Ord & Uttryck‟; Whittle, 2000, 18-19). 
Transgender Identities 
Transperson, TP: an umbrella concept, which usually refers to individuals whose 
gender identities and/or gender expressions at times, or as a rule, differ from the 
norms of the sex they were registered as at birth (Lund, „Ord & Uttryck‟). 
FTM: a Female-To-Male transgender person. The first letter refers to the 
person‟s biological sex, and the second letter denotes direction, or the sex 
he/she identifies with (Whittle, 2000, 21). 
MTF: a Male-To-Female transgender person. The first letter refers to the 
person‟s biological sex, and the second letter denotes direction, or the sex 
he/she identifies with (Whittle, 2000, 21). 
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Transsexual, TS: A person who experiences him/herself to belong to the sex 
“opposite” to his/her biological sex. TS can both be a medical diagnosis and a 
personal identity (Whittle, 2000, 11). 
Transvestite, TV: a person who more or less often, completely or partially dresses 
in the attires, and takes on the gender role of the „opposite sex‟ for the sake of his/her 
own well-being and/or for sexual pleasure (Whittle, 2000, 16-17).   
Transgenderist/Transgender, TG: a person who more or less constantly lives in 
the gender role of the opposite sex, but chooses not to change his/her body surgically 
and/or hormonally. Alternatively, a transgenderist may be a person who identifies 
with the opposite sex, but chooses not to let this identity manifest in his/her 
appearance or behaviour (Lund, „Ord & Uttryck‟; Whittle, 2000, 15). 
Intersex, IS: Person who is born with atypical sex organs, which means that it was 
impossible to definitely determine the person‟s biological sex at birth. IS is a medical 
diagnosis (Whittle, 2000, 17-18). 
Intergender, IG: Person who defines him/herself as being in between, or beyond the 
traditional genders or chooses not to define their gender identity at all. IG is a gender 
identity (Lund, „Ord & Uttryck‟). 
Other Gendered Identities 
Dragqueen, DQ: a man (often a gay man) who plays with the male gender 
expression, on stage or in order to rouse attention. DQ is usually not an identity, but a 
performance (Lund, „Ord & Uttryck‟). 
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Dragking, DK: a woman (often a lesbian) who plays with the male gender 
expression, on stage or in order to rouse attention. DK is usually not an identity, but a 
performance (Lund, „Ord & Uttryck‟). 
Androgyne: a person with a gender neutral exterior (Lund, „Ord & Uttryck‟). 
Bigender, BG: a person who identifies both as a man and a woman (Lund, „Ord & 
Uttryck‟). 
Cross dresser, CD: a person who dresses in the clothes of the opposite sex, 
regardless of reason (Lund, „Ord & Uttryck‟). 
Femme: a lesbian with a feminine gender role/identity (Lund, „Ord & Uttryck‟). 
Butch: a lesbian with a masculine gender role/identity (Lund, „Ord & Uttryck‟). 
Stone Butch: a lesbian who exclusively takes on a masculine role socially and in her 




Sellberg    20 
 
[CHAPTER 1] Historicising New Historicism: The ‘new’-ness 
of Renaissance Sexualities and Genders 
 
In my attempt to outline the ways that gender studies and queer theory  narrativise 
themselves historically, I have chosen to turn to 1980s and 1990s literary criticism of 
English Renaissance drama. Late twentieth-century historical criticism is dominated 
by Stephen Greenblatt‟s project new historicism and its twin movement cultural 
materialism,
1
 both of which engage overtly with a range of critical theory and 
contemporary cultural studies and a large amount of this work is dedicated to queer 
ideas and the history of sexuality and gender.
 2
 Interestingly, a large amount of new 
historicist and cultural materialist material focus on the English Renaissance, and 
more often than not the 1980s and early 1990s criticism engages with the drama of 
the period.
3
 They thus form unusually localised and temporally limited critical 
practices. Also, the critics engaging with the new historicism belong to a select group 
that continually react to and interact with the other members‟ texts.
4
  
The gender related new historicist criticism forms an even more limited field, 
where a disproportionate amount of texts make theoretical responses to 
Shakespeare‟s Twelfth Night, As You Like It and The Merchant of Venice.
5
 Thomas 
Healy notes in his book on Renaissance criticism, New Latitudes, that despite the fact 
that new historicism emphasises diversity,
6
 it „has so far produced critical analysis 
[sic] of texts which tend to be recognisably similar to one another‟ (68). This chapter 
will show that the new historicist idea of English Renaissance sexuality and gender 
formation can easily be read as a mutually narrated, theoretically imbued historical 
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construction; a collective fantasy, shared by a select group of keen feminist and 
queer literary critics. 
Claire Colebrook suggests in New Literary Histories that new historicism‟s 
particular and sustained preoccupation with the English Renaissance lands it in such 
a limited scope of time and space that it becomes oddly binary in its relational 
capacity (2). As Jonathan Goldberg states in his introduction to Queering the 
Renaissance, traditional scholarship has invested a certain amount of faith in the idea 
that the Renaissance is the cradle of modernity (1). Whereas the new historicists 
attempt to substantiate or refute this claim, the constantly reiterated relationship 
remains interestingly solid.
7
 This fact evokes a number of intriguing queries. What is 
the function of new historicist criticism? Is modernity here attempting to „find itself‟, 
by relational analyses of its perceived origins? A simple psycho-analytic reading of 
the situation raises the question: does the Renaissance dominate the new historicist 




One of the main concerns in the new historicist texts on historical gender and 
sexuality is the development of the terms, and the difference between their usage in 
early modern English and contemporary English. Initially, I will thus provide a short 
etymological summary of the general new historicist and contemporary 
interpretations of early modern sexuality and gender.  
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Sexuality, as a term and a concept, was according to the Oxford English Dictionary 
not in common English use until the mid-nineteenth century (OED, „sexuality‟). The 
adjective „sexual‟ was in the early modern English of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries either used to connote something relating to the reproductive organs, or 
something related to or predicated on the biological sexes. It could also refer to the 
social and cultural relations between the sexes or to something particular to the 
female sex – something remarkably feminine (OED, „sexual‟). Similarly, „sex‟ in its 
noun form was not a term used in relation to what would be considered sexual 
interaction in contemporary discourse, but generally connoted biological sex, gender 
or genitalia (OED, ‟sex n
1
‟). The noun „sex‟ was also used in an entirely non-
gendered capacity, to signify a class or a kind, primarily of people (OED, „sex n
2
‟). 
On these grounds, Ian Maclean argues in The Renaissance Notion of Woman, that sex 
was a less erotically charged term in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England (2). 
It was a linguistic device used as a means of division; a measurement of polarity, not 
so much in terms of innate desires or desiring personalities as in the determination of 
physical differences and determining behaviours (Maclean, 2-3). 
 It is important to note that, despite the fact that the term for sexuality and the 
idea of sexual tendencies did not exist in early modern English, there were terms 
similar to contemporary conceptions of sexual personas in circulation in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries and these were used in adjectival forms to describe sexual 
interaction and relationships. There were a number of expressions for men who took 
part in certain sexual acts with other men: „sodomite‟, „pederast‟, „buggerer‟ and 
„catamite‟ are only a few of them (OED). There were also terms for women who 
took part in sexual intercourse with other women, such as „virago‟ or „tribade‟ (Park, 
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1997, 184-187; Traub, 1991, 66-67). However, these terms, with the exception of 
„virago‟, usually signify the specific actions the person in question takes part in, 
rather than some form of innate desire or manifested persona (Park, 1997, 184-187). 
„Sodomy‟ and „buggery‟, for example, did most often refer to sexual acts between 
two men (OED, „sodomy‟; „buggery‟), but it could also be used to describe other 
socially unacceptable forms of sexual intercourse. Such acts included anal sex 
between a man and a woman; penetrative sex between two women; sexual 
interaction between a man and a child; or sexual abuse of an animal. Legally, it 
merely signified an „unnatural‟ sexual act (Foucault, 1978, 37-39; Goldberg, 1992, 
122). Sexual personas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are expressed rather 




Gender, similarly to sexuality, did not possess the same connotations in sixteenth 
and seventeenth-century English as it does in modern usages. Whereas since the mid-
twentieth century it may be used as a form of mental identification or group 
expression of femininity and/or masculinity, in early modern English the term 
generally referred to a type or a class (OED, „gender‟).
10
 The word was also, as in 
modern linguistic discourse and a number of European languages, often used in 
reference to grammatical groups or divisions. These are sometimes separations into 
masculine and feminine „genders‟, but many languages also have a neutral gender or 
a different set of classifications, such as animate and inanimate „genders‟.
11
 The early 
modern term „gender‟ is also used synonymously with biological sex, as an 
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indication of physical differentiation (OED, „gender‟). It was thus inherently linked 
with particularly sexed connotations and sexually classified acts and attributes.  
 The terms „feminine‟ and „masculine‟ were used synonymously with „female‟ 
and „male‟ both in reference to biological features, in terms of belonging to one sex 
or the other, and as terms that signified gendered appearance and character traits 
(OED, „feminine‟; „masculine‟; „female‟; „male‟). Linguistically, the „gendered‟ and 
the „sexed‟ is thus less strictly defined in early modern English than in contemporary 
English.
12
 However, the definition between gendered and the non-gendered is also 
less strict. Variations of the terms „feminine‟ and „masculine‟ can be found in a 
number of grammatical, linguistic and classifying examples, which are often more or 
less gendered, but not always primarily so. For example, „effeminacy‟ and 
„masculinity‟ most obviously signify traits belonging to women or men, respectively, 
but could also refer to concepts that are culturally attributed to the masculine or the 
feminine, like strength, sensitivity, beauty, sense or any other quality that carries 
even remotely gendered connotations (OED, „effeminacy‟; „masculinity‟).
13
 There is 
a great amount of critical disagreement and debate over how far the Renaissance 
borders between masculinity and femininity could stretch. Some scholars, like 
Stephen Greenblatt, Stephen Orgel and Thomas Laqueur suggest that the limits were 
malleable and that the gender contingency rested on a continually shifting sliding 
scale.
14
 What the connotations of femininity and masculinity actually were is 
unresolved, although  most scholars agree on a lack of clarity,
15
 and the term 
„unclear‟ is perhaps the best description of Renaissance gender available, considering 
that the debate is present not only among the scholars of early modern gender, but 
also within the textual remains of early modern society itself.
16
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The new historicist gender debate recognises that it is useless to speculate on what 
terms and expressions actually stood for and how their connotations actually 
functioned in a society of the past.
17
 There are, however, examples of how certain 
words and phrases quite obviously operated differently to their modern usage and it 
is this concept of difference that becomes the starting point of the project of new 
historicism. In the introduction to Shakespearean Negotiations, Stephen Greenblatt 
expresses a wish to delve into the „textual traces‟ (1) of an older society found in 
Renaissance texts and to let the long departed voices „make themselves heard 
through the voices of the living‟ (1). It is the apparent difference between these 
voices that give such an act power, „for simulations are undertaken in full awareness 
of the absence of the life they contrive to represent, and hence they may skilfully 
anticipate and compensate for the vanishing of the actual life that has empowered 
them‟ (Greenblatt, 1988, 1). 
The Project of New Historicism 
Catherine Gallagher states in „Marxism and the new historicism‟ that  
Although there has been a certain amount of controversy over just 
what the new historicism is, what constitutes its essence and what 
its accidents, most of its adherents and opponents would agree that 
it entails reading literary and non-literary texts as constituents of 
historical discourses that are both inside and outside of texts and 
that its practitioners generally posit no fixed hierarchy of cause and 
effect as they trace the connections among texts, discourses, power, 
and the constitution of subjectivity (37). 
This attempt to define the project of new historicism, outlines what its practitioners 
are trying to do, but not what it is, how it identifies itself, or where it positions its 
methodology. In a later volume Gallagher and Greenblatt argue that „new historicism 
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is not a repeatable methodology or a literary critical program‟ (2000, 19) inferring 
that it exceeds these terms and conceptions. Greenblatt claims that the main problem 
of previous historical scholarship is that its methodology is „endlessly repeated‟ 
(1988, 3) and thus „repeatedly fails for one reason: there is no escape from 
contingency‟ (1988, 3). New historicism, according to Greenblatt and Gallagher, has 
no hidden agenda, and „because of this very lack of a given set of objects, new 
historicism becomes a history of possibilities‟ (2000, 16). The authors show a fairly 
obvious agenda within these short passages, however: that is, the arduously upheld 
attempt to remain outside of any defining methodologies or agendas. Indeed, new 
historicism has a deeply localised sense of procedure, which as its name suggests, is 
part of a particular time and place in the history of literary criticism. 
The term „new historicism‟ implies a situatedness within a tradition of 
historicising criticism. In order to identify a new historicism, there must be a clear 
pre-existing conception of a more traditional „old‟ historicism, to contest or depart 
from.
18
 There are also particular connotations to the declaration of a „new‟ „–ism‟: it 
has become a trope within twentieth-century academic discourse,
19
 thus inferring a 
number of pre-conceived expectations as to its objectives and intents. In order to 
comprehensively outline the ideas behind new historicism, the project needs to be 
critically historicised.  
In his introduction to The Power of Forms in the English Renaissance, a 
collection of late twentieth-century Renaissance criticism, Stephen Greenblatt 
identifies previous twentieth-century lines of thought in Renaissance criticism in 
terms of two opposing critical schools (1982). Twentieth-century criticism in general 
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departs from the ideas of critical thought decreed by Coleridge, Shelley and Arnold, 
where the creative power of the author and an insight into his creative mind is the 
ultimate objective. The first of the newer lines of thought is the movement of new 
criticism, which argues in accordance with the emerging structuralist conceptions, 
that a text should be studied closely and exclusively as an autonomous whole. 
Criticism should involve a practice of stylistic analysis and close reading of structure 
and symbolic discourse. Form is synonymous with meaning, and thus any additional 
interaction is superfluous. The other school Greenblatt refers to, the „earlier 
historicism‟ (Greenblatt, 1982, 2253)  reacts to the overly simplistic readings 
produced by new criticism and offers a more historio-linguistic attempt to read 
Renaissance literature in terms of arduously calculated and contrived historical 
reconstructions. The text is still a discursively determined concept, but language is 
dependent on the dominant social discourses of the historical period. Greenblatt 
establishes that the „earlier historicism‟ „tends to be monological; that is, it is 
concerned with discovering a single political vision, usually identical to that said to 
be held by the entire literate class or indeed the entire population‟ (1982, 2253)  Both 
new criticism and „earlier historicism‟ read literary material as fixed coherent units. 
They do not allow for opposing discourses and historical inconsistency. 
Both new criticism and „earlier historicism‟ share one important feature with 
new historicism: they overtly draw criticism away from a historical author-intent 
level to a discursive level. They ultimately fail, however, because they consider text 
and language to be unified structures, and as later post-structuralist thinkers such as 
Saussure, Derrida, Barthes, Lacan and Foucault have established, language can never 
be truly homogenous. The new critics attempt to produce conclusive readings of their 
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texts, but once the texts become seen as merely „texts‟ or segments of language, they 
are inevitably fluid concepts, prone to invite myriad readings and interpretations. The 
new critics‟ intent is to unify, but their method leads to disarray. Also the more 
historically concerned critics of the early twentieth century often relate to discourse 
in terms of coherence and fixity. History here presents a field of establishable facts 
and the critics‟ mission is to find them.  
According to Greenblatt, the concerns arising from the methodology of 
previous criticism signifies a need for a school of criticism that does not require unity 
or conclusive evidence (1982, 2253-2254). Similarly, Thomas Healy claims that the 
project of new historicism in Renaissance scholarship arose from an increasing 
awareness of the difficulty in conclusively explaining, or „accessing‟ the period 
through any specific selection of cultural artefacts: „The idea that the Renaissance 
could be named, classified, described, and interpreted so that it was rendered readily 
comprehensible within some generalised scheme of the humanities was no longer a 
clearly defined process‟ (1992, 62). New historicism thus emerged as an attempt to 
access the cultural discourses of the past, or „speak with the dead‟ (Greenblatt, 1988, 
1) as Greenblatt conceives of it, in a way that fully engages with the fragmented 
nature of its voices, emphasising that „no discourse gives access to unchanging truth‟ 
(Healy, 1992, 66). Unlike earlier critical schools, new historicism is „less concerned 
to establish the organic unity of literary works‟ (Greenblatt, 1982, 2254) and is thus 
not obstructed by the discursive incongruities either of historical texts or textual 
scholarship. Rather, according to Greenblatt, new historicism is „open to such works 
as fields of force, places of dissension and shifting interests, occasions for the 
jostling of orthodox and subversive impulses‟ (Greenblatt, 1982, 2254). The spaces 
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of historical incongruity and discursive inconclusiveness comprise the areas in which 
most new historicist criticism finds an interest.  
 In a move away from earlier historical scholarship, the new historicists 
attempt to read canonised historical material in new ways or ideas of a certain period 
through forgotten sources, because as Greenblatt claims: „the normal is constructed 
on the shifting sands of the aberrant‟ (1988, 86). New historicism, as a methodology, 
turns its back on previous historical methodologies and areas of interest and forms 
new ideas of development and periodicity, new terms of value, and new connections 
between textual sources, previously unthought-of. The „new‟ in new historicism thus 
signifies a rejection of earlier historical thought, placing it in opposition to „normal‟ 
scholarship, in favour of the scholarly „aberrant‟. This act of opposition is not merely 
a methodological swerve. The declaration of a „new‟ „-ism‟, echoes new criticism‟s 
affirmation of a new paradigm within critical scholarship.
20
 It is a political and 
philosophical statement. Louis Montrose‟s and Stephen Greenblatt‟s early texts 
function much like new historicist manifestos.
21
 Although Greenblatt at one point 
claims that the project adheres to „no doctrine at all‟ (1989, 1), most practitioners 
engage with poststructuralist and critical theory. 
22
 This is evidenced in the degree 
that compilations like Kiernan Ryan‟s New Historicism and Cultural Materialism – 
A Reader conditions its content according to it. Ryan‟s reader includes an 
introductory section entitled „sources‟, with extracts from the major theoretical 
writers influencing its content (1996). 
The „new‟ „-ism‟ trope utilised by new historicism also signifies a conception 
of rebirth. It is a new way of conceptualising poststructuralist ideas that allows for 
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historical perspectives. Claire Colebrook argues in New Literary Histories that „it is 
almost a commonplace that post-structuralism was a form of ahistoricism, and that 
new historicism marked something like a “return” to history‟ (1). This new historical 
thinking was to be a more „enlightened‟ reformation of historical thinking: a form 
that heeds the poststructuralist lessons concerning the inevitable discrepancies of 
cross-cultural discourse, without falling prey to its relativism. The post-structural 
element of new historicism often takes the expression of „awareness‟. Louis 
Montrose describes it as „a reciprocal concern with the historicity of texts and the 
textuality of history‟ (20).
23
 The „historicity of texts‟ denotes an awareness of the 
social specificity of all writing, and the „textuality of history‟ suggests a recognition 
„that we can have no access to a full and authentic past, a lived material existence, 
unmediated by the surviving textual traces of the society in question‟ (20).  
The dual concern of new historicism within literary studies positions it on the 
one hand as a branch of historical criticism and on the other as a product of its post-
structural reformation. This is a problematic position. Montrose acknowledges that 
an „enlightened‟ post-poststructuralist history should recognise that the „textual 
traces are themselves subject to subsequent textual mediations when they are 
construed as the “documents” upon which historians ground their own texts, called 
histories‟ (20, original emphasis). Whereas new historicism endeavours to consider 
the social forces at work in the formation of each historical document in its embrace, 
it fails to engage with the social forces directing its own formation. As Claire 
Colebrook acknowledges, the post-structural relativism threatening the basis of new 
historicist work is rather overridden than overcome and the problems concerning 
historicism presented by the post-structural theorists are not removed: they are 
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merely renamed and relocated. Colebrook states that „Not only does new historicism 
itself draw upon the work of Lacan, Derrida, Foucault and the broad range of post-
structuralist thought, the questions raised by the problem of historicism have 
intensified rather than been resolved‟ (1997, 1). The fact that new historicism 
outlines discrepancies, but makes no serious attempt to offer viable remedies, makes 
its discursive grounds even less stable than its predecessors within historical 
scholarship (Colebrook, 1997, 1-2). Similarly to Colebrook, Thomas Healy, Scott 
Wilson and Richard Strier acknowledge in their respective analyses of new 
historicism that the legacy to post-structural theory of history present in new 
historicist conceptions of textuality and historicity turns the movement against itself 
(Healy, 1992, 68-69; Wilson, 1995, 54-56; Strier, 1995, 68-69). Both Montrose and 
Greenblatt claim that they are aware of this fact (Montrose, 1989, 20; Greenblatt, 
1980, 4-5; Greenblatt, 1982, 2254)
 24
, but as Healy establishes: 
Although, claiming that they bring attention to their own 
historicity, New Historicists are reluctant to map out what that 
historicity is. In other words, the type of critical and political self-
analysis which New Historicists claim to be aware of is 
insufficiently foregrounded when reading a Renaissance text (1992, 
68). 
Stephen Greenblatt claims that new historicism „erodes the firm ground of 
both criticism and literature‟ (1982, 2254). He argues that its theoretical grounding 
encourages it „to ask questions about its own methodological assumptions and those 
of others‟ (1982, 2254). The problem is that it only works as long as it remains in the 
„eroding‟ or „asking‟ position. When new historicism becomes problematised and 
questioned by its own standards, it does not stand up to the test. As Thomas Healy 
notes in New Latitudes, „if Greenblatt recognises that he believes “literature 
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professors are salaried middle-class shamans” he is reluctant to confront his position 
as shaman‟ (Healy, 69; Greenblatt, 1988, 1).
25
 The tenets of new historicism cannot 
be reconciled with the project‟s own position in critical scholarship. New historicism 
is not an oppositional, „aberrant‟ or reactionary school of thought. Greenblatt himself 
is one of the most influential middle-class shamans in the Anglo-American academic 
community. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s new historicism became an established 
norm, with a place on most major university curriculums involving historical literary 
criticism, multiple entries in the prolific critical anthologies, and a number of readers 
and „how-to‟ dedicated specifically to its methodologies.
26
 Although new historicism 
rejects the idea of critical canonicity, textual and historical unity and the adherence to 
an absolute historical truth, it happily harbours an idea of critical superiority, it forms 
coherent arguments out of historical disarray and it merely half-conceals an 
aspiration to get closer to a „true‟ reality. In the introduction to The Power of Forms, 
Greenblatt states that his methodology will produce a more genuine idea of the social 
and political climate behind Shakespeare‟s drama than the earlier critics have 
managed to provide (1982, 2253). Like new criticism, new historicism claims to get 
closer to some Platonic ideal or structure of reality, but in this case the ideal is a 
vision of a theoretically enforced structure of discursive power struggles. These 
power struggles, however, as Greenblatt himself notes (1982, 1988), cannot be 
captured or envisioned. When he argues that he enters the textual incongruities; the 
battlefields of historical discourse, in order „to speak with the dead‟ (1988, 1), he 
reinforces the fantasy of unity and coherence that assumes that the dead are available 
to take part even in a reconstructed capacity in such communication. Although he 
acknowledges that „[i]t was true that I could only hear my own voice‟ (1988, 1), he 
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contrives an idea of post-mortem articulation: „Many of the traces have little 
resonance, though every one, even the most trivial or tedious, contains some 
fragment of lost life; others seem uncannily full of the will to be heard‟ (1988, 1). 
New historicism as a practice thus fails to correspond with its theoretical 
grounding in several respects. The methodologies of new historicism inherently refer 
to two major theoretical stances: firstly the Foucauldian notion that the subjects and 
documents of a society should be read through social forces at play within its 
paradigmal framework; secondly the Lacanian idea that this framework can be 
accessed, and more importantly assessed through the interpretation of discursive 
difference.
27
 Foucault and Lacan both focus on the subject‟s act of historicising 
itself, or conceptualising itself in terms of language, when forming an idea of 
identity, but they do so in radically different manners. Foucault discusses social 
discourses and subject referentiality from a materialist perspective, whereas Lacan 
analyses the subject‟s entry into discourse from a psychoanalytic point of view. They 
both use the terms „subject‟ and „discourse‟, but these terms have radically different 
connotations in Marxist and psychoanalytic theory. Claire Colebrook establishes in 
New Literary Histories that for this reason the amalgamation of psychoanalytic and 
Marxist stances are deeply problematic. Foucault regards psychoanalysis as „an 
institution which produced sexual subjects as objects of knowledge and 
normalisation‟ (1997, 175). The „desiring subject‟ as a primal essence is according to 
Foucault an internalised fantasy. The only way to fit a psychoanalytic perspective 
into a Foucauldian reading is to regard psychoanalysis as a type of textual 
production. Psychoanalysis then becomes a form of discursive domain, under the rule 
of which the subjects relate to one another, invest and position themselves in an 
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economy of desire. This idea goes against the idea of the psychoanalytical subject, 
however. „Any description of the subject as a type of thing, with representable 
interests and motives or patterns of behaviour (such as the anthropological account of 
human life) is a misrecognition. Subjectivity can never be recognised in a system or 
order, because the subject always posits itself as an excess of any represented 
system‟ (Colebrook, 1997, 178). 
The development of Foucauldian desiring subjects and Lacanian economies 
of desire are nevertheless commonplace in new historicist as well as cultural 
materialist criticism. The juxtaposition is seldom problematised or even extrapolated 
upon. It has become a normalised part of the methodology. Often, the theoretical 
lines are not even separated in the historical and critical analysis. For the sake of 
clarification, however, this chapter will consequently outline the particularly 
Foucauldian, Derridean and Lacanian ideas in circulation in new historicist gender-
oriented criticism in two different sections and offer examples of the connotations 
produced by their usages. 
Gender and Difference 
New historicism establishes that history is textually determined, but it also concludes 
that the historian needs to consider the text beyond its textual limits. Greenblatt 
complains that the closed textual system of new criticism reduces historical texts to 
linguistic markers. Its formalist approach is attempting to impose unity where there 
should or could be none. Claire Colebrook acknowledges that Jacques Derrida argues 
in Writing and Difference that structuralism suffers from the fact that it conceives of 
language in terms of unity (1997, 222-223). If there is nothing „outside‟ of language, 
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there can be no conception of the „structurality of structure‟ (Derrida, 1978, 352). 
Without some form of exterior viewpoint, there would be no possibility for the 
formation of language, and certainly not of a school like structuralism, which 
establishes its methodology on reading into the structure of language. Structuralism‟s 
focus on unity leads it into a structural tautolgy.  
In adherence to the structuralist linguistic theory of Ferdinand de Saussure, 
Derrida acknowledges that the sign is made up of a function both as „signified‟ and 
„signifier‟; it alludes both to an ideal meaning and to a physical – acoustic or textual 
– manifestation. Also in accordance with Saussure, Derrida states that the totality of 
the sign, as „signified‟ and „signifier‟, is involved in differential signification; in an 
always already present „play of differences‟ (Derrida, 1996, 30), which creates 
meaning. Derrida refers to this game as différance. It is an a priori mode of 
becoming, necessary for any production of signification. As the origin of differences, 
however, the concept of différance seemingly eludes the productive game of 
difference. It is not a concept that comes before language, since such an idea is not 
possible according to linguistic theory, yet it is the agent of language production. It is 
the cause of signification, but also itself an effect without cause, which Derrida 
acknowledges is no effect at all. He states: „I have attempted to indicate a way out of 
the closure of this framework via the “trace” which is no more an effect than it has a 
cause, but which in and of itself, outside its text, is not sufficient to operate the 
necessary transgression.‟ (1996, 31). The „trace‟ is thus not inside language, but it is 
unsustainable outside language.  
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The analysis of the differential structurality, which Derrida refers to as 
deconstruction, equally emphasises the power of language on social reality and the 
importance of recognising and tracing the space/non-space, or rather the spacing; the 
„trace‟ that somehow exceeds it. Similarly, Montrose and Greenblatt recognise the 
textuality of history, although they attempt to remove themselves from its process by 
analysing the historicity of the text. Problematically, however, as Derrida 
acknowledges, the „trace‟ is not a concrete space from which such a practice can 
truly take place. The textualising of historicity will always already be a part of the 
text that is history. New historicism does not attempt to overcome this dilemma, but 
side-tracks it in an expression of awareness. This is where the school departs from 
post-structualism: its basic conceptions are founded on the same idea, but its 
methodology refuses to fully incorporate its logical consequences. It does not 
perform deconstructive readings of literature. 
If new historicism does not propagate a post-structural methodology, it 
nonetheless acknowledges a number of post-structural recognitions and „truths‟. The 
idea of the textuality of history is merely one of these. Derridean conceptions, such 
as the tracing of différance in the structure of binary opposition in historical texts, as 
well as the deconstruction of philosophical discourse, are often freely appropriated in 
new historicist criticism.
28
 However, these ideas are inserted as side-lines, to shed 
light on curious examples – they are not incorporated in the general methodology of 
the text. 
 Similarly, new historicism does not directly adhere to psychoanalysis, but 
Lacan‟s theories as well as less overt psychoanalytic conceptions are often 
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appropriated in individual pieces of criticism.
29
 There is a particular interest in Lacan 
and psychoanalysis in criticism focusing on gender and sexuality. Indeed, any form 
of gender studies can arguably be seen as a sub-school of psychoanalysis. The way 
„gender‟ is conceived of in gender theory and contemporary discourse (that is, as an 
internal identification with the connotations pertaining to one of the sexes) is itself an 
inherently psychoanalytic idea – as is the concept of an internal sexuality.  
 Apart from this, Lacan‟s post-structuralist psychoanalytic theories
30
 are 
inherently included in the conception of gendered subject formation, or indeed in the 
conception of any subject formation within a social reality determined by language 
and power. Lacan establishes a link between post-structuralist theories of language 
and their social effect on the individual subject. Lacanian ideas are present directly 
and indirectly in a large number of new historicist critics, including Stephen Orgel, 
Thomas Laqueur, Valerie Traub, Phyllis Rackin and Theodora Jankowski, in the 
form of character analyses, French feminist theory, studies of sexuality, explications 
of gendered language and numerous more.
31
 Indeed, psychoanalysis has such a 
bearing in contemporary discourse, that the new historicist texts that do not perform 
a psychoanalytic reading on some level do so in an attempt to overtly reject it.
32
  
Saint Foucault and Sexual Utopia 
Although Derrida‟s theories are inherent in new historicist methodology and Lacan 
features largely especially in the criticism exploring Renaissance gender, the first 
patriarch of new historicism is unquestionably Michel Foucault. Foucauldian 
materialist discourses, developed from Marxist sources such as Louis Althusser and 
Walter Benjamin are inherent in the new historicist methodology, although the 
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critical theorist is not always directly referenced in the texts. When his influence is 
acknowledged, it is commonly referred to in passing, without critical engagement 
with his theories. It is thus often unclear which particular facet of Foucault‟s theories 
is being discussed. The name is thrown in as a discursive marker; a sign of 
belonging; a conceptual concept that the participants of the discourse are expected to 
know, but nobody cares to extrapolate on.
33
  
Additionally to Derrida‟s „Différance‟, Kiernan Ryan‟s reader includes an 
extract on „Panopticism‟ from Foucault‟s Discipline and Punish in its introductory 
sourcing section (1996, 11-16). This particular part of the work outlines the basis of 
Foucault‟s social materialist theories. Foucault describes Jeremy Bentham‟s 
architectural ideas for an institutional „Panopticon‟ in terms of a state apparatus „for 
dissociating the seen/being seen dyad‟ (1991, 202). In Bentham‟s construction the 
observer is never seen to observe, and the observed thus possesses a sense of acting 
unobserved. Power, according to Foucault, functions most effectively if its source is 
hidden or unspecified: 
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, 
assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them 
play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power 
relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes 
the principle of his own subjection (1991, 202-203). 
Importantly, this implies that power relations need to remain unseen to function in a 
binary formation of absolute one-sided control.  
A real subjection is born mechanically through a fictitious relation. 
So it is not necessary to use force to constrain the convict to good 
behaviour, the madman to calm, the worker to work, the schoolboy 
to application, the patient to the observation of the regulations 
(1991, 202).  
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Through the construction of governing absolutes, the subjects believe themselves to 
act independently, when in fact their actions are determined by the controlling 
construct. In this case the governing apparatus is an architectural formation, but the 




 Throughout his work, Foucault determines that one of the most important 
discourses of power in any society is the discourse of normality. Madness and 
Civilization for example, investigates how the discourse becomes internalised in 
Western culture, when scientific discourses establish the concept of pathological 
mental states and tendencies. The discourse forms its subjects into a socially valuable 
and functional shape. In order to control society effectively, the example of the 
„Panopticon‟ illustrates that the discourse of normality needs to appear hidden. The 
discourse will thus not be visible in the social produce that adheres to „the normal‟. It 
can however be glimpsed through society‟s abnormalities; the waste material that is 
excluded from it.  
A considerable amount of new historicist criticism is concerned with 
negotiations and exchange or circulation of „social energy‟ (Greenblatt, 1988, 6) in 
societies of the past. The essays included in Ryan‟s collection engage closely with 
power relations and invested discourses embedded in historical documents from a 
particular period and location, which are assumed to carry over to the literature 
produced. Following the notion that society‟s norms are not directly readable, the 
new historicists often attempt to decipher historical societies from the documents that 
express a sense of disquietude or abnormality. In order to evaluate the contemporary 
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forcefulness of particular literary tropes and discursive oddities, new historicism 
turns to its most peripheral applications, for in true Foucauldian spirit, the movement 
pledges, „to try to track what can only be glimpsed, as it were, at the margins of the 
text‟ (Greenblatt, 1988, 4).  
So far, so good: the historical analyses, put in these terms, are straight-
forward appropriations of Foucault‟s theories. The basic agendas are epistemological 
queries into the possibilities and limitations of Foucault‟s social delineations. It is a 
simple matter of theory and practice – and indeed, as long as new historicism 
remains within the strict theoretical bounds it sets out for itself, the discourse is 
seemingly unproblematic and its practice appears sound. The problem is that new 
historical readings of history seldom do remain within these bounds.  
The theoretical limits of new historicist methodology do not allow for a more 
complex reading of either Discipline and Punish or Foucault‟s other works on power 
and knowledge. One of the most powerful and destructive normalising discourses, 
according to Foucault, is an act of „linear‟ progressive historicising, which new 
historicism admittedly attempts to challenge. As shown above, however, in the 
discussion of Greenblatt and the failed „marginality‟ of new historicism, this attempt 
is not particularly successful. A historicising methodology that claims progressive 
superiority over previous methodologies inevitably engages with a discourse of truth 
and normality. In The Order of Things, Foucault deems the concept of history one of 
the most „privileged and dangerous‟ (405) of the humanist sciences‟ attempts at 
„anthropologism‟ (379). History and historicising fuel and establish the 
universalising tendency which Foucault discerns in all pursuits of knowledge: 
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To each of the sciences of man it offers a background, which 
establishes it and provides it with a fixed ground and, as it were, a 
homeland; it determines the cultural area – the chronological and 
geographical boundaries – in which that branch of knowledge can 
be recognized as having validity; but it also surrounds the sciences 
of man with a frontier that limits them and destroys, from the 
outset, their claim to validity within the element of universality 
(1989, 405). 
The particularly strict limits in time and space that the new historicists 
establish for their historical analyses further complicates the already awkward 
relationship the movement shares with its own historicising methodology. The new 
historicist critics set up home in the English Renaissance; a shared discursive space 
within the dialogue of Elizabethan and Jacobean drama, which differentiates itself 
from, but simultaneously validates and further empowers their own particular social 
discourses. New historicism does not merely apply Foucauldian methodologies in 
reconstructions of historical social conflict – it establishes and normalises the image 
of Foucault and Foucauldian power relations in its reconstitution of progressive 
history. 
Even if the Foucauldian methodology established in new historicism had 
been less prone to self-destruction, it would still prove incompatible with the type of 
analyses performed by many of the new historicist critics. Most of these readings 
interact with disparate pieces of critical theory, and unfortunately Foucault‟s 
discourse of power and knowledge often jars with other social and cultural 
discourses. As recounted above, Foucault‟s social theories are problematically 
incompatible with psychoanalysis, which is an important component in a large 
amount of criticism engaging with issues of gender and sexuality. New historicist 
readings of Renaissance gender and sexuality also often engage closely with queer 
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theory, which similarly to new historicism acknowledges Foucault as one of its 
seminal authors.
35
 The Foucauldian discourses established in queer theory are rather 
different, however, from the Foucauldian discourse inherent in new historicist 
methodology – and the juxtaposition of these discourses becomes confusing and 
incoherent. 
Queer theory‟s basic Foucauldian text is the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality, individually entitled The Will to Knowledge. This work establishes a 
discourse, which in a manner that jars especially with the ideas expressed in The 
Order of Things, suggests that the obsessively „liberated‟ sense of sexuality 
circulating in 1970s and 1980s Anglo-American society is an immediate product of 
one previous discourse. The History of Sexuality carries on the task of radically re-
thinking the individual subject in history that Foucault started in Madness and 
Civilization when historicising the formation of the „psyche‟ and the idea of 
psychological urges and tendencies. Foucault‟s analysis of sexuality, however, 
moves in a different direction. The History of Sexuality not only attempts to re-think, 
but to re-write history. In „Part One: We “Other” Victorians‟ in The Will to 
Knowledge, Foucault writes that late twentieth-century sexuality is formed in an act 
of differentiation from nineteenth-century norms of sexual repression, which creates 
a directly opposite continual perpetuation: the overcoming of repression re-affirms 
its intial presence. Twentieth-century expressions of sexual liberalism thus reflect 
nineteenth-century sexual constrictions, rather than develop and explore a concept of 
their own. Free sexual expression is a myth, empowered and normalised by its 
previous restriction. Sexuality is always already determined by its limits. It is not a 
fixed concept; or even a concept in itself, but a fluid relationship founded on power, 
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the law and their internalisation. From the aspects developed through this idea, 
Foucault establishes the objective of „forming a different grid of historical 
decipherment by starting from a different theory of power; and, at the same time, of 
advancing little by little toward a different conception of power through a closer 
examination of an entire historical material‟ (1998, 90-91). This section is followed 
by the foundation of a „method‟ by which sexuality should be interpreted, a 
determination of the „domain‟ that is to be referred to as sexuality and a final 
organisation or „periodization‟ of sexuality into a new chronological unity. 
David Halperin‟s review of The History of Sexuality in American Journal of 
Philology aptly outlines the limitations of Foucault‟s theory: 
Volume One, for all its admittedly bright ideas, is dogmatic, 
tediously repetitious, full of hollow assertions, disdainful of 
historical documentation, and careless in its generalizations: it 
distributes over a period spanning from the seventeenth to the 
twentieth centuries in a gradual process of change well known to 
Foucault only in its later, mid-nineteenth century manifestations 
(277). 
The conceptions generated in The History of Sexuality are guilty of interestingly 
similar acts of historical normalisation and validation that Foucault criticises in The 
Order of Things. The History of Sexuality establishes that social conceptions of the 
present are dependent on society‟s idea of the past, to a similar degree that The Order 
of Things argues that narrativisations of the past are validations of the present. 
Foucauldian discourses that state that „[w]e must construct an analytics of power that 
no longer takes law as a model and a code‟ (1998, 90) are not the same as the 
Foucauldian discourses that establish and criticise historians like this narrator of their 
„perpetually secondary and derived character‟ (2002, 380) and „their claim to 
universality‟ (2002, 380). One of these Foucaults speaks as a historical theorist and 
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cultural materialist, whereas the other Foucault appears as a radical constructivist and 
a queer activist.
36
 The second Foucault is problematically inconsistent with the new 
historicist movement, since its founding historical narrative is as linear and 
ideologically biased as the conventional historicism Greenblatt and Montrose 
criticise (Greenblatt, 1982, 2253-2254; Montrose, 15-17). 
Yet, new historicist gender critics often amalgamate the two Foucaults.
37
 The 
result is a Foucault that sets a theoretically murky example as he appears in the de-
historicising historicist garbs picked up by Stephen Greenblatt and the other new 
historicists. Not unlike the new historicists, Foucault focuses a central part of his 
argument in The History of Sexuality on the seventeenth century: „The Seventeenth 
century, then, was the beginning of an age of repression emblematic of what we call 
bourgeois societies, an age which perhaps we still have not completely left behind‟ 
(1998, 17). He states that  
The history of sexuality supposes two ruptures if one tries to center 
it on mechanisms of repression. The first, occurring in the course of 
the seventeenth century, was characterized by the advent of the 
great prohibitions, the exclusive promotion of adult marital 
sexuality, the imperatives of decency, the obligatory concealment 
of the body, the reduction to silence and mandatory reticences of 
language (1998, 115). 
Before this initial „rupture‟ the sexual reality in Europe was different altogether. 
Foucault argues that it contained the vestiges of the Greco-Roman social 
conventions, and accordingly, in the two successive volumes of The History of 
Sexuality, Foucault proceeds to analyse the sexual conventions of the Ancient world, 
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Renaissance Self-Fashioning and the Queer Renaissance 
Numerous new historicist and cultural materialist readings of gender and sexuality 
take Foucault‟s lead in considering the English Renaissance to be the last outpost of 
Greco-Roman sexual fluidity; a utopian time before sexual repression, linguistic 
limitation and historical fixity. Despite some complaints about the generalising 
nature of Foucault‟s thesis in volume one of The History of Sexuality, the 
foundations of his analysis are seldom questioned. In Gay Ideas, Richard Mohr refers 
to the queer historicist scholarship as the „generic worship of Saint Foucault‟
39
 (287), 
continually reiterating, further embellishing and re-appropriating Foucault‟s basic 
arguments, as they form a new idea of what sexuality and/or gender before the 
„rupture‟ actually was. The most notable texts in the critical canon on Renaissance 
sexuality include Stephen Greenblatt‟s Renaissance Self-Fashioning (1980), Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgewick‟s Between Men (1985), Gregory W. Bredbeck‟s Sodomy and 
Interpretation (1991), Jonathan Goldberg‟s Sodometries (1992), Bruce R. Smith‟s 
Homosexual Desire in Shakespeare’s England (1991), Alan Bray‟s Homosexuality in 
Renaissance England (1994), Stephen Orgel‟s Impersonations (1996) and Thomas 
Laqueur‟s Making Sex (1992).
40
 
The interpretations of the sexual utopia before the mid-seventeenth century 
are numerous and varied. A number of them not only consider the Renaissance as the 
final period before Foucault‟s paradigm shift, but as the beginning, or lead-up to 
what was to come; that is, as the cradle of modern identity.
41
 Perhaps the most 
influential of these narratives, partly because it was published considerably earlier 
than the other works and thus set an example, is Stephen Greenblatt‟s Renaissance 
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Self-Fashioning. This work has become less of an individual contribution to the 
discussion of subject formation and sexuality in the English Renaissance, and more 
of a concept.
42
 The basic argument of Renaissance Self-Fashioning, or the „starting 
point‟ as Greenblatt conceives of it „is quite simply that in sixteenth-century England 
there were both selves and a sense that they could be fashioned‟ (1).
43
 He argues that 
Renaissance texts show evidence of a considerable shift in the conception of the 
relationship between selves, identity and power: „Perhaps the simplest observation to 
make is that in the sixteenth century there appears to be an increased self-
consciousness about the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful 
process‟ (Greenblatt, 1980, 2).  
Self-fashioning is the process or power to control one‟s outward appearance, 
as well as that of others: „it is linked to manners and demeanor, particularly that of 
the elite; it may suggest hypocrisy and deception, an adherence to mere outward 
ceremony; it suggests representation of one‟s nature or intention in speech and 
actions‟ (Greenblatt, 1980, 3). This form of physical expression does not remain 
purely expressive, however. Renaissance self-fashioning is an internalised process of 
signification; a development of a readable and expressible identity. Greenblatt quotes 
Clifford Geertz‟s The Interpretation of Cultures, asserting that „[t]here is no such 
thing as human nature independent of culture‟ (Geertz quoted in Greenblatt, 1980, 3). 
Greenblatt argues that Renaissance culture recognises that there is no essential 
identity beyond or beneath the culturally inscribed. Self-fashioning is the power to 
inscribe and re-inscribe the surfaces, creating an acknowledged semblance of 
internality. 
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 A number of critics of Renaissance gender and sexuality, including 
Greenblatt himself, Stephen Orgel, Peter Stallybrass, Valerie Traub and Lisa Jardine, 
appropriate the concept of Renaissance self-fashioning to gender identity and 
sexuality.
44
 The result is an idea of gender and sexuality that is mouldable and fluid – 
and most importantly, can be directed and developed. Some critics, such as Stephen 
Orgel and Thomas Laqueur refer to the fact that the terms „gender‟ and „sex‟ were 
synonymous in early modern English, arguing that the idea of gender and physical 
sex were one and the same. Identity did not exist separately from the body. The idea 
of Renaissance self-fashioning thus infers that not merely a detached gender identity, 
but also the Renaissance idea of the sexed body was fluid and susceptible to external 
and internal direction.
45
 Whether or not the idea of gender self-fashioning is taken to 
affect only mind or both mind and body, the concept of a fixed essential sex/gender 
is practically portrayed as nonexistent. 
According to this idea, Renaissance bodies, sexed or not, were in many ways 
similar to actors on stage, capable of changing into subjectivities as they change their 
garments. Indeed, the sixteenth century religious controversialist Thomas Wright 
claims that this is the case in a discussion on appropriate attire in The passions of the 
minde in generall:  
some you haue so inconstant in their attire, that the varietie of their 
garments pregnantly proueth the ficklenesse of their heads: for they 
are not much vnlike to Stage-players, who adorne themselues 
gloriously like Gentlemen, then like clownes, after as women, then 
like fools, because the fashion of their garments maketh them 
resemble these persons (136). 
If this conception of Renaissance subjectivity is taken seriously, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the critics of Renaissance identity almost exclusively use drama in 




 They engage with the plays in various ways, however: in 
formalist terms, theoretical terms and in terms of the materiality of the stage. The 
remaining section of this chapter will outline some of the ways in which gender 
identity, sexual roles and Renaissance drama operate in some feminist and queer new 
historicist criticism. 
Queering Renaissance Gender 
There is an ample amount of individual collections and readers of new historicist 
theory and criticism, including Alternative Shakespeares, ed. John Drakakis, 1985; 
The New Historicism, ed. H. Aram Veeser, 1989; The New Historicism Reader, ed. 
H. Aram Veeser, 1994; and New Historicism and Cultural Materialism: A Reader, 
ed. Kiernan Ryan, 1996. There is an even greater amount of readers and collections 
of new historicist criticism specifically focusing on gender and sexuality, however, 
the best known of which are The Matter of Difference: Materialist Feminist 
Criticism of Shakespeare, ed. Valerie Wayne, 1991; Erotic Politics: Desire on the 
Renaissance Stage, ed. Susan Zimmerman, 1992; Queering the Renaissance, ed. 
Jonathan Goldberg, 1994; Feminist Readings of Early Modern Cultures: Emerging 
Subjects, ed. Valerie Traub, M. Lindsay Kaplan, Dympna Callaghan, 1996; A 
Feminist Companion to Shakespeare, ed. Dympna Callaghan, 2000. 
As recently as the year 2000, Stephen Greenblatt and Catherine Gallagher co-
produced a volume entitled Practicing New Historicism, in which the new historicist 
methodology is being, as the title suggests, practised, re-assessed and exemplified. 
Some of the new historicist readers similarly direct their audience to a particular 
interpretation of the material. As mentioned, Ryan‟s reader includes an introductory 
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section of appropriate background reading. H. Aram Veeser‟s The New Historicism 
includes several essays that overtly point to specific theoretical readings of history, 
for example Frank Letricchia‟s „Foucault‟s Legacy – A New Historicism‟ and 
Catherine Gallagher‟s „Marxism and the New Historicism‟. For obvious reasons, the 
compilations focusing on new historicist readings of gender and sexuality are 
specifically asking their readers to consider historical periods from a political 
feminist or gender/sexuality psychoanalytic perspective.  
New historicist readings of the English Renaissance have a tendency to 
express immediate political agendas or theoretical directives. New historicism finds a 
discursive space in the English Renaissance, through which other more modern 
discourses may be circulated. The literary texts become a means of communication. 
Like the specific jargons of the particular contemporary discourses, the discursive 
space is narrowly administered and exclusively discussed. To clarify this notion, the 
following section will look closer at the space formed by the particular discourses of 
gender and sexuality.  
An undue amount of essays and larger works on Renaissance gender and 
sexuality locate their ideas in a select number of passages from a select set of plays 
by William Shakespeare, often As You Like It (AYL), Twelfth Night (TN) and The 
Merchant of Venice (MV), which all feature female characters sporadically masked 
as the opposite gender. The early new historicist feminist criticism considers these 
plays as opportunities to question and re-consider gender roles. In „Disrupting Sexual 
Difference‟, from the 1985 compilation Alternative Shakespeares, Catherine Belsey 
argues that the changes of gendered attire in Twelfth Night and As You Like It blur 
the differences between the male and female as well as the masculine and feminine, 
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creating a space in which all sexed and gendered embodiments are arbitrary when it 
comes to love. The Renaissance dramas become mouthpieces for Belsey‟s standpoint 
in the gender debate.  
Phyllis Rackin and Katherine E. Kelly have both produced articles further 
developing the idea of a relationship between gendered disguises and Renaissance 
problematisations of gender roles. Kelly acknowledges that characters confronted 
with the female transvestites in As You Like It, Twelfth Night and The Merchant of 
Venice comment on their feminine attributes, just like Shakespeare intertextually 
flaunts the actors‟ actual maleness. Male and female connotations are continually 
invoked and cut short through the bodies of the boys-dressed-as-girls-dressed-as-
boys. Kelly thus exposes the concept of gendered „personation‟; the more general 
construction of gendered performance in society (1990). Phyllis Rackin refers to 
Rosalind‟s epilogue in As You Like It, arguing that Shakespeare overtly asks the 
audience to „cooperate if the play is to work‟ (1987). She argues that gendered 
connotation is explicitly recognised for what it is: nothing but gendered connotation. 
Another faction of the discourse of Renaissance gender and sexuality 
considers the homoerotic connotations the characters with ambiguous sexual 
attributes produce. Mario DiGangi‟s The Homoerotics of Early Modern Drama 
further investigates Catherine Belsey‟s ideas from „Disrupting Sexual Difference‟, 
establishing that the Shakespearean comedy form enables not merely a space where 
different sex and gender becomes arbitrary, but where differently gendered sexual 
desires may be generated and momentarily sustained. However, according to 
DiGangi these desires are always ultimately suppressed. He argues that the couplings 
that go against the heteronormative imperative are always dissolved at the end of the 
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plays (1997, 29-63). Tracy Sedinger considers the suppression as a political 
necessity. In a society where, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick acknowledges in Between 
Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire, the main political alliances 
were based on „homosocial‟ intimacy, an intellectual platonic friendship between 
men, the implication of similarly formed homoerotic couplings would be rather 
threatening: „certain types of representation activate a desire that would frustrate 
efforts to render the sociopolitical space transparent‟ (1985, 78). Carol Thomas 
Neely refers to the suppression of homoerotic bonds in terms of the medieval trope 
of „Lovesickness‟ instead in „Lovesickness, Gender, and Subjectivity: Twelfth Night 
and As You Like It‟. Thomas Neely argues that suppression of desires is a norm in 
early modern love discourse. The homoerotic connotations of Twelfth Night and As 
You Like It thus take a more subversive turn, since homoerotic desires are generated 
similarly by the heteroerotic aims of the main sexual couplings.  
Marjorie Garber describes the transvestite character as an embodied „space of 
desire‟ (1992, 75). According to Garber, Shakespearean transvestite characters 
embody a fetishised sense of gendered displacement. This is not because the 
character is really female or the actor is really male, however: it is because the body 
of the transvestite is overtly characterised as both and neither. In her Lacanian 
analysis, she argues that „[t]he transvestite here articulates herself/himself as that 
which escapes‟ (1992, 75, original emphasis). She quotes Viola‟s lament when about 
to fight a duel in Twelfth Night that „a little thing would make me tell them how little 
I lack of a man‟ (TN, 109; III.iv.307-309) and Portia‟s remark in The Merchant of 
Venice: „they shall think we are accomplished with what we lack‟ (MV, 97; III.iv.61-
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62). The expression of lack, according to Garber, denotes „that which cannot be 
satisfied‟ (1992, 75), and is thus constantly coveted.  
Peter Stallybrass, Theodora A. Jankowski and Valerie Traub explore the idea 
of lack in relation to bodily prosthetics. Stallybrass speculates on the possibility of 
the general boy actor wearing prosthetic breasts along with the dress and the wig. He 
acknowledges that Restoration transvestite actors often disband the illusion at a 
climactic point in the play, removing the wig or some other gendered device. The 
„real‟ bodies of the Renaissance boy actors, however, remain concealed. Stallybrass 
reads this fact through a Freudian idea of fetishism: desire may be diverted from the 
genitals to another part of the body or some prosthetic gendered indication, if the 
shape is concealed. The boy actors, according to Stallybrass, are thus desirable 
because of their immediate gender indeterminacy and their fixed connotative gender 
devices (1992). Jankowski and Traub investigate the idea of the prosthetic body in 
terms of dislocation of female-female desire in Renaissance sexual discourse. In „The 
(In)significance of “Lesbian” Desire in Early Modern England‟ Traub concludes that 
„“feminine” homoerotic desires were dramatized because they did not signify‟ 
(1992b, 80). The female-female bonds conjured by the Shakespearean transvestite 
characters are portrayed in terms of desire for an imagined maleness; a prosthetic 
phallus, which is disbanded once the lacking body is revealed (1993). Jankowski 
similarly determines that the woman-only space constructed between characters such 
as Portia and Nerissa in The Merchant of Venice do not suggest a repressed 
homoerotic intimacy; „some early modern closet‟ (2000, 315), but an arena through 
which a more undefined relation is circulated: „What I have discovered is not so 
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In „Desires and the Differences it Makes‟,
48
 Valerie Traub draws on previous 
new historical readings of As You Like It and Twelfth Night to form a theory of desire 
and difference. Traub spends a remarkably small amount of space discussing the 
textual material. The main body of the essay engages with discourses of Foucauldian 
power relations and eroticism. Without feeling the necessity to justify her 
Foucauldian approach, she states that „[e]rotic arousal is preeminently (but not 
exclusively) a function of power differences – of exchanges, withholdings, struggles, 
negotiations‟ (1991, 93). However, she argues that the focus on gender 
transgressions in Shakespearean criticism is narrow-minded: „because of the 
institutionalised character of heterosexuality, gender has appeared as the sole 
determinant of arousal, but I suspect that gender is only one among many powerful 
differentials involved: arousal may be as motivated by the differences within each 
gender as by gender itself‟ (1991, 93, original emphasis). The essay refers to „the 
desires circulating through the Phebe/Rosalind/Ganymede relation, or the 
Olivia/Viola/Cesario interaction‟ (1991, 96) in passing, as it establishes a logic of 
desire based on a matrix of erotic position, rather than gendered subjectification. She 
refers to the power dynamics of S/M eroticism, where an economy of difference is 
created by the duality of top and bottom. Through this argument she suggests that 
new historicist criticism engaging with gender theory often takes an overly 
psychoanalytic stance: „The work I have begun here is only a first step in the much 
larger project of deconstructing “sex-desire”, in the words of Foucault, in the interest 
of “bodies and pleasure”‟ (1991, 107). 
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Dympna Callaghan similarly engages with a Foucauldian conception of 
bodies and power relations in Shakespeare Without Women. Callaghan investigates 
the corporeality of Shakespeare‟s comedies, particularly Twelfth Night. A large part 
of chapter one is devoted to an analysis of textual puns directed towards female and 
male genitalia and indications of castration. The fact that the letters C U [N] T take 
form in the discussion of Olivia‟s writing style, creates an idea of female power; a 
prominent almost masculine genitalia, according to Callaghan – and as a male, 
Malvolio‟s reading of the letters emphasises his C U T masculine position. 
Renaissance bodies in Shakespeare Without Women are subjects to a phallic 
hierarchy, and desire is a matter of illusion and disillusion of gendered power 
(2000b, 26-48). 
Callaghan‟s analysis refers to what is arguably the most extreme, and what I 
will call the third faction of the new historicist readings of Renaissance gender and 
sexuality: Stephen Greenblatt, Stephen Orgel and Thomas Laqueur‟s physical 
consideration of Renaissance self-fashioning radically juxtaposes sexed bodies and 
gendered performances. This sub-discourse, in which not merely bodily inscriptions, 
but sexed bodies can be fashioned, interestingly corresponds with the idea of sex and 
gender that Judith Butler forms in Bodies that Matter, inferring that sex is as 
culturally conditioned as gender (Butler, 1993, 57-91). In „Fiction and Friction‟, 
included in Shakespearean Negotiations, Greenblatt analyses Shakespeare‟s 
breeched female characters in As You Like It and Twelfth Night. To determine the 
normative ideas of sexual difference in Renaissance society from its textual margins, 
Greenblatt uses descriptions of human genitalia in contemporaneous anatomy texts, 
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establishing that sexual difference was a more fluid concept then than it is in modern 
society.  
 Stephen Orgel and Thomas Laqueur both affirm the connection Greenblatt 
establishes between Renaissance sexual anatomy and the formation of sexual 
identity in Renaissance drama. Laqueur‟s article „Orgasm, Generation, and the 
Politics of Reproductive Biology‟ infers that such texts could even be read as 
reflections of a common social conception: „Biology and human sexual experience 
mirrored the metaphysical reality on which, it was thought, the social order too 
rested‟ (4). In his subsequent analysis of the progression of sexual conceptions in 
Europe, Making Sex, he directly refers to Greenblatt‟s „Fiction and Friction‟, stating 
that „The nature of sex, I argue in this and the next two chapters, is the result not of 
biology but of our needs in speaking about it‟ (115).  
 Laqueur argues that the difference between the sexes was less rigid during 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, than it was to become in the 
eighteenth century and onwards. Renaissance anatomy was according to Laqueur 
formed on the basis of traditions inherited from classical medicine, in particular the 
works of Galen. Sex and gender were conceived of in terms of a singular scale on 
which the male was situated on the one extreme and the female on the other. Gender 
and sex was thus a matter of degrees, and there was always a possibility that an 
individual would glide further from one end and closer to the other, or alternatively 
move back and forth through the course of a lifetime.
49
 Laqueur states that since sex 
and gender identity was a concept open to fashioning and self-fashioning, it was 
constantly threatened and never at rest: „In the absence of an Archimedean point in 
the body that assures the stability and nature of sexual difference‟ (1990, 114).  
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 Stephen Orgel adheres to Laqueur‟s idea of Renaissance gender as a concept 
invoking a continual state of unrest and anxiety. Orgel‟s Impersonations applies a 
psychoanalytic edge to Stephen Greenblatt‟s notion of Renaissance self-fashioning. 
The text goes into a deep analysis of the ideas and practices that may have shaped 
the social norms in late Elizabethan and Jacobean England. His central question is: 
„Why Did the English Stage Take Boys for Women?‟ (1996, 1, original emphasis). In 
order to offer an explanation to this question he revisits the anatomy sources 
established to be central to Renaissance gender identity in both the work of 
Greenblatt and Laqueur. He also reiterates a number of references to anti-theatrical 
sources previously made in Laura Levine‟s Men in Women’s Clothing. The outcome 
of his study is remarkably close to that of Greenblatt and Laqueur. He affirms that 
Renaissance gender was a dialectical concern; a concept stirring continuous anxiety, 
because the belief in a self-fashioned gendered self inferred the threatening 
possibility of further fashioning.  
Speaking of/for Shakespeare: Manifest(o)ing the Dead 
The discourse of Renaissance gender and sexuality criticism finds problematisations 
of gender differentiation, gender roles, heteronormativity, sexual power structures, 
biological hegemony, and above all gender, sexual and biological fixity, in 
Shakespeare‟s comedies. Dympna Callaghan acknowledges that „[t]he Renaissance 
body, then, especially in the arena of the theatre, has been recognized as political, 
that is, as a site for the operation of power and the exercise of meaning‟ (2000b, 26). 
This certainly seems to be the case. One question remains, however: what powers are 
being operated, and whose meaning is being exercised? Are the Foucauldian, 
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Derridean and Lacanian – or indeed Greenblattian and Montrosian – readings of 
Renaissance bodies truly interpretations of Renaissance society, or are they rather 
reflections of the cultural climate in which they are being produced?  
The introduction to Practicing New Historicism continually emphasises the 
importance of remaining outside of theoretical or critical fields and movements, in 
favour of a closeness or loyalty to the text: „Each time we approached the moment in 
the writing when it might have been appropriate to draw the “theoretical” lesson, to 
scold another school of criticism, or to point the way towards the path of virtue, we 
stopped, not because we‟re shy of controversy, but because we cannot bear to see the 
long chains of close analysis go up in a puff of abstraction‟ (Gallagher & Greenblatt, 
2000, 19). The important notion here is thus close reading and authenticity, and this 
concept is considered in opposition to theoretical analysis. Yet, new historicist 
readings of Shakespeare and Renaissance society, including Greenblatt and 
Gallagher‟s own work, contains a considerably small amount of close analysis that is 
not directly used to found a theoretical, social or cultural argument.  
Theodora Jankowski states that her „exploration of the “lesbian void” has 
been a conscious effort to push the boundaries of our early modern field of vision, to 
try to “see” the previously invisible, to consider where “lesbians” have been hidden 
and how we might draw them out‟ (2000, 315, original emphasis). Jankowski 
suggests that it is her task as a feminist new historicist to devise a way to consciously 
„push‟ a modern concept into her early modern sources, despite the fact that she 
recognises that it is nowhere to be seen. Dympna Callaghan depicts her authorial 
position as similarly interventionist in Shakespeare Without Women: „In this I hope 
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that my analysis constitutes an intervention for current feminist politics by using the 
body in a Shakespeare text as a way of articulating the problems of its reclamation at 
this historical juncture for a feminist-materialist agenda‟ (47).
50
  
Jean E. Howard declares in her book review „The Early Modern and the 
Homoerotic Turn in Political Criticism‟ that she takes the publication and 
republication of the numerous analyses of Renaissance gender and sexuality „as a 
sign that gay, lesbian and queer criticisms now have an acknowledged place in early 
modern literary and cultural studies‟ (1998, 105). The emphasis here is on place, 
rather than time: Howard declares an objective to claim a specific location; to set up 
home, academically and politically in the readings of a period. She congratulates her 
fellow Renaissance gender scholars who have „contributed to the achievement of this 
ambitious goal‟ (105). The new historicist studies of gender and sexuality have, 
according to Howard, changed the way a generalised „we‟ conceives of „ourselves‟ 
and history, and „ourselves‟ in history, „“deheterosexualising” our assumptions‟ 
(106).  
Throughout the new historicist explorations of Renaissance sexuality and 
gender, historicism is synonymous with some undefined form of socio-political 
ventriloquism. In order to explore this critical tendency further, I would like to return 
to Stephen Greenblatt‟s heart-felt desire and admitted failure to „speak with the dead‟ 
(1988, 1). In his uncomfortable position as de-historicising historian, Greenblatt 
makes up for his disability to speak with the dead, by repeatedly speaking for the 
dead, while criticising the people who merely speak of the dead. Rather than 
inferring a „totalizing‟ notion of „artistic completeness‟ (1988, 3) and reading the 
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Renaissance as a fixed concept that can be unproblematically spoken of, Greenblatt 
revitalises the period with his own conceptions and political agendas. He is rather 
building a manifesto on the traces of the dead, than manifesting their lost presence. 
As Greenblatt fears, all that can be heard is his own voice.  
The initial chapters and introductions to Stephen Greenblatt‟s Renaissance 
Self-Fashioning, Shakespearean Negotiations, Learning to Curse, Practicing New 
Historicism and his latest Will in the World: How Shakespeare Became Shakespeare 
all focus on the author‟s personal experiences of history and the process of writing 
history. Greenblatt portrays his academic works as private explorations – and 
perhaps that is what they should be read as. If the dead are mere mouthpieces for the 
living in new historicist criticism, then the most pressing question would be: what do 
the dead have to say about the living? What is appropriately spoken through this 
particular group of dead people? I shall return to these questions in chapter four.
51
 
For now, though, it is more urgent to investigate why the dead are made to carry the 
voices of the living. 
In the initial overtly dogmatic chapter of Shakespearean Negotiations, 
Greenblatt lists ten new historicist commandments; a number of „abjurations‟ and 
„generative principles‟ (12). Number two of this list reads: „There can be no 
motiveless creation‟ (1988, 12). If this statement were applied not merely to 
Renaissance literature, but also to new historicist criticism of Renaissance literature, 
one cannot help but ask why the political agendas of modern authors would need to 
be developed through analyses of past societies. This is where Jacques Rancière‟s 
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concept of the „founding narrative‟ becomes relevant: the Renaissance is a historical 
event that creates a foundation for a political agenda.
52
  
There are not merely political discourses in circulation in Greenblatt‟s texts, 
however. Especially his introductions
53
 often enter more personal territories than 
Rancière‟s analysis accounts for. Scott Wilson suggests in Cultural Materialism that 
the founding narrative within Greenblatt‟s Learning to Curse is constructed 
according to psychoanalytic tropes, in terms of a response to a founding academic 
trauma and a desire to transgress the boundaries it has created for him (Wilson, 60).
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Greenblatt‟s rejection of critical theory, particularly poststructuralism, is explained in 
the introduction to Learning to Curse through his original indebtedness to this 
movement. His „will to tell stories‟ (Greenblatt, 1990, 5) is portrayed as an 
indomitable desire, on the one hand responding to the traumatic experience of being 
asked to remain within the boundaries of a conventional idea of historical truth 
(1990, 5), and on the other hand as an attempt to identify a sense of self: „My earliest 
recollections of “having an identity” or “being a self” are bound up with story-
telling‟ (1990, 6). 
Desire and identity are deeply connected in psychoanalysis. Jacques Lacan 
describes the conceptualisation of identity as a realisation of an initial sensation of 
lack, or distance, fuelling a desire of closeness or completion (2006, 75-81). As 
recounted above, Lacan considers the subject position in relation to language. Since 
language is the means by which conceptualisations are made, the subject must 
always conceptualise him/herself within language, but the subject is also on some 
level conscious that this medium merely signifies the „real‟, it will never be reality. 
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The initial sensation of lack is according to Lacan, the recognition of the gap 
between the symbolic order represented by language and the „real‟. The subject will 
attempt to fill the gap; make him/herself „real‟, by conceptualising him/herself, thus 
forming a sense of identity. Problematically, however, this form of self-
representation still takes place within the symbolic order and will rather emphasise 
the subject‟s otherness, or distance to the „real‟, than bring him/her closer. Lacan 
argues that the subject will always long to restore him/herself as he/she was before 
the sensation of lack, but the idea of pre-significatory restoration can only be 
conceived of through signification (Lacan, 2006, 244-245).  
The initial moment of subject formation, which Lacan claims to take place 
the first time an infant subject recognises his/her image in the mirror as him/herself is 
the moment that implements the sensation of lack.
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 This symbolically becomes 
represented as a moment of castration, and the idea of pre-significatory restoration is 
thus signified by the fantasy of the restored phallus (Lacan, 2006, 75-81). The 
fantasised phallic being; the representation of the self within language ceaselessly 
takes place from the first time of subject recognition throughout a life generated by 




Sigmund Freud, the precursor of Lacan‟s model of subjectivity and language, 
uses self narrativisation and symbolic representation (especially in dreams) as a 
means of getting closer to the reality of the subject in psychoanalytic therapy; 
unravelling his subject‟s trauma by encouraging narrative self revelation.
57
 Lacan, 
however, insists that narrative, as an appropriation of language, does not reveal the 
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„real‟; it only further conceals it (2006, 77). Interestingly, considering his resistance 
to psychoanalysis, Stephen Greenblatt initially chooses to narrativise himself in both 
a Freudian and a Lacanian psychoanalytic manner in Learning to Curse. He sets out 
presenting his writing almost as a „therapeutic response to trauma‟ (Wilson, 60). The 
introduction narrativises Greenblatt, as a new historicist, from his initial childhood 
desire for „story-telling‟ (1990, 5-9) to his academic urges to conceptualise the non-
conceptual past (1990, 9-11). Greenblatt is conceptualised as a subject, but there is 
still a sensation of lack. He expresses his desire to reach the past (1990, 11), and 
finishes the introduction to Learning to Curse once more regretfully conceding to the 
impossibility of reaching the „real‟ past; „a real world, real body, real pain‟ 
(Greenblatt, 1990, 15) within the traces of language available to historical 
scholarship (1990, 15). Greenblatt‟s narrativisation of himself thus implicitly turns to 
a Freudian self-exposition and a Lacanian recognition of distance. In the spirit of 
Lacanian scholarship he creates for himself a founding narrative; an idea of the 
Renaissance that takes on the characteristics of a Lacanian phallus, a pre-Oedipal 
state of being. 
 The same volume that narrativises Greenblatt‟s childhood desires, Learning 
to Curse, includes his controversial essay, „Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture‟, 
which rejects psychoanalysis as unsuitable for readings of early modern subjectivity. 
In accordance with Foucault‟s repressive hypothesis, Greenblatt argues that 
Renaissance identity predates the formation of the psychoanalytic subject. It cannot 
even truly be read in relation to the signifier „identity‟. It exceeds modern language 
(1990, 131-145). In simple Lacanian terms, Greenblatt thus manages to steer his new 
historical journey of self exploration to a pre-Oedipal event; a founding narrative that 
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to some extent creates the illusion of closing the distance. The analyses of 
Renaissance subjectivity and the idea of trans-historical communication become 
Greenblatt‟s and new historicism‟s phallus.  
Despite the fact that psychoanalysis according to Greenblatt is „a totalizing 
vision‟ (1990, 138), he thus recognises himself as a psychoanalytic post-Oedipal 
subject, thoroughly other to the self-fashioning pre-Oedipal subjects in the 
Renaissance queer utopia, preceding this lacking state. Greenblatt‟s rejection of 
psychoanalysis as lacking (1990, 134-135) can even be read as a component of this 
psychoanalytic understanding of subjectivity. Most interesting in this equation, 
however, is the questionable analytic grounds for the founding narrative itself. As the 
following chapter shows, the conception of the Renaissance queer utopia is neither 
thoroughly established nor critically explored. It is a shared fantasy sustaining the 
political and scholarly identity of a small but canonical academic faction.  
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[CHAPTER 2] Renaissance Self-Fashioning Revisited: 
Narrativised Claims to History 
 
This chapter delves further into the historical materials and theoretical frameworks 
used by Stephen Greenblatt, Stephen Orgel and Thomas Laqueur in their founding 
narrative of a physically and mentally flexible gender self-fashioning Renaissance.
1
 
These authors eagerly depict a time before the restrictive ideas of sex, gender and 
sexuality, which modern feminism and queer studies continually battle with. The 
idea of a previous model challenges the inevitability of contemporary conceptions, 
furnishing feminist and queer scholars with an exceedingly attractive alternative 
model of early modern subjectivity. Angus McLaren aptly remarks in his review of 
Laqueur‟s Making Sex, that „[g]iven its overarching argument, many readers will 
want to [my emphasis] like this book‟ (1993, 833). Linda Woodbridge makes a 
similar claim about Orgel‟s Impersonations: „His thesis is attractive: I too would like 
to [my emphasis] believe that Renaissance women rejoiced in more agency than we 
have thought‟ (1999, 101). The new historicist advocates of Renaissance self-
fashioning are proposing an argument which is easily accessible to modern readers, 
because it challenges constricted norms and hierarchies, not primarily within the 
idea of the early modern period, but within the methodologies of modern academic 
discourse. As discussed in the previous chapter, they thus form a basis; a founding 
narrative for these modern schools of thought.
2
 
This chapter takes a closer look at the work of Greenblatt, Orgel and Laqueur, 
particularly in relation to two of their continuously reiterated examples of early 
modern discourse: the first is the medical discussion surrounding the source of sexual 
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differentiation, particularly the reflections on Galen‟s homological sex thesis; the 
second example comprises the academic and public debate over the feminising effect 
of the early modern theatre. Greenblatt, Orgel and Laqueur take note of a continual 
reiteration of sexual aberrance or monstrosity (Greenblatt, 1988, 81; Orgel, 1996, 22; 
Laqueur, 1990, 128). As Michel Foucault notes in The Order of Things, this space of 
monstrosity which the new historicists colonise with discussions of modern ideas of 
gender and sexuality was a potent space also in the formation of early modern 
philosophical and scientific discourse (170). It is one of the heterotopias that is 
„outside of all places‟ (Foucault, 1986, 24), but it is yet an integral part of the specific 
period. Foucault refers to it as a spacio-temporal mirror (1986, 24): „the monster is 
the root-stock of specification, but it is only a sub-species itself in the stubbornly 
slow stream of history‟ (2002, 171). 
Self-Fashioned Sexual Difference 
The first space where Greenblatt, Orgel and Laqueur encounter sexual monstrosity is 
in the Renaissance discourse of sexual anatomy, which they claim to be founded on 
Galen‟s homological sex thesis (Greenblatt, 1988, 78; Orgel, 1996, 20; Laqueur, 
1990, 69). This model is derived from Galen‟s On the Usefulness of the Parts of the 
Body, where Galen describes the female genitalia to be in every part comparable, 
although entirely opposite to the male generative construction. According to Galen, 
the female genitals are internal inversions of their external male counterparts: „Turn 
outward the woman‟s, turn inward, so to speak, and fold double the man‟s, and you 
find them the same in both in every respect‟
 
(628). Sex difference is subject to 
difference of temperature within humanity‟s initial environment in the womb. If the 
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foetus grows on the right side, it will become a male. The less heated left side merely 
produces females (Galen, 628). Galen explains this concept, emphasising heat-
energy required in order for the male organs to move out of the body, into their 
strategic generative position. The female genitals become distinguished through the 
defective environment of their growth, rendering them unable to protrude (Galen, 
628).  
Laqueur argues that Galenic anatomists were so intent on seeing a direct 
inversion of the male genitals whenever empirically analysing the female genitalia, 
that their descriptions were often anatomically flawed. The Galenic body „was so 
deeply enmeshed in the skeins of Renaissance medical and physiological theory, in 
both its high and its more popular incarnations, and so bound up with a political and 
cultural order, that it escaped entirely any logically determining contact with the 
boundaries of experience or, indeed, any explicit testing at all‟ (Laqueur, 1990, 69). 
Laqueur uses the mid-sixteenth-century English Royal physician Thomas Vicary, as 
an example. In his work The English-man’s treasvre Vicary describes how the 
clitoris, which according to tradition he calls the Lazartus Pannicle, is situated 
midway between the womb (the matrix) and the opening of the vagina (the neck of 
the matrix):  
it [the necke of the Matrix] hath in the middell a Lazartus Pannicle 
which is called in Latine Tengito: And in the creation of this 
Pannicle is found two utilities. The first is, that by it goeth forth the 
Urine, or else it would be shed throughout all the Vulva: The 
second is, that when a woman doth let her thighes abroad, it 




Vicary is convinced that the vagina is an inverted penis, and that women thus urinate 
and procreate with it. Since the clitoris was compared to the phallus at the time, he 
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places it at the centre of this two-fold activity: situated inside the vagina, by the neck 
of the womb, it functions like the tip of an inverted penis, controlling urination, as 
well as the procreative process of heat in the womb (Vicary, 51). Vicary is blinded 
by the socially constructed authority of Galenic medicine. His observations are 
theoretical to the point that they have no root in empirical evidence. He trusts his 
theories enough to disregard rather obvious indications of a more complex structural 
difference between male and female genital physiology.
4
 
Referring to uncritical Galenic analyses such as this, Greenblatt, Orgel and 
Laqueur depict Renaissance sexual anatomy as an unequivocal reiteration of a single 
sexual formula (Greenblatt, 1988, 76-86; Orgel, 1996, 19-24; Laqueur, 1990, 98-
108). According to this homological sex thesis, sexual differentiation functions as an 
uncontested hierarchy of heat, in which the female body is considered to be of the 
same essence, but is presented as a colder and thus defective male body. Orgel 
describes Renaissance anatomy as a form of anatomical history, in which „we all 
begin as female, and masculinity is a development out of and away from femininity‟ 
(1996, 20). Greenblatt uses even more emphatic terms, invoking a Galenic metaphor, 
in which females are described as „creatures that have not yet emerged from the 
womb‟ (Greenblatt, 1988, 80). 
Orgel argues that there is evidence of a widespread empirical arbitrariness in 
the anatomical science of the period, since „the persistence of homology has little to 
do with science‟ (1996, 24). He goes on to state that authority weighs „a great deal 
more heavily than empiricism‟ in Renaissance anatomy (1996, 24). In other words, 
despite the newly born neo-classicist urge to further material knowledge, 
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Renaissance science was conceived through the biased lens of Renaissance politics, 
rather than the recently popular dissections conducted on human cadavers.
5
 Galen‟s 
homological sex thesis reiterated and reified firmly rooted beliefs in male centrality. 
As Orgel argues, „Renaissance ideology had a vested interest in defining women in 
terms of men; the aim is thereby to establish the parameters of maleness, not 
womanhood‟ (1996, 24). 
This is not necessarily different from later constructs of sexual difference, 
however.
6
 The great distinction between contemporary and early modern teleologies 
of sexual difference is, according to Orgel, their relationship to the sexed body 
(1996, 19). Whereas a modern binary sex/gender formally appears static, the 
homological sex thesis would (in theory) admit a certain possibility of movement, 
and perhaps even reversal. It allows for a flexible quality to Renaissance sex, and 
with it gender and sexuality, which modern social constructs lack. Orgel, Laqueur 
and Greenblatt quote a number of early modern accounts and discussions of 
instances when spontaneous female-to-male sex changes are reputed to have taken 
place. They argue that such a possibility not only naturally follows, but should be 
duly expected within a sexual paradigm built on Galen‟s homological sex thesis 
(Orgel, 1996, 19-24; Laqueur, 1990, 122-134; Greenblatt,1988, 73-86). There was 
merely one sex, and the perfection of this sex was its male form. This suggests that 
Renaissance anatomists considered it natural that female bodies should, in an 
Aristotelian sense, yearn to progress towards perfection.
7
 Orgel claims that the flat-
chested and narrow-hipped trends within Renaissance fashion, as well as the fact that 
women were played by men on the English Renaissance stage, testify to the truth of 
this claim (Orgel, 1996, 83-105).  
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The examples from the anatomy sources used by the new historicists suggest 
that spontaneous sex-change only occurred from the female to the male, never the 
other way around (Greenblatt, 1988, 73-86; Orgel, 1996, 20-24; Laqueur, 1990, 122-
134). This fact is coherent with the homological sex thesis. Laqueur quotes Gaspar 
Bauhin‟s Theatrum Anatomicum (Basel, 1605), establishing that „movement is 
always up the great chain of being: “we therefore never find in any true story that 
any man ever became a woman, because Nature tends always toward what is most 
perfect and not, on the contrary, to perform in such a way that what is perfect should 
become imperfect”‟ (1990, 127).  
The first case re-narrated by Laqueur, Orgel, and Greenblatt is immortalised 
in Montaigne‟s travel journal and essays.
8
 Montaigne writes in his journal, that on 
going through the town of Vitry he heard an anecdote of a man named Germain „who 
was a woman up to the age of twenty-two, and only noticeable as such from having 
more hair about her chin than other girls, whence she was called Bearded Mary. One 
day, making an unusual effort in a leap, her virile utensils came out, and the Cardinal 
de Lenoncourt … gave her the name of Germain‟ (1680, 529). Montaigne adds that, 
„[t]hey have still in the place a song, common in the mouths of the girls, in which 
they advise one another not to stretch their legs too wide, lest they should become 
men, as Mary Germain did‟ (1680, 529). 
Ambroise Paré reports the same incident in „Of Monsters and Prodigies‟, 
which is included in his highly influential Collected Works.
9
 He argues that the 
violence of Marie‟s leap may have produced the Galenic heat needed to overcome 
her female deficiency:  
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Certainely, women haue so many and like parts lying in 
their wombe, as men haue hanging forth; onely a strong 
and lively heat seemes to bee wanting, which may drive 
forth that which lyes hid within: therefore in processe of 
time, the heat being encreased and flourishing, and the 
humidity (which is predominant in childhood) 
overcome, it is not impossible that the virile members, 
which hitherto sluggish by defect of heat, lay hid, may 
be put forth, especially if to that strength of the growing 
heat some vehement concussion or jactation of the body 
be joined (975).  
Paré attempts to naturalise the concept of „monstrous‟ sexual degenerates, by using 
Galen‟s idea of a natural genital development, to describe these cases as examples of 
a belated natural progress. He concludes: „I thinke it manifest by these experiments 
and reasons, that it is not fabulous that some women haue beene changed into men‟ 
(975, my emphasis). 
Laqueur and Orgel argue that Montaigne and Pare‟s insistence on the possible 
truth of this story proves that Renaissance medicine allows a greater mobility within 
the sexual binary than would be conceivable in post-enlightenment science (Laqueur, 
1990, 127; Orgel, 1996, 21). The homological sex thesis could, as Greenblatt 
suggests, be considered in terms of a corporeal transvestism: it „imagines an 
individual identity emerging from the struggle between conflicting principles, the 
topographical account imagines gender as a result of the selective forcing out 
through heat of the original internal organ – like the reversal of a rubber glove – so 
that where there was only one sex, there are now two‟ (1988, 81). The body is shaped 
according to an incorporation of the internal gender identity, the appropriate heat of 
which determines its sex. As Laqueur puts it, „mind and body are so intimately 
bound that conception can be understood as having an idea, and the body is like an 
actor on stage, ready to take on the roles assigned to it by culture‟ (1990, 61).  
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The story of Marie Germaine is also quoted in Montaigne‟s essay „Of the 
Force of Imagination‟, alongside the story of Iphis from Ovid‟s Metamorphoses  
(Montaigne, 1680, 34; Ovid, 2005, 50-61; IX.666-797).  Iphis is brought up as a boy, 
and her father arranges for her to be married to another girl. Just before her marriage 
is to be consummated, Iphis is metamorphosed into a boy. As Laqueur puts it, „she 
gained a penis to match the phallus she already carried within‟ (1990, 129). Laqueur 
compares this episode to another case recounted in the works of the French anatomist 
Jacques Duval, which is also referred to directly after the Marie Germaine anecdote 
in the English anatomist Helkiah Crooke‟s Mikromosgraphia (250). According to 
Duval, a certain young female servant, Marie le Marcis, is reported to have fallen in 
love with a fellow servant, with whom she had been sharing a bed for some time. She 
declared to this woman that she was a man and proposed marriage. Since the couple 
demanded public confirmation of their love, Marie le Marcis needed a new sexual 
identity in the eyes of the community, so he/she asked to be called Marin. The 
community, however, rejected their claim and accused them of tribadism,
10
 which 
was a crime punishable by death (Laqueur, 1990, 136). Since the couple still asserted 
their innocence, a panel of surgeons was brought in to judge Marie/Marin‟s true sex. 
They all, however, declared him/her to be a woman. Only Jacques Duval, who 
specialised on hermaphrodites, found „a male organ, rather large and hard‟  by 
probing Marie‟s vulva (Duval, 403, Greenblatt‟s translation).
11
 This organ proved to 
be a penis, rather than a clitoris, since it ejaculated by Duval‟s touch (Duval, 403). 
As was common in cases of hermaphrodism,
12
 the panel commanded Marie/Marin to 
continue to wear women‟s clothes, and not to have sexual relations with either sex, 
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Laqueur states that the pivotal detail in this case is the fact that Marie/Marin 
was not immediately allowed to live as a man. He argues that the judges were less 
concerned with physical sex than Marie/Marin‟s social gender, which according to 
Laqueur, they considered to inhabit a more formative position within the subject 
(Laqueur, 1990, 137).  Such an understanding implies that the case of Marie/Marin 
anticipates 1980s and 1990s queer theory.  Judith Butler, who next to Michel 
Foucault may be considered one of the key figures of this school, famously declares 
that gender identity does not directly develop from biological sex, but rather „it is an 
identity tenuously constituted through time – an identity instituted through a stylized 
repetition of acts‟ (1999a, 179).
14
 Laqueur argues that it is the lack of a perfect 
masculine gender „act‟ that makes the judges suspicious of Marie/Marin, rather than 
a perfect male sex. He states that the council‟s reluctance to announce Marie/Marin a 
man, is a question of whether „someone who had lived all her life as a woman, had 
what it took to legitimately play a man‟ (1990, 137) –  a role, which in accordance 
with the homological sex thesis, was considered „higher‟ or „more perfected‟. 
Laqueur claims that Marie/Marin‟s period of probation was a way for him/her to earn 
his/her way into the social state of manhood: she plays and thus becomes a man 
(Laqueur, 1990, 137). 
In accordance with Butler, Laqueur thus considers the „act‟ of becoming to be  
a „speech act‟; a linguistic performative event. However, Laqueur argues that 
Renaissance performative corporeality, as defined within the homological sex thesis, 
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possesses a greater possibility of dimensional flux than Butler‟s Post-Lacanian model 
of the gendered body (1990, 109). Whereas Butler‟s performative gender becomes 
inscribed on the body, the Renaissance gender inscribes from within the body. The 
Renaissance body invokes a conception in which the flesh is not merely a canvas, but 
also a scribe. Laqueur writes: „it is the constant back and forth, the interpretative 
dialogue between the corporeal and the linguistic, which itself constitutes the 
meanings of the body in the one-flesh model [the homological sex thesis]‟ (1990, 
119). 
Greenblatt also considers the double agency of the corporeal and the 
linguistic to take part in a dialogic relationship (1988, 86-87). He confers on it an 
agency similar to a form which has become crucial to queer theory: Butler‟s idea of 
the drag act (1999a, 174-177).
15
  Greenblatt uses the episode of Marie/Marin to show 
that the anecdotes of spontaneous sex change worked as disruptions of the 
homological sexual order (1988, 85). As extra-ordinary reflections of Galen‟s idea of 
the original formation of sex, the sex changes were „imitations which effectively 
displace the meaning of the original‟ (Butler, 1999a, 176), „harnessing the dominant 
order itself to do the work of dismantling its own hierarchy of orders‟ (Meyer, 1994, 
20). Greenblatt argues that the corporeal transvestism carried out by Marie/Marin  
represents a structural identity between man and woman – identity 
revealed in the dramatic disclosure of the penis concealed behind 
the labia – but it does not present this identity as reality. On the 
contrary, in some ways the case serves to marginalize, to render 
prodigious, the old wisdom (1988, 82). 
Laqueur, Orgel and Greenblatt allow the Renaissance body to become, not 
only linguistically but also corporeally, what Elizabeth Grosz refers to as a body of 
„pure difference‟ (1990, 93):
16
 their Renaissance body is a space which despite, and 
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because of its position within a society of strict sexual norms and mandatory 
sumptuary laws
17
 has the capability to create not merely a transcendent subjectivity, 
but a transcendent corporeality (Laqueur, 1990, 139-140; Orgel, 1996, 23; 
Greenblatt, 1988, 82). It simultaneously, however, creates an adjacent space in which 
something transcendent and abstract may acquire a shape: where a conception may 
take material form. When Laqueur expresses his excitement at Montaigne‟s account 
of Iphis in „Of the Force of Imagination‟, a woman whose wish and masculine 
mental image of herself transforms her flesh into its corporeal male counterpart, he 
also expresses his excitement at the possibilities such a transformation opens up: 
allowing an abstract idea to be shaped into something material, and present.  
Laqueur makes a number of tenuous assumptions when he depicts the 
spontaneous sex changes of Marie Germaine and Marie/Marin, however. His 
reference to the panel decision to enforce an initial gender suspension in the case of 
Marie/Marin, so that the subject could „become‟ masculine, is based on authorial 
deduction rather than textual evidence. Greenblatt points out that the panel did not 
directly state that Marie/Marin would become a man (1988, 82). Not unlike the 
procedures in modern cases of transsexuality, Marie/Marin was told to wait until 
he/she reached a slightly more mature age before making a final decision.
18
 This is 
more likely to refer to his/her ability to make a definitive choice than his/her ability 
to play a man. Rather than a matter of gender, it may be a matter of distrust in a 
young subject‟s self-knowledge, considering what Thomas Wright calls „the frivolity 
of youth of either sex‟ (1604, 40). 
Sellberg    75 
 
Laqueur thus, himself, readily performs a textual metamorphosis from 
abstract source to fleshed-out historical image, through which Greenblatt‟s wish to 
„speak with the dead‟ (1988, 1) seemingly comes true. The bodies of the past are 
given a precise (although flexible) shape: they are fashioned into the embodiment of 
a modern queer ideal. Laqueur, Orgel and Greenblatt construct a material 
embodiment of a utopian space, which is theoretically and critically self-fashioned.  
Fashioning the Renaissance 
Laqueur acknowledges that his historical analysis of the past to some extent is a 
reflection of the present. He states that his analysis of the „one-sex model‟ is an 
attempt to shed further light on its successor, the „two-sex model‟: „by making 
manifest the web of knowledge and rhetoric that supported the one-sex model, I am 
setting the stage for its challengers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries‟ (1990, 
69). However, his construction of a utopian queer Renaissance also implies that 
gender and sexuality in present queer theory is a reflection of the past. As Jonathan 
Goldberg and Madhavi Menon establish in „Queering History‟ the problem with such 
an endeavour is the fact that it constructs one concept of difference on top of another 
(Goldberg & Menon, 2005, 1610).  Laqueur attempts to read his present through a 
past marked by difference, but this past is constructed by the present. A theory based 
on a past defined by its difference from the present, and a present defined by its 
difference from the past, is tautological. Although Laqueur‟s sexual genealogy may 
reveal some truths about the present, it fails to give any specificity to the past. The 
notion of queer historicising contradicts its own premises: „In its turn against 
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universalism, historicism has replicated universalist assumptions‟ (Goldberg & 
Menon, 2005, 1610). 
Laqueur, Orgel, and Greenblatt construct Renaissance ways of thinking in 
terms of opposition to modern teleology. Laqueur develops a model in which the 
conception of sexual difference changes dramatically from a „one-sex model‟ to a 
„two-sex model‟ at some point during the nineteenth century, re-shaping the 
foundations of sexual logic. Laqueur states that „the emipirically testable claims of 
the old model, which represent and are represented by the transcendental claim that 
there exists but one sex, are so farfetched to the modern scientific imagination that it 
takes a strenuous effort to understand how reasonable people could ever have held 
them‟ (1990, 69). Orgel makes similar claims of difference, arguing that concepts a 
modern mind may consider contradictory, were readily accepted without much 
reflection (1996, 20).  
The historical validity of these declarations of difference is dubious. Angus 
McLaren points out in his review of Making Sex, that the homological sex thesis was 




 Also, the sexual fluidity derived 
from this conception was not as straight-forward. The question remains, however, 
whether Greenblatt, Laqueur and Orgel‟s idea of Renaissance self-fashioning is 
entirely fictional, or if there is some degree of a historical basis for the idea of self-
fashionable sex to be found within the early modern medical sources. So far, this and 
the previous chapter have suggested that the advocates of Renaissance self-
fashioning, here specifically Greenblatt, Laqueur and Orgel, tend to form rather 
biased readings of the Renaissance, but to what extent are their narratives actually 
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drawn from the ideas more unequivocally embedded in the historical material 
referred to? 
Although anatomists like Ambroise Paré attempt to show how spontaneous 
sex changes can be explained through contemporary medicine, he never claims, as 
Laqueur, Greenblatt and Orgel suggest, that they were part of a „natural‟ paradigm. 
Paré discusses the sex changes in „Of Monsters and Prodigies‟, the title of which 
indicates that they are not „natural‟. Paré attempts to merge the mythical and the 
metaphysical with the natural, a project which was popular in the period.
20
 He notes 
that there are numerous occurrences of spontaneous sex changes in Classical 
mythology. In Chapter 5 entitled „Of the changing of Sexe‟, he invokes the authority 
of Pliny to show that traditionally, „such monsters did alwaies shew or portend some 
monstrous thing‟ (Paré, 1634, 975).
 21
 The sex changes are not Paré‟s main focus, 
however. They are merely one of a myriad of monstrous creatures portrayed in 
Classical sources. Alongside his attempt to provide a natural explanation for 
spontaneous sex change, Paré thus provides illustrations and natural explanations to 
the generation of mermaids, centaurs, celestial beasts, and a number of half-
human/half-beasts (1634, 961-980). 
In „The Case of Marie Germain‟, Patricia Parker notes that Paré‟s  „Of 
Monsters and Prodigies‟ was part of a vogue for monster and prodigy literature, in 
which it formed „a popular and even pornographically stimulating part‟ (1993, 
337).
22
 Its power of titillation lay in the fact that it encountered the perverse or 
unnatural. Laqueur, Greenblatt and Orgel‟s interpretation of this particular work as a 
common conception of sexual reality is thus rather skewed. The other more scientific 
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works collected in The workes of that famous chirurgion Ambrose Parey often 
challenge rather than affirm the early modern reliance on Galen‟s homological sex 
thesis. In „Of the Generation of Man‟ Paré describes a number of women, whose 
wombs have actually fallen out of their vaginas, in a manner akin to the anecdotes of 
spontaneous sex change: „it comes out of the necke and a great portion thereof 
appeares without the privie parts‟ (1634, 934). He gives many possible reasons for 
these occurrences, but none of them are related to excessive or „manly‟ heat. He also 
recounts: „I remember that once I cured a young woman who had her wombe 
hanging out of her privie parts as big as an egge‟ (934). This narrative gives an 
expressly non-phallic impression of the protruding female genitalia. It also concurs 
with an anti-Galenic objection to the homological sex thesis, made by French 
physician, Jacques Duval: „If you imagine the vulva completely turned inside out… 
you will have to envisage a large-mouthed bottle hanging from the woman, a bottle 
whose mouth rather than base would be attached to the body and which would bear 
no resemblance to what you had set out to imagine‟ (Duval, 1603, 375).
23
 
Orgel bases a large part of his discussion of the homological sex thesis on 
Mikromosgraphia by the English anatomist Helkiah Crooke, which he explains to be 
„the authoritative compendium of anatomical and sexual knowledge‟ in Jacobean 
England (1996, 156, note 8). Orgel claims that Crooke accepts Galen‟s homological 
sex thesis „with minor reservations‟ (1996, 21). Laqueur, contrarily, refers to Crooke 
as an adversary of the homological sex thesis, although a rather unsuccessful 
opponent. Crooke, in fact, writes in the „Controuersis‟ to Book IV: „me thinks it is 
very absurd to say, that the necke of the wombe inuerted is like the member of a 
man‟ (1615, 249). He goes on, in the „Controuersis‟ to the next book, to argue,  
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Those things which Galen vrgeth concerning the similitude of the 
parts of generatiõ or their differing only in scite and position, many 
men do esteeme very absurd … Wherefore we must not thinke that 
the Female is an imperfect Male differing onely in the position of 
the Genitals (271).  
Rather than validating the homological sex thesis, Crooke gives a distinct 
lecture on Aristotelian functionalism, according to which all species of animals are 
measured against one specific state of natural perfection (1999, 33-36; 192b8-b18). 
In accordance with this, Crooke explains that „the perfection of all naturall things is 
to be esteemed and measured by the end‟ (271). He argues, in reference to Aristotle 
and Galen, that the sexes cannot be distinguished and divided up in the same way as 
the species: „This difference of the Sexes do not make the essentiall distinctions of 
the creature‟ since „we know that the Male and Female are both of one kinde, & 
onely differ in cerraine accidents‟ (271). However, Crooke disagrees with the 
conclusion that since there is only one state of perfection within the human species, 
there is also one more perfect and one less perfect sex.
24 
According to Crooke the 
female is as important in nature as the male: „we thinke that Nature intendeth the 
Generation of a Female as of a Male‟ (271). 
Crooke blames Aristotle for the fact that the less perfect female is sometimes 
portrayed as something less natural than the male: „hee … saith, that the female is a 
by worke or preuarication, yea the first monster in Nature‟ (271).
25
 In Crooke‟s 
opinion Galen follows Aristotle „something too neere‟ (271), similarly claiming that 
females are produced accidentally; that they are the imperfect results of insufficient 
productive heat. Since both males and females are necessary for procreation, neither 
form can be accidental or unnatural (Crooke, 271).  Women are not imperfect, nor 
monstrous in Crookes eyes. The monstrously sexed to him are the people who do not 
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adhere strictly to the sexual boundary: the very products that Orgel, Laqueur and 
Greenblatt attempt to make space for in the Renaissance sexual paradigm. Crooke 
describes monstrosity „[i]n the Sex, when they are of an vncertaine Sex, so that you 
may doubt whether it be a Male or a Female, or both, as Hermaphrodites‟ (299). 
Orgel quotes a number of sequences from Helkiah Crooke‟s work where the 
author according to him is expressing Galenic ideas. He refers to a chapter on the 
male genitals, in which Crooke claims that „the Testicles in Men are larger, and of a 
hotter nature then in women…; heat abounding in men thrusts them forth of the 
body, whereas in women they remain within, because their dull and sluggish heat is 
not sufficient to thrust them out‟ (Orgel, 1996, 22; Crooke, 206). Orgel also quotes 
Crooke‟s account „Of the proportion of these parts both in men and women‟ (Orgel, 
1996, 21; Crooke, 216), where the author writes that „a woman is so much lesse 
perfect then a man by how much her heate is lesse and weaker then his‟ (Orgel, 
1996, 21; Crooke, 216). Orgel, however, disregards the fact that Crooke starts these 
particular accounts of the difference between the sexes with „Galen saieth‟ (Orgel, 
1996, 21; Crooke, 205; 216). He notes sequences where Crooke expressly makes a 
contrary argument, but quickly dismisses these, claiming that „ambiguity is in no 
way unusual in the period‟ (Orgel, 1996, 22).  
Mikromosgraphia is not a seat of ambiguity. Crooke devises a clear structure 
throughout the work: he states the particulars of different common medical 
discussions in his „chapters‟, and his own thoughts and objections on the subjects in 
subsequent „controuersies‟. This Socratic form of arguments and counter-arguments 
produces most of the „ambiguities‟ that Orgel uses to dismiss Crooke‟s anti-Galenic 




 In his chapter on male genitals, Crooke quickly brushes past stories 
where an „operative heat‟ in „truth‟ has transformed certain women into men (1615, 
217). However, in question 8 of the „controuersies‟ to the same chapter, entitled 
„How the parts of generation in men and women doe differ‟ (249) Crooke ponders 
the reality of these stories more minutely, reminding his readership that the Galenic 
inversion does not add up anatomically. He recounts a number of incidents from 
Ancient, as well as modern sources, one of which is the story of Marie Germaine. He 
concludes: „But what shall we say to those so many stories of women changed into 
men? Truely, I think saith he, all of them monstrous and some not credible‟ (250). 
Like Paré, Crooke thus refers these anecdotes to the realm of the monstrous, or 
unnatural: „it may well be answered that such parties were Hermaphrodites, that is, 
had the parts of both sexes‟ (250). 
Orgel draws similarly hasty conclusions in his discussion of the English 
physician Sir Thomas Browne‟s Pseudodoxia Epidemica. Orgel initially quotes from 
the middle section of Browne‟s chapter „Of Hares‟, where the physician disclaims 
the homological sex thesis: „though Galen do favour the opinion, that the distinctive 
parts of sexes are onely different in position, that is inversion or protrusion, yet will 
this hardly be made out from the Anatomy of those parts, the testicles being so seated 
in the female that they admit not of protrusion, and the necke of the matrix wanting 
those parts which are discoverable in the organ of virility‟ (1646, 228).
27
 Orgel 
proceeds to quote the beginning of the chapter, where Browne phrases the dilemma 
he is trying to solve: „As for the mutation of sexes, or transition into one another, we 
cannot deny it in Hares, it being observable in Man‟ (226). Browne includes the 
following marginal gloss, beside the paragraph in question: „Transmutation of Sexes, 
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viz. of women into Men, granted‟ (226) Orgel treats the combination of his initial 
quotation and this affirmative claim as a definite ambiguity: 
Granted! Women are totally different from men from before the 
moment of birth, even in the womb, and their genital organs „admit 
not of protrusion‟, yet the possibility of their transformation into 
men goes without saying … these are for Browne, as for 
Montaigne, Ambroise Paré, and much of the time for Helkiah 
Crooke, facts (1996, 23). 
This conclusion is not merely hasty, but thoroughly false. The complexities of 
Browne‟s argument make it perfectly clear that the marginal note merely grants 
incidences believed to be sex changes to have taken place in hares and in humans. 
However, considering the anatomical impossibility of such occurrences, he comes to 
the same conclusion as Helkiah Crooke: both the hares and the humans in question 
must have been hermaphrodites: „the examples hereof have undergone no reall or 
new transexion, but were Androgynally borne, and under some kind of 
Hermaphrodites‟ (1646, 228). Browne, like Crooke and Paré, invokes the idea of the 
unnatural. He concedes that all hares may seem to have two sexes, but he deduces 
that there are merely a few that do. What had seemed during his investigations to be 
a male generative organ on female hares had, by dissection, been proved to be „little 
bags or tumors‟ (230). He finally concludes that there are monstrous aberrations of 
sex among hares and humans: „Now as we must acknowledge this Androgynall 
condition in man, so can we not deny the like doth happen in beasts … but that the 
whole species or kinde should be bisexous or double-sexed, we cannot affirme‟ 
(Browne, 1646, 229).  
Early modern conceptions of sex certainly appear different from what 
Laqueur calls the „two-sex model‟ of late twentieth- and early twenty-first century 
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thought. The difference may not be as directly opposite as Greenblatt, Laqueur and 
Orgel suggest, however. Perhaps the most striking feature of the discourse is the fact 
that we can talk about early modern conceptions in the plural. Montaigne, Paré, 
Crooke and Browne all have different conceptions of Renaissance sexual difference, 
as do the modern critics of the subject.
28
 There is enough flexibility within the 
conceptual paradigm for the early modern ideas of sexual difference to be open to 
discussion both to past and present thinkers. Susan Zimmermann suggests in The 
Early Modern Corpse and Shakespeare’s Theatre that the Renaissance idea of the 
body was the space that was fluent at the time, rather than the Renaissance body as 
one coherent concept (24-66).
29
  
Anti-Theatrical Fear of Fashioning 
In addition to the early modern medical sources, Stephen Orgel‟s general argument 
in Impersonations relies heavily on the anti-theatrical polemicists. Orgel claims that 
the all-male casts on the English Renaissance stage are indicative of his proposed 
early modern conception of gender flexibility. He argues that all boys were 
considered to have travelled towards masculine perfection through the lower stages 
on the sexual scale (1996, 20). Orgel thus creates the image of a society where each 
male body to some degree was considered an actor. Lisa Jardine notes that the 
criticism preceding the new historicist movement agreed that the concept of the 
transvestite boy actress was thought of as a „“verisimilitude” by the Elizabethan 
audience, who simply disregarded it, as we would disregard the creaking of stage 
scenery and accept the backcloth forest as “real” for the duration of the play‟ (1992, 
57). Orgel‟s work, in which boys and women are both imperfect men (1996, 20), 
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suggests the possibility of an Elizabethan audience that would have considered boy 
actresses „natural‟. 
The ideas of sexual flux and queer gender self-fashioning are thus transported 
onto the context of the Renaissance stage, and particularly into the early modern 
criticism of the stage. Laura Levine argues in Men in Women’s Clothing that the anti-
theatrical writers believed the theatre to possess an almost magical power of 
metamorphoses (1994, 12).
30
 She refers to a passage where Stephen Gosson 
describes playwrights as „the cuppes of Circes, that turne reasonable creatures into 
brute beastes‟ (1579, 10). She notes that Phillip Stubbes makes a similar claim when 
he argues against people wearing the apparel of their opposite sex: „I neuer read nor 
heard of any people except drunkē with Cyrces cups, or poysoned with the exorcisins 
of Medea that famous and renoumed, that euer woulde weare suche kinde of attire‟ 
(1583, F5v). Levine claims that these invocations of witchcraft in relation to drama 
and theatrical cross-dressing may indicate that the anti-theatrical writers were 
anxious that performance of femininity would literally turn the transvestite actors 
into women. As Donald Perret acknowledges in his review of Men in Women’s 
Clothing, the leaps of deduction in Levine‟s study reveals that it „owes much to the 
new historicists‟ interpretation of the Renaissance as that era in which power 
„“manifests itself in theatrical ways”, and where “selves construct themselves in 
theatrical ways”‟ (1996, 175). 
Orgel and Levine especially emphasise one section from Phillip Stubbes‟s 
The Anatomie of Abuses: „Our Apparell was giuen vs as a signe distinctiue to discern 
betwixt sex and sex, & therfore one to weare the Apparel of another sex, is to 
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participate with the same, and to adulterate the veritie of his owne kinde. Wherefore 
these Women may not improperly be called Hermaphroditi, that is, monsters of 
bothe kindes, half women, half men‟ (Stubbes, 1583, F5v; Orgel, 27). Like Levine, 
Orgel connects this idea to the new historicist notion of theatrical subjectivity. He 
claims that „it is the fragility, the radical instability of our essence, that is assumed 
here, and the metamorphic quality of our sinful nature‟ (Orgel, 27). According to 
Orgel, the fear of gender transgression from either sex implies that the sexes were 
imbued with a certain plasticity and that the sexual boundaries could be transversed: 
if a woman is made less female by virtue of her deficient apparel, she could certainly 
also be made  more male if she were to wear appropriate masculine clothing (1996, 
27). Orgel thus argues that the boy actresses on the English stage were to a certain 
degree conceived of as women (1996, 25).  
Orgel‟s conclusion is somewhat hasty, however. The fact that appropriate 
gender status is easily lost does not necessarily imply that it is as easily gained. 
Stubbes here expresses an idea of gender that is far from plastic within the acceptable 
gender norms: appropriate gender performance is conceived of as a strict and static 
piece of legislation, which immediately disqualifies the subject from his/her 
gendered status if he/she is slightly aberrant.  Stubbes‟s exclamation against women 
wearing men‟s clothes is part of a larger discussion of the implications of the biblical 
commandments,
31
 in this case „Deuteronomy 22‟,
32
 which emphasises the 
impossibility of change within the boundaries of human nature.
33
 A woman wearing 
men‟s apparel is certainly not metamorphosed into a man, she becomes something 
altogether other. Stubbes implies that a change from woman to man would be 
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preferable to the current course of events, „as now they degenerat from godly sober 
women‟ (1583, F5v).  
Like Stubbes, William Prynne also argues vehemently for a static natural 
essence,
34
 which is the opposite of new historicist self-fashioning. Prynne is 
vehement in his judgement of each person‟s essential „true‟ gender: „it is a shameful 
and dishonest thing for a man to become a woman, and to appeare in the forme of a 
woman. And it is againe a most abominable thing for women to become men, (as 
many of haire-clipping moderne impudent Viragoes doe) and to weare the apparell of 
a man‟ (1633, 188, my emphasis). Gosson similarly argues that it „is in outwarde 
signes to shelve them selues otherwise then they are, and so with in the compasse of 
a lye‟ (1582, C4, my emphasis). Prynne and Gosson object to the fact that these 
people „dishonestly‟ soil and belie their essential gender; what „they are‟. Like 
Stubbes, they do not consider the wearers of the opposite gender‟s garments to be 
less gendered, or more like the other gender, but rather soiled and sinful members of 
their own essential gender: 
For why being a man, wilt thou not seeme to be that which thou art 
borne? Why dost thou take unto thy selfe a different forme? Why 
dost thou feine thy selfe a woman, or thou woman thy selfe to be a 
man? Nature hath clothed every sex with its owne garments 
(Prynne, 1633, 191-192). 
Prynne concludes that these people are outside of the scope of humanity. He 
condemns the manly female „Viragoes‟, claiming that „nature herselfe abhors to see a 
woman shorne or polled; a woman with cut haire is a filthy spectacle, and much like 
a monster‟ (201). He is equally severe about men in female attire: „What Monster, or 
what Prodigy is this? They deny themselves to be men, and yet are such: They would 
be reputed women, but the quality of their body confesseth the contrary‟ (195). 
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The anti-theatrical writers represent an extreme and at this time relatively 
marginal discourse within English Renaissance society.
35
 As Greenblatt points out in 
„Fiction and Friction‟, these texts are deliberately chosen by the new historicists 
because of their marginality. The texts represent the „sands of the aberrant‟ where the 
conception of the normal is constructed (Greenblatt, 1988, 86).
36
 The texts in 
question interestingly also deal with the idea of normality.  The anti-theatrical writers 
attempt to define the limits of the „normal‟, similarly to the way that the anatomical 
writers define the limits of the „natural‟. Orgel argues that the fact that the concept of 
„normality‟ and „naturality‟ is discussed at all in relation to gender transgressions is a 
sign of disruption in the gender discourse of the time (1996, 18-30). This is 
undeniably a significant point: if the anti-theatrical and anatomical writers feel that 
the gender norms need to be re-established, it is reasonable to assume that they are 
not entirely stable. Orgel, however, unequivocally looks at normality as a 
measurement of sexual discourse. What if the sexual discourse were to be considered 
a reflection of the broader discourse of normality instead?  
The medical sources, as well as the anti-theatrical sources, evoke more 
questions about the borders of humanity than the transition between the sexes: 
Crooke, Paré, Browne, Prynne and Stubbes do not merely refer to sexual and gender 
deviations as sexually different or slightly monstrous men and women – they are 
inhuman sex-less monsters, hermaphrodites, prodigies and abominations (Crooke, 
217; Paré, 975; Browne, 228; Prynne, 195; Stubbes, F5v). The fact that the static 
sexes are continually used as signs of normal human behaviour or anatomy is a sign 
of the extent to which the gender discourse remains unproblematised. Gender- and/or 
sexual transgression is considered inconceivably monstrous because sex is thought to 




 The concept that is truly being evoked and 
interrogated is the monstrous, or aberrant. The question is: why were Renaissance 
thinkers so particularly interested in the aberrant? I propose that they were drawn to 
the boundaries of the conceivable for the same reason that the new historicists are: 
they attempt to define the limits of their identities. The narratives of monstrosity are 
part of the „sands of the aberrant‟ that the Renaissance writers use to establish their 
own idea of normality. 
Monstrosity and Difference 
In The Order of Things Foucault outlines the traditional ways in which the modern 
concept of nature is considered to have developed: „Histories of ideas or of the 
sciences ... credit the seventeenth century, and especially the eighteenth, with a new 
curiosity: the curiosity that caused them, if not to discover the sciences of life, at 
least to give them a hitherto unsuspected scope and precision‟ (136). The 
development of this interest is a straightforward move from the theologically based 
philosophy of the middle ages, towards a secular conception of a natural order. The 
basis of thought, which used to be an omni-potent deity, is gradually exchanged for a 
guiding spirit referred to as „Nature‟ (Foucault, 2002, 137).  
Foucault argues that the philosophers of the late seventeenth century began to 
introduce classifications and categorisation to human experience: before this „life 
itself did not exist. All that existed was living beings, which were viewed through a 
grid of knowledge constituted by natural history‟ (2002, 139).
38
 Life was not a 
concept and identity was not yet spatialised. There was a „history of living beings, 
the history of things, and the history of words‟, but „man is not himself historical‟ 
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(Foucault, 2002, 403). Not until the eighteenth century approached its end „there 
appears another, more radical, history, that of man himself – a history that now 
concerns man‟s very being, since he now realizes that he not only “has history” all 
around him, but is himself, in his own historicity, that by means of which a history of 
human life, a history of economics, and a history of languages are given their form‟ 
(2002, 403).
39
 Foucault thus argues that history and temporal categorising and 
narrative at this point became a pre-requisite for identity formation.
40
 
According to this model, the nineteenth century thus provided a platform on 
which new human identities; the first modern identity spaces could be formed.
41
 The 
analyses of the experienced world only then became fully corporealised: before this 
time a body could not fashion or perform its own identity, for bodies were 
identifiable as part of a broader network of relations between sameness and 
difference; kinds and species Foucault, 2002, 136-137).
 
Foucault thus argues that 
Renaissance thinkers could not fully conceive of the concept of modern identity.
42
 
However, it was in the process of becoming and the Renaissance discourse of 
monstrosity was a pivotal part of this development (Foucault, 2002, 164-177).
43
 
Levine‟s Men in Women’s Clothing constructs the Renaissance psyche as a 
site of instability and conflict.
44
 She also adds that it harbours „the antithesis between 
a monstrous self and “no inherent self”‟ (23). For Levine, the concept of monstrosity, 
although implicated in the rise of modern identity, does not inhabit a dimension 
which could be considered synonymous with it (23-24).
45
 According to Foucault, 
however, monstrosity was central to the evolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth-
century body of knowledge. Foucault argues in The Order of Things that additionally 
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to being the catalysts of a scientific classifying development and the roots of a less 
biologically static evolutionary thinking (164-168), monsters and prodigies were 
fore-runners in the formation of modern identity (172). Monsters, in their 
unnaturalness, provided a blueprint from which the Renaissance thinkers could 
project the structure of the binary between „natural‟ and „unnatural‟ being. Monsters 
were connected to human being, but they were also „things‟ that could be historicised 
(Foucault, 2002, 166-167).  
Since the discourse of monstrosity is foundational to the establishment of 
natural science, it has been duly researched within the fields of philosophy and 
history of science.
46
 Interestingly, however, considering the numerous other 
scientific discourses invoked, this discourse has not been analysed to any greater 
length by Greenblatt‟s 1980s and 1990s followers of new historicist gender and 
sexuality.
47
 This fact is curious, considering monstrosity‟s pivotal position both in 
the Foucauldian model they claim to adhere to and the sexual discourse at work 
within the Renaissance sources they consult:
 48
  most of the major anatomical and 
anti-theatrical works quoted by Orgel, Laqueur and Greenblatt refer to monstrosity at 
least in passing (Crooke, 217; Paré, 975; Browne, 228; Prynne, 195; Stubbes, F5v).  
Katherine Park and Lorraine Daston note in „Unnatural Conceptions‟ that 
stories of monsters and prodigies had been invoked for literary, religious, socially 
constructive and political purposes throughout the middle ages (22). According to 
Arnold I. Davidson, Martin Luther and Philip Melanchton‟s usage of prodigious 
births in 1523 as a device against the Catholic Church,
49
 spurred on a sudden 
increase of monster and prodigy narratives in religious contexts (37-40). The newly 
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founded interest in natural science, which appeared throughout Renaissance Europe, 
interestingly merged with religious dogma: the religiously deviant was represented 
by biological discourses (Park & Daston, 1981, 23-25).
50
 It thus created the 
foundation of a discourse in which the binary of the natural and the unnatural as well 
as the natural and the supernatural crossed paths and juxtaposed, unsettling the 
boundaries between these concepts (Park & Daston, 25).
51
 
According to Davidson, the church used the sense of horror produced by the 
tales of monsters and prodigies in order to frighten people into submission. The 
church thus created a direct link between the moral order and the order of nature, in 
which monstrous children are produced by monstrous deeds: „the resulting bestial 
creature is a symbolic representation of God‟s wrath, and the reaction of horror we 
have to such hideous creatures is intended to remind us of, and to impress upon us, 
the horror of the sin itself‟ (Davidson, 1991, 47).
52
 Because of this link, words such 
as „natural‟ and „unnatural‟ are used in reference to deeds as well as to phenomena. 
The course of nature was considered synonymous with God‟s will (Davidson, 1991, 
48). 
The scientific interest in monsters successively dissolved the link between 
Christian morals and nature (Park & Daston, 1981, 52). When scientific works, such 
as Helkiah Crooke‟s Mikromosgraphia (and to some degree also Ambroise Paré‟s On 
Monsters and Prodigies) form causal explanations of monstrous births; theories that 
were perfectly coherent with the rules of nature, monsters and prodigies could no 
longer be referred to as „unnatural‟. The naturalisation of the horrific objects 
displaced the sense of horror that was considered the observer‟s „natural‟ reaction 
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according to the religious explanations of monsters (Daston, 1991, 120). According 
to Park and Daston‟s unacknowledged though curiously Foucauldian reading of the 
history of monstrosity, this displacement created a paradigm shift (1981, 53).
53
  
Katherine Park and Lorraine Daston argue in „Unnatural Conceptions‟ that 
once the monstrous births had been stripped of their religious connotations, they 
were „presented as natural wonders or secrets – the visible effects of hidden causes 
known only to a few – it gained a new aura of intellectual respectability‟ (1981, 40). 
Rather than being a separate concept with distinct and discrete associations, 
monstrous creatures were used in all branches of the natural sciences: „they 
approached monsters as special cases in the established fields of comparative 
anatomy and embryology rather than as items in a heterogeneous category composed 
solely of anomalies‟ (Park & Daston, 1981, 52). The idea of the prodigious sign was 
demystified, along with the interpretative school that surrounded it. The discourse of 
monstrosity, however, remained a reflective tool; a means to re-consider the stigmas 
of „natural‟ and „unnatural‟ attached to the sciences (Park & Daston, 1981, 52-53).  
Lorraine Daston further investigates the usage of the discourse of monstrosity 
in a subsequent article, „Marvelous Facts and Miraculous Evidence in Early Modern 
Europe‟. She particularly focuses on the work of seventeenth-century writer and 
philosopher Francis Bacon, who vehemently denies any room for religious 
connotations to natural phenomena. He notes in Novum Organum that „some modern 
Men guilty of much levity, have so indulged this vanity, that they have essayed to 
sound natural Philosophy in the first Chapter of Genesis‟ (10, original emphasis).
54
 
This tendency has taken them on a false route:  „the corruption of Philosophy through 
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superstition and intermixed Divinity … works much mischief, both to Philosophy in 
general and particular‟ (1667, 10). Bacon wants to eradicate what he calls the „Idols 
or false Images, which besiege Mens minds‟ (1667, 4), and interpret and learn from 
nature anew. He lists „Diviantes‟ and „Monsters‟; creatures formed „when Nature 
declines and goes aside from its ordinary course‟ (1667, 31) as „instances‟ that 
should be catalogued because „he that knows the ways of Nature, he shall with more 
ease observe its deviations. And again, he that understands its Deviations can better 
discover its ordinary ways and methods‟ (1667, 31).
55
  
Bacon‟s argument became central in the construction of a scientific thinking 
which was not merely observatory, but also analytical (Park & Daston, 1981, 43-51). 
According to Foucault, the natural sciences had up to this point followed an 
Aristotelian tradition of natural historicising.
56
 The earlier Renaissance scientists 
engaged in writing innumerable histories of natural phenomena (Foucault, 2002, 
140). It was an attempt to understand all the elements of the natural world, through a 
unitary, temporally- and visually one-dimensional system: „The history of a living 
being was that living being itself‟ (Foucault, 2002, 140). The concept of natural 
development and continuity, which is an important component in modern 
evolutionary theories, was not merely non-existent, but had no room to develop 
within this closely taxonomical system (Foucault, 2002, 169).  
Francis Bacon criticises his predecessors in Novum Organum. He considers 
the methods of Aristotle and his followers to be „Anticipations of nature, because it is 
rash and hasty‟ (1667, 3), whereas the sort of science he believes would be more 
beneficiary is an „interpretation of Nature‟ (1667, 3). Bacon complains that 
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Aristotelian science has built up a structure, which is used by scientists in a manner 
not unlike the workings of superstition on „vulgar‟ minds (1667, 4-9). Aristotle‟s 
philosophy in general adhered to this overly simplistic system, according to Bacon: 
„By his Logick he corrupted natural Philosophy made the world consist of Categories 
attributed to the humane Soul (1667, 9). The Aristotelian tradition continually 
attempts to fit phenomena and events to Aristotle‟s pre-conceived taxonomical 
method: „And though a greater strength and number of contrary instances occur, yet 
it doth either not observe, or contemn them, or remove, or reject them by a 
distinction not without great and dangerous prejudice‟ (1667, 5). Bacon claims that a 
more useful system would be formed if the sciences should turn their methodology 
around, and build their view on the instances of failure to the norm: „the strength of a 
negative Instance is greater in constituting every Axiom‟ (1667, 5). 
What Bacon argues then is that the development of an evaluative natural 
science could not proceed unless natural history learnt to consider itself historically. 
It needed to trace itself back to its original structure. Bacon and his contemporaries 
started to view the Aristotelian tradition in a critical manner. Rather than referring to 
similarities and norms, like Aristotle, they attempted to outline the borderlines of 
nature, introducing differences and deviations in the scientific accounts (Park & 
Daston, 1981, 43-51). They described the shapes and multitudes of nature‟s 
monsters, or as Foucault puts it „the background noise, as it were, the endless 
murmur of nature‟ (2002, 169).  
The recognition and interpretation of monstrous „background noise‟ enabled 
the Renaissance scientists to look not merely to the universalised form, which had 
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been created through taxonomical tradition, but also to the principles that had 
precipitated its creation. Foucault states that „the proliferation of monsters without a 
future is necessary to enable us to work down again from the continuum, through a 
temporal series to the table‟ (2002, 170). As an embodiment of that which does not 
fit into the taxonomy, „the monster provides an account, as through caricature, of the 
genesis of difference‟ (Foucault, 171), and thus of the principle that structures the 
system of sameness.  
Lorraine Daston‟s „Marvelous Facts and Miraculous Evidence‟ adheres to 
Foucault‟s idea of the monster as an early modern catalyst. Daston approaches the 
concept from a slightly different angle, however. The medieval conception of reality, 
according to Daston, basically divided phenomena into two groups: the natural and 
the supernatural. In coherence with the Aristotelian tradition, the natural phenomena 
were seen as the habitual custom of nature. The supernatural events, on the other 
hand, were considered to be the hidden course of the power above. Since natural 
history was constructed as a system of sameness there were a number of strange and 
singular creatures and events which did not fit the taxonomical mould, despite the 
fact that they clearly belonged to the natural rather than the divine realm. These were 
referred to as the preternatural (Daston, 1991, 98-100). Daston explains:  
Although preternatural phenomena were in theory difficult to 
distinguish from natural events (since they belonged to the same, 
lower order of causation), and in practice difficult to distinguish 
from supernatural events (since they evoked the same sense of 
astonishment and wonder), they nonetheless constituted a third 
ontological domain until the late seventeenth century (1991, 99). 
As Davidson argues, the preternatural phenomena were used as a link between the 
divine and the natural realms through their ontological ambiguity, taking the roles of 
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signs within the communication between God and humanity (Davidson, 1991, 37-
43). Daston notes that „churches had long displayed curiosities of no particular 
religious significance, such as giant‟s bones, ostrich eggs, and unicorn horns, 
alongside splinters of the true cross and other more conventional objects of devotion‟ 
(1991, 106). When these phenomena were naturalised, they did not immediately lose 
their signification. They remained highly charged objects often called upon by 
reformers since, as John Spencer wrote in 1665, the word monster or prodigy gave 
„every pitiful prodigy-monger … credit enough with the People‟ (Daston, 1991, 
108).  
Francis Bacon‟s decision to use monsters as the catalysts of his new scientific 
thinking was thus highly controversial, but cleverly effective (Park & Daston, 1981, 
43-51).
57
 If the preternatural had once been conceived as the signature of God, Bacon 
seems intent on now making it the signature of nature, something which would 
render a human signature possible.
58
 Bacon thus takes the monster discourse in an 
opposite direction, controlling nature, as it had formerly been controlled by people‟s 
idea of what could be natural. He develops an idea of self-reflection, the act of 
„reveal[ing] the common forms‟ (1667, 30) and recognises this reflection as a means 
of control.  
Foucault considers this revelation to have been the first stage of modern 
identity. The idea that man had a position in scientific reasoning, as a thinking entity, 
made its first entry into the field of science, and thus into the way humanity 
conceived itself (2002, 136 -177). Bacon‟s Novum Organum establishes that this 
statement is substantiated, and that this discovery furthermore made room for an 
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acknowledgement of human discursive constructs. Bacon recognised a monstrous 
streak within each part of nature, as a reflective part of each well-formed creature. 
The monstrous was thus part of the formation of the abstract concept signified by the 
term human identity: it dwelled in its very structure. It is not a monstrous identity, as 
Laura Levine suggests (1994, 23): Bacon shows that the monstrous is an integral part 
of the embryonic pre-modern subjective identity, at the stage it had reached by the 
mid-seventeenth century. 
Monsters in (Natural) History 
Davidson notes that there is a marked difference between the works published early 
into the transition of the preternatural phenomena into marginal natural phenomena 
(1991, 43-46). Earlier anatomists such as Ambroise Paré, whose „Of Monsters and 
Prodigies‟ was first published in 1564, exposes an ambivalently semi-superstitious 
approach to monstrous births, whereas Helkiah Crooke, who wrote Mikromosgraphia 
in 1615, delivers an objectively scientific view of monsters and prodigies.
59
 
There are obvious structural differences in Paré‟s and Crooke‟s treatment of 
monsters and prodigies. Paré constructs a separate treatise discussing only monsters 
and prodigies, which was included in his more compendious anatomical Collected 
Works later. He thus treats the concept of monstrosity as an independent 
phenomenon. Although it was included in a work of natural science, it was not quite 
adopted as part of any of the natural concepts. The work „Of Monsters and Prodigies‟ 
contains a particular group of facts, alongside other separate areas of knowledge such 
as „Of the Generation of Man‟ and „Of the Anatomy of Man‟s Body‟.  
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In Crooke‟s Mikromosgraphia, monsters are introduced primarily in a sub-
section, Question XIIII of Book 5, entitled „Of Monsters and Hermaphrodites‟. 
Crooke, however, also refers to monstrous differences in certain men and women in 
Book 4, Question VIII, „How the Parts of Generation in Men and Women Doe 
Differ‟. The monstrous births are included in different parts of the work, and Crooke 
attempts to conceive of the concepts in the same light as the rest of the natural 
phenomena to a completely different degree than Paré does. As mentioned above, 
Crooke even discusses whether or not, as Aristotle is said to have claimed, the 
female sex is an „Error or Monster in Nature‟ (1615, 270) in the chapter „Of the 
Difference of the Sexes‟, but concludes that it is not (1615, 270). The fact that 
Crooke finds it a matter of discussion whether something as commonplace within 
scientific thought as the female sex may be conceived of as a monster is a sign of 
how far monstrosity had been incorporated into the natural sciences.  
Davidson also notes that Paré differentiates between monsters and prodigies 
(1991, 43). Paré distinguishes prodigies as supernatural phenomena, „those things 
which happen contrary to the whole course of nature: as, if a woman should bee 
delivered of a Snake, or a Dogge‟ (1634, 961), whereas monsters belong to the 
sphere of the preternatural „what things soever are brought forth contrary to the 
common decree and order of nature. So wee terme that infant monstrous, which is 
borne with one arme alone or with two heads‟ (1634, 961). In writing a treatise on 
monsters and prodigies, Paré thus still considers the preternatural as associated to the 
supernatural, rather than a fully incorporated part of the natural order. Although his 
account strives to produce a natural explanation to monstrosity, he also 
acknowledges the religious signification assigned to the more extreme of monstrous 
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births: „But to conclude, those Monsters are thought to portend some ill, which are 
much differing from their nature‟ (1634, 961).  
Paré‟s ambivalent attitude towards the concept he is treating is apparent 
throughout „Of Monsters and Prodigies‟. Like his religious predecessors on the 
subject, he mixes a great variety of curious creatures: there are rather ordinary 
„monsters‟ of the sea, crocodiles and ostriches; entirely mythical „monsters‟ like half-
animal centaurs and mermaids; and there are malformed creatures of various species 
(1634). Park and Daston claim that such mixture was common among the secular 
monster writers of the period: they directly transferred the discourse of monstrosity 
from religious to scientific contexts. Like the non-religious relics in the Catholic 
churches, all slightly different phenomena were „granted honorary monstrous status 
by virtue of their rarity‟ (Park & Daston, 1981, 36).  
Davidson further notes that Paré acknowledges the fact that the naturalisation 
of monstrosity to some degree displaces the horror that formerly signified its moral 
incorrectness. Hence, Paré carefully alerts his readers when a phenomenon is 
prodigious and unnatural, so that they may enact the correct reaction of horror 
(Davidson, 1991, 50-51). Paré attempts to naturalise certain strange occurrences, but 
he is not yet prepared to separate the deviant creatures from the supernatural beasts 
they were usually attached to. This fact becomes especially obvious in the cases that 
confuse Paré as to their correct allocation in the monster/prodigy equation: „There 
are other creatures which astonish us doubly because they do not proceed from the 
above mentioned causes, but from a fusing together of strange species, which render 
the creature not only monstrous, but prodigious, that is to say, which is completely 
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abhorrent and against Nature‟ (1634, 961). These cases often entail births of what 
was thought to be half-human/half-animal creatures. Paré attempts to explain these 
occurrences scientifically, suggesting that it comes out of the mixture of seed from 
different species. Nevertheless, he carefully makes sure that this explanation does not 
decrease the level of horror that the recount of such creatures should appropriately 
produce, pointing out that they are first and foremost prodigies. There may be a 
natural explanation available, but he emphasises that in most of the cases he prefers 
the traditional explanation, which would class them as signs of God‟s moral 
displeasure: „It is certain that most often these monstrous and prodigious creatures 
proceed from the judgement of God, who permits fathers and mothers to produce 
such abominations from the disorder that they make in copulation, like brutish 
beasts‟ (1634, 961). 
Helkiah Crooke makes no acknowledgement of prodigies. He discusses 
monstrous formations within humans, dividing them in groups according to „Figure, 
Magnitude, Scituation and Number‟ (1615). His account relies entirely on a natural 
discourse, and is thus devoid of reference to supernatural sources:
 60
  
to speak as a Physitian or naturall Philosopher, it must be granted 
that all these Aberrations of Nature are to be referred vnto the 
Materiall and Efficient causes of Generation. The Matter is the 
Seed, the Efficient or Agent is either Primarie or Secondarie. The 
Primarie or Principle cause is double: the formatiue Faculty and the 
Imagination. The Secondarie is the Instrument, to wit, the place and 
certaine qualities as heat (Crooke, 1615, 300). 
Interestingly, Crooke‟s treatment of monstrosity is solely devoted to sexual 
monstrosities or sexual causes of monstrous aberrations. As the quotation above 
indicates, Crooke considered monstrosity invariably to be connected to sexual 
mixture in some way or another. The sexual monsters; the hermaphrodites or 
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„Androgynas‟, are thus used as a type of blueprint for monstrous formation. They are 
incorporated in the basic cause of natural aberration.
61
 Similarly to Bacon‟s reference 
to monsters, Crooke likens hermaphrodites to „Trauellors, who wander out of their 
way yet goe on their intended journey‟ (1615, 299), and in accordance with Bacon‟s 
maxims, Crooke uses these travellers to mark the journey of differentiation 
undertaken by every individual in the initial process of sexual differentiation (1615, 
Book 4 & 5). 
For Crooke, the hermaphrodite comes to signify the sexually undifferentiated. 
This idea is apparent also in Paré‟s „Of Monsters and Prodigies‟, where in the middle 
of a scientific paragraph describing the features of a hermaphrodite body, the writer 
sees fit to invoke the legal regulations guarding these cases, as if to emphasise that 
differentiation is a practical necessity: „the lawes command those to chuse the sexe 
which they will use, and in which they will remaine and live, judging them to death 
if they be found to have departed from the sexe they made choice of, for some are 
thought to have abused both, and promiscuously to have had their pleasure with both 
men and women‟ (1634, 972-973). Paré‟s reference to hermaphrodites thus becomes 
an example of the monstrous opposite to the correct course of nature: the necessary 
differentiation between the sexes. Like Bacon, Crooke, and indeed Greenblatt, he 
seems to find that the normal is best defined through a close observance of the 
aberrant. 
The discourse of monstrosity had implications also outside the scientific 
discourses of the time. Evidence of this can be found in the texts of the sixteenth- and 
early seventeenth-century anti-theatrical polemicists. These writers often use the idea 
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of the monstrous – and particularly the hermaphroditical monstrous – similarly to 
Crooke and Paré. John Rainoldes refers to „monsters of nature‟ (1599, 44) when he 
attempts to accentuate the incorrectness of sodomitical acts. William Prynne refers to 
„that monstrous unparalleled sinne of Sodomy‟ (1633, 212), which his „Inke is not 
blacke enough to decipher‟ (1633, 211). Rainoldes‟ discussion of the sodomitical 
perpetrators particularly underline the fact that this act requires a man to take the 
passive sexual position meant for a woman (1599, 44). The anti-theatrical writers 
thus adopt monsters of sex, the performers of aberrant acts, to signal the „natural‟ 
course of sexual interaction, much in the same way as Bacon uses monsters as 
reflections of a natural order.
62
 
The employment of the discourse of monstrosity, however, also implies that 
monstrous acts recounted in the anti-theatrical tracts possess the catalytic power of 
Baconian monsters. Like Bacon‟s monsters take the embryonic shape of a modern 
scientific and historically reflective identity, the gender-ambiguous monsters of the 
anti-theatrical tracts are the fore-runners of a modern self-reflective sexual identity. 
The monstrous became part of this new way of being. Jonathan Sawday claims in 
The Body Emblazoned that one of the significant changes brought about through the 
introduction of a self-reflective self – a Cartesian subject – in the discourse of the 
body was the recognition of internal ambiguity, generating internal contention 
between a reflective „I‟ and an uncanny (or monstrous) body (29). 
Interestingly, this particular contention between the familiar and the aberrant 
is what, according to the practitioners, distinguishes new historicist methodology.
63
 
There are obvious similarities between the radical new historicists and the 
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increasingly self-reflective seventeenth-century writers. Bacon‟s evaluation of the 
existing science almost paraphrases Greenblatt‟s statement about 1940s criticism: 
„The things that are already invented in Sciences, are such as most commonly depend 
on vulgar Notions‟ (1667, 2). His cure for this state of things is „search into the more 
inward, and remote mysteries of Nature‟ (Bacon, 1667, 2). This will, according to 
Bacon, expose „these things, which indeed are more known to Nature‟ (1667, 3, my 
emphasis). Similarly, Greenblatt suggests that in order to see the real framework of 
the common view of the sexes within Renaissance society, one must look to its 
strange extremes, the uncanny aberrations (1988, 86).
64
  
The Order of Things argues that historical thinking derives from the same 
source as natural science. Foucault claims that the interest in the „history‟ of a 
particular concept appeared in the late seventeenth century, simultaneously with the 
modern idea of a secular „Nature‟, and these two fields are not separable (2002, 140). 
The concept of „Nature‟ appeared as an attempt to outline the „history‟ of nature, 
which at the time meant the characteristics and elements of the life-giving entity 
(Foucault, 2002, 140). Similarly, the idea of a „history‟ was implicated in Nature‟s 
inherent aura of truth and authenticity: „For natural history to appear, it was not 
necessary for nature to become denser and more obscure ... it was necessary – and 
this is entirely opposite – for History to become Natural‟ (Foucault, 2002, 140). 
When history and nature were separated, forming the antithetical schools of 
humanitarian and natural sciences, their methodologies; their „archaeological‟
65
 
search for origins remained similar (Foucault, 2002, 422). 
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Both these schools, as Sawday acknowledges, developed in a parallel line 
with the Cartesian subject, which represented the introduction of the self in relation 
to an uncanny „other‟ (1995, 29). New historicism, according to Foucault‟s model, is 
an inheritor of the historical methodology developed from the type of natural history 
conducted by Bacon. They both attempt to outline their respective realities through a 
fascination with and subsequent alienation of an aberrant „other‟. The concept that 
truly appears strange and „other‟ in the new historicist analysis of Renaissance sex 
and gender, however, is the idea of the Renaissance. Laqueur, Orgel and Greenblatt 
marvel at the strange „wonder‟ of Renaissance sex and gender and construct a self-




The question that inevitably arises in response to this conclusion is whether it 
is possible to conduct any form of historical analysis without this type of outcome. If 
historical methodology is bound to the Cartesian subject, and its methodology is 
parallel with the Cartesian dualism between a reflexive self and its uncanny „others‟, 
then the texts produced will inevitably become founding narratives.
67
 I do not 
suggest that this necessarily is a problem. What is problematic about the new 
historicist research is that its practitioners do not recognise their analyses as founding 
narratives, or develop them according to their particular potential as such. Why not 
embrace historical criticism‟s capacity to create new identity spaces? Why not read 
texts from the past in order to shed light on specific discourses developed in the 
present? What I will propose in the next chapter, through a re-interpretation of the 
pivotal critically self-fashioned Renaissance comedies, is a conception of historical 
texts as heterotopias or heterochronologies: points of communication or interaction 
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between past and present narratives. This is not what Greenblatt would call an 
attempt to „speak with the dead‟ (1988, 1), but a multi-discursive historical 
transpositioning. 
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[CHAPTER 3] Monstrous Transvestites: Renaissance Self-
Fashioning Reconsidered 
 
Whereas the previous chapters outline and theorise the methodology of new 
historicist criticism on gender and sexuality, this chapter returns to the texts and 
passages commonly used in the models of Renaissance self-fashioning. The first 
chapter outlines the project of new historicism, and the second chapter analyses the 
theoretical conclusions drawn from „Fiction and Friction‟, Making Sex and 
Impersonations. This chapter will round up the early modern section of the thesis by 
re-encountering and re-thinking the literary examples engaged with in the new 
historicist model of Renaissance gender and sexuality. The previous chapters have 
raised questions regarding the limitations of historical narrative and critical practice 
in connection with new historicist methodology, especially in regards to the 
formation of a personal founding narrative space, a political founding narrative 
space, or both.
1
 This chapter continues to discuss the limitations of Stephen 
Greenblatt, Thomas Laqueur and Stephen Orgel‟s applications of these narratives 
within their readings of Shakespeare‟s Twelfth Night (TN), As You Like It (AYL) and 
The Merchant of Venice (MV) and Middleton and Dekker‟s The Roaring Girl (RG), 
but it will also open up an idea of the possibilities these plays may provide if used as 
a more transient and enabling narrative space.
2
 The chapter suggests that the 
discourse of monstrosity provides such spatiality.  
Critical Founding Narratives 
Laqueur, Orgel and Greenblatt shape their readings of the English Renaissance in 
order to fit the period into a postmodern founding narrative of a sexually self-




 They use Michel Foucault‟s conception of a time before 
modern sex and gender in The History of Sexuality I, but their analysis is incoherent 
with Foucault‟s more analytical text on history and the development of the modern 
subject in The Origin of Things.
4
 According to the new historicists, Renaissance texts 
discussing gender and/or sexuality cannot be properly understood by modern readers, 
because the modern idea of two binary sexes is so embedded in our perception, that it 
confuses our perception of plots taking place in the earlier one-sex paradigm.
5
 They 
consider this confusion a product of Foucault‟s early modern paradigm shift, which 
is presented as a perceptive chasm, and their dramatic analyses are seen as a means 
of bridging the „gap‟.
6
  
The dramatic analyses are expressively used to reflect on modern rather than 
Renaissance concerns: Laqueur, Greenblatt and Orgel profess to use examples from 
Renaissance drama to illustrate and investigate how the perspective on gender-
related issues differs in relation to modern standards. The texts are presented as 
quantitative analyses. Dramatic interludes, dialogues and character formations are 
used to demonstrate the relative amount of plasticity in Renaissance gender 
determination (Laqueur, 1990, 114-115; Greenblatt, 1988, 66-93; Orgel, 1996, 50-
82). Yet,  Laqueur, Greenblatt and Orgel often use the same examples from the same 
sources: they refer to limited passages from William Shakespeare‟s Twelfth Night 
and As You Like It so repetitively,
7
 and to such similar effect and emphasis, that it 
reads as invocation rather than analysis. The fact that the selection is so limited 
undermines rather than reinforces the prima facie value of the proposed „great‟ 
amount of gender plasticity which is exhibited in Renaissance texts and documents. 
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So, what is going on here? If historical validity is a minor concern in these 
analyses, then what is actually at stake? Similarly to Greenblatt‟s introductions,
 8
 
Orgel‟s preface in Impersonations binds the discussion of Renaissance gender 
performativity and fluidity to a personal event. He describes how he has experienced 
a change in attitude towards sexuality, sexual difference, and sexual diffidence, 
throughout his lifetime, particularly recalling an epiphanic moment at his Boys 
School‟s drama department. He realises that whereas women used to be considered 
the greatest moral danger to young susceptible boys‟ minds, „suddenly, in 1948, 
travesty itself was the danger, and women had to be imported to save us from 
becoming pansies‟ (Orgel, 1996, xiv). Although he acknowledges that the latter fear 
was very much present also in the times of the Renaissance transvestite theatre, 
Orgel‟s main inquiry in Impersonations is: „Why did the English Stage Take Boys for 
Women?‟ (Orgel, 1996, 1, original emphasis). He aspires to investigate why this 
custom, which is considered both slightly odd and morally dubious in modern 
society, was commonly accepted in Renaissance England. He argues that it was a 
particularly English Renaissance practice. Influences from France and Italy, as well 
as English Medieval custom, would have encouraged the English stage to use female 
actors. The English, for some reason, preferred a transvestite theatre. Referring to the 
works of Laqueur, Greenblatt and Levine, who all attempt to demonstrate how the 
Renaissance sexes differ from their modern equivalents, Orgel speculates on why 
and when this conception changed (1996, 2-3). The main emphasis of his study is 
thus put on what is different within the common sexual mentality of Renaissance 
England, and how the general conception of gender differentiation of those days 
challenges his own.  
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Thomas Laqueur similarly traces his scholarship to personal and political, as 
well as historical concerns. He writes that the intellectual origins of Making Sex stem 
from his professional and personal friendship with Catherine Gallagher and Peter 
Brown and the fact that he „encountered feminist and [new] historical scholarship‟ 
(1990, vii), and that his original interest was in the historical conception of the 
female orgasm. This original intent is not inconsequential. Laqueur traces a concept 
that he considers self-evident back to a time when its existence was considered 
somewhat similarly but also altogether differently.
9
 Through reflection, his 
subsequent argument is then built on impressions of similarity and difference: he 
constructs an idea of two sexual paradigms divided by a conceptual chasm.
10
 The 
greatest benefit of this venture, as Laqueur to some degree recognises but barely 
develops, is a reflective insight into modern (1980‟s and 1990‟s) thought processes 
about gender (69-70). Unfortunately, his historical analysis becomes limited and 
stale as a result. 
Despite the problems encountered in Orgel‟s and Laqueur‟s works, the usage 
of historical data to form critical founding narratives can be a useful and enabling 
scholarly process. As Elizabeth Grosz testifies in The Nick of Time, historical spaces 
can be used to form multi-dimensional enabling discourses.
11
 The main problem that 
reoccurs in Laqueur and Orgel‟s historical analyses is the conceptualisation of 
historical movements in terms of a chasm between past and present, where historical 
documents gain signification merely in relation to modern comparatives.
12
 The idea 
of a perceptual chasm emphasises the historical differences rather than prepare a 
means of appreciating Renaissance literary complexities: instead of opening up 
spaces from texts of the past, it limits and alienates them. If time were to be 
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considered a more transient and multi-dimensional concept, and temporal discourses 
were to be treated as numerous co-existing co-dependent variables, the relationship 
between the critic and the historical material need not remain binary.
13
 Historical 
literary criticism should rather consider itself a part of a connective network of 
currents, than an all-knowing all-connecting conceptual bridge. 
This is where the previous discussion of Foucault becomes relevant.
14
 Rather 
than the linear progression and binary chasm of past and present discussed in 
Greenblatt, Laqueur and Orgel‟s work, Foucault‟s The Order of Things presents the 
early modern paradigm shift in terms of a conceptual delta. It is a space of intensely 
visible change, where numerous social discourses acquired further capacity to 
multiply and re-connect. The generator of Foucault‟s model is the historical 
discourse of monstrosity and the enabling figures are the social and political 
monsters. Like all social discourses are transformed, transposed and multiplied 
through their individual aberrations according to Foucault,
 
the Renaissance discourse 
of gender and sexuality is opened up and continually re-considered through the 
sexually monstrous transvestite or hermaphrodite. This character does not form a 
discursive space in itself so much as make possible the formation of new spaces 
within the general discourse of sexual norms. 
Internalised Renaissance Travesty: The Boy Actress 
In accordance with Stephen Orgel‟s expressed desire to create a more detailed 
understanding of why Renaissance society accepted – and at a certain level even 
preferred – a transvestite theatre, he spends some time investigating the concept of 
the boy actress.
15
 He comments on how Shakespeare‟s As You Like It seemingly 
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depicts beautiful boys as a preferable alternative to women: „eroticized boys appear 
to be a middle term between men and women, they are represented as enabling 
figures, as a way of getting from men to women‟ (1996, 63). Orgel argues that 
Rosalind‟s eroticised boy role, Ganymede, functions as a means to desexualise 
Rosalind, and thus bring her closer to the male she desires (1996, 63). Greenblatt 
makes a similar statement about boy actresses in general: „these figures function as 
modes of translation between distinct social discourses, channels through which the 
shared commotion of sexual excitement circulates‟ (1988, 86-87). Orgel notes that 
eroticised boy- turned girl- turned boys, such as the boy Cesario, become instruments 
of connection and communication in Shakespeare‟s Twelfth Night and As You Like 
It.
16
 Twelfth Night‟s Orsino appeals to Cesario to act the messenger in his attempt to 
woo Olivia, indicating that the effeminate boy possesses the power to bridge the 
sexual spheres: „she will attend it better in thy youth‟ (TN, 20; I.iv.27).  
The idea of a particular power invested in the eroticised boy can, according to 
Michel Foucault‟s The History of Sexuality 3, be traced back to classical sources. 
Foucault claims that Plutarch in particular considered love, as the appreciation of 
beauty, to be a concept which transcended the sexual barriers. Foucault quotes 
Plutarch‟s „Dialogue of Love‟: „They say that beauty is the flower of virtue … all 
these characteristics belong to both sexes alike‟ (Foucault, 1990, 204).
17
 Boys were 
thus considered equally able to produce an amorous sensation within men as women. 
Although Plutarch presents the relationship of marriage to be more perfect than the 
relationship to a boy, he considers the love for women and boys to be equally 
virtuous. The love for boys has an additional advantage, however, in also producing 
the sensation of respect and friendship. Plutarch thus suggests that a relationship with 
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a boy could teach a man to discover an ability to love that is not only centred on the 
beauty of a person, but also discerns the character underneath, such as would be 
required in a happy marriage. The boy would then function as a catalyst, „enabler‟ or 
„translator‟ in the formation of marital bliss (Foucault, 1990, 203-206). 
In accordance with Plutarch‟s description of love, Viola and Rosalind both 
induce their future spouses to develop eroticised friendships with their boyish alter-
egos before they enter into a marital relationship.  In Viola‟s case, the formation of a 
male-male friendship is necessary in order to catch Orsino‟s attention. Orsino‟s 
eroticised friendship for Cesario is the only thing that successfully distracts him from 
his purely physical attraction for Olivia. In this space Cesario may then sow the seeds 
of the virtuous marital love Orsino comes to hold for Viola (Shakespeare, TN). 
Rosalind, on the other hand, knows that she already has Orlando‟s love. She makes 
him enter into an eroticised friendship with Ganymede purely to cultivate him; to 
shape him into the type of husband she desires (Shakespeare, AYL). Rosalind 
deliberately uses the disguise of a Plutarchan boy to form a virtuous relationship. 
Orgel and Greenblatt agree that Shakespeare frequently emphasises the 
boyish, androgynous and bi-gendered appearances of the „breeched‟ female 
characters Viola/Cesario and Rosalind/Ganymede in Twelfth Night and As You Like 
It (Orgel, 1996, 51; Greenblatt, 1988, 91).
18
 Malvolio describes Cesario as: 
Not yet old enough for a man, nor young enough 
for a boy: as a squash is before „tis a peascod, or a 
codling when „tis almost an apple. „Tis with him  
in standing water, between boy and man 
   (TN, 29; I.v.158-161) 
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Ganymede is described in similarly androgynous terms: 
He is not very tall, yet for his years he‟s tall. 
His leg is but so so; and yet „tis well: 
There was a pretty redness in his lip, 
A little riper and more lusty red  
Than that mix‟d in his cheek 
   (AYL, 92; III.v.118-122) 
Cesario and Ganymede‟s appearances are initially contrived to desexualise the 
characters: both Viola and Rosalind choose their attires in order to “conceal me what 
I am” (TN, 10; I.ii.53) and not to “stir assailants” (AYL, 28; I.iii.109). Ironically, 
however, both characters not only stir the desires of both men and women towards 
them, but catalyse their own marriages and a number of additional marital liaisons 
among their fellow characters.
19
  
Orgel and Greenblatt both explain the Renaissance penchant for boy actresses 
in terms of the prevalent anxiety which they claim to be stirred by the plasticity of 
the sexes in the homological sex thesis (Greenblatt, 1988, 87; Orgel, 1996, 63). Orgel 
considers the boy actress in terms of a political device, or a means of control: „In a 
society that has an investment in seeing women as imperfect men, the danger points 
will be those at which women reveal that they have an independent essence, an 
existence that is not, in fact, under male control‟ (Orgel, 1996, 63). The boy actress 
evades this danger. It is a means to convey – as Malvolio expresses it – an essence 
not yet masculine, without creating a space for a dangerous feminine existence. 
Shakespeare calls attention to the feminine, or rather the non-masculine status 
of the bodies „underneath‟ Rosalind and Viola‟s masculine disguises.
20
 Viola fears 
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that her „lack of balls‟ will reveal her real gender when she hears that Sir Andrew is 
challenging her to a sword fight: „Pray God defend me! A little thing / would make 
me tell them how much I lack of a / man‟ (TN, 109; III.iv.307-309). Rosalind 
expresses a similar concern, when Celia does not immediately tell her who has 
scribbled „Rosalind‟ on the bark of numerous trees. She indicates that her lack of a 
male lower body makes her as impatient as any woman:  
Good my complexion! Dost thou think though I  
am caparisoned like a man I have a doublet and  
hose in my disposition? One inch of delay more is  
a South-sea of discovery. 
   (AYL, 70; III.ii.191-194) 
However, through these male disguises Shakespeare also calls attention to the boy 
underneath the female characters Viola and Rosalind.
21
 The most obvious example is 
Rosalind‟s epilogue in As You Like It, which is cited and recited in numerous of the 
new historicist work on gender self-fashioning: both before and after Laqueur, Orgel 
and Greenblatt‟s introduction of the homological sex thesis (Orgel, 1996, 50; 
Digangi, 1997, 61; Rackin, 1987, 36; Kelly, 1990, 90; Garber, 1992, 76; Traub, 
1991, 104).
 
As Phyllis Rackin points out in „Androgyny, Mimesis and the Marriage 
of the Boy Heroine‟, Rosalind immediately puts herself in a sexually ambiguous 
position (36), reminding the audience of the fact that in the late sixteenth century, „It 
is not the fashion to see the Lady in the epilogue‟ (AYL, 131; Epilogue.198). She then 
delivers a short address to the men in the audience, in which she suggestively implies 
that she is actually not a lady:  
If I were  
a woman, I would kiss as many of you as had  
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beards that pleased me, complexions that liked  
me, and breaths that I defied not: 
   (AYL, 131; Epilogue.214-217, my emphasis) 
Orgel argues that Rosalind‟s speech primarily introduces the possibility of 
homoerotic idealisation: the indication that Rosalind is actually a man would suggest 
that the ideal union, the course towards which the play moves, is not between 
Orlando and Rosalind, but between Orlando and Ganymede (1996, 57-58). However, 
Katherine E. Kelly proposes in „The Queen‟s Two Bodies‟ that the situation is 
slightly more complicated. Kelly argues that Shakespeare‟s „breeched‟ boy actresses 
are a narrative function: a dialectical means to convey the tension between reality 
and verisimilitude, which is, according to Kelly, the generator of much Elizabethan 
and Jacobean drama. She thus connects Rosalind and Viola‟s halting boy 
performances to the extensively discussed „play within the play‟ function used in 
others Shakespeare dramas like Hamlet and A Midsummer Night’s Dream. 
Rosalind‟s speech is the climax of a part that „develops dialectically, shifting from 
the woman to the boy and back again, subordinating both fictional personae to the 
presence of a virtuoso performer‟ (Kelly, 1990, 90). Thus Rosalind/Ganymede 
positions him/herself as a boy and as a woman, but first and foremost as an actor.  
The Physicality of the Boy Actress 
Stephen Orgel, Thomas Laqueur and Stephen Greenblatt discuss references to nature 
and nature‟s power over humanity in Twelfth Night. There is particularly one 
instance near the finale in Act V, which they linger on (Orgel, 1996, 51; Greenblatt, 
1988, 71; Laqueur, 1990, 114). Sebastian attempts to console Olivia when she 
realises that she has not wed Cesario, who she intended to marry. When she 
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furthermore understands that Cesario is actually Viola, Sebastian gives her a 
biologically based explanation: 
So comes it lady, you have been mistook. 
But nature to her bias drew in that. 
You would have been contracted to a maid; 
Nor are you therein, by my life, deceiv‟d; 
You are betroth‟d both to a maid and man. 
   (TN, 145; V.i.257-261) 
Greenblatt understands the „bias of nature‟ in Twelfth Night to be related to the 
physical laws manifested in the homological sex thesis (1988, 71). The play leads the 
characters into a comic predicament, which is naturally and socially unsustainable: 
„To be matched with someone of one‟s own sex is to follow an unnaturally straight 
line; heterosexuality, as the image of nature drawing to her bias implies, is bent‟ 
(Greenblatt, 1988, 68). The predicament is not unlike Iphis‟s problem, or that of 
Marie le Marcis, referred to in chapter 2. There, as in this case, the problem 
encountered when desire is allowed to follow a straight line, is dissolved when nature 
interferes to draw the individuals off their initial sexual course. Viola does not 
become a man, or turn out to actually be a man, like Iphis or Marie le Marcis, but she 
manages to produces a twin brother, who is so like her that „An apple cleft in two is 
not more twin / Than these two creatures‟ (TN, 143; V.i.221-222). They are in fact 
„One face, one voice, one habit, and two persons‟ (TN, 143; V.i.214), who may as 
well, except for the slight detail of sexual difference be one and the same. Olivia is 
thus not deceived. Sebastian is Viola, only with an extra bonus: Viola is „a maid‟, but 
Sebastian is „a maid and man‟.  
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This interpretation coheres with the homological sex thesis, according to 
which the new historicists argue that Renaissance men and women were essentially 
the same. They are differentiated merely by the woman‟s insufficient heat.
22
 From 
this perspective, Olivia has unintentionally gained something when she marries 
Sebastian instead of Viola. Sebastian is the perfected version of Viola. He is what 
Viola would have been if she had not lacked the necessary heat. Greenblatt‟s „Fiction 
and Friction‟ explores what impact Galenic medicine may have had on 
Shakespeare‟s Twelfth Night: „What happens when a body is translated from 
“reality” to the stage or when a male actor is translated into the character of a 
woman?‟ (1988, 87). The audience knows that the actor underneath Viola‟s vestiary 
exterior is actually a boy. Viola‟s insufficient heat is merely an act. He further 
inquires: „What does it mean for a Renaissance comedy, that most artificial of forms, 
to invoke nature or for nature, in the reified form of medical discourse, to assume the 
artificial form of Renaissance comedy?‟ (Greenblatt, 1988, 87).  
Greenblatt concludes that the answer is simple: „a conception of gender that 
is teleologically male and insists upon a verifiable sign that confirms nature‟s final 
cause finds its supreme literary expression in a transvestite theatre‟ (1988, 88). A 
perfected being can easily enact something further down the biological scale, 
because he possesses all the qualities she does. It would be difficult, however, for 
someone further down the scale to play a person on a higher level, since their 
different levels are affirmed by her lack. This perspective could explain why both 
Viola and Rosalind are presented as inadequate actors. Cesario and Ganymede are 
insistently described as androgynous or effeminate men.  
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Greenblatt establishes that the reference to „nature‟s bias‟ indicates that 
„Nature has triumphed … And nature‟s triumph is society‟s triumph‟ (1988, 71). 
According to Greenblatt, Shakespeare infers something very similar to Foucault‟s 
The History of Sexuality 3: it is easier for the characters to fall for someone of their 
own sex. The forces of nature, however, coerce them to act in a way that suits 
nature‟s reproductive purposes. In accordance with Greenblatt, Thomas Laqueur 
infers that this image of the physical world is a reflection of the social norms in 
Renaissance society. Renaissance drama mirrored and was mirrored by the social 
constructs, like the social constructs mirrored and were mirrored by Galenic biology: 
„The one-sex body of the doctors, profoundly dependent on cultural meanings, 
served both as the microcosmic screen for a macrocosmic, hierarchic order and as the 
more or less stable sign for an intensely gendered social order‟ (Laqueur, 1990, 115). 
Threatening Effeminacy 
Stephen Orgel argues in Impersonations that English Renaissance drama is infused 
with a „fear of effeminization‟ (1996, 26). He extracts this argument from Thomas 
Laqueur‟s Making Sex and Laura Levine‟s Men in Women’s Clothing, both of which 
establishes that this anxiety is the primary reason for the avid production of anti-
theatrical writing in Elizabethan and Jacobean England. Orgel claims that 
„effeminization‟ was considered a veritable threat within Renaissance society, and 
consequently discusses the common occurrence of the word „effeminate‟ within 
Renaissance discourse, including a number of Shakespearean dramas (1996, 26-52). 
Orgel further argues that this anxiety particularly sparked the anti-theatrical 
movement‟s criticism of the transvestite theatre. According to Orgel, Renaissance 
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masculinity was continually destabilised because of the conceived possibility of 
being reduced to a woman. They feared that men involved in dramatic femininity 
may actually be turned into women (1996, 26-30).  
Both Orgel and Laqueur quote three lines from act III, scene i of Romeo and 
Juliet (Rom.), where Romeo, after an extensive fight scene with Tybalt, questions his 
reluctance to hurt his enemy: 
  O sweet Juliet, 
Thy beauty hath made me effeminate 
And in my temper softened valor‟s steel! 
  (Rom., 164; III.i.115-117) 
Laqueur uses this quotation to establish that the sexual scale within his conception of 
the Renaissance homological sex thesis does not merely allow an upwards climb, 
from man to woman.
23
 According to Laqueur, Romeo‟s fear proves that the scale was 
flexible. Men could as likely digress into womanhood: „Men‟s bodies too could 
somehow come unglued. “Effeminacy” in the sixteenth century was understood as a 
condition of instability, a state of men who through excessive devotion to women 
become more like them‟ (1990, 123).  
Laqueur‟s understanding of the Renaissance usage of „effeminacy‟ here is 
simplistic: he assumes that the effeminate is necessarily emasculating. Laqueur uses 
a 1589 example from the Oxford English Dictionary to substantiate his interpretation 
of the Renaissance usage of „effeminacy‟: „The king was supposed to be … very 
amorous and effeminate‟ (1990, 123).
24
 The main problem with this example is that 
Laqueur‟s choice of quotation illustrates a usage of the word that according to the 
Oxford English Dictionary is not particularly common: „Unequivocal instances are 
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rare‟ (OED, „Effeminate‟ 3). Laqueur further misrepresents the specific significations 
of the word in his example. The Oxford English Dictionary notes that „effeminacy‟ 
occasionally denoted something womanish or unmanly, but it also stood for self-
indulgence and voluptuousness (OED, „Effeminate‟ 1). Laqueur‟s quotation is used 
as an example of the latter: „The notion “self-indulgent, voluptuous” seems 
sometimes to have received a special colouring from a pseudo-etymological 
rendering of the word as “devoted to women”‟ (OED, „Effeminate‟ 3). Romeo‟s love 
for Juliet has thus not made him more feminine, but rather more self-indulgent and 
voluptuous.  
An understanding of Romeo‟s exclamation in regards of self-indulgence is 
more coherent with the full act III scene i‟s course of events than Laqueur‟s gender-
bending interpretation. Throughout the fight with Tybalt, Romeo is blinded by 
personal amorous feelings. When Tybalt threatens him, he thinks of his bond of 
passion, which embraces the Capulets rather than the honourable bond of allegiance 
to his friends, who regard Capulets as enemies. He thus pleeds: 
I protest I never injur‟d thee, 
But love thee better than thou canst devise: 
Till thou shalt know the reason of my love, 
And so good Capulet, which name I tender  
As dearly as mine own, be satisfied. 
  (Rom., 162; III.i.67-70) 
Romeo‟s self-indulgent change of priorities becomes the cause of his friend‟s death. 
His shame at committing such a dishonourable betrayal is the reason why he laments 
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Juliet‟s beauty. The full speech, of which Laqueur merely quotes a fraction, makes 
Romeo‟s emotions clear: 
This gentleman the Prince‟s near ally, 
My very friend hath got this mortal hurt 
In my behalf, my reputation stain‟d 
With Tybalt‟s slander, Tybalt that an hour 
Hath been my cousin: O sweet Juliet, 
Thy beauty hath made me effeminate, 
And in my temper soften‟d valour‟s steel. 
  (Rom., 164; III.i.109-115)  
Similarly to Laqueur, Orgel interprets Romeo‟s usage of the word 
„effeminate‟ as a sexualisation, pulling male identity down the homological sex 
scale: „Women are dangerous to men because sexual passion for women renders men 
effeminate: this is an age in which sexuality itself is misogynistic, as the love of 
women threatens the integrity of the perilously achieved male identity‟ (1996, 26). 
The only other interpretation of „effeminate‟ that the Oxford English Dictionary 
allows in connection to the love of a woman, except for the „self-indulgent and 
voluptuous‟ connotation, is a usage of the participial adjective „effeminated‟, where a 
man‟s excessive devotion for a woman reduces him to her employment (OED 
„Effeminated‟ b). Such a state does not cohere with either Romeo or Juliet‟s 
behaviour, however. Romeo does not curse himself for being Juliet‟s slave – he 
considers himself the slave of his emotions. This connotation of „effeminacy‟ is more 




If ever thou shalt love, 
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In the sweet pangs of it remember me: 
For, such as I am all true lovers are,  
Unstaid and skittish in all motions else, 
Save in the constant image of the creature 
That is belov‟d… 
  (TN, 56; II.iv.15-20) 
Orsino also displays the other established signs of „effeminate‟ amorous behaviour. 
From the very opening of the play, he expresses himself in terms of self-indulgence 
and voluptuousness: „If music be the food of love, play on, / Give me excess of it; 
that surfeiting, / The appetite may sicken, and so die...‟ (TN, 5; I.i.1-3). Despite 
Orsino‟s „effeminate‟ love, however, there is no indication that the character should 
be considered emasculated. He is introduced as „A noble duke, in nature as in name‟ 
(TN, 9; I.ii.25). 
The example of Orsino demonstrates that the Renaissance idea of 
„effeminate‟ behaviour is not necessarily emasculating. There is, however, evidence 
of a vast Renaissance debate concerning the behaviours appropriate for members of 
each gender.
26
 Thomas Wright lists the motions, expressions, apparel, and 
particularly the emotions that signify each gender in his The Passions of the Mind in 
General.
27
 He introduces his study praying that „Christ Iesus preserve you in his 
grace, … and deliver you from inordinate passions‟ (1604, A3). The emotions that 
direct Romeo‟s dishonourable change of allegiance in act III, scene i of Romeo and 
Juliet are referred to as effeminate, because they are accepted in women, but 
considered inordinate in a man. This fact does not steer the bearer of the passions 
towards femininity. He merely becomes an imperfectly emoted man.  
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Laqueur and Orgel‟s example from Romeo and Juliet proves the insufficient 
complexity of a model where effeminate emotions are considered equal to 
femininity. It does not allow for different layers of gendered being. Orsino‟s 
„effeminacy‟ is not emasculating, because the source of this behaviour is his love for 
Olivia. As the description of Orsino shows, and the character himself implies, there 
is a significant difference between his gendered subjectivity and his effeminate 
passions. This is why he begs Viola, disguised as the boy Cesario, to express his 
emotions to the beloved Olivia: „I know thy constellation is right apt / For this affair‟ 
(TN, 20; I.iv.35-36). The youngster‟s effeminate appearance suits them better than 
his own or that of his more masculine attendants: „It shall become thee well to act my 
woes; / She will attend it better in thy youth‟ (TN, 20; I.iv.26-27). Youth is here 
equated with femininity: „they shall yet belie thy happy years, / That say thou art a 
man ... all is semblative of a woman‟s part‟ (TN, 20; I.iv.30-34).
28
   
The lack of communication between Orsino‟s masculine character and the 
feminine connotations which his passions evoke, create a state of confusion. Carol 
Thomas Neely argues in „Lovesickness, Gender, and Subjectivity‟, that such a state 
would not be readily accepted in Renaissance society, unless it was generated by 
desire (283-285). In a position of desire, the idea of gendered behaviour becomes 
somewhat displaced. In these situations it was acceptable for gendered manners not 
to correlate directly with the gender of their bearers (Thomas Neely, 294-296).  
Indeed, the usage of the word „effeminate‟ in reference to amorous manners indicates 
that it was somewhat expected.  
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In the case of Orsino, however, the state of gendered confusion invoked by 
desire temporarily does influence the subjectivity of the person affected. This 
influence does not, as Laqueur and Orgel argue, place the subject on a different level 
on the sex scale: Orsino does not become a differently gendered or even a bi-
gendered person during his amorous suspension, but he is depicted as inactive, 
incompetent, fickle and comical (TN). Despite his normally „noble‟ traits, Orsino is 
considered to suffer from an effeminate „affliction‟. His subjectivity, which is bound 
to his gender, temporarily decreases in precision and perfection when his amorous 
emotions take hold. Orsino is inactive because his gendered agency is off balance 
(TN). He becomes pathetic and slightly monstrous. This argument can be 
substantiated by Thomas Wright‟s indication that differently gendered signals, such 
as motions, expressions, and apparel, slightly dehumanise their bearers, robbing them 
of a recognisable reference point. He uses an example from classical sources: „well 
alluded Diogenes, being asked a question of a yoong man, very neatly and finly 
apparreled; he sayd he would not answere him before he put off his apparell, that he 
might know whether he was a man or a woman: declaring by his effeminate attire, 
his womanish wantonnesse‟ (1604, 137).  
Dramatic Transvestite Functions 
Greenblatt introduces a concept which he refers to as gender „swerving‟ in „Fiction 
and Friction‟ (68). The ideas of Orsino‟s state of gender suspension and 
Viola/Cesario‟s gender juxtaposition in Twelfth Night are posed against the concept 
of a natural „bias‟ that draws the characters onto their intended course. The 
movement of the plot is thus sustained by „a strategic, happy swerving‟ (Greenblatt, 
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1988, 68). Greenblatt argues that „Swerving is not a random image in the play; it is 
one of the central structural principles of Twelfth Night‟ (1988, 68). This principle is 
not merely a function carrying dramatic signification, according to Greenblatt: it is 
the primary cause and interpretation inferred by the play. By allowing the characters 
and the plot to „swerve‟ between a number of binary extremes; man and woman; 
master and servant; reality and staged reality, Shakespeare creates a situation of 
continual instability and friction. 
Greenblatt recounts several instances in Twelfth Night, where a sense of 
swerving becomes obvious. He argues that Shakespeare‟s deliberate references to the 
ambiguity of the breeched characters‟ gender are examples of the means that create 
this dramatic effect. The fact that Viola/Cesario‟s character actually appears to be 
both „a maid and man‟ (TN, 145; V.i.261);
 29
 both a humble servant and her „master‟s 
mistress‟ (TN, 149; V.i.324); both reality‟s androgynous young actor and the 
versatile young girl of the play, allows the character to avoid absolute 
characterisation (Greenblatt, 1988, 70-72). Viola/Cesario is the incorporation of a 
conceptual paradox, which is portrayed rather as a reminder of the unreliability of 
recognition, than as a recognisable person. 
Viola/Cesario tells Olivia at their first meeting: „by the very / fangs of malice 
I swear, I am not that I play‟ (TN, 31; I.v.184-185). This comment is directly aimed 
at the audience, who knows that Viola is not the boy Olivia believes her to be. She 
thus calls attention to this particular act of swerving. However, the comment may 
also be interpreted as the interference of a deus ex machina, reminding the audience 
that Viola‟s femininity, as well as Cesario‟s masculinity, is an act. The conception of 
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Viola‟s character thus swerves between genders on two planes simultaneously, 
creating a persona whose exterior attributes are so mutable that they eliminate any 
possibility of an interior essence. 
Orgel concludes, that Viola‟s lack of an individual essence is affirmed by the 
fact that she so easily gets exchanged for Sebastian when her femininity is exposed. 
He thus argues that gender in Twelfth Night is determined by attire:  
only the costume, the chosen role, distinguishes Cesario from Viola 
and Viola from the Sebastian who is effortlessly substituted for her 
in Viola‟s affections. The gender of these figures is mutable, 
constructed, a matter of choice (1996, 57). 
In coherence with this argument, Greenblatt points out that Orsino will not consider 
Viola a woman until she has put on women‟s garments, and the play finishes before 
she has a chance to do so (1988, 92). Despite the fact that Orsino knows Viola‟s 
„true‟ gender, he addresses her as a man: 
Cesario, come; 
For so you shall be while you are a man; 
But when in other habits you are seen, 
Orsino‟s mistress, and his fancy‟s queen. 
   (TN, 153; V.i.384-387) 
Similarly, Rosalind/Ganymede immediately considers the inappropriateness of her 
male garments, when she realises that Orlando harbours affections for her female 
persona: „Alas the day, what shall I do with my doublet and / hose?‟ (AYL, III.ii.215-
216). 
Orgel argues that Shakespeare‟s usage of characters that lack essential 
genders is a sign of universal fluidity within the conceptual gender paradigm of 
Sellberg    127 
 
English Renaissance society (1996, 53-82). Viola/Cesario and Rosalind/Ganymede‟s 
dualities thus become neatly explained through the tenets of the homological sex 
thesis: they appear to be dramatic reflections of the new historicist concept of 
Renaissance self-fashioning.
30
 Although Greenblatt makes similar connections 
between Renaissance medicine and Renaissance drama as Orgel, he does not reach 
the same conclusion. For Greenblatt „swerving‟ is a dramatic and social function 
rather than a cultural explanation. „Fiction and Friction‟ fetishises both the inherent 
duality assumed in Galen‟s homological sex thesis and the dual gendered character 
of Viola/Cesario. Greenblatt considers gender „swerving‟ to produce a form of 
titillating chafing and it becomes a particularly effective dramatic function because 
of its inherent eroticism. The contemporary success of Twelfth Night as well as the 
stories of spontaneous sex change is due to the sexual friction produced by the 
multiple layers of sexual identity involved in the construction of their protagonists 
(1988).  
Both Greenblatt‟s „Fiction and Friction‟ and Orgel‟s Impersonations create 
the idea of a particular transvestite function in Renaissance drama. For Orgel, the 
transvestite is a means of gendered communication; a dual persona that brings men 
closer to women, whereas Greenblatt considers the transvestite to be the embodiment 
of the friction between the sexes. Both Orgel and Greenblatt‟s transvestites are 
„enabling figures‟ (Orgel, 1996, 63):
 
they are the centre of the dramatic sexual 
tensions that enable the plots of the plays to move forwards. Orgel and Greenblatt 
create bi-gendered transvestites: they portray characters that embody the borderlands 
of the gender binary. There is a notable difference, however. The character Orgel 
speaks of is something in between men and women; something half-way on the 
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sexual scale from men to women.
31
 Greenblatt‟s transvestite function is dependent on 
the character being both man and woman
32
.  
Orgel quotes Tennenhouse‟s Power on Display, arguing that Shakespeare‟s 
The Merchant of Venice creates „a problem which can only be resolved by a 
transvestite‟ (Tennenhouse, 59; Orgel, 1996, 77).
33
 Orgel refers to the part of the play 
in which Portia and her maid Nerissa‟s male personas demand their female personas‟ 
husbands to give them the rings that their wives have earlier given them as love 
tokens. Portia sets up a test for her lover Bassanio, which she knows he will fail. 
Since her male persona Balthazar has saved the life of Bassanio‟s beloved patron and 
friend Antonio, he cannot deny him the ring. The test, however, exposes the 
difference in value between the male and the female bond when, as Antonio puts it: 
„his deservings and my love withal / Be valued „gainst your wife‟s commandment‟ 
(MV, 122; VI.i.446-447). Bassanio gives Balthasar the ring, and in Orgel‟s opinion, 
shows what marriage is worth in comparison to the love between men (1996, 75-77).  
In order for this comedy to have a suitably happy ending, Bassanio should 
thus be married to a man rather than a woman. This is the situation for which a 
transvestite is needed. Orgel argues that marriage does not constitute a repudiation of 
male bonding: „a wife is the supreme gift of male friendship‟ (1996, 77). Antonio 
describes his generous act in suitably physical terms: „I once did lend my body for 
his wealth‟ (MV, 137; V.i.249). Since Antonio and Bassanio‟s relationship has 
openly been deemed more important than marriage, something needs to be done if 
the play is to end on a harmonic note. According to Orgel, Portia hence „engineers a 
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marriage that does not constitute a repudiation of male friendship; and it is to the 
point that she has to pose as a man in order to do so‟ (1996, 77). 
Orgel argues that Portia becomes something in-between the man and the 
woman of Bassanio‟s contentious affections, in order to mediate or „enable‟ a happy 
resolution (1996, 77). However, Portia‟s breech of the gender division is slightly 
different from that of Viola or Rosalind. Orgel notes that Portia is increasingly de-
feminised throughout the play. She is strong and domineering (1996, 77). From the 
start, she sets the rules for her courtship and for the movements of the plot. She not 
merely dresses as a man to save Antonio: she transgresses her gender limits to get the 
upper hand in her prospective marriage. Unlike Viola and Rosalind, she appears to be 
a successful man, never slipping, and delivering a learned and thoughtful 
performance of the inherently male judicial profession. When Portia executes her 
cunning plan to expose Bassanio‟s true feelings, she provides a final reminder that 
Balthazar‟s mental virtues do not disappear when the doctor‟s cloak is shed (MV).  
Like Orgel suggests, Portia partially becomes a man, but her male 
characteristics not merely „enable‟ a happy relationship to Bassanio, they constitute 
the ingredients for their happy union. If Portia succeeds to win over Bassanio‟s 
affections by becoming a man, she manages to keep and control his affections by 
partially remaining in her male disguise. Before Portia reveals her dual personas, she 
attempts to make Bassanio jealous by telling him that she has slept with Balthasar, 
and after the revelation Bassanio flirtatiously responds by offering both his own and 
his wife‟s marital services to Portia‟s male alter-ego: „Sweet doctor, you shall be my 
bedfellow, - / When I am absent, then lie with my wife‟ (MV, 138; V.i.284-285).  
Sellberg    130 
 
Despite Orgel‟s examples of half-male/half-female performances, the way in 
which Portia holds on to her male character coheres better with Greenblatt‟s 
definition of the transvestite function. Bassanio never directs his attentions to an in-
between or bi-gendered character. He either addresses the female Portia or the male 
Balthazar, and so does his friend Antonio. Completing Bassanio‟s flirtatious address, 
Antonio turns to Portia‟s female side: „Sweet Lady, you have given me life and 
living‟ (MV, 138; V.i.286). The transvestite function in Bassanio and Portia‟s 
conventional marital relationship seemingly makes way for a decidedly more 
titillating ménage à trois, the sexual friction that generates and maintains a lasting 
marital happiness. This idea is strengthened by a mirror marriage between Nerissa, 
who disguises herself as Balthasar‟s clerk, and her husband Gratiano. The latter 
suggestively states: 
The first inter‟gatory 
That my Nerissa shall be sworn on, is, 
Whether till the next night she had rather stay, 
Or go to bed now (being two hours to day): 
But were the day come, I should wish it dark 
Till I were couching with the doctor‟s clerk. 
   (MV, 139; V.i.300-305) 
From the perspective of Greenblatt‟s transvestite function, Shakespeare manages to 
create a final scene that does not dispel the binary sexual tension created by the 
transvestite characters, but rather strengthens it. The means are similar to those used 
in Twelfth Night and As You Like It. Viola is still in her masculine attire at the closing 
of the play, and as Orsino indicates, this means that she remains Cesario indefinitely 
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(TN). Rosalind regains her masculine credibility when she addresses the audience in 
the epilogue, implying that she is not a woman (AYL).  
Although Greenblatt‟s theory convincingly explains the suspended 
transvestite status of Shakespeare‟s breeched heroines, it does not cohere with the 
rest of the argument presented in „Fiction and Friction‟. Greenblatt argues that the 
sexual friction produces an erotic heat similar to the heat described in Galen‟s 
homological sex thesis, in which the Roman philosopher claims that men and women 
are produced from the same seed. The gender of a phoetus depends on the amount of 
heat the womb manages to gather up when forming the seed. Greenblatt suggests that 
the development of the breeched heroines‟ identities mirror this progression „because 
the transformation of gender identity figures the emergence of an individual out of a 
twinned sexual nature‟ (91). He argues that the transvestite plays demonstrate the 
emergence of female identity: „Rosalind and Viola pass through the state of being 
men in order to become women‟ (92). As Greenblatt‟s own idea of the transvestite 
function shows, however, both Rosalind and Viola are more female in the beginning 
of the plays than at their closure. The characters rather reverse into a twinned state 
than emerge out of it. 
In fact, neither Viola, Rosalind nor Portia are depicted as either men or 
women in the final scenes of Twelfth Night, As You Like It and The Merchant of 
Venice. Rather than being half-man/half-woman or both man and woman, the 
transvestite characters in these comedies attain their particular power from being 
neither man nor woman. When Rosalind‟s epilogue suggests that she is not a woman, 
she does not explicitly expose herself as a man. Her implications of masculinity are 
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spoken while she continues to address her audience in her women‟s garments, 
displaying feminine mannerisms. The epilogue Rosalind is neither thoroughly a man 
nor a woman: she indicates that she is a transvestite. Viola‟s exposition is met with a 
reaction of wonder and references to „A natural perspective, that is and is not‟ (TN, 
143; V.i.215). Also Portia becomes a strange and conceptually unnatural character. 
Orgel establishes that English Renaissance society considered strong and masculine 
women to be slightly disturbing, and these were often made the objects of mirth 
(1996, 77). Portia takes a masculine upper hand until the very end of the The 
Merchant of Venice. It is Portia, rather than the male protagonists, who finally takes 
the first step towards terminating the action:  
Let us go in,   
And charge us there upon inter‟gatories,   
And we will answer all things faithfully.  
   (MV, V.i.297-299) 
Like the other breeched heroines, she thus confesses herself to be something more 
destabilising and less definable than the „natural‟ sexes entail. Shakespeare‟s 
heroines are revealed as something beyond simple „nature‟: Viola recognises that she 
has successively become a „poor monster‟ (TV, 42; II.iii.33).  
The Function of Monstrosity 
As I established in chapter 2, the anti-theatrical writers continually refer to the act of 
gender transgression as monstrous or prodigious. William Prynne concludes his 
description of masculine women, stating that they are „much like a monster‟ (201). 
Phillip Stubbes similarly states that they belong to the prodigies known as 
hermaphrodites (F5v). Prynne also refers to gender transgressors in general, 
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exclaiming „What Monster, or what Prodigy is this?‟ (195). Transvestites are 
monsters of nature, and like Orsino‟s reaction to the simultaneously unnatural and 
natural perspective indicates, they gain their particular power from being part of 
nature, yet outside of its norm.  
As chapter two recounts, the idea of the monstrous and the prodigious was a 
fashionable concept in religious and scientific discourse throughout the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. It was used in a similar fashion to the new historicist usage of 
the marginal or the „aberrant‟ (Greenblatt, 1988, 86).
34
 References to monstrous or 
prodigious creatures were frequently included in tracts from a vast number of 
scientific and religiously oriented fields, as a means to allocate and sometimes even 
re-set the borders between the natural and the unnatural. Hermaphrodites and other 
sexually ambiguous people were referred to in diverse medical tracts, in order to 
form an idea of the natural sexual anatomy.
35
 Similarly, the anti-theatrical writers use 
examples of transvestites and androgynes in their stipulations of the natural gendered 
attributes and mannerisms. The abhorrence attributed to these monsters is charged by 
the contemporary social limits of gender normality.
36
  
This chapter is suggesting that Renaissance drama also uses monsters for 
their antithetical quality; for the fact that they simultaneously are a natural 
perspective and something beyond the limits of nature. This may seem similar to new 
historicist investigations of „normality‟ within „aberration‟ (Greenblatt, 1988, 86). 
There is an important difference, however. Greenblatt, Laqueur and Orgel read 
Renaissance monstrosity as an indication of accepted gender norms.
37
 The normal is 
the concept of interest: and since Greenblatt claims that „the normal is found in the 
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sands of the aberrant‟ (Greenblatt, 1988, 86, my emphasis), the aberrant becomes a 
mere means to measure its limits. Greenblatt and Orgel also acknowledge a 
transvestite function, but this merely operates as a deliberator within the gender 
binary (1988; 1996). Neither Greenblatt nor Orgel consider the immediate function 
of the aberrant; the implications of a concept that is placed opposite to the natural 
orders. Rather than considering the invocations of monstrosity in Renaissance texts 
as judgements on transgender elements, the gender aberrant can be read as a 
reference to a more general function of monstrosity. 
Renaissance drama is constructed on the principle of monstrosity. As Michael 
O‟Connell points out in an article on the rejection of iconoclasm, the anti-theatrical 
writers did not merely consider the presence of transvestite actors on the Renaissance 
stage evil: they find the representational quality of the dramatic medium equally, if 
not more unacceptable (1985, 206-300). Orgel affirms that „the fact of transvestite 
boys is really only incidental; it is the whole concept of the mimetic art that is at 
issue, the art itself that effeminates‟ (1996, 29). The anti-theatrical writers refer to the 
theatre as a space of voluptuous „effeminate‟ behaviours. William Prynne argues that 
all stage-plays and their players are unnatural „in respect of the costly gawdinesse, 
the immodest lasciviousnesse, the fantastique strangeness, the meretricious, 
effeminate lust-provoking fashions of that apparell wherein they are commonly acted 
and frequented‟ (1633, 216). Phillip Stubbes further claims that the theatrical space 
not merely displays monstrosity, but produces it: „these goodly pageants being done, 
euery mate sorts to his mate, euery one bringes another homeward of their way verye 
friendly, and in their secret conclaues (couertly) they play ye Sodomits, or worse‟ 
(1583, L8v). 
Sellberg    135 
 
The monstrous transvestite actors pose as a reflection of the dramatic 
medium. They transform gender reality into gender fiction. Transvestite characters 
mirror the well-known „natural‟ conventions of gender according to an „unnatural‟ 
exactness: they are overt reflections of gender, enacted and refashioned
38
. In The 
Birth of Tragedy, Friedrich Nietzsche describes classical tragedy as a progressive 
contention between Apolline forces, which serve the ends of conventional structure, 
and Dionysiac forces, issuing a state of disbelief and havoc. This continual 
dissension produces a cathartic effect, through which the audience may glimpse a 
possibility of something beyond the received beliefs.
39
 The given behaviour of the 
transvestite characters and the knowledge that this is an enacted behaviour, the 
natural mannerisms and their unnatural seat, may thus provide a certain amount of 
insight into the art of imitation.  
According to Aristotle‟s „Poetics‟, imitation is the primary function of 
comedy. Comedy is presented as the antithesis of the „higher‟ art of tragedy: „one 
would make its personages worse, and the other better, than the men of the present 
day‟ (Aristotle, 1954, 18-19; II.1448a.). He states that „these elements of difference 
in the above arts I term the means of their imitation‟ (1954, 29-30; II.1447b). If the 
comedy form reflects the form of tragedy, but is yet unlike tragedy, creating disbelief 
within the formal recognition, it creates a cathartic experience relating to the 
structure of drama. Comedy is the monstrous twin of tragedy, like drama according 
to the anti-theatrical writers is the monstrous form of life and the transvestite actor is 
the monstrous form of the naturally sexed human being. Shakespeare‟s breeched 
heroines thus add an extra dimension to an already multi-dimensionally active hall of 
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mirrors, generating extra frictive power within the monstrously charged classical 
comedy form. 
Both Orgel and Greenblatt argue that the transvestite characters are enablers 
or translators of sexual relationships between men and women. This is not, however, 
because they harbour parts of both sexes or because they are intermediates between 
the sexes, but because they are different from the sexes.
40
 This does not mean that 
that they are an independent concept. The monstrous transvestite is the binary 
opposite of the binary sexes; the „natural‟ sexual order. It is a deviation; a mutant of 
the sexual construct. Like the monsters described by Francis Bacon in Novum 
Organum and Michel Foucault in The Order of Things, the monstrous transvestite is 
created on the basis of an existing concept, but goes outside of its limits, and is thus 
charged with the ability to reconsider and reshape it. This monstrous transvestite 
cannot be considered as a group or a separate sex. One monster may not share many 
similarities with another. The transvestites formed in one play may be crucially 
different from those formed in another.
41
 The only thing that they definitely have in 
common is their status as sexual deviants or monsters. 
The function of the monstrous transvestite is aptly represented in Thomas 
Middleton and Thomas Dekker‟s The Roaring Girl (1611).
42
 Unlike the transvestites 
in Shakespeare‟s comedies, Moll Cutpurse in Middleton and Dekker‟s play is not one 
of the primary characters in the play.
43
 She is not one of the characters whose 
relationship is being enabled, but functions merely as the „enabler‟. Also unlike 
Shakespeare‟s transvestites, she is not a continually transgressive character; she does 
not move between different layers of gendered existence. Moll‟s presence is merely 
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there to enable other characters‟ sexual interests and marital movements. Her state as 
an outsider in the battle between the sexes makes her able to meddle in it (Middleton 
& Dekker, RG).  
According to Orgel‟s Impersonations, Moll‟s character would have been 
attired in a male jerkin worn over a woman‟s duster, „since the role was played by a 
boy, this was a way of indicating that she is “really” a woman‟ (151). However, this 
form of dress does not make her look like either a man or a woman. It makes her 
look like a strange and sexually indefinable creature. Since Moll, unlike 
Shakespeare‟s transvestites, does not move between differently gendered states, the 
duster and the jerkin is a way of signifying that she is different, and thus not to be 
confused either with the other men or the other women.   
Orgel refers to the protagonist in The Roaring Girl as a final example of a 
number of English Renaissance „real-life‟ transvestite case histories. The character 
Moll Cutpurse is based on „Mistress Mary Frith, commonly called Moll Cutpurse‟ 
(Orgel, 1996, 139, original emphasis). The real Moll Cutpurse was immensely 
popular in early sixteenth-century London. She was as Middleton and Dekker‟s 
character Sebastian puts it, „a creature / So strange in quality, a whole city takes / 
Note of her name and person‟ (RG, 13; I.i.95-97).
44
 The original production of The 
Roaring Girl was thus intended to obtain its success through Moll Cutpurse‟s 
popularity. From this point of view, Moll Cutpurse‟s „strangeness‟ not merely 
enables the sexual interactions in The Roaring Girl, but enables the actual dramatic 
production.  
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Yet, Impersonations reads Moll Cutpurse in terms of incompleteness. Orgel 
quotes the character Sir Alexander‟s description of Moll: „her birth began / Ere she 
was all made‟ (RG, 20; I.ii.129-130), claiming that the old man indicts that Moll is an 
unfinished human being. He refers to the Galenic descriptions of the human 
anatomy, stating that Moll would have been considered almost a man; on her way to 
being a man, but in a state of male incompleteness. Her mentality managed to be 
formed like a man‟s but her mother‟s womb failed to conjure up the amount of heat 
needed to give her a male body before she was born. Orgel argues that this also 
makes her an incomplete woman, if considered from the Aristotelian point of view 
that there is a state of perfection in both sexes. Moll‟s attire and mannerisms are 
reflections of an inappropriate and thus incomplete female psyche (Orgel, 1996, 139-
153).  
This conception seems strange, considering the amount of power that Moll 
wields over both the characters and the structure of the play.
45
 The statement about 
Moll‟s birth is, however, merely a fraction of Sir Alexander‟s full speech. 
Considered in its actual context, the connotations of the words are less consistent 
with Orgel‟s argument about sexual intermediacy and incompleteness: 
A creature, saith he, nature hath brought forth  
To mock the sex of woman. It is a thing  
One knows not how to name, her birth began 
Ere she was all made. 
   (RG, 20; I.ii.127-130) 
Sir Alexander does not indicate that Moll was born before she was made into a man, 
but rather that she was born before she was shaped into a proper human being at all. 
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Sir Davy replies to Sir Alexander‟s description: „A monster! „Tis some monster‟ 
(RG, 20; I.ii.134). Sir Alexander later re-affirms this diagnosis: „This wench we 
speak of strays so from her kind, / Nature repents she made her‟ (RG, 24; I.ii.211-
212).  
This monstrosity is sexually deviant, but it does not „stray‟ within the sexual 
binary. Even in Sir Alexander‟s most overt references to Moll‟s prodigal nature, 
there is never any doubt that she is a woman. Moll Cutpurse is a monstrous woman, 
and she is aware that her monstrosity is her particular attraction. Trapdoor, a man Sir 
Alexander sends out to spy on her, manages to gain her trust by offering her a form 
of flattery that she apparently greatly appreciates. He assures her that he wishes to 
volunteer his services because of „The love I bear to you heroic spirit and masculine / 
womanhood.‟ (RG, 42; II.i.322-323).
46
 Despite her affirmed womanhood, however, a 
man called Laxton, who vows at the beginning of the play, that „I will have nought to 
do with any woman‟, finds this particular woman irresistibly attractive. When 
encountering her fierce persona, he exclaims: „Heart, I would give but too much 
money to be / nibbling with that wench.‟ (RG, 34; II.i.169-170). Moll Cutpurse is 
thus attractive and powerful because she is a woman, and yet not a woman.  
Moll‟s power lies in the fact that she, in accordance with my stipulation of the 
monstrous function, is natural, and yet not natural. The play acquires its ends because 
of the fact that Moll‟s monstrosity is commonly seen as strange, but simultaneously 
curiously attractive. Sebastian tricks his father, Sir Alexander, to believe that he 
intends to marry Moll in order to make him more benevolently inclined towards his 
actual fiancée. Despite his disdain for the monstrous, Sir Alexander readily believes 
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that Moll‟s strangeness possesses enough power to lead his son down such a 
„crooked way‟ (RG, 13; I.ii.103). He „grieves / As it becomes a father for a son / That 
could be so bewitched‟ (RG, 13; I.i.100-102). Sir Alexander even trusts that Moll‟s 
monstrosity gives her the power to change the course of his son‟s life: „‟Tis a 
mermaid / Has tolled my son to shipwreck.‟ (RG, 24; I.ii.212-213). 
Moll is also aware of her power to control the plot, and happily agrees to 
become the means of Sebastian‟s happiness. In the final scene she acts as the 
conjuror of marital bliss, introducing Sir Alexander to his actual daughter-in-law: 
„Now are you as gulled as you would be. Thank me for‟t, / I‟d a forefinger in‟t.‟ (RG, 
140; V.ii.168-169). This is not an overstatement. She personally arranges and carries 
out the plot to secure the happy union. As she puts it herself, she has a particular 
knack for devising marriage: „marriage is but a chopping and changing / where a 
maiden loses one head, and has a worse I‟th‟ place‟ (RG, 47; II.ii.43-44). She states 
that she has acquired this skill, because her transgendered nature makes her complete 
in herself and thus allows her to remain outside of this convention: „I have no 
humour to marry. I love to lie o‟both sides / o‟th‟bed myself and again on the other 
side‟ (RG, 47; II.ii.36-37). 
Moll Cutpurse offers The Roaring Girl an enabling monstrous transvestite 
function. Furthermore, Middleton and Dekker affirm the idea of the reflectivity of 
monstrosity, by indicating that the transvestite mirrors the concept of drama. Orgel 
notes that the playwrights romanticise Moll, implying that a strange surface may hide 
an honourable and natural interior: „Who‟d think that in one body there could dwell / 
Deformity and beauty, heaven and hell?‟ (RG, 109; IV.ii.198-199). He continues to 
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suggest that „the play makes similar claims for the theatre itself; … demonstrating 
that beneath the stage‟s transgressive costume beats a chaste and true heart‟ (Orgel, 
1996, 149). Middleton and Dekker clearly make a connection between their 
transvestite character and the concept of drama in the epilogue to The Roaring Girl. 
They describe a painter, who attempts to paint the perfect woman, and although some 
people commend his work, some will still find faults. The painter then continually 
mends the painting, until „it was so vile, / So monstrous, and so ugly, all men did 
smile / At the poor painter‟s folly‟ (RG, 144; „Epilogue‟, 13-15). Middleton and 
Dekker assure that they will not make the same mistake:  
         Such we doubt  
Is this our comedy – some perhaps do flout 
The plot, saying „tis too thin, too weak, too mean; 
Some for the person will revile the scene, 
And wonder that a creature of her being  
Should be the subject of a poet, seeing 
In the world‟s eye, none weighs so light; 
   (RG, 144; „Epilogue‟, 15-21) 
The playwrights thus argue that although Moll Cutpurse is a strange woman and their 
comedy is a strange play, their creation of strangeness is better than a creation 
striving towards perfection, because perfection is not a universal concept.  They 
conclude: „If we to every brain that‟s humorous / Should fashion scenes, we, with the 
painter, shall / In striving to please all, please none at all‟ (RG, 145; „Epilogue‟, 28-
30). The fact that Moll Cutpurse is neither man nor woman, and that she does not 
strive to be either, thus makes her monstrosity less vile. Moll gains her power of 
attraction because she is not as Greenblatt would claim both man and woman, nor as 
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Orgel suggests something between man and woman. Her function relies on the fact 
that she is comfortably neither man nor woman.  
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[CHAPTER 4] Becoming-Queer: Queer Space and Personal 
Narration 
 
The thesis now makes a temporal leap from the queer space developed by 
historicisation of the past to a queer space formed through historicisation of the 
present. As I argued in the previous three chapters, the first space is shaped by 
historical contrast through idealist readings of a supposedly queer Renaissance. The 
space I will outline now is formed through acts of self-reflexive narration. Whereas 
the first space is a historicisation of the „other‟, the second space is thus a 
historicisation of the „I‟; the narrating subject. I will return to this idea.
1
 First, 
however, the discussion will turn to the theoretical queer discourse of the late 1980s 
and 1990s and the conceptualisation of the queer subject.    
 The previous chapters repeatedly refer to the fantasy of an ideal queer past 
constructed in the English Renaissance.
2
 It is now time to move to the queer fantasy 
conjectured in the 1980s and 1990s discussion of contemporary gender and sexuality. 
Kath Weston comments in Gender in Real Time that it was „an impossibly beautiful 
dream: to live in a genderless world, or if that‟s not your cup of tea, to live in a world 
untrammelled by the inequalities historically associated with gender‟ (1). This 
chapter will make a thorough investigation of the academic conception of the 
„queer‟, the act of queering and above all the concept of queer identity, especially in 
relation to transgender studies conceptions of the transgender subject and transgender 
self-reflexive narratives.  
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The queer is an infamously difficult concept to define, as most readers, 
anthologies, introductions and guides acknowledge.
3
 David Halperin states that 
„there is nothing in particular to which it necessarily refers‟ (1995, 62, original 
emphasis). One of the reasons for this may be that it has been given a vast array of 
different more or less abstract interpretations.
4
 I will favour a theoretical, rather than 
a sociological interpretation of the movement, in which the formation of gendered 
and sexual identities and the limits of subjectivity are questioned. 
Queer Identity: Performative and Non-Essential Subjectivity 
Queer theory recognises the queer both in terms of a verbal and a subjective 
capacity; as the act of queering and a queer identity or concept. According to Diana 
Fuss both uses signal an attempt to deconstruct dominant sexual and gendered 
binaries; „to bring the hetero/homo opposition to the point of collapse‟ (1991, 1). 
Annamarie Jagose claims that „queer describes those gestures or analytical models 
which dramatise incoherencies in the allegedly stable relations between 
chromosomal sex, gender and sexual desire‟ (1996, 1). The Oxford English 
Dictionary describes queering as the critical endeavour to „challenge or deconstruct 
traditional ideas of sexuality and gender‟ (OED, „queer‟ v). The „queer‟ thus 
becomes the defiantly non-binary, hyper-normal or abnormal and the act of 
„queering‟ is an act of deconstructing or de-normalising. 
The birth of queer theory as an academic movement is, as I mention in 
chapter one,
5
 often attributed to Michel Foucault‟s influence and the publication of 
the three volumes of The History of Sexuality. How and where queer theory actually 
started and what it in reality entails is less easily defined. In Saint Foucault: Towards 
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a Gay Hagiography, David Halperin describes queer identity as a concept which by 
its definition cannot be defined: „Queer is by definition whatever is at odds with the 
normal, the legitimate, the dominant. It is an identity without an essence‟ (62). In A 
Genealogy of Queer Theory, William B. Turner describes it as a cultural and 
academic development that perhaps among other things can be traced back to an 
increased openness of gay and transgender people in public society and a resulting 
indeterminacy of the gender binary and heteronormative inevitability.  The direct 
roots of this movement are indefinable but at the same time quite obviously lodged 
throughout the entirety of post-Enlightenment western history (Turner, 2000, 1-3). 
„Whatever the cause‟, he writes however, „a large and rapidly growing body of 
scholarly literature exists under the rubric of “queer” and “queer theory”‟ (Turner, 
2000, 3).  
Despite Turner‟s claim to indefinable origins, queer theory as a defined 
academic movement certainly has a traceable past. The term „queer theory‟ was 
coined by Teresa de Laurentis when attempting to distinguish a trend in recent theory 
of gender and sexuality at a conference held at the University of California, Santa 
Cruz in February 1990 (White, 2007, 1).
6
 A number of the theorists who make up the 
foundation of the field never directly identified with the movement themselves or 
were only attributed the title of „queer theorist‟ after the publication of their key 
texts.
7
 Different readers, critical guides, websites and anthologies
8
 conjoin different 
critical theorists under the umbrella term of „queer theorists‟ and a large proportion 
of these express widely different views on gender and sexual identity, gendered and 
sexual practice and academic methodology.
9
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 The majority of the various readers, anthologies, websites, introductions, 
critical guides and genealogies of queer theory do however agree that the two pivotal 
queer theorists are Michel Foucault and Judith Butler.
 10
 Foucault‟s The History of 
Sexuality (1976-84) trilogy lays the grounds for a critique of traditional presentations 
of identity and sexuality in history,
11
 and Butler‟s Gender Trouble (1990) and Bodies 
that Matter (1993) are generally considered to have founded the specifically queer 
conception of where gendered and sexual identity is constructed and how it should be 
negotiated. There are a number of differences and basic incongruities in Foucault‟s 
and Butler‟s accounts,
12




Encountering various psychoanalytic accounts of subjectivity and gender, 
mainly from Jacques Lacan and Julia Kristeva, Butler‟s Gender Trouble argues that 
gender is neither a natural concept nor a pre-determined essence; „rather, gender is an 
identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a 
stylized repetition of acts‟ (1999a, 179, original emphasis). She explains that gender 
is a performance, but not in the sense that the actors or their social surroundings can 
control the results. This is why gender appears to be internal: neither society nor its 
individual subjects are in control of gender production. The concept is neither lodged 
internally or externally. It appears only within the repetition. This is where Butler 
introduces the great paradox of gender: without the myth of internality it could not be 
sustained. It is repeated precisely because it is „believe[d] and perform[ed] in the 
mode of belief‟ (Butler, 1999a, 179). Despite this, however, the myth can never be 
fully embodied. The gendered self conducts „repeated acts that seek to approximate 
the ideal of a substantial ground of identity, but which, in their occasional 
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discontinuity, reveal the temporal and contingent groundlessness of this “ground”‟ 
(Butler, 1999a, 179). 
Butler furthers her argument of performative gender in „Imitation and Gender 
Insubordination‟, stating that gender performance inscribes a conception of sexual 
difference upon the body: „gender is a performance that produces the illusion of an 
inner sex or essence or psychic gender core; it produces on the skin, through the 
gesture, the move, the gait (that array of corporeal theatrics understood as gender 
presentation), the illusion of an inner depth‟ (2004a, 134). She thus argues that not 
only internalised gendered difference, but the idea of an essential biological sexual 
difference is false, and that all signification of such is performative.
14
 In doing so, 
Butler challenges the division between sex and gender, considered to have been 
made first by Kessler and McKenna in 1978 (Kessler & McKenna, 1978; Jagose, 
1996). Bodily difference is here considered to be entirely discursive – and although 
she claims in the introduction to the subsequent Bodies that Matter that this was 
never her intent (Butler, 1993, x-xii), she continues to do so throughout that text.
15
  
Butler devotes a great amount of space in Bodies that Matter, attempting to 
tie up the many loose ends identified in her theory of performativity after the 
publication of Gender Trouble.
16
 She further argues that all gender and sexual 
identities, such as lesbian, gay, bisexual or straight, man, woman or transgender, 
should be exposed as what they are: performative re-articulations of an internalised 
social imperative. These should also be resisted as far as is possible and exchanged 
for a position of being critically citational and assuming a „stance‟ of queerness 
(1993, 21-22; 222-242). It may be important politically, Butler argues, to perform 
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female or male, lesbian or gay identities, but the agents should be critically aware of 




Although Butler denies that there is such a thing as a queer identity, she 
creates a concept of queerness that infers a form of subject positioning.
18
 Butler‟s 
demand for a resistance to internalised norms is the basis for the conceptualisation of 
queer identity in queer theory. However the resistant queer subject is considered in 
two ways: it is either a person who through their dissident gender attributes or sexual 
practices resists the dominant social norms, or a person who refuses to identify with 
any set identity categories of woman, man, lesbian, gay, bisexual or straight.
19
 
Numerous guides, readers and introductions to queer theory quote Judith Butler‟s 
Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter when outlining queer identity and queer 
agendas.
20
 Butler‟s performativity theory paves the way for an identity that operates 
like a form of non-identity; a rejection of identity, although it carries all the traits of 
the concept it defies. Unsurprisingly, this stance has proven problematic in relation to 
other political movements or academic conceptualisations of gender and sexuality.
21
 
This chapter will particularly focus on its reverberations within transgender studies 
and conceptualisations of the transgender subject. 
Gender Fiction versus Transgender Identity 
Although the concept of transgenderism is celebrated as a space of transgressive 
gender formation in some works engaging with queer theory and Judith Butler‟s 
performativity theory, a number of transgender academics have acknowledged that 
transgender subjectivity is incompatible with queerness.
22
 Whereas some transgender 
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scholars and authors, such as Stephen Whittle, Kate Bornstein and Julia Serano have 
attempted to find a common space for queer and transgender subjectivity (Whittle, 
2006; Bornstein, 1995; Serano, 2007), others angrily reject queer theory as a form of 
transgender suppression and objectification (Jones, 2006; Zander, 2003).  
Jordy Jones refers to Judith Butler in order to demonstrate queer theory‟s 
tendency to objectify transgender subjectivity (2006). At the end of Gender Trouble, 
Judith Butler forms a libratory idea of the transgender body. She discusses the 
concept of „drag‟ as it is presented in Esther Newton‟s Mother Camp. Drag 
performance, Butler argues, excellently displays the performative nature of gender 
attributes, since it „plays upon the distinction between the anatomy of the performer 
and the gender that is being performed‟ (1999a, 175). Drag performance is not 
merely exemplary of how gender can be performed, but is an important agent in 
Butler‟s political project of de-essentialising society‟s general idea of gender: „In 
imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself – as 
well as its contingency‟ (1999a, 175, original emphasis).  
 This particular section of Gender Trouble has set off a great number of works 
on drag or camped-up gender difference as a discourse of gender resistance, collected 
for example in Moe Meyer‟s  The Politics and Poetics of Camp and Fabio Cleto‟s 
Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing Subject. In his introduction, Moe Meyer 
refers to Butler‟s drag as he outlines a discourse of active resistance to social norms, 
a discourse of camp or „queerness‟, which reconsiders gender transgressive deviation 
as a political device. Meyer describes the discourse of camp as the „constitution of a 
homosexual social identity‟ (19); the political function within queer discourse. The 
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discourse of camp is a means of dispersing the terror of sublimation, but also acts as 
a parody of the dominant discourse: „By inverting the process of appropriation, 
Camp can be read as a critique of ideology through a parody that is always already 
appropriated‟ (18).  
The transgender body here becomes a political means for queer action.
23
 
Meyer‟s appropriation of Butler‟s body in drag is an abstract space for exterior 
political battles, and Butler indeed advocates something similar in the section on 
Esther Newton‟s Mother Camp in Gender Trouble. She writes about a performative 
and completely abstract conception of the transgender body. This fictional 
transgender character is a mere canvas for inherently queer and/or homosexual 
conflicts. In Second Skins, Jay Prosser points out that while Butler‟s transgender 
abstraction has made the idea of transgender characteristics into something which is 
considered libratory and fashionable, and thus given it a place within theoretical 
discourse, the concept does not allow for transgender subjectivity (1998). If gender is 
always performative, the transgender body – like any gendered body – is always in 
drag. The distinction which is usually made between a transsexual and a drag 
performer is the experience of an essential gender,
24
 the very thing that Butler 
attempts to abolish. According to this idea, the transsexual body, as an agent in 
Butler‟s political project, thus partakes in the annihilation of its own particular 
existence.  
Butler herself admits that her theory does not leave space for transgender 
identity. In „Against Proper Objects‟, she suggests that there is an „important 
dissonance‟ methodologically between lesbian and gay studies and transgender 
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studies, indicating that the two are irreconcilable (1994, 11).
25
 Jay Prosser notes that 
Butler does not consider whether this might derive from a problem with the 
articulation of her theory: „For Butler the concern is queer‟s capacity to include, a 
question about queer‟s elasticity, about how far the term “queer” will stretch. What is 
not a concern is whether queer should even attempt to expand‟ (1998, 58). 
Butler defends and further explains her conception of drag in Bodies that 
Matter, referring to the cult documentary Paris Is Burning, which depicts a number 
of MTF transsexuals in New York. She concludes that „drag is not unproblematically 
subversive‟ (231), on the grounds that for the purposes of the film, the filmmaker 
Jennie Livingston needs to ask the characters to perform femininity. She describes 
how Jennie Livingston metaphorically acquires a phallus „i.e. the ability to confer 
that femininity‟ (Butler, 1993, 135), in the act of becoming the camera‟s 
fetishising/feminising gaze and through this intrusion the drag performance becomes 
an act of violence (135-137). Butler describes the camera simultaneously as a means 
of rape and as a surgical instrument (135), thereby implying that there is a connection 
between gendered and sexual violence and trans-sex operations. 
Jay Prosser criticises Butler‟s usage of psychoanalytic language inter-
changeably as abstract and corporeal terms in Second Skins. He notes that Butler‟s 
discussion of „transsexualisation‟ in Paris Is Burning depends on a „crucial 
substitution of fleshly part with symbolic signifier‟ (53).
 26
 Butler identifies the 
abstract psycho-analytic concept of the „phallus‟ in Livingstone‟s gaze and she 
automatically translates it onto the body, thus short-circuiting the tension between 
the „real‟ and mere signification: „the “real girl” acquir[es] a phallus … as she 
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represents the transsexual as a “real girl”‟ (Prosser, 1998, 275). According to Prosser, 
such an exchange „displaces the materiality of transsexuality, and thus the materiality 
of sex, to the level of figurative‟ (275). 
Corporeal feminist Rosi Braidotti‟s Metamorphoses similarly argues that 
Butler reduces the body to a purely superficial entity in Bodies that Matter. She also 
uses Butler‟s discussion of Livingston‟s phallus as an example. She considers this 
section, which is entitled „The Lesbian Phallus‟ to form an appropriate conception of 
a phallus with „a sort of plastic quality, a transferability which leaves it open to 
appropriation and re-signification by others‟ (2002, 43). This idea extinguishes the 
possibility of bodily experience. Braidotti explains: „I see in it a sort of reduction not 
only of the Phallus to its penile support, but also of the erotic body as a whole to the 
status of a prosthetic device‟ (2002, 43). 
In the political fervour of Bodies that Matter and Gender Trouble, Butler 
forgets the reality of the bodily inscriptions, when outlining the process of inscribing. 
Like the phallus, the transgender body is reduced to Butler‟s prosthetic political 
marionette. It becomes an appropriate laboratory sample to dissect and discard, in 
order to show that it was never truly there. When the skin is peeled off, it reveals an 
essence of non-essential queer values. Yet Butler casts herself as the defender of the 
transgender community in Gender Trouble (174-180). Radical feminists, such as 
Janice G. Raymond tend to see transgender bodies as perpetuators of unwanted 
gender values (1980). Butler attempts to exculpate the transgender performers, 
arguing that drag liberates rather than perpetuates gender: „[a]s much as drag creates 
a unified picture of “woman” (what its critics often oppose), it also reveals the 
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distinctness of those aspects of gendered experience which are falsely naturalized as 
a unity through the regulatory fiction of heterosexual coherence‟ (1999a, 175, my 
emphasis).  
Judith Butler‟s objectification of the transgender body reverberates 
throughout the contemporary queer movement. In her latest book, In a Queer Time & 
Place, Judith Halberstam argues that transgender issues have acquired a secondary 
status in the conception of queer emancipation. Transgender bodies are made into 
bearers of non-essentialist queer ideals. She recounts a curious incidence, which took 
place when she stood up to give a paper after a viewing Susan Muska and Greta  
Olafsdottir‟s documentary The Brandon Teena Story (1998), which explores the 
tragic events that led to the murder of the young FTM transsexual Brandon Teena. 
She fully expected to find her primarily transgender audience to consider this film, 
like many academics working within queer studies, to be a milestone within the 
popular conception of transgender subjects. However, she was faced with a deeply 
offended crowd that repeatedly charged Halberstam personally, along with Muska 
and Olafsdottir, with hijacking the tragic appeal of an FTM murder victim to forward 
inherently queer agendas (2005, 31-32). 
Halberstam takes this academic setback as an opportunity to further 
investigate both the theoretical paradigm that constitutes the basis for contemporary 
queer theory, and to establish the reasons for the transgender community‟s adamant 
sense of animosity towards it (2005). She uses what she calls „The Brandon 
Archive‟, which includes The Brandon Teena Story as well as  Kimberly Peirce‟s 
Boys Don’t Cry (1999), to show that there is a tendency both within journalistic, 
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political, legal and gender theoretical discourses either to shift the attention away 
from Brandon Teena‟s transgender identification, or to pathologise this condition.
 27
 
Kimberly Peirce‟s  Boys Don’t Cry portrays Brandon as a young person, whose 
confused state of gender dysphoria is a rite of passage in the discovery of a more 
mature and liberated sensibility. Peirce‟s Brandon overcomes his concern with his 
wrongly sexed body in the final love scene with Lana Tisdel, indicating that 
everything about his life up to this point has been a lie. Before undressing Brandon, 
revealing his „true‟ female form, Lana acknowledges that what they are about to 
perform is a lesbian love act, exclaiming „I don‟t know if I‟m gonna know how to do 
it‟ (Peirce, 1999). Brandon, who has finally reached his state of cathartic self 
revelation, affirms that this is what they are about to do, answering her: „I‟m sure 
you‟ll figure it out‟ (Peirce, 1999). 
Halberstam comments that 
Brandon‟s promiscuity and liminal identity is depicted as immature 
and even pre-modern and as a form of false consciousness. When 
Brandon explores a mature and adult relationship with one woman 
who recognises him as „really female‟, the film suggests, Brandon 
accedes to a modern form of homosexuality and is finally „free‟ 
(2005, 25). 
 Brandon‟s FTM identity is portrayed as a product of his rural hetero-normative 
upbringing. Boys Don’t Cry is a homosexual coming-of-age story, where the 
protagonist matures into the recognition that his/her desires for other women do not 
require him/her to be a man. The tragic fate of the real-life FTM Brandon Teena, 
when appropriated to the silver screen, is transformed into a queer drama, starring a 
fictional maturing lesbian (Halberstam, 2005, 86-92). 
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There is a similar process of  transgender subject erasure at work in the 
transformation of Susan Swan‟s 1993 novel The Wives of Bath into Judith Thompson 
and Lea Pool‟s lesbian cult classic Lost and Delirious (2001). The novel depicts an 
inconclusively transgendered FTM, leading a double life at the prestigious Bath‟s 
Ladies‟ College: she sullenly accepts the role as the tom-boyish school girl Paulie 
during school days, but  during weekends and evenings she becomes Paulie‟s 
flirtatious brother Lewis, who claims to be staying near the school grounds, doing 
odd jobs for the gardener. As Lewis, Paulie expresses her masculinity in a number of 
ways, one of which is the courtship of Paulie‟s room-mate Tory, who according to 
Swan, „always looked feminine – with milk-white hair you could die for and plump, 
high cheeks that coloured up the second anybody teased her‟ (1993, 58). If Tory is 
portrayed as the ideal woman, Lewis is the ideal man. Tory appreciates Lewis‟s 
advances, because he is the image of chivalric masculinity.
28
 Both characters enact 
an ideal of heteronormative courtship, until Lewis is discovered to be a girl. 
In Lost and Delirious, the girl Paulie enters into a relationship with Tory. 
There is a strong mutual love between the girls, but when Tory‟s sister finds them in 
a compromising position, Tory decides to sacrifice her passion for social acceptance, 
denying that the relationship had ever taken place. Desperately, Paulie enters into a 
cycle of enactments of chivalric pleas for love, and ultimately commits suicide. 
Lewis is cut out of the storyline. All but a few traces of Paulie‟s original transgender 
subjectivity are lost in the novel‟s transformation into a film. The concept is only 
allusively approached in a scene where Paulie dresses in a suit and asks Tory to 
dance, and another scene where she asks her second room-mate Mary to cut her hair. 
Mary responds: „She wants a guy, Paulie, not a girl with hacked hair‟ (2001). 
Sellberg    156 
 
Paulie‟s defeatist response to Mary‟s claim further affirms the fact that in the 
conceptual gender paradigm of Lost and Delirious a girl is unquestionably always a 
girl. 
In Loren King‟s Chicago Tribune review of the film, Lost and Delirious is 
described boldly to go „where Hollywood rarely treads: into the passionate, intense 
and complex world of girls at the point in their lives when self-discovery is 
combined with enormous vulnerability‟ (2001). Yet, this world is reserved for self-
discovering girls who unproblematically identify as girls. Judith Thompson and Lea 
Pool are not bold enough to venture down the philosophically charged transgender 
paths that The Wives of Bath opens up. Judith Halberstam concludes that Boys Don’t 
Cry is similarly restricted to certain accepted areas. Rather than providing an attack 
on trans-phobic crime, Kimberly Peirce‟s film confronts the binary gender 
conception in transgender identity: the villain of the piece is the the homophobic 
„backward-ness‟ of non-urban communities, where the persistence of essential binary 
genders becomes the source of hate crime (Halberstam, 2005, 33-44).  
Halberstam argues that the queering of Brandon, his transformation into a 
liberated non-essentialist subject, is an intentional agenda on Peirce‟s part.
29
 If Boys 
Don’t Cry were to appeal to its potential audience of urban intellectuals and 
culturally conscious viewers, its protagonist had to be re-appropriated to suit the 
urban idea of a sympathetic character. Trev Lynn Broughton and Joseph Bristow 
term this practice „butlerification‟ in a similar observation regarding the reception of 
Angela Carter‟s writings (1997, 19).
30
 Once Brandon Teena has been „butlerified‟; 
reconstituted as an urban „liberal subject‟, his „death at the hands of local men can be 
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read simultaneously as a true tragedy and an indictment of backward rural 
communities‟ (2005, 25). Judith Thompson and Lea Pool‟s Paulie in Lost and 
Delirious is also appropriately queered before the film leads her to a seemingly 
liberating suicide. Paulie not only rejects a gender identity, but refuses to internalise 
any generic labels, also those referring to sexuality. Mary tries to convince Paulie to 
give up her fruitless pursuit of Tory: „Tory is not a lesbian, so you should just forget 
about her, okay!‟ (2001) Paulie is shocked by Mary‟s indications about her sexual 
identity: „Lesbian! Lesbian? Are you fucking kidding me? Do you think I‟m a 
lesbian?  … No! I‟m Paulie in love with Tory, remember? And Tory is, she is, in 
love with me. Because she is mine and I am hers and neither of us are lesbians!‟ 
(2001). 
The fact that popular culture uncritically equates the „liberal‟, „non-essential‟ 
or „queer‟ with the concept of enlightened urbanity, with the inevitable effect that its 
reverse – rural corporeal gender identification – is discarded as „backward‟ or 
„immature‟ is undoubtedly a problematic matter. It raises some serious questions 
about the validity of the premises behind the concept of queerness. It is especially 
dubious considering that the queer project sets out to eradicate the binary conception 
of right/wrong sexuality and gender.
31
 The „butlerification‟ of Boys Don’t Cry and 
Lost and Delirious shows that this binary notion has simply been slightly redefined. I 
would like to argue that one of the reasons for this critical situation is the fact that the 
term „queer‟ has been used, sometimes by the same author, to signify several 
different developments. 
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In „Outlaw Readings: Beyond Queer Theory‟, an article interrogating the 
discontinuities between the queer movement, queer theory, and the queer project, 
Sally O‟Driscoll describes the queer movement as the political struggle for LGBT 
rights, and she quotes Eve Sedgwick‟s „Queer and Now‟ in Tendencies to describe 
the concept of queerness in queer theory as „the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, 
overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning where the 
constituent elements of anyone‟s gender, of anyone‟s sexuality aren‟t made (or can‟t 
be made) to signify monolithically‟ (O‟Driscoll, 31; Sedgwick, 8). She subsequently 
quotes Michael Warner‟s Fear of a Queer Planet to define the objectives of the 
queer project as „a resistance to regimes of the normal‟ (O‟Driscoll, 31; Warner, 
xxvi). O‟Driscoll acknowledges that the didacticism of the queer project 
problematically clashes with the openness of queer theory, as well as with the 
agendas of the political queer movement. Nevertheless, the libratory agenda of the 
queer project often slips into the frameworks of texts adhering both to queer theory 
and the queer movement. 
In Metamorphoses Rosi Braidotti acknowledges that such a slippage occurs 
in Judith Butler‟s Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter. Braidotti discerns the 
presence of a political struggle lurking between the lines of the non-essentialist 
philosophy framing Butler‟s work: „If the frame of reference is deconstructivist, … 
Butler‟s passion is fundamentally political‟ (2002, 42). Butler is not merely 
disbelieving of essential identities, she rejects them; she is not non-essentialist, but 
anti-essentialist. This is one of the points where, according to Braidotti, Butler‟s 
logic fails (2002, 39-52). If there is no essential subjectivity dressing up or 
performing, how can such an entity be called to the fray? To explain further: Butler 
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states that the gendered subject has no agency over the gender he/she performs. 
„There is no volitional subject behind the mime who decides, as it were, which 
gender it will be today. ... gender is not a performance that a prior subject elects to 
do, but gender is performative in the sense that it constitutes as an effect the very 
subject it appears to express.‟ (Butler, 1993, 24). Yet, as mentioned above, Butler 
equally urges her reader to practise resistance. The logic of the former cancels the 
premises of the latter. According to Braidotti „[s]he defends a vision of the subject 
which, however much in process and non-essentialized, requires the workings of 
consciousness as a regulatory entity‟ (Braidotti, 2002, 42). Braidotti notes that 
„Hegel casts a long and maybe even growing shadow over Butler‟s work‟ (2002, 
42).
32
 Butler develops a definite separation between the psychic and the social, and 
then struggles to re-join them.  
Furthermore, Braidotti acknowledges that whereas Butler‟s theory engages 
heavily with psychoanalysis, her deconstructive agenda confuses several of the basic 
concepts of this theoretical paradigm (2002, 49). Most crucially, Gender Trouble and 
Bodies that Matter disregard the subject, which is where psychoanalysis starts, in 
Butler‟s zeal to deconstruct its inscriptions. The entirely discursive body is 
constructed as a slate, and nothing but a slate. The idea of metamorphous pain, a 
concept which both interacts with and directs the body, does not enter into the 
equation. Braidotti points out that the type of interventions Butler urges onto the 
body „are neither easily accessible nor free of pain. In other words, changes hurt and 
transformations are painful; this does not mean that they are deprived of positive and 
even pleasurable side-effects, of course‟ (2002, 43). 
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The concept of pain in relation to the body – and in relation to identification – 
is important. The experience and description of pain is pivotal both in academic 
transgender studies and fictional as well as non-fictional transgender coming-of-age 
narratives.
33
 The metamorphous pain is not merely physical, but mental and social 
and creates a chain of distinguishable transgender experience that is iterated and 
reiterated throughout transgender discourse. It creates a founding narrative; a 
common point of reference, through which the individual authors can meet and 
communicate. I will return to this concept at the end of the chapter.
34
 
Feminism and Butler’s Ideal Drag 
As established above, Judith Butler‟s queer theory cannot be considered without 
distinguishing its roots in the queer project‟s political aim to resist „the regimes of 
the normal‟ (Warner, xxvi). Her work also needs to be considered in relation to its 
roots in feminism and its adherence to the discursive opposition at play in feminism‟s 
different strands. Butler‟s Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter are considered to 
be formative for and part of the third wave of feminism,
35
 which in some respects 
often is considered to be a reaction to second-wave feminism.
36
 Butler‟s work and its 
incongruities with transgender studies thus needs to be considered in this relational 
light. 
Both Chris Beasley and Linda J. Nicholson‟s introductions to feminism 
consider the concept of gendered subjectivity and the idea of social construction of 
sex and gender to be one of the major spaces of contention between second- and 
third-wave feminism (Nicholson, 13-16; Beasley 25-35).
37
 Second- and third-wave 
feminist works generally take opposing stances regarding the constructivity of 
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gender. Although some early feminist thinkers, such as Simone de Beauvoir, Julia 
Kristeva and Luce Irigaray argue that gender is discursively constructed (Beauvoir, 
1949; Kristeva, 1987a; Irigaray, 1985), second-wave feminist work often considers 
gender identity to be physically determined and an essential gender identity to be a 
pivotal point that can be changed and challenged, but the core of which remains the 
same (Colebrook, 2004, 146). The idea of a fictional element to that essential gender 
subjectivity is inconceivable. Third-wave feminism deems gender identity to be more 
or less entirely socially constructed, and thus not physically determined (Colebrook, 
2004, 146-147), which infers that a fictional element is inevitable.
38
 Essential gender 
is rejected as an oppressive myth (Felski, 1989, 119-120).
39
 Transgender thought 
usually disagrees with both of these approaches. According to the general conception 
within transgender studies, gender is indeed constructed to a certain degree. 
Constructedness in the case of a transgender person, however, does not infer an 
element of fictionality, if there is an authentic transgender experience of gender.
40
 
The first question urged by this conception is how experience authenticates 
subjectivity and the second question is why the concept of fictionality is demonised 
in theories of the gendered subject. I will consider the second question first. Both 
second-wave feminist and transgender writers express a fear of the artificial or 
fictional.
41
 The presence of such a fear infers that there is an immediate assumption 
of a division between the idea of the authentic „true‟ narrative and the piece of „false‟ 
fiction. Second-wave feminist and transgender academics alike reiterate claims of 
belonging and ownership of each particular discourse, in order to authenticate their 
theses.
42
 Especially works on transgender studies thus often introduce the topic in 




 It is a matter of asserting the right to move within the 
boundaries of a certain discourse.  
Second-wave feminist and transgender discourse tread similar discursive 
grounds. They make claims on similar or affiliated territories. The difficulties appear 
because their particular claims of ownership or authenticity of these territories rely 
on the inauthenticity, or fictionality of the other. Stephen Whittle‟s article „Where 
Did We Go Wrong? Feminism and Trans Theory –Two Teams on the Same Side?‟ 
determines that the unnecessary incongruities which have developed within the 
advancement of the feminist and the transgender projects, can be traced back to the 
publication of Janice Raymond‟s paranoid and polemical The Transsexual Empire 
(1979), in which transgender bodies are viewed as perpetuators of unwanted gender 
values (2006, 195-198).
44
 He establishes that „[f]eminists when faced with trans 
people find themselves between the devil and the deep blue sea. They now see that 
general theories are nothing more than fictions‟ (2006, 198). Raymond indeed claims 
that „[a]ll transsexuals rape women‟s bodies by reducing the real female form to an 
artefact, appropriating this body for themselves‟ (104). Transgender academics, on 
the other hand, generally have a different conception of essential gender subjectivity 
in relation to bodily sex. The concept of femininity is considered, if not 




Third-wave feminist thought and queer feminism may at first glance seem 
more conductive to the concept of transgenderism. Through notions such as the 
gender performativity of Judith Butler‟s Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter, the 
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idea of the „real female form‟ is deemed to always be fictional. The artificiality of the 
transsexual body is thus not a threat to the discourse. Problematically, however, the 
idea that gender is entirely fictional eliminates the possibility of transgender 
experience. In this case, the transgender community expresses a sense of being 
fictionalised. Sandy Stone explores a number of ways in which transgender bodies 
have been used to „ventriloquize‟ ideas from other discourses. In third-wave feminist 
writing, as well as research concerning medical advances „[b]odies are screens on 
which we see projected the momentary settlements that emerge from ongoing 
struggles over beliefs and practices‟ (Stone, 229). Stone compares the projection of 
ideas onto transgender subjects to the objectification of women forcefully combated 
by feminist writers: „As with males theorizing about women from the beginning of 




Butler‟s third-wave feminism and queer theory are once more accused of 
eliminating the possibility of agency and gendered experience in its attempt to 
problematise the idea of essential gender subjectivity, but most importantly, it is 
accused of making transgender bodies into screens; something less „real‟. Experience 
and agency in both Stone‟s and Raymond‟s accounts are bound together and the idea 
of the reality of specific experience is portrayed as crucial for any form of identity. 
This is where I want to return to the other question posed above: how does 
experience authenticate subjectivity? Why should femininity or transgender 
subjectivity need to be justified by pain? 
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Julia Kristeva suggests that feminine writing creates an anti-space: a space 
that exists primarily in opposition to patriarchal discourse (1981, 166). Janice 
Raymond relates to feminist identity in a similar manner: as a woman-only hide-out, 
a subjectivity that acts like a buffer on the specific wounding experiences that 
patriarchy inflicts on women. In order to access this space, each subject needs to 
justify their right to enter.
47
 Raymond‟s all-woman space is an extreme example, but 
Kristeva‟s idea of a feminine discursive anti-space is visible also in a wider feminist 
community. Rita Felski refers to it in a rather negative light in Beyond Feminist 
Aesthetics. She suggests that a specifically female space defines femininity in terms 
of a compulsory marginality and oppression (1989, 47). According to Felski, there is 
a tendency among feminist writers to give what Judith Butler refers to in her 
eponymous book as ‘an Account of Oneself’ in order to establish a feminist identity. 
Felski presents several examples of feminist autobiographical accounts, or as she 
calls them, „confessionals‟ (Butler, 2005; 1989, 86-121).  
These confessionals seem to operate like identifying narratives by aspiring 
activists, justifying their belonging in the feminist community through negative 
experiences of patriarchal society and formative feminine pain. This pain forms a 
sense of shared feminine being. Yet, as Felski acknowledges, the idea that there is a 
specific feminine expression of a specific female space is not particularly coherent 
with the third-wave feminist idea that identity is entirely socially constructed and all 
such gendered essences are oppressive myths (1989, 121). It is even less coherent 
with the political zeal of the more extreme queer feminism that Judith Butler‟s early 
work predicates, in which all such normalising regimes should be avidly resisted. 
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Yet, confessional authenticating narratives are not uncommon features in queer 
theory. 
The Paradox of the Queer Identity Narrative 
Numerous influential queer theorists and critics make a point out of assuring their 
readership that they are actually queer, and that they thus can make a legitimate 
contribution to queer discourse.
48
 The issue of sexual identity is undoubtedly not 
arbitrary to the queer canon. As David Halperin points out in Saint Foucault –
Towards a Gay Hagiography, Michel Foucault became a crucial part of the queer 
canon predominantly because he became one of the famously gay victims of the 
AIDS epidemic in 1984 (3). Also Judith Butler, whose performativity theory has 
shaped queer theory as it is conceived today, openly identifies as non-heterosexual in 
her texts and elsewhere. Judith Halberstam and Gloria Anzaldúa refer to their own 
particular queer identities throughout their work. Kate Bornstein and Riki Wilchins 
build their work against their identities as queer MTF transsexual S/M dykes. Also 
the above mentioned David Halperin is openly gay.
49
 There are numerous other 
examples: the queer canon is largely constructed of gay people writing about gay 
people. 
Of course, one might argue that, although not a coincidence, it is unsurprising 
that such a great amount of queer theorists openly identify as other than heterosexual. 
To be fair, these writers belong to groups that may have a particular interest in 
challenging traditional ideas of sexuality and gender. It is not always merely a matter 
of personal interest, however. It is also a matter of belonging.
50
 Before an author can 
be accepted into the theoretical idiom, he or she has to confirm his or her right to 
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speak. There is an implicated demand for participation in the queer discourse. Its 
participants do not simply talk about it. They are inherently expected to speak for the 
queer discourse; to give it a voice. Thus, when writing within queer theory, the critics 
are implicitly asked to become discursively queer. 
As always, the potency of this discursive stigma is best demonstrated through 
the examples that do not quite meet the requirements. Its importance becomes 
apparent when heterosexual-identified queer theorists like Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
attempt to come to terms with their place within the theoretical discourse.
51
 
Sedgwick has oscillated between several alternative attempts at legitimising her 
contributions to queer theory. In A Dialogue on Love she argues that she can relate to 
non-heterosexual experience, because she has experienced a sense of otherness due 
to her obesity (1999, 19-24). In Tendencies, published six years earlier, she uses her 
struggle against breast cancer to affirm her identification with gay men. Her 
argument focuses on the physicality of her breasts. She claims that the diminished 
erotogenicity in her recreated breasts drew her towards masculinity and the sense of 
„loss‟ inherent in their removal was similar to the trauma of the AIDS epidemic 
(1993, 262). Later, in an article on the construction of masculinity, she also professes 
that her breast cancer created a space in which she could relate to lesbians, since the 
baldness incurred by the chemotherapy sometimes caused her to be read as queer 
(1996, 11-20).  
Sedgwick spends a considerable amount of energy building narratives that 
may allow her to become queer. She constructs a personal history, exploring the 
personal experiences that could possibly compare to an experience or an 
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understanding of queerness. Yet, her frequent change of focus suggests that her 
narratives fail to thoroughly convince. It implies that her narrated experiences do not 
yield the sense of authenticity, authority or understanding that will uncomplicatedly 
give her a place in the queer canon.  
Just like there are numerous different takes and approaches to queer theory, 
there are obviously different kinds and degrees of authorial inclusion. Sedgwick‟s 
anxiety of insufficient queerness becomes the focus of some of her texts like 
Tendencies and A Dialogue on Love, whereas it is merely implied in texts such as 
Between Men and Epistemology of the Closet. Other queering authorial narratives 
take a variety of more or less inclusive forms. Kate Bornstein‟s identity narrative is 
the consistent ongoing focus of her texts. The character of the differently gendered 
author becomes the subject of gender discussion in Gender Outlaw and her 
experiences form the narrative around which it circulates. The book takes the form of 
a confessional, invoking an internal negotiation and ultimate understanding of the 
self. She writes: 
All my life, my non-traditional gender identity had been my biggest 
secret, my deepest shame. It‟s not that I didn‟t want to talk about 
this with someone; it‟s just that I never saw anything in the culture 
that encouraged me to talk about my feeling that I was the wrong 
gender (Bornstein, 1995, 8). 
She describes how this feeling leads to an urge to challenge the given norms: 
„This book, and the many other words, acts, art, and politics of other gender activists 
attest that it‟s a time of cultural readiness for these theories – these ambiguities‟ 
(1995, 111). Bornstein thus uses the differences and changes in her own body to 
exemplify a queer subject, and further, to signify the emergence of a queering 
society.  
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In the personal narrative or narratives that Judith Halberstam weaves into 
Female Masculinity, the author‟s experiences are expressed as moments of shared 
recognition. Her preface recounts: 
I was a masculine girl, and I am a masculine woman. For much of 
my life, my masculinity has been rendered shameful by public 
responses to my gender ambiguity. However, in the last ten years, I 
have been able to turn stigma into strength. This book is a result of 
a lengthy process of both self-examination and discussion with 
others (Halberstam, 1998, xii). 
Like Bornstein, Halberstam acknowledges the production of her book to have 
initiated a queering process. Her self-examination and sharing of experience enables 
her to encounter queerness. However, unlike Bornstein, Halberstam‟s authorial 
persona is less the focus of the texts, and more of a meeting-point: a cluster of ideas 
and dilemmas from which the discussion of various other gender narratives spring. 
Halberstam refers back to her initial introductory self-reflexive narrative throughout 
Female Masculinity, using words like „we‟ in reference to queer experience to 
suggest a form of implicitness.
52
 The author is not the subject of the analysis, 
however, but rather the methodological means to the exploration of a recognised 
subjective perspective. Halberstam is positioned within the book, but her position is 
never completely localised.  
Authorial confessionals primarily become problematic when they are posed 
next to the more anti-essentialist queer texts, like Judith Butler‟s Gender Trouble. 
The 1999 edition of the work includes an introductory autobiographical section in 
which the author, in rather stereotypical terms describes her personal hardships as a 
queer subject:  
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I grew up understanding something of the violence of gender 
norms: an uncle incarcerated for his anatomically anomalous body, 
deprived of family and friends, living out his days in an „institute‟ 
in the Kansas prairies; gay cousins forced to leave their homes 
because of their sexuality, real and imagined; my own tempestuous 
coming out at the age of 16; and a subsequent adult landscape of 
lost jobs, lovers, and homes. All of this subjected me to strong and 
scarring condemnation but, luckily, did not prevent me from 
pursuing pleasure and insisting on a legitimating recognition for 
my sexual life (Butler, 1999a, xix). 
Considering that this particular work asks its readership to actively resist internalised 
norms and essentialised identities, it is rather odd that Butler attaches such a clichéd 
construction of herself to it. She paints the image of the ideal queer experience. Her 
narrative is sustained by the type of backwards rural communities with their 
physically enforced norms of gender and sexuality, that Halberstam argues to be the 
stereotypical setting for queer pain. Butler here attempts to demonstrate an 
understanding of her subject matter and a reason for her ongoing battle against 
gender norms. Most importantly, she emphasises the formative pain she has 
personally experienced because of these norms.  
Butler‟s narrative of queerness differs noticeably from the other examples. 
Perhaps because of its incongruity with the subject matter, the author‟s personal 
identity establishment has been expunged from the body of the texts, inhabiting a 
separate exclusive space in the preface. The form these sections take is also radically 
different from the rest of Butler‟s text: the language is less formal and the tone is 
more intimate. Compared to the formal academic analysis of her subsequent 
theoretical thesis, this preface sounds oddly caricatured and sentimental. Similarly to 
the psychoanlalytic binary of inside and outside that Butler attempts to challenge,
53
 
the very structure of her work falls prey to the enlightenment division of experience 




 Butler separates the authority of her experiences from the general 
theories, only to re-combine them and call it truth. The product is an oddly abstract 
and stale concept of queer subjectivity.  
The problems presented in relation to Judith Butler‟s narrative construction of 
queer identity are similar to the problems inherent in the basic stances of queer 
theory: the idea of queering; the unsettling of norms and de-centring of subjectivity, 
harbours a prevalent desire for resulting change, not least in Judith Butler‟s own 
work – and change requires agents of change. The queer canon thus comes to 
function as a collective. It forms a norm of the legitimately queer, not unlike the 
norms of the legitimately gendered, which according to the definition of queer theory 
should be challenged. Scott Wilson declares in a chapter on queer theory in his 
introduction to Cultural Materialism that „[o]ne fascination of homosexual, gay, 
lesbian or queer communities is the fact that they cannot be based on the very thing 
that would define them‟ (1995, 212). It is a concept that by its definition cancels 
itself out.  
Judith Butler attempts to negotiate this problem in Bodies that Matter. She 
argues that the queer subject should perform gender challengingly and creatively, in 
order to avoid the creation of false universals and set identities.  The resulting 
cancellation of queer identity, however, must equally be avoided. She thus states that 
this particular identity is acceptable because here „temporary totalization performed 
by identity categories is a necessary error‟ (1993, 230). She acknowledges that 
without this, there will be no space for political agency. 
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Something is not quite right about a theory that requires „temporary errors‟. 
In a recent essay, Claire Colebrook suggests that queer theory cannot be sustained 
unless it queers the concept of theory (2008a, 22). As long as queer theory operates 
within the perimeters of normative discourse, it can merely function in terms of 
opposition. It can never employ affirmative action. As it is, queer theory merely 
challenges the subject in psychoanalysis with different notions of the same character 
(2008a, 19). Gender subjectivity cannot be removed from the frame of the inside-
outside binary, simply by the assertion that gender is performative rather  than 
essential, or that what was once in should now be out. Subjectivity needs to be 
removed both from the inside and the outside – and be considered in terms altogether 
other. In this case, the concept of subjective agency need not rely on „totalisation‟, 
temporary or sustained, because the subject does not depend on a totalising urge.  
Self-reflexive Narrative and Corporeal Becoming 
Kath Weston claims in Gender in Real Time that the growing realisation within 
gender studies that a queer world without gender was inconceivable brought about a 
tragic loss of theoretical influence on the movement: „Somewhere in the course of 
the changes leading up to the present century the dream died, and with it went a 
certain critical edge for gender studies‟ (1). She argues that gender studies has 
become empirical, messy and paradoxical. Weston attempts to resurrect a critical 
side to the idea of gender, visualising queerness as a challenge to gendered power 
relations and the categories of gendered time and space. Judith Halberstam‟s In a 
Queer Time and Place and Sara Ahmed‟s Queer Phenomenology attempt to do 
something similar. Rita Felski aptly recognises that identities do not need to be 
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essential to function as identities: „The fact that they are socially constructed does not 
mean that they are less “real” or that their political function can be reduced to one of 
complicity with ruling ideologies‟ (1989, 120). Weston, Halberstam and Ahmed‟s 
works build theories of multitudinous, juxtapositional and continually created 
genders that move between gendered spaces; reconsider, and recreate them (Weston, 
2002; Halberstam, 2006; Ahmed, 2007).  
So how is this done? How can a type of subjectivity that escapes totalisation 
and stagnation be conceptualised? Claire Colebrook suggests that identity and 
identity construction should be considered from a corporeal feminist perspective 
(2000a; 2000b; 2004; 2008a). I will investigate this option in relation to self-
reflexive gender narration in what is left of this chapter, and the following two 
chapters will form a conception of corporeal transgender characterisation in late 
twentieth-century fiction. In an article on possible departures from Judith Butler‟s 
theories of subjectivity, Colebrook refers to this corporeal perspective as a 
specifically Australian school of feminism (2000a). I will adopt this term, although I 
choose to ignore the geographical specificity of it in order to incorporate some 
theorists that have definite conjectural similarities (including Colebrook herself), 
although sometimes more dubious Australian connections (e.g. Elspeth Probyn and 
Rosi Braidotti).   
Colebrook‟s article on Australian feminism discusses Judith Butler‟s usage of 
Lacan in relation to Genevieve Lloyd, Moira Gatens and Elizabeth Grosz‟s 
engagement with psychoanalysis. She argues that where Butler considers Lacan‟s 
description of the subject‟s conceptualisation of the „real‟ to be the creation of false 




  these Australian feminists consider the mental positioning of 
the „real‟ to be a form of „realization‟ (2000a, 86); a process of „becoming‟ real, or in 
the case of gender identification: becoming-woman and becoming-corporeal (86).
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The concept is derived in reference to the idea of becoming-woman that Deleuze and 
Guattari introduce in A Thousand Plateaus.  For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-
woman is a process of subjective othering that enables the subject to consider itself 
and communicate its conception of selfhood (2007, 304-307).
57
 Gatens refers to this 
in terms of a continual „doubling‟, a play of contrast through which the subject 
represents itself in a network of bodies (1996, 40-43), whereas Lloyd describes it in 
terms of a self narrative or a shared fiction of identity (1993, 161-165). 
Formation of identity creates possibilities rather than prisons for the body, 
since becoming-gendered is a continual mental and corporeal development. Judith 
Butler‟s performativity theory challenges the idea that the body harbours „reality‟ 
whereas the mind is a seat of self-illusion. As established above, she problematises 
the conception that „natural‟ and „essential‟ bodily attributes determine the formation 
of the mind – but her theories merely turn the concept inside out. The Australian 
feminists rather attempt to get rid of the split between the mind and the body, 
considering both in juxtaposition with one another. Employing a Spinozist 
understanding of the relation between mind and body, Genevieve Lloyd describes it 
thus: „The body is not the underlying cause of the mind‟s awareness and knowledge, 
but rather the mind‟s object – what it knows. And the mind knows itself only through 
reflection on its ideas of body. Its nature is to be the idea of a particular body.‟ 
(Lloyd 1982, 20). 
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Rosi Braidotti considers the idea of a unified corporeal mentality and the 
process of becoming-gendered in a similar manner. However, she specifically 
emphasises the affirmative qualities of becoming; the possibilities of what Elizabeth 
Grosz refers to as „thinking the new‟ (1999b, 15), and the connective powers of 
representational processes. For Braidotti, identity is an occupation of specific 
corporeal and representational spaces (2002, 12). Her Metamorphoses and 
Transpositions advocate an idea of Deleuzean nomadic subjectivity, which functions 
somewhat like a tracer of consciousness or an inconsistent and inconclusive 
subjective narrative. Each moment of shared experience or recognition is a location 
of intersecting and interrelating forces and „spatio-temporal variables‟ (2002, 21). „A 
“location”, in fact, is not a self-appointed and self-designed subject-position. It is a 
collectively shared and constructed, jointly occupied spatio-temporal territory.‟ 
(2002, 12). These locations are constantly altered. The subject-position is in 
continual flux. Nomadic gender is considered in terms of differently patterned 
„revisitations and retakes‟ of shared encounters. It is a continual conditioning of 
connective events and experiences that lead to potential becomings.  
Braidotti‟s conception of becoming is connected to her idea of ethics: 
continual revisitations of shared spaces enable the process of becoming-ethical, or 
becoming more and more connected. The specificity of the identities are opened up 
to a number of different loci, indeed connect a number of different loci, but do not 
lose their specificity. An identity-in-becoming is the means by which spaces are 
connected, conditioned, revisited and reconsidered, rather than a specific space in 
itself (2006, 268-272). An urge or desire to identify would thus be considered an 
urge to become connected and a desire for affirmative reconsidering of previous 
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conditions. Connective experiences, whether painful or not, are revisited and 
reformed into possibilities for positive change. 
Judith Halberstam‟s In a Queer Time and Space suggests that this type of 
identity formation is intrinsically queer. It moves between mediums and negotiates 
subjectivity between the lines of „indefinite and virtual‟ time and space (11), and it 
enables „political and cultural change‟ (4). Claire Colebrook argues in adherence 
with Deleuze and Guattari that such queer movement requires a construction of 
difference; a play of doubles (2008a, 18). These doubles are not stable, but 
continually produce and reproduce one another in order to become more and more 
other. Like Moira Gatens, Colebrook argues that becoming-woman or becoming-
other is a prerequisite for gendered communication, and like Braidotti she states that 
communication and connection is a prerequisite for change: „to know is to relate to, 
and conceptualise, what is other than oneself‟ (2009a, 12). The gendered others are 
not fixed or essential, however; they are not states of gendered being, but processes 
of becoming-gendered. 
Deleuze and Guattari‟s chapter on radical becomings in A Thousand Plateaus 
describes three stages of becoming: becoming-woman, becoming-animal and 
becoming-imperceptible or molecular. It is a process of becoming more and more 
other. In the final stage, the subject is thoroughly liberated from the subjective and 
categorising state of being human (2007, 307-309). All the notions of concepts and 
their boundaries are erased. From a gendered perspective, a play of differences where 
gendered doubles form and reform in relation to one another is thus a process that 
moves towards gender transcendence. Continual gendering, othering, connection and 
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communication are processes that produce change as they move towards the limits of 
human consciousness and existence. 
These are the type of queer processes that this thesis advocates. These 
intrinsically queering gendered becomings are a useful structure to consider the 
gendered self-reflexive identity narratives through. As Rita Felski acknowledges, 
autobiographical narratives are common within feminist and gender studies 
discourse. Judith Butler attempts to deal with the idea of self-narrative in her later 
work, Giving an Account of Oneself. According to Butler, the exchange of self-
reflexive accounts creates spaces where the ‟I‟ intersects with the „other‟; they enable 
connection and communication, and it is through these that the individual subjects 
become ethically minded or socially responsible individuals (3-40). Butler‟s account 
does not, however, give a particularly clear idea of how the relationships are further 
developed or re-shaped. They are described in oddly static terms. The analysis also to 
some level sustains the rejection of identity expressed in Butler‟s earlier work: the 
identities formed in self-reflexive narratives are still presented as fictions that „blind 
the “self”‟ (2005, 40), but these, according to Butler should in this particular case not 
be shunned, since subjective blindness is „an indispensible resource for ethics‟ (2005, 
40). 
The idea of a „blinded‟ ethical self is not sufficiently complex to harbour the 
identities formed through feminist self-reflexive narratives, however. Rita Felski 
argues that „Confessional writing has been central to this sphere, as it has played out 
an anxious, often uneasy struggle to discover a female self, a struggle which is by no 
means free of contradiction but which constitutes a necessary moment in the self-
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definition of an oppositional community‟ (1989, 121). I want to linger on Felski‟s 
reference to a struggle played out and a moment of self-definition here. In Being in 
Time, Genevieve Lloyd refers to the „moments of being‟ that Virginia Woolf 
describes in „Modern Fiction‟ and the Proustian idea that fiction should attempt to 
capture a sliver of life (123-161). Lloyd argues that the achievement of this is not 
inconceivable, because the narration of defining moments can actually constitute 
their process of becoming: „writing can find truth by making it‟ (1993, 163). She 
explains that reality is not reality until we understand it as such and identity exists 
only once it has been recognised. Once it is, it starts to become identity, founding its 
particular narrative: „to think myself as unified is to enact a unity – to tell a story‟ 
(Lloyd, 1993, 164). The writer and the written word create each other symbiotically, 
like the identity narrative and the identifying subject both function within the 
identity-in-becoming. Thus identity formation and story-telling are synonymous, for 
„each of us, on the model we are now constructing, does something akin to what the 
writer does‟ (Lloyd, 1993, 164). 
Sara Ahmed similarly breaks down the boundaries between the authorial 
voice and the text in Differences that Matter. It includes a number of 
autobiographical narratives, although Ahmed makes sure to acknowledge and 
consider the implications of her self-narration. She notes that „[o]ne must be cautious 
of how the anecdote can become an absent centre, not only by being given the status 
of an event that simply happened, but also by being used as a justification for a given 
argument‟ (143).  However, she explains that anecdotal reflection is pivotal to what 
she is trying to achieve: „Through the telling of the anecdote, I have implicated 
myself in the subject of my research and any such implication always invokes an-
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other who cannot be named‟ (143). She argues that the account of her private 
experiences inserts her personally, „as a feminist‟ (143), in the text. The anecdote 
thus functions as a point from which the text – and Ahmed in the text – becomes 
feminist.  
Sandy Stone argues in „The Empire Strikes Back‟ that the composition of 
autobiography is a process of territorialisation (2006, 229). Halberstam similarly 
claims that certain narratives and discourses form spaces of recognition. There are 
stories, like the reiterated recount of the problem a questionably gendered person 
faces when choosing between the mens‟ and the ladies‟ room,
58
 that function like 
indicators of specific identity categories. Like Lloyd, she speaks of these spaces in 
terms of „persistent presents‟ or „moments‟ of potential subject experience 
(Halberstam, 2005, 11). This idea of identity formation mirrors Rosi Braidotti‟s 
conception of identity as a process of revisiting and reconsidering shared spaces of 
experience – and the identity narrative functions like a textual version of it. 
Becoming-Woman by Becoming-(Queer) Feminist 
Formative self-reflexive writing has been employed by the transgender community 
since the 1950s, when Christine Jorgensen‟s successful sex change operation made 
headlines. However, Marjorie Garber notes in her Vested Interests that the greater 
part of these writers, or at least the ones that had been made famous by 1992 are 
MTF oriented (110). This is still the case.
59
 Whereas there are a number of shorter 
works, poetry collections, interviews and even theoretical works by FTM-oriented 
transsexuals,
60
 the self-reflexive narratives are largely an MTF genre.
61
 There are, 
however, a few popular FTM self-narratives in circulation, like Matt Kailey‟s Just 
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Add Hormones and Max Valero‟s The Testosterone Files. Interestingly, as the titles 
indicate, these are largely focused on the experience of hormone treatment and 
bodily difference,
 62
 whereas the MTF self-narratives mainly deal with the 
psychological, social and psycho-social experience of becoming-woman.
63
 This 
analysis of narrative as a means of becoming-gendered will thus primarily discuss 
self-reflexive MTF narratives.  
Transgender autobiography has become one of the cornerstones of the 
transgender discourse and social transgender awareness. Bernice L. Hausman refers 
to transsexual autobiography as the establishment of a public space; a „“true story” of 
transsexualism‟ (1995, 174). There are several comprehensive analyses of this 
phenomenon, including Patrick Califia‟s Sex Changes, Jay Prosser‟s Second Skins, 
Bernice L. Hausman‟s Changing Sex and Marjorie Garber‟s Vested Interests.
64
 The 
academic analyses have slightly different selections of autobiographical writers, but 
they all engage with three standard MTF works: Renée Richards‟s Second Serve, Jan 
Morris‟s Conundrum and Christine Jorgensen‟s A Personal Autobiography.
65
 All 
these narratives describe a traumatic sensation of alienation and bodily dysphoria that 
becomes somewhat cured through the realisation of transgender identity and the 
performance of a sex change operation. Jan Morris describes how she was always a 
girl in a boy‟s body (1974, 169); Renée Richards describes how she initially led a 
double life, letting the Renée inside her out in secret (1983, 54), Christine Jorgensen 
recounts how she tried to identify as a homosexual, but failed, because she felt like a 
woman in a heterosexual relationship (1967, 38-49). All of these accounts are fairly 
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Califia and Prosser‟s analyses of transgender narrative also investigate Kate 
Bornstein‟s Gender Outlaw, which is radically different from its predecessors. This 
works, together with autobiographies like Riki Wilchins‟s Read My Lips, Julia 
Serano‟s Whipping Girl and Erica Zander‟s Transactions, refuse to follow the 
straightforward autobiographical norm. They develop a form of narrative that is less 
focused on the realisation of transgender subjectivity, and the feeling of being 
wrongly embodied. They encounter the actuality of living as an MTF transsexual and 
the social and academic discourses that circulate around the gendered subject. They 
take advantage of their specific gendered position and their movement between the 
binary genders to investigate the boundaries, thus to some degree affirming Marjorie 
Garber‟s rather objectifying and stigmatising statement that „it is to transsexuals and 
transvestites that we need to look if we want to understand what gender categories 
mean‟ (1992, 110).  
However, they do not necessarily adhere to Garber‟s following statement that 
„transsexuals and transvestites are more concerned with maleness and femaleness 
than persons who are neither transvestite nor transsexual‟ (1992, 110). Bornstein, 
Wilchins, Serano and Zander do not consider themselves to be truly male or female, 
and they do not attempt to belong to either one gender. Kate Bornstein notes that she 
is „supposed to be writing about how to be a girl. I don‟t know how to be a girl. And 
I sure don‟t know how to be a boy. And after thirty-seven years of trying to be male 
and over eight years of trying to be female, I‟ve come to the conclusion that it‟s 
really not worth the trouble‟ (1995, 234). 
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Interestingly, Bornstein, Wilchins, Serano and Zander all identify with a form 
of feminism. Bornstein, as mentioned above, considers herself a queer lesbian S/M 
dyke; Zander aligns herself with S/M lesbianism and Wilchins and Serano are both 
queer lesbian feminists. Considering their shifting gender positions the formation of 
these feminist, queer, lesbian and S/M identities-in-becoming are particularly visible. 
Bornstein, Wilchins, Serano and Zander all acknowledge that their experiences will 
never be identical to biological women‟s, yet they recount experiences of what 
Serano‟s subtitle indicates to be the scapegoating of femininity in society and 
passionately advocate feminist and LGBT rights. These feminist critiques of society 
are fairly classical. Zander recounts how she noticed people treating her differently 
when she appeared and passed as a woman (2003, 210); Serano criticises the 
objectification of bodies and advocates a rebirth of celebratory femininity (2007, 16); 
Riki Wilchins and Kate Bornstein both outline and challenge the boundaries of 
gendered subjectivity (Wilchins, 1997; Bornstein, 1995, 45-69).   
I would like to argue that there is more than a classic critique of patriarchal 
and heteronormative society forming within these narratives, following the authors‟ 
shift from male to female. Firstly, Bornstein, Wilchins, Serano and Zander express a 
need to align themselves with the feminist discourse in order to combat the feminist 
fear of transgender women, as expressed by radical feminists such as Janice 
Raymond. All four transgender authors discuss The Transsexual Empire and attempt 
to establish themselves as the opposite of Raymond‟s gender spies (Bornstein, 1995, 
75-77; Wilchins, 1997, 59-62; Serano, 141-142; Zander, 229-233). Secondly, the 
transgender authors attempt to gain a form of femininity. In becoming-feminists, in 
narrating spaces of shared feminist concerns, they open up the possibility of creating 
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new ways of becoming-women. Despite their acknowledged difference – and to 
some degree also because of it – Bornstein, Wilchins, Serano and Zander attempt to 
engage the feminist community in a conversation that simultaneously revisits and 




Marjorie Garber states that it is not surprising that MTF transsexuals have 
acquired more fame and space in literature and media. Employing a psychoanalytic 
feminist perspective of the gender binary, she argues that these subjects are still 
somewhere male, and because of their primary position in the gender binary, males 
have always taken precedence in these spheres (1992, 110). This is a rather simplistic 
interpretation of the MTF bias in transgender autobiographical production. 
Considering the discourses in circulation in Bornstein, Wilchins, Serano and 
Zander‟s narratives, I would be more inclined to suggest a Deleuzean reading of this 
phenomenon. The authors initially construct themselves as other than the universal 
subject, the male. They iterate and reiterate the idea of their feminine otherness, but 
all four autobiographers finally realise that they are further other. They are the other 
of the other. A Deleuzean otherising process of becoming-woman here transforms 
into a process of becoming thoroughly gender other. The recounted experiences of 
patriarchal society‟s oppression of femininity is used as an entrance into the feminist 
community, but the feminist discourse is also challenged to move further from the 
concept of gender; to start a process of „menacing‟ (Wilchins, 1997, 61); 
„ungendering‟ (Serano, 195); „queering‟ (Bornstein, 1995, 164) or „TransCending‟ 
(Zander, 257) the concept. The transgender narratives are thus attempting to shape 
feminism and their sense of femininity into a process of becoming-indefinable. 
Sellberg    183 
 
Kate Bornstein‟s Gender Outlaw attempts to articulate a set of movements 
towards a final stage of gender transcendence. She concludes her narrative with a 
personal play entitled „Hidden: a Gender‟, through which she unwittingly resounds 
Deleuze and Guattari‟s radically transformative form of becoming, in creating a 
space where her gendered self may initialise a process of becoming-imperceptibible 
(1995, 171-223). Bornstein‟s eponymous protagonist states that „gender is not the 
issue. Gender is the battlefield. Or the playground‟ (1995, 222). She adds that „One 
day we may not need that‟ (1995, 222). 
Jami Weinstein argues in reference to Elizabeth Grosz‟s reading of Deleuze 
and Guattari that the process of becoming-imperceptible is an affirmation of 
gendered difference, but this should ultimately lead to a space beyond difference. 
She emphasises that Deleuze and Guattari‟s processes of becoming only begin with 
becoming-woman (Grosz, 2005, 194; Weinstein, 2008, 25-26). Weinstein and Grosz 
finally want to institute a feminist politics of imperceptibility, „leaving its traces 
everywhere but never being able to be identified with a person, group or 
organisation‟ (Grosz, 2004, 194; Weinstein, 2008, 26). Because of this, Weinstein 
argues that sexual difference may be a useful tool towards imperceptibility, but it 
should ultimately be extinguished.  
I do not agree with this reading of Deleuze, and neither does Claire 
Colebrook. The idea of becoming-imperceptible does not necessarily infer a final 
being-imperceptible. Colebrook argues that the specific terms „woman‟ and „animal‟ 
merely signify states of further otherness (2008b, 7), and the „imperceptible‟ is the 
idea of the completely other (2008a, 32). This state is a fantasy, or an „idea‟ of 
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otherness, that is not supposed to be seen as a state, but rather a goal (2009a, 20). As 
the next two chapters establish, gender difference is not one consistent relationship, 
but a transformative cycle that pushes its own boundaries and enables both subjective 
and social change. 
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[CHAPTER 5] Queer(ing) Fiction: A De-Butlerification of 
Angela Carter 
 
Whereas the previous chapters have encountered the queering of historical discourses 
and the formation of queer identity, this chapter focuses on queering practices in 
1980s and 1990s literary criticism of Angela Carter‟s work. Angela Carter has been 
recognised as one of the major post-modern feminist novelists of the late twentieth 
century and her work is considered to overtly engage with queering discourses. Since 
her most recognised novels were published before the rise of feminist and queer 
theorists like Judith Butler and Donna Haraway, however, she tends to be seen as 
iconically proto-queer. This chapter establishes that although there are important 
queer discourses within Carter‟s texts, her project has also deliberately been read in a 
queer light: Carter criticism tends to perform a selective queering of the author‟s 
work. 
Noting that Angela Carter‟s recent popularity marks an apparent change in 
the reception of the author‟s writing since the 1970s when some of her texts were 
shunned by the feminist community, Joseph Bristow and Trev Lynn Broughton‟s 
introduction to the 1997 critical compilation The Infernal Desires of Angela Carter 
questions what implications the recognition of such a dependence on cultural 
receptive trends has on the conception of the author‟s work: 
Her [Carter‟s] early preoccupations, many of them deeply 
unfashionable at their inception, are now acclaimed as 
„anticipating‟ postmodern feminists such as Judith Butler and 
Donna Haraway in a way it tests the resources of grammar to 
describe. What does this posthumous recognition, this after-the-fact 
„Butlerification‟ of Carter mean for literary history, for feminist 
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historiography, and for Carter‟s own project (Bristow & 
Broughton, 19). 
This is an important question: to what extent has Angela Carter‟s work been 
critically „butlerified‟ or queered to fit the image of her authorship in feminist literary 
criticism? Sara Ahmed, Kate Chedgzoy, Marjorie Garber and numerous other 
influential critics present Carter as one of the major fictional writers within late 
twentieth-century postmodern feminist and queer literature.
1
 I do not necessarily 
attempt to argue that this reading is flawed. Rather than to question whether this is 
truly what Angela Carter is, this chapter investigates whether this is all she can be. 
What types of readings have been ignored, omitted or brushed over in the process of 
queering Angela Carter? What readings may Angela Carter‟s work enable? 
 I initiate my exploration of the possibilities of Angela Carter‟s production by 
looking at what she does not produce. By comparing her to another author of fiction 
who has achieved iconic status within queer literary circles, Jeanette Winterson, I 
establish that Carter‟s work certainly employs a more ambiguous engagement with 
queer agendas. Although Carter and Winterson‟s work are often read in correlation 
with each other, there are also major differences in their approach to queer 
discourses. This is of course partially because Carter‟s work was produced earlier, 
but nonetheless Winterson communicates with queer theory whereas Carter merely 
alludes to concepts prevalent in queer ideology. Winterson provides (semi-)fictional 
affirmations of queer values and Carter produces a number of more or less dubious 
queer metaphors and allegories. 
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Jeanette Winterson’s Affirmation of Butler and Haraway 
Jeanette Winterson produces text book examples of queer fiction. As, Brenda Jo 
Brueggemann and Debra Moddelmog establish in „Coming-out Pedagogy‟, 
Winterson‟s fiction is thus an excellent base for teaching discourses of gender and 
sexuality to undergraduate students (2002). Richard Hobbs similarly considers 
Winterson‟s Written on the Body to provide „a crucial doorway into the debate 
surrounding gender‟ (5). This particular work is used as a canonical example of 
queering fiction in numerous critical essays,
2
 and the active connotations of the verb 
„queering‟ are fitting here, since Winterson‟s novel responds directly to Butlerian 
discourses. As the previous chapter establishes, Judith Butler‟s Gender Trouble and 
Bodies that Matter conclude that the interplay between sex and gender is 
misrespresented in previous feminist and psychoanalytic discourse.
3
 According to 
Butler, sex is produced, or „written‟ onto the body through the subject‟s gender 
performance. The title of Jeanette Winterson‟s Written on the Body refers to this 
idea. Structurally, the novel is perhaps one of Winterson‟s most conventional texts. 
Its particular critical attraction is lodged in its queer presentation of gender 
attribution as excessive or arbitrary. Written on the Body revolves around the 
narrator‟s sexual obsession for a woman. The narrative moves through the initial 
attraction as well as the physical consummation of this obsession in explicit detail, 
but although the character and the body of the first person narrator are explicitly 
described, the text never divulges his or her gender identity (Winterson, 1992).
4
  
Although the narrative framework of Written on the Body does not directly 
explore gender definitions, the absence of such is striking. The novel passively 
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questions the desire to define the gender of a narrator which despite a great amount 
of psychological and physical detail, refuses to take form.
5
 Winterson thus employs a 
negative didactic in which the absent gender attribution is given a key position. As 
Susan S. Lanser acknowledges in „Queering Narratology‟, Winterson uses the 
destabilising power of silence in Written on the Body. The absence of the narrator‟s 
gender is a form of particularly queer narrative poetics, in which the urge to 
categorise both in relation to binary gender and binary sexuality is challenged and 
finally overcome (Lanser, 1996, 252-256). The impossibility to define the narrator‟s 
gender also destabilises definitions of the narrator‟s sexual orientation and the 
narrative‟s generic classification, since a female narrator would make it a lesbian 
narrative, whereas a male narrator would indicate a rather unremarkable piece of 
heteronormative romantic fiction.  
As the critics of Jeanette Winterson‟s work establish, Written on the Body 
overtly interacts with Judith Butler‟s theories and perfectly demonstrates the impact 
of gender definitions in narrative constructs. Butler urges her readers to „resist the 
myth of interior origins‟ (2004a, 339), in order to expose gender as a social construct 
which has been interiorised to pose as essential. Written on the Body is a direct 
answer to this challenge. The absence of any gender-specific language continually 
interrupts the performance of the „stylized repetition of [gendered] acts‟ (1999a, 179) 
which Butler regards as necessary to construct the impression of a gendered essence. 
The „regulatory fiction‟ (1999a, 180) of „gender coherence‟ (1999a, 180) is 
destabilised in the reading of Written on the Body, showing that its continual 
presence is not essential. The marked absence of gender definitions additionally 
exposes the construct of gender continuity to be, as Butler argues, a central position 
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in the current perception of reality.
6
 Winterson explicitly „Butlerifies‟ her narrative, 
creating a fictional parallel to Butler‟s theories. She seemingly anticipates the 
reactions and theoretical references produced by her critical readership, and makes 
the correlations particularly pertinent in order to adhere to them.  
Written on the Body is merely one of Winterson‟s overtly queering pieces of 
fiction. If Winterson there responds to Butler by resisting gender definitions, The 
Powerbook directly portrays the queer potentiality of Butler‟s conception of sex and 
gender performance. The protagonist, Ali, is able to transpose her gender 
performance onto her physical body.
7
 She dresses as a boy in order to smuggle tulip 
bulbs from Turkey to Holland, carrying two bulbs fitted as her testicles with a 
particularly fine tulip stem in the middle, to represent her phallus. Ali gets captured 
on her way to Holland and becomes a sex slave to a virginal princess. Not knowing 
what a male body should look like, the princess assumes that Ali‟s tulip is an actual 
penis. Winterson writes: „Then a strange thing began to happen. As the princess 
kissed and petted my tulip, my own sensations grew exquisite, but as yet no stronger 
than my astonishment, as I felt my disguise come to life. The tulip began to stand‟ 
(2000, 22). In adherence to Butler‟s performativity, the convincing performance of 
masculinity here corporeally rewrites Ali‟s body as male.  
The Butlerian discourses reiterated in The Powerbook also interact with 
Donna Haraway‟s emancipatory cyborg theories. Haraway‟s „A Manifesto for 
Cyborgs‟ gives the „queer‟ feminst body of literary and cultural critics an opportunity 
to extend Butler‟s ideas into a libratory agenda.
8
 Haraway forms an argument for 
women‟s self-creation and recreation, comparing womanhood to the concept of the 




 She quotes a strand of feminism that claims that, like the cyborgs, women 
are not fully essential subjects. She particularly focuses on an argument posed in 
Catherine McKinnon‟s „Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for 
Theory‟, which suggests that the idealised objectification of the female body renders 
it an illusion or abstraction: „a woman is not simply alienated from her product, but 
in a deep sense she does not exist as a subject, or even potential subject, since she 
owes her existence as a woman to sexual appropriation‟ (Haraway, 1990, 201). 
Haraway does not agree that there necessarily is, as McKinnon claims, an 
„“essential” non-existence of women‟ (201), however. She argues that the feminist 
agenda should not be the construction of „self-knowledge of a self-who-is-not‟ (201).  
Instead, Haraway suggests that feminism should stop aspiring to the male-
created myths that seek essential subjectivity, and attempt to find a more constructive 
mythology. She claims that the entirely performative characters of the Star Trek 
cyborgs, who seek no subjectivity, but exist merely in their simulation of a „common 
language‟ (205), are the creatures feminism should look to: „The cyborg is a kind of 
dissembled and reassembled, postmodern collective and personal self. This is the self 
feminists must code‟ (205). The cyborg is never an individual being, nor an 
embodied community – it is a unit in which mind, body and tool form „a surface for 
writing‟ (195), which is „in communication with all of [its] parts‟ (223). As the 
individual units are neither physical apparatuses, under the control of biological 
processes, nor computers run by a conscious mind, they incorporate a conception of 
being which escapes the mind/body – and thus also the gender/sex – polemic. For 
Haraway they embody the possibility for feminism to break free from fatalist 
binarism, and to recreate itself in relation to a myth which embraces an identity of 
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creative and destructive possibilities: „Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the 
maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves 
... It means both building and destroying machines, identities, categories, 
relationships, spaces, stories‟ (223). 
Winterson‟s protagonist in the The Powerbook embodies the relationship 
between organic and mechanical construction which Haraway‟s cyborgs symbolise. 
Ali‟s body collaborates with her constructed phallus to actualise the physicality of 
her performed gender. In accordance with Butlerian and Harawayian principles, 
Winterson uses a cyborg to portray a situation in which a body becomes either male 
or female when it initially becomes conceived of as either male or female; when the 
social construct of gender difference becomes internalised. The libratory account of 
how the princess‟ belief in Ali‟s maleness becomes actualised in Ali‟s body is 
portrayed in the novel as an example of the boundless possibilities of personal 
narrative: „I can change the story. I am the story‟ (2000, 5).
10
  
Jeanette Winterson‟s Written on the Body and The Powerbook re-narrativise 
the prevalent mythologies of the queer canon and thus create recognisable queer 
spaces. The Butlerian imagery is worked into the symbolic language of the text, 
forming a platform of queer signification.
 
Additionally, both novels interact with the 
discourses they evoke. Winterson asks and responds to her own questions in The 
Powerbook: „Why did I begin as I did, with Ali and the tulip?‟ (209). She decides 
that it is because „I wanted to make a slot in time‟ (2000, 209). Written on the Body 
refers to the possibilities that this narrative space creates: „The world is bundled up in 
this room ... We can take the world with us when we go and sling the sun under your 
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arm‟ (190). Winterson conceptualises her development of queer space in her 
queering novels as a form of queer self-narrative.
11
 She compares herself to 
Rembrandt in The Powerbook: 
Why did Rembrandt use himself as a prop? 
Well, because he was there, but more importantly, because he 
wasn‟t there. He was shifting his own boundaries. He was inching 
into other selves (2000, 214). 
The ‘Butlerification’ of Literary Value 
The „queer‟ critical readership often reads Angela Carter‟s work in the same 
theoretical light as Jeanette Winterson‟s: as pieces of actively queering literary 
production.
12
 This is a problematic move. Whereas Winterson‟s Written on the Body 
and The Powerbook were published in 1992 and 2000 respectively, when Judith 
Butler and Donna Haraway‟s theories were properly established, Carter‟s queer 
novels were written considerably earlier. There are certainly clear connections to 
Butler and Haraway also in Carter‟s work, but these are particularly prominent in the 
novels published before Gender Trouble (1990) and „A Manifesto for Cyborgs‟ 
(1985). This „anticipation‟ of canonical queer theory has made Carter so popular 
among academics working within feminist and „queer‟ theories, that she has been 
permanently labelled „The High Priestess of Post-Graduate Porn‟ (Bristow & 
Broughton, 1; Sebestyen, 38). According to Lorna Sage, there were more 
postgraduate proposals for theses on Angela Carter‟s work in 1994, than any other 
twentieth-century literary topic (2001, 3). The „anticipatory‟ queer reading of 
Carter‟s oeuvre is, however, rather selective. As Bristow and Broughton note in the 
quotation above, the queer reading of Carter will always be an „after-the-fact 
“butlerification”‟ of the texts (19).
13
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The queering tendency among Carter‟s critics is particularly evident in the 
evaluation of the author‟s work. Most feminist and queer critics interestingly find the 
author‟s early queer novels somewhat problematic.
14
 Most critics agree that the 
pivotal point in Carter‟s literary career was the publication of Nights at the Circus in 
1984.
15
 Paulina Palmer writes in an essay on Nights at the Circus and the earlier The 
Passion of New Eve that the former is the more accomplished work, because it 
completes themes merely „touched upon‟ in The Passion of New Eve (190). The title 
of her essay – „From Coded Mannequin to Bird Woman: Angela Carter‟s Magic 
Flight‟ – suggests that she considers Carter‟s work to illustrate the writer‟s ascent 
towards a correctly performative and „complete‟ feminism. The popularity of Nights 
at the Circus shows that she is not the only critic to have considered the novel thus. 
There is an abundance of interviews and critical analyses on Nights at the Circus, 
which is uncontested by Carter‟s other novels.
16
 It was awarded the James Tait Black 
Memorial Prize in 1984 and the critics protested openly when it did not appear on the 
1984 Booker Prize shortlist (Gamble 2001, 136). Although the criticism is sometimes 




Bristow and Broughton‟s introduction to the collection of essays The Infernal 
Desires of Angela Carter quote Robert Nye‟s review of Nights at the Circus, which 
appeared in the guardian shortly after the novel‟s publication. He suggests that her 
previous novels had been interesting but unconsummated attempts at introducing the 
discourses that Carter problematises in Nights at the Circus. „They could only be 
called successful --- if their author‟s aim was merely to intrigue, and it is impossible 
to believe that Carter is that crude. Nights at the Circus, her new and most ambitious 
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novel to date, breaks fresh ground for her both in content and style, and is without 
doubt her finest achievement so far‟ (Broughton & Bristow, 1997, 5). Palmer 
similarly claims that „In treating, in Nights at the Circus, themes of liberation and 
change in personal relationships and the social formation, Carter focuses attention on 
topics which, though absent from or marginalised in her earlier texts, were indirectly 
heralded in them by means of her analysis of the contradictions and element of 
violence in patriarchal social structures and institutions‟ (201).  
Despite the fact that throughout Angela Carter‟s oeuvre there is a central 
concern with images of femininity and the formation of gender identity, the critical 
canon has determined that Nights at the Circus treats these concepts more 
„completely‟ than Carter‟s other novels. Both Palmer and Nye argue that their 
appreciation is based on the recognition of increased authorial maturity. Nye writes 
that „Angela Carter goes from strength to strength‟ (Broughton & Bristow, 1997, 5), 
implying that her authorship can be defined in terms of linear qualitative progression. 
Palmer makes similar assumptions about the linearity of Carter‟s literary career, 
victoriously announcing that „[Carter] completes the movement from the 
representation of woman as “coded mannequin”, trapped in conventional feminine 
roles and positions, to the representation of her as “bird-woman”, courageously 
exploring new realms, both personal and political‟ (201).  
Nights at the Circus was Carter‟s latest novel when Palmer‟s essay was 
published in 1987. However, the majority of Carter‟s critics make similar claims 
about the superiority and increased maturity of Nights at the Circus even after her 
last novel, Wise Children was published in 1991.  The Oxford Companion to English 
Sellberg    195 
 
Literature  praises Nights at the Circus at length in its entry on Angela Carter, stating 
that it is the author‟s „chief achievement‟ (176). She merely mentions Wise Children 
in passing. Joyce Carol Oates writes in her New York Times review on the novel that 
she found it entertaining, even though „Wise Children may not be Angela Carter‟s 
most provocative or arresting work of fiction‟ (Gamble, 2001, 163). The idea of 
Carter‟s progressively developing feminist authorship is thus not sustained after 
Nights at the Circus, raising the question as to whether her apparent „insight‟ into 
feminist „completeness‟ has grown less sharp with old age or if the progressive 
elucidation of Carter‟s work was merely a critically sustained myth in the first place.  
Some critics avoid these questions, claiming that Wise Children should be set 
aside from Carter‟s other work:
18
 it presents a different perspective on life, and thus 
applies separate discourses from the author‟s earlier work, because Carter died of 
cancer only months after it was published. Beth A. Boehm states in „Wise Children: 
Angela Carter‟s Swan Song‟, that the novel should be read as a form of „memento 
mori‟. This analysis cannot be related to Carter‟s personal or political reasons for 
writing the book, however, since Lorna Sage adamantly claims, in her highly 
personal biography of Angela Carter, that the author was unaware of her cancer 
diagnosis when Wise Children was published (76).  
Wise Children is structurally less unconventional than Carter‟s immediately 
previous three novels, The Infernal Pleasure Machines of Doctor Hoffman, The 
Passion of New Eve and Nights at the Circus and it does not as overtly challenge set 
gender norms.
19
 Nights at the Circus, on the other hand overtly deconstructs all 
binary identity constructions. I will argue that Nights at the Circus‟s abundant 
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popularity in comparison to the rest of Carter‟s novels is due to its continual sexual 
and gender disruptions. Considering the critical climate at the time it was 
published,
20
 it is the most „politically correct‟ of her works. Nights at the Circus 
adheres more thoroughly to the paradigm of early Butlerianism than any of the 
novels published before or after. Carter presents gender (as well as any other form of 
identity) as a matter of performance. The narrative is fittingly set partly on and partly 
off a circus arena, and it is often impossible to tell when the characters‟ performances 
are genuine or part of the show. In accordance with Butler, Carter literally portrays 
gender as a fiction. The fiction is, however, disrupted. The circus train explodes 
somewhere in Siberia, the male protagonists are taken captives, and the women and 
animals are „translated into another world‟; set free to compose their own futures 
(Carter, 1984, 225). 
The narrative thus creates a space for a feminist libratory agenda. The 
liberation is cast in the hands of a grotesque „winged victory‟.
21
 The protagonist, 
Fevvers, is portrayed as a form of feminine „monstrosity‟, a large and often vulgar 
woman with a pair of powerful wings. Like Haraway‟s cyborgs, Fevvers‟s 
„monstrous‟ being threatens the centre of Patriarchal society from its margins.
22
 
Although the question is often asked, it is ultimately unclear whether or not Fevvers‟ 
wings have been constructed by nature or by human hands, but as the narrative 
progresses the source of her „monstrous‟ growths becomes unimportant. Although 
the wings are natural, Fevvers dyes them bottle-blonde.
23
 The „illegitimate fusion‟ 
(Haraway, 218) that Fevvers is made from becomes naturalised, and like the cyborgs, 
she is a juxtaposition of woman and alien construction.  
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Much of the critical debate surrounding Nights at the Circus centres on the 
utopian aspects of the novel.
24
 Fevvers is often read, as in Paulina Palmer‟s essay, to 
be the symbol of a final feminist victory; a simple libratory icon „rebel[ling] against 
[her] captors and succeed[ing] in liberating [herself] from the tyranny of the circus‟. 
When femininity has been set free, Fevvers is awarded a husband whose mind is „a 
perfect blank‟ (Carter 1984, 222), so that she can prepare for „the subsequent 
reconstruction of his masculinity‟ (Palmer, 200) and Fevvers conclusively laughs in 
victory, „mocking the existing political order‟ (Palmer, 201). Aidan Day makes a 
similar analysis:  
The twentieth century that it looks forward to had, by the time 
Carter wrote the novel substantially happened. I read Fevvers‟ 
laughter as, in part the delight of the victor, the delight that Angela 
Carter herself has retrospectively and that her character has 
prophetically, in knowing that the war for women‟s rights, even if 
not ultimately won, would score up notable victories in the 
twentieth century. The celebratory laughter touches all human 
beings because the gaining of women‟s rights is a gaining of the 
rights of being human (Day, 194). 
Day notes that Fevvers is described in utopian terms early in the novel: „the pure 
child of the century that just now is waiting in the wings, the New Age in which no 
women will be bound down to the ground‟ (Carter, 1984, 25; Day, 172). 
As several critics acknowledge, however, there are numerous layers to 
Angela Carter‟s recount of utopia.
25
 Fevvers‟s performance as the Winged Victory 
has been rehearsed as one among many roles performed in the „museum for women 
monsters‟ (Carter, 1984, 55) described early in the novel, among the other roles are 
Death the Protectress, the Angel of Death, Azrael, Venus and Gabriel. In The 
Female Grotesque Mary Russo comments on the fact that Carter‟s cynical tone 
remains prevalent throughout Fevvers‟s libratory movement. Fevvers openly 
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proclaims herself to be the New Woman and her friend/carer Lizzie constantly 
reminds her that she performs the role slightly incorrectly. Russo concludes that: 
This exchange between Lizzie and Fevvers is, like everything in 
the novel, inconclusive ... There is always something left over, 
something as untimely as subjectivity itself, that forms the basis of 
a new plan, perhaps another flight. Like Fevvers‟ excessive body 
itself, the meaning of any possible flight lies in part in the very 
interstices of the narrative, as the many-vectored space of the here 
and now, rather than a utopia hereafter (Russo, 180-181). 
Regardless of whether Carter considered herself to write a feminist utopia, 
however, the fact that Nights at the Circus presents such multiple „vectors‟ and that 
the narrative voice elusively engages with the concept of being and performing on 
several levels, give the „queer‟ feminist faction of her critics ample opportunity to 
apply various proto-Butler/Haraway perspectives to the novel.
26
 These arguments 
become more problematic to sustain in the discussions of The Passion of New Eve. 
There is one scene in particular, which most critics find highly problematic.
 27
 In this 
scene the main „cyborgized‟ female character Eve, who has surgically been 
transformed from the male Evelyn, against his/her will, performs sexual intercourse 
with the Hollywood superstar Tristessa St Ange, who has just been revealed to be a 
MTF transvestite. Carter describes how the two gender ambiguous bodies take it in 
turns to perform both gender roles: „Turn and turn about, now docile, now virile – 
when you lay below me all that white hair shifted from side to side … I beat down 
upon you mercilessly, with atavistic relish, but the glass woman I saw beneath me 
smashed under my passion and the splinters scattered and recomposed themselves 
into a man who overwhelmed me‟ (1977, 149). She concludes that:  
Every modulation of the selves we now projected upon each other‟s 
flesh, selves – aspects of being, ideas – that seemed, during our 
embraces, to be the very essence of our selves; the concentrated 
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essence of being, as if, out of these fathomless kisses and our 
interpenetrating, undifferentiated sex, we had made the great 
Platonic hermaphrodite together (1977, 148). 
In her essay on the development of Angela Carter‟s feminist subject, Ricarda 
Schmidt argues that this passage displays one of the weaknesses of The Passion of 
New Eve. Eve and Tristessa inhabit either a male or a female sphere which is 
represented by either a dominant or a submissive role in their love-making. The act is 
symbolically likened to the image of the Platonic hermaphrodite, which is a creature 
combined of a clear male side and a clear female side. Schmidt considers this to be 
an incomplete form of androgyny, the application of which renders The Passion of 
New Eve an incomplete feminist novel. This male-and-female androgyny, is 
according to Schmidt, merely useful as a step towards the more refined neither-male-
nor-female androgyny which is more easily traceable in Carter‟s later novel, Nights 
at the Circus (Schmidt, 1990, 64).  
Aidan Day spends the larger part of his chapter on The Passion of New Eve in 
Angela Carter: The Rational Glass arguing against Schmidt‟s simplistic dismissal of 
the novel. He never questions Schmidt‟s idea of a neither-male-nor-female 
androgyny as more sophisticated and complete than Platonic androgyny, however. 
He claims that Schmidt has merely misunderstood Carter‟s usage of imagery.  
According to Day, the invocation of the Platonic hermaphrodite should not 
necessarily be taken literally. Day attempts to „save‟ The Passion of New Eve, by 
claiming that despite the fact that the love-making passage seems to invoke „“fixed 
entities” – of the male and the female‟ (1998, 123), this cannot be what Carter meant 
to imply, since, in Day‟s words: „we know that Carter was sharply opposed to the 
idea of such mythic entities or archetypes‟ (1998, 123). He claims this regardless of 
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the fact that he fully accepts her to adhere to the myth of the New Woman and the 
Winged Victory in Nights at the Circus (Day, 1998, 175-80). Day finds no real proof 
of the „fact‟ of Carter‟s opposition to archetypes in The Passion of New Eve itself, 
but refers his reader to interviews and earlier novels to prove his point.
 28
  
Grudgingly or not, the critics agree that neither Eve nor Tristessa are at any 
point devoid of gender identity (Day, 1998; Schmidt, 1990; Lee, 1996; Hobbs, 2004; 
Punter; Johnson, 1997; 2000). The novel plays with the interchangability and fluidity 
between the male and the female, but both Eve and Tristessa are at each depicted 
moment either experiencing a male identity, a female identity or both. Despite the 
fact that critics like Aidan Day try to fit it into an uncomfortably narrow „queer‟ 
ideal, the novel refuses to take the correct „queer‟ shape. Rather than reading it in a 
different light, most critics thus consider it to be an early and uncouth example of 
„queer‟ feminism,
 29
 and award it acclaim for „anticipating‟ the theories of Judith 
Butler.  
Carter’s Queer(ied) Utopia  
The sex scene between Eve and Tristessa in The Passion of New Eve is difficult to 
place for several different reasons. One of the critical issues discussed in relation to 
this section of the novel concerns the decision of whether or not to read it seriously.
30
 
The text gives rise to similar concerns about ambiguity as the section describing the 
New Woman in Nights at the Circus: it is uncertain whether or not the author is 
describing a feminist utopia. This problem is emphasised by the presence of the 
essential image of the Platonic hermaphrodite, the actual essence of which none of 
the critics quite agrees upon.
31
 The second major point of critical disagreement 
Sellberg    201 
 
concerns the parts Tristessa and Eve play in the scenes leading up to and directly 
following the erotic union. Most critics attempt to argue that Eve is constructed as a 
gender „cyborg‟ and that Tristessa becomes an embodiment of Butlerian gender 
performance: Eve is a corporealised construction and Tristessa continually re-iterates 
myths of femininity up to the point immediately before the love scene when her 
performative tableau is shorn.
32
 Considered separately and without Carter‟s 
ambiguous layers of cynicism the two characters may arguably be read thus. As a 
unified concept, however, neither the de-feminised Tristessa, nor the „cyborgised‟ 
Eve quite fit the libratory moulds that the critics place upon them.  
Despite the fact that the novel was published as early as 1977, The Passion of 
New Eve at first glance conveys a number of ideas that feminist theory did not fully 
express until the late 1980s. Lucie Armitt acknowledges in Theorising the Fantastic 
that Eve is, like Haraway‟s image of the cyborg, an amalgamation of physicality and 
construction (Armitt, 1996, 176-179). The radical women‟s liberation movement that 
constructs her considers her to be a libratory „Messiah of the Antithesis‟ (Carter, 
1977, 67). Like Haraway‟s cyborg the New Eve‟s very existence is supposed to 
create a „powerful infidel heteroglossia‟ (Haraway, 223), disrupting the Patriarchal 
„dialectic of creation‟ (Carter, 1977, 67). The image of Eve will give birth to „other 
present-tense, illegitimate cyborgs, not of Woman born, who refuse the ideological 
resources of victimisation so as to have real life‟ (Haraway, 219). They will be 
creatures beyond gender, and will thus not be trapped in woman‟s inevitable route 
through „Woman, Primitive, Zero, the Mirror Stage and its imaginary‟ (Haraway, 
219).
33
 Having once been a man, Eve initially needs to become a woman. Literarily 
performing the feminine antithesis, she reversely tracks her own rebirth after her 
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transition, going through all the stages quoted above from the opposite direction; 
tracing the „feminisation of Father Time‟ (Carter, 1977, 67). Eve experiences the 
Mirror Stage in her room in the feminist lair in Beulah, when she first sees the 
reflection of her female body: „I had become my own masturbatory fantasy. And – 
how can I put it – the cock in my head, still, twitched at the sight of myself.‟ (Carter, 
1977, 75). When she escapes Beulah she becomes the slave of the misogynist and 
impotent man Zero, who reduces all his slave women to primitive creatures by 
treating them like animals and not allowing them to speak. In the final part of the 
novel Eve enters a cave in search of Mother, the Goddess/surgeon who created her, 
but the journey leads her to a womb-like condition and a back-wards birth, „worming 
[her] way through‟ (1977, 184) „[w]alls of meat and slimy velvet‟ (1977, 184). When 
she reaches the end of her journey, the sea, she realises that she may be pregnant. Her 
journey is promising to give birth to a „hopefully monstrous‟
34
 creature which has 
been conceived by a cyborg and a phallic woman. 
The storyline of New Eve in The Passion of New Eve does fit remarkably 
well with Haraway‟s „A Manifesto for Cyborgs‟. Similarly, the character of Tristessa 
St Ange can easily be read as anticipatory of Judith Butler‟s formulation of gender 
performance. Tristessa, the Hollywood icon, performs all the myths of femininity. 
Carter writes that „She had been the dream itself made flesh though the flesh I knew 
her in was not flesh itself but only a moving picture of flesh, real but not substantial‟ 
(1977, 7-8). When Eve is taught to perform femininity, her feminist captors show her 
clips of Tristessa‟s roles. She is „the very type of romantic dissolution, necrophilia 
incarnate‟ (1977, 7), and as such, the „real‟ physical Tristessa, when Eve first sees 
her, is „a sleeping beauty who could never die since she had never lived‟ (1977, 119). 
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She lives in a house of glass, „in her own mausoleum‟ (1977, 112), surrounded by a 
waxwork collection aptly named „THE HALL OF THE IMMORTALS‟ (1977, 119). 
The concept of Tristessa is fully non-essential: she is merely a screen on which 
femininity is performed. 
Considering the fact that The Passion of New Eve offers its queer and third-
wave feminist critical readership such anticipatory iconic embodiments of Haraway‟s 
and Butler‟s early theories, it is perhaps not odd that they expect the union of these to 
be suitably utopian. At a pivotal moment, however, Tristessa and Eve abandon their 
potential for non-gendered being and perform the essentially male-and-female 
Platonic hermaphrodite. This sequence is only problematic if it is read as a possible 
pure utopian moment, embodying a „queer‟ feminist myth.
35
 Aidan Day and Ricarda 
Schmidt do not merely attempt to find the absence of representation or the extinction 
of myth in Eve and Tristessa; they want to corporealise the modern myth of the 
perfectly queer being. They attempt to visualise a representation of an essentially 
gender-less entity. In Day‟s and Schmidt‟s readings of The Passion of New Eve, 
Butler and Haraway are taken for granted: like Fevvers‟s wings, they have become 
naturalised. In their quest to eliminate universals, they have made Judith Butler and 
Danna Haraway themselves universal.  
Aidan Day acknowledges that if Eve and Tristessa‟s sex scene is not read as 
utopian, Carter‟s Platonic hermaphrodite is not necessarily presented as an ideal. 
Instead, he argues, it may be considered a satire of the mythological being: „Carter‟s 
passage on the „great Platonic hermaphrodite‟ is daring because it goes right into 
mythic territory in order to make a point which is anti-mythic‟ (Day, 124). The 
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critical discussion thus moves between ideal and satire, mythic portrayal or anti-
myth. Aidan Day and Riccarda Schmidt attempt to define Angela Carter‟s political 
relationship to her mythical referent. Yet, Carter frequently mentions mythological 
characters throughout the narrative of The Passion of New Eve, without taking a 
stand to the myths. Neither Day nor Schmidt linger over the fact that only a few 
paragraphs before she mentions the Platonic hermaphrodite, Carter makes a fleeting 
reference to the mythological character Tiresias.
36
 I would like to suggest that rather 
than either idealising or satirising the myth of the hermaphrodite – both approaches 
of which indicate that Carter in reality believes in a non-essential „queer‟ self – the 
author simply invokes the symbolism of sexual difference and union connected to 
Plato‟s hermaphrodite and the philosophy of abstract love inherent in this concept.  
Becoming the Platonic Hermaphrodite 
As Aidan Day claims, The Platonic hermaphrodite has been mythologised into a 
symbol of gender unity (1998, 123). It is invoked in canonical texts on gender 
transgression as various as Thomas Heywood‟s Apology for Actors and Freud‟s 
„Beyond the Pleasure Principle‟.
37
 The idea of the Platonic hermaphrodite has, 
because of this symbolic status, been greatly misconstrued. Plato‟s formulation of the 
hermaphrodite is more ambiguous than its subsequent incarnations. Plato‟s The 
Symposium stages a competition to explain the true meaning of love, in which Plato‟s 
philosophical father, Socrates, takes part (2005). The idea of the hermaphrodite is not 
expressed by Socrates, but one of his opponents: Aristophanes, the famous 
comedian.
38
 This fact, in itself, throws an enigmatic light on the status of the idea. 
Aristophanes urges his listeners to accept that his narrative is not a joke (Plato, 2005, 
Sellberg    205 
 
32). He explains that in the beginning there were three human genders: „not just the 
present two, male and female. There was also a third one, a combination of these 
two; now its name survives, although the gender has vanished‟ (Plato, 2005, 27). 
Each creature had either two male sides, two female sides or a female and a male 
side. The gods, however, decided to cut them in half, to decrease their strength. 
Aristophanes concludes that love is the individual demi-beings‟ urge to find the other 
half, from which they have been so painfully separated (Plato, 2005, 32). 
Eve and Tristessa come together in their erotic union, performing the myth of 
the Platonic (Aristophanes‟s) hermaphroditical being of completeness. In the course 
of their intercourse they become one whole creature, rather than two separate halves. 
As Carter describes in the passage quoted above, their beings „smash‟ (1977, 149) 
and „recompose‟ (1977, 149), finally joining in „the mysterious equivalence of 
orgasm, that solvent of the self‟ (1977, 149). Aristophanes states that once the halves 
are fused together „you are one person; and when you died, you would have a shared 
life in Hades, as one person instead of two‟ (Plato, 2005, 31). Eve and Tristessa‟s 
performance of the Platonic myth is shattered when Tristessa is killed and Eve lives 
on. Eve is, however, tempted to continue the ritual:  
I was free to run away, to run back to the grave in the sand, to lie 
down upon it and there to waste away from sorrow. I was very 
much struck by the emblematic beauty of this idea; to die for love! 
So much had I become the mortal, deathward-turning aspect of 
Tristessa (Carter, 1977, 162). 
Eve does not complete this particular mythic performance of love, however. 
She lives on when her other part has been severed and moves on to another stage. 
After Aristophanes has finished his speech in The Symposium, Plato proceeds to 
describe another idea of love. The final speech is given by Socrates, himself, who 
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quotes the wise woman Diotima to claim that love has nothing to do with the 
particular lovers, but resides in a productive connection, the abstraction that draws 
them together. „The idea has been put forward ... that lovers are people who are 
looking for their own other halves. But my view is that love is directed neither at 
their half nor their whole unless, my friend, that turns out to be good ... Love‟s 
function is giving birth in beauty both in body and in mind‟ (Plato, 2005, 52-53). 
Socrates explains that the love of a person allows the character to give birth to, and 
understand an abstraction of, love.  
Socrates‟s idea of love in Plato‟s The Symposium has correlations with 
postmodern deconstructive philosophy – and not surprisingly – theories of 
performativity.
39
 He looks at love partly in terms of binary opposition, referring to 
two planes of existence: that of the divine and that of the physical, which, in view of 
Plato‟s theory of subjectivity in The Republic, can also be interpreted as a plane of 
„ideal‟ abstractions and a plane of physical imitations of these abstractions.
40
 
Socrates refers to love as a spirit, which is a concept that resides between the above 
opposites: „Being intermediate between the other two, they fill the gap between them 
and enable the universe to form an interconnected whole‟ (Plato, 2005, 48). It is 
important to note that love is thus not just the union of two lovers: it is the concept 
which unifies the lovers with their abstract forms. The fact that other people consider 
there to be an appearance of love between two lovers, connects the lovers and their 
observers to the ideal abstraction. When love between lovers is discussed, „[w]hat 
we‟re doing is picking out one kind of love and applying to it the name (“love”) that 
belongs to the whole class‟ (Plato, 2005, 51). This image, or continual performance 
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of love, progressively creates an impression which may lead to the apprehension of 
the ideal drama.  
As recounted above, Socrates explains that love is a desire for the good and 
the beautiful, which may connect its bearer to the actual concept of beauty. He 
relates how Diotima has told him: „Even you, Socrates, could perhaps be initiated in 
the rites of love I‟ve described so far. But the purpose of these rites, if they are 
performed correctly, is to reach the final vision of the mysteries‟ (Plato, 2005, 59). 
The ritual performance first takes the form of a sexual union with a beloved object, 
which if the roles are performed as roles, leads to the disruption of the particular 
love, through the comprehension of the generality of this object‟s performance, and 
so to the comprehension – and apprehension – of the idea of beauty: 
At first, if his guide leads him correctly, he should love just one 
body and in that relationship produce beautiful discourses. Next he 
should realize that the beauty of any one body is closely related to 
that of another, and that, if he is to pursue beauty of form, it‟s very 
foolish not to regard the beauty of all bodies as one and the same ... 
Looking now at beauty in general and not just at individual 
instances, he will no longer be slavishly attached to the beauty of a 
boy, or of any particular person at all, or of a specific practice. 
Instead of this low and small-minded slavery, he will be turned 
towards the great sea of beauty and gazing on it he will give birth 
... to many beautiful discourses and ideas (59-60). 
The apprehension of the „beautiful and good‟ is thus a conception which is gained 
through a continual performance; a creation and destruction of that which seems 
„beautiful and good‟. Love, for Socrates, is an act of catharsis: a deconstruction 
which leads to a state that is both physical and abstract; both performance and form. 
Carter presents an uncannily similar idea in the conclusion of The Passion of 
New Eve. At the end of her many adventures, Eve finds herself pregnant and embarks 
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upon a journey on the sea. The memory of her union of Tristessa is replaced by a 
greater union and this allows Eve to give birth to something beautiful – an embodied 
and unified imprint of the abstraction of their love: „after many, many embraces, he 
[Tristessa] vanishes when I open my eyes. The vengeance of the sex is love. Ocean, 
ocean, mother of mysteries, bear me to the place of birth‟ (Carter, 1977, 191).
41
 Eve 
and Tristessa‟s ritual of gendered love-making and their continual production and 
destruction of gendered performances symbolises Eve‟s journey to a plane where 
gender performance and gender essence are inter-changeable and transposed.
 42
 
Unless it is seen as a direct critique of the ideas it presents, neither Aidan Day 
nor Ricarda Schmidt acknowledge performance to be anything but an enslaving 
practice; a submission to universalised forms. They note how Eve and Tristessa 
become more pronouncedly gendered in the scenes leading up to and directly 
following their sexual union (Day, 1998, 125; Schmidt, 66). Day claims that this is 
part of Carter‟s satirising process. He suggests that she depicts a Butlerian concept of 
„drag‟, to expose the false universals at play in her characters‟ actions (1998, 125).
43
 
He comments on how „the various selves which each partner projects upon the other 
only “seemed” to be “the very essence of our selves” and that it is only “as if” they 
had made the “Platonic hermaphrodite” together‟ (Day, 124). Carter certainly does 
emphasise the performativity of the gendered roles that Eve and Tristessa put on, but 
these performances do not simply play upon their bodily surfaces in a charade of 
satirical love-making. Eve and Tristessa actively pursue their performances. If there 
is one myth Carter definitely does not attempt to crush here or anywhere else,
44
 it is 
the idea of a unifying love. The Passion of New Eve does not merely refer to, but 
directly paraphrases Socrates‟s philosophy of love. 
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Carter indicates that before her union with Tristessa, Eve identifies as 
essentially male. When Zero and his primeval slaves force Eve to enact the groom in 
a wedding service, with Tristessa as bride, Eve comments:  
I had become my old self again in the inverted world of 
mirrors. But this masquerade was more than skin deep. 
Under the mask of maleness I wore another mask of 
femaleness but a mask that now I never would be able to 
remove, no matter how hard I tried, although I was a boy 
disguised as a girl and now disguised as a boy again, like 
Rosalind in Elizabethan Arden. In the desert, we played 
out an arid pastoral (1977, 132, my emphasis). 
After the sex scene, Tristessa instead expresses an essential masculine ego, and is 
denoted as „he‟ until his tragic end. He describes his experience of his female self:  
I was a lost soul. Tristessa is a lost soul who lodges in me; she‟s 
lived in me so long I can‟t remember a time she was not there, she 
came and took possession of my mirror one day when I was 
looking at myself. She invaded the mirror like an army with 
banners; she entered me through my eyes (1977, 151). 
The binary male and female parts that Eve and Tristessa play out are part of 
an erotic ceremony of unification, which leaves neither of the parts unaffected.
45
 It is 
an extended state of becoming-man-and-woman: „He and I, she and he, are the sole 
oasis in this desert. --- every modulation of the selves we now projected upon each 
other‟s flesh‟ (Carter, 1977, 148). It is a ritualistic dance, in which there are two parts 
that Eve and Tristessa‟s respective flesh take it in turns to act out. Eve states: 
Masculine and feminine are correlatives which involve one 
another. I am sure of that – the quality and its negation are locked 
in necessity. But what the nature of masculine and the nature of 
feminine might be, whether they involve male and female, if they 
have anything to do with Tristessa‟s so long neglected apparatus or 
my own factory fresh incision and engine-turned breasts, that I do 
not know (1977, 149-150). 
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Eve and Tristessa give birth to a Platonic concept of unification – an abstraction of 
love – because they take on each other‟s performance: „I did not close my eyes for I 
saw in his face how beautiful I was‟ (Carter, 1977, 151). The erotic progression thus, 
in addition to the binary reflections, includes an idea of identification, and as Eve 
expresses it, an „ecstasy of narcissistic gratification‟ (Carter, 1977, 146). The ideas of 
difference and sameness; outside and inside are deconstructed, not by liberating Eve 
and Tristessa from gendered performance, but rather, by the cathartic production of 
ideal love. 
Platonism and Deleuzeism 
Claire Colebrook recognises in „How Queer Can You Go?‟ that the idea of a theory 
as a prevalent line of thought or a transcendent norm and logic has been identified to 
have its origin in Platonism (2008a, 17). Feminist and queer theory, following French 
feminism and post-structural philosophy,
46
 attempt to move away from essentialist 
Platonic structures of thinking, although this attempt inevitably proves unsuccessful 
since the logic of the movement relies on a Platonic structure (Colebrook, 2008a, 17-
19).
 47
 Whereas Judith Butler‟s later work on sexuality and gender responds to this 
dilemma by attempting to further de-essentialise the conception of theory and 
theorising,
48
 Colebrook suggests a reconsideration of Plato‟s essential ideas and 
systems of logic. She advocates Gilles Deleuze‟s appropriation of what she calls a 
„higher Platonism‟ (2008a, 18) instead of the rejection of Platonic principles. This 
„high‟ Platonism, which Deleuze develops in The Logic of Sense and Difference and 
Repetition, functions as a reversal of the Platonic relationship between pure „ideas‟ 
and the „images of thought‟ (2004, 164-208).
 49
 It is not, however „the overcoming of 
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a transcendent logic in favour of lived experience, but an overturning of experience 
and the lived in favour of radically inhuman Ideas beyond judgement‟ (Colebrook, 
2008a, 18). This type of Platonism can be conceived of both as a radical essentialism 
(conceptually) and a radical non-essentialism (subjectively). Deleuze focuses on the 
conceptual, but rather than considering a concept, an idea or a structure of logic in 
terms of its compatibility with lived experience and the living subject as it presently 
is,
50
 Deleuze visualises ideas as springboards for becoming. Thus, whereas Judith 
Butler‟s Gender Trouble attempts to outline what the concept of gender difference 
entails, or how it is constructed, Deleuze‟s theory tries to consider the potentialities 
of gendered categories; what they may enable.  
In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze distinguishes the motives of Plato‟s theory to 
be „a question of “making a difference,” the “thing” itself from its images, the 
original from the copy, the model from the simulacrum‟ (253). Plato does so in order 
to establish a binary relationship between the diverse and ultimately finite simulacra 
and the perfect, pure and infinite forms (Deleuze, 1990, 254). Deleuze attempts to 
deconstruct the opposition that is usually conceived within this construct.
 51
  He 
argues that the forms are in fact compound simulacra of the diverse expressive 
simulacra, which do not function in opposition to finite expressions, but rather in 
correlation with them (1990, 279). According to Deleuze, forms and concepts are 
thus never certainties, „[i]n fact, concepts only ever designate possibilities‟ (2004, 
175). He explains that concepts and categories cannot denote „necessities‟ (2004, 
175), because reality is a relational process and concepts like simulacra are units 
within this process. As such, they may never alienate themselves from, or grasp the 
relational structure of which they are part.  
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Concepts should not be conceived of as representations of thought but as 
bases for relational encounters (2004, 176). Deleuze acknowledges that Plato states 
that „It is from “learning”, not from knowledge, that the transcendental conditions of 
thought may be drawn‟ (2004, 206). It is in the encounters with Socrates that Plato‟s 
texts develop their thought processes and conceptualisations. These encounters 
cannot themselves be rationalised, but may only be grasped, or given birth to (Plato, 
2005, 53) through the senses „in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, 
suffering‟ (2004, 176). And as Plato acknowledges, these sensual catharses are the 
generators of continual becomings. 
From this perspective, Tristessa and Eve‟s ritualistic becomings as they 
„[t]urn and turn about, now docile, now virile‟ (Carter, 1977, 149) may be conceived 
of in terms of steps in an intricate metamorphic process. Colebrook acknowledges 
that Deleuze‟s conceptualisation of Platonic abstractions in The Logic of Sense shows 
that sexual categories may enable bodies to connect and „play with the “pure 
predicates” of sexuality‟ (Colebrook, 2008a, 18). When Eve and Tristessa become 
the ideal sexed concepts; when they project gendered „aspects of being, ideas‟ 
(Carter, 1977, 148) on each other‟s flesh and form the platonic hermaphrodite 
together, they are „enjoying sexuality in its ideal and inhuman form‟ (Colebrook, 
2008a, 18) and the metamorphic desire that is generated in this act enables Eve to 
become the New Eve. She incorporates a new ideal, binary and thoroughly artificial 
process of becoming-woman. The male Evelyn‟s former lover Leilah (who by this 
point has become Lilith) indicates that this was Mother‟s plan all along: Eve had to 
go through the processes of gendered mirroring (Carter, 1977, 172-173).  
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As mentioned in the precious chapter, Elizabeth Grosz and Moira Gatens 
consider the process of becoming-woman to be a process of mirroring or 
„doubling‟.
52
 Becoming-woman is the othering or fictionalising of the self that 
constitutes the formation of the subject (Gatens, 1966, 43). Gatens argues in 
Imaginary Bodies that there is nothing outside of these illusions of the self; „rather, 
the human condition is a condition of illusion‟. When arriving at the end of her 
journey Eve thus realises that Leilah, the only „real‟ woman she had so far 
encountered was also an illusion: „She can never have existed, all the time mostly the 
projection of the lust and self-loathing of a young man called Evelyn, who does not 
exist, either‟ (Carter, 1977, 175). This recognition is not portrayed in a negative light, 
however. Eve recounts that „the same moon that took Tristessa and me into its 
polarised embrace in the desert now swung up into the sky‟ (Carter, 1977, 175-176) 
and the dis-illusory Leilah/Lilith leads her through her final process of becoming. 
This is where Eve becomes one with the ocean, which Angela Carter concomitantly 
likens to an abstraction of love, the disintegration of subjectivity and the escape from 
linear time (Carter, 1977, 190). 
Time is inseparable from the type of becoming discussed here. Deleuze 
argues that one of the important outcomes of Plato‟s emphasis on the process of 
learning rather than the concept of knowledge is that his idea of subjective 
conditioning becomes determined by reminiscence rather than innateness (2004, 
206). The concept of time thus becomes a variable in the formation of subjectivity, 
and as such it may be transposed and transformed. Angela Carter refers to a 
significant relationship between time, desire and subjectivity in the sex scene 
between Eve and Tristessa in The Passion of New Eve, where „[t]he erotic clock halts 
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all clocks‟ (148), but the concept is more thoroughly explored in her earlier novel, 
The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman. This novel follows the young 
Desiderio‟s erotic adventures and journeys through „Nebulous Time‟ (189), „the 
anteriority of all times‟ (189) as he attempts to restore reality to a city that has been 
laid under siege by the „Lord of Illusions‟ (28), Doctor Hoffman.  
The plot line of Doctor Hoffman is based around a war between a Freudian 
Reality Principle and the Pleasure Principle.
53
 Desiderio‟s city is falling to ruins 
because Doctor Hoffman‟s warfare of illusions has rendered time and space non-
linear and multi-dimensional, so that „[n]othing in the city was what it seemed ... life 
itself had become nothing but a complex labyrinth and everything that could possibly 
exist, did so‟ (Carter, 1972, 11): reality is merely a „flux of mirages‟ (11). This 
overwhelming indeterminacy is produced when Doctor Hoffman succeeds in 
channelling pure actualised desire, or „Eroto-energy‟ (Carter, 1972, 206) to generate 
a set of enormous all-enveloping mirage machines. These machines are powered by 
„a hundred of the best-matched lovers in the world, twined in a hundred of the most 
fervent embraces passion could device‟ (Carter, 1972, 214).  
The protagonist of Doctor Hoffman is led through the different stages of the 
novel by his desire for the Doctor‟s daughter, Albertina. This changeable yet 
recognisably metamorphic character acknowledges that she and Desiderio are an 
ideal match. Their simulations and differences are symmetrical and their mutual 
desire is thus both infinitely powerful and inevitable. Yet, it is Desiderio‟s desirous 
journey that transforms him into the image and the antithesis of his lover: „I had been 
transformed again. Time and travel had changed me almost beyond my own 
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recognition. Now I was entirely Albertina in the male aspect‟ (Carter, 1972, 199). 
And as Desiderio is shaped by his desire for Albertina, so is she: „all the time you 
have known me, I‟ve been maintained in my various appearances only by the power 
of your desire‟ (204).
54
 
Once more Carter refers to desire in terms of Plato‟s ideal abstractions: 
Albertina is Desiderio‟s „Platonic other, my necessary extinction, my dream made 
flesh‟ (1972, 215). In Doctor Hoffman Carter develops her Platonic poetics and 
erotics further than in The Passion of New Eve, however. The relationship between 
the ideal „dream‟ and the ephemeral „flesh‟ is described here, not in terms of a 
Platonic dualism, but rather as a Deleuzean encounter: „There is the mirror and the 
image but there is also the image of the image; two mirrors reflect each other and  
images may be multiplied without end ... Ours is a supreme encounter, Desiderio. 
We are two such disseminating mirrors‟ (Carter, 1972, 202). Carter acknowledges 
that there is no stable subjectivity or reality behind these mirrors, yet they are not 
immaterial: all of Doctor Hoffman‟s mirages „though absolutely unreal, nevertheless, 
were‟ (1972, 12). The Doctor attempts to liberate reality from the constraints of the 
Real.
55
 The „eroto-energy‟ produced by his desire machines supply „sufficient energy 
to intensify a symbol until it becomes an object according to the law of effective 
evolving, or, if you prefer a rather more explicit term, complex becoming‟ (1972, 
208). The Desiderio that narrates the story thus notes that he „is no longer the „I‟ of 
my own story‟: the protagonist self continually becomes transformed and transposed. 
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High Platonic Erotics and Poetics 
In accordance with Deleuze‟s „high‟ Platonism, Albertina in Angela Carter‟s Doctor 
Hoffman argues that „Love is the synthesis of dream and actuality‟ (Carter, 1972, 
202). The „pure predicates‟ of sexuality are played out and played with in desirous 
spatiality, enabling the formation of a „matrix of the unprecedented‟ (Carter, 1972, 
202). Rosi Braidotti makes a similar argument about the relationship between desire 
and becoming in Transpositions: „Desire is the propelling and compelling force that 
is attracted to self-affirmation or the transformation of negative into positive passions 
... To enact different steps of this process of becoming, one has to work on the 
conceptual coordinates.‟ (2006, 169). She differentiates this nomadic form of 
gendered being from a concept of gender essentials: „These are not elaborated by 
voluntaristic self-naming, but rather through processes of careful revisitations and 
retakes, or patterns of repetition ... It is a transformative force that propels multiple, 
heterogeneous “becomings” of the subject‟ (2006, 169-170).   
Angela Carter acknowledges that these becomings are also a matter of power, 
and we thus return to queer theory and the question of liberation from gendered and 
sexual power dynamics. Lorna Sage recounts that Carter‟s persistent interest in 
mirror relationships lead her to „look into some dangerous mirrors – like de Sade‟s‟ 
(1994, 31). Much to the horror of many contemporary feminists,
56
 Carter‟s The 
Sadeian Woman discusses the idea of sexual power struggles as processes of 
liberation. Carter argues that Marquis de Sade‟s work functions as a ritual 
transformation of „living flesh to dead meat‟ (Carter, 1979, 138); from subject to 
pure object. De Sade‟s women are bound to strict ritualistic performance, whether 
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these are dominant as in the case of his Juliette or submissive like the tormented 
Justine. These sexual power-relations are always presented in their utmost extreme, 
and as such they appear as performance; they become overt reiterations of sexual 
predicates. According to Carter, this process is best portrayed in „The Philosophy of 
the Bedroom‟, where the young Eugénie is schooled in the ways of the libertine; she 
is supervised through a Sadeian „rite de passage‟ (1979, 122, original emphasis) and 
finally rapes her own mother. Carter explains that Eugénie here „“plays the husband” 
to her lovely Mama, acts out upon the mirror image of her own flesh a charade of 
domination and possession‟ (1979, 126) and through the reflective objectification of 
her mother‟s and her own flesh she is liberated from the bounds of her Oedipal 
subjectivity.
57
 This act gains its power because of the power that has been invested 
and divested from the performance‟s signification. Eugénie simultaneously becomes 
the artifice and destroys the artifice (Carter, 1979, 129-130).  
Deleuze makes a similar argument about the objectification involved in 
masochism in „Coldness and Cruelty‟. The separate parties within the power relation 
enter into a strict performative contract and this leads to a cold and thoroughly 
dehumanising, but also re-humanising ritual (1997, 100). Masochism, which Deleuze 
relates to Freud‟s death drive,
58
 produces pleasure through the transcendence of 
sexualisation in a ritualised repetition of pain (Deleuze, 1997, 120). The sacrifice of 
pleasure enables transcendent pleasure. Angela Carter argues that a similar result is 
sought in sadism‟s sacrifice to pleasure. She quotes the Marquis‟ statement that „It is 
only by sacrificing everything to sensual pleasure that this being known as Man, cast 
into the world in spite of himself, may succeed in sowing a few roses on the thorns of 
life‟ (Carter, 1979, 135). By giving up his self-governance, by relinquishing his 
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humanity to the abstract power ritual, Sade‟s „Man‟ may enable a certain amount of 
transformative agency.  
This type of queer Deleuzean/Sadeian sexual liberation can also 
accommodate the sexual spaces in the queer/transgender discourse. Judith 
Halberstam discusses FTM transgender/butch lesbian performances of gendered 
roles during sexual encounters in Female Masculinity. Like Carter, she 
acknowledges that sex is liberating because it is a matter of performance; a 
reiteration of preconceived roles. It gains its power as an experience because of the 
power that has been invested in the performance‟s signification. Because the roles 
have been played out before, the sex act is simultaneously a performance of a 
character‟s self and a performance of something outside of him/her (Halberstam, 
1998, 111-139). It deconstructs the boundaries between self and other; the player and 
what is played. These types of strictly gendered or conventional sexual roles, where 
performative power is deliberately played out may thus cathartically produce a 
possibility of self-creation. 
Kate Bornstein, who defines herself as an S/M dyke also affirms the 
possibilities of ritualistic sex roles.
59
 In an interview with Lindsay McClune in the 
transgender chapter of On Our Backs Guide to Lesbian Sex she describes the 
liberating possibilities of S/M practises:  
What I‟ve found in S/M is the rawest expression of power: I am, 
you‟re not. I do, you receive. It is a constructed binary that is 
honored by both of the participants. When you give yourself 
consciously to that sort of thing, it‟s like any other discipline, you 
achieve an ecstatic place from that (2004, 223). 
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Bornstein further explains that she prefers to partner up with women who 
identify as „old school butches‟. She wants a sexual partner who adheres strictly to a 
traditional masculine gender role to perform her feminine gender role against. She 
describes the sexual interplay as a ritualistic dance: 
When an old-school butch starts flirting with me, it‟s a 
recognizable dance, it‟s in my blood. And I just follow myself 
there, I follow her and she‟s just ... It‟s a dance of identities, and a 
very, very structured dance. Like any great dances, you have to 
learn the steps (222). 
In the same chapter of the On Our Backs sex guide, FTM transsexual Patrick 
Califia‟s „Femmes: A Love Letter‟ describes how he found himself increasingly 
attracted to overtly feminine femme lesbians during his transformation into a man. 
He recounts how „this surprised me because I bought into the idea that if you are a 
transsexual man, you must on some level have negative feelings about the female 
form‟ (2004, 199). Califia deduces that the fact that his bodily shape no longer 
invokes him to perform the feminine role helps him to appreciate it as a role: 
„Polarization. The more masculine my body has become, the more comfortable I feel 
putting my skin against Her‟ (201). The presence of a traditional feminine part in the 
ritualistic gender game helps him to perform a traditional male part, and in the 
process affirm his progress in becoming a man: „By taking pleasure from me, a 
femme confirms that I am not deficient ... In some ways, a femme is my dick, 
because when she gets off around me, she makes what I have seem valuable to us 
both‟ (202). Califia thus describes the performance of a gendered sex act to 
cathartically transform him into a man. 
For Angela Carter, a truly liberating outcome of this gendering process would 
lead to an ultimate dissolution of categorised subjectivity, where „Being would cease 
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to be a state-in-itself‟ (1979, 129),
 
not unlike Deleuze‟s idea of becoming-
imperceptible.
60
 This concept is simply presented in Doctor Hoffman, The Passion of 
New Eve and The Sadeian Woman as „love‟, and like Plato‟s transcendent love it is 
continually likened to the sea. Doctor Hoffman, the transformative power in Doctor 
Hoffman, is described as an inhuman abstraction of humanity: „He was cold, grey, 
still and fathomless – not a man; the sea‟ (204). He has transformed the cogito to „I 
DESIRE THEREFORE I EXIST‟, but he is portrayed as „a man without desires‟ 
(1972, 211). The New Eve „commits‟ herself and „her little passenger‟ to this 
indefinable and all-enveloping sea in The Passion of New Eve (Carter, 1977, 190). 
Carter‟s love is constituted in reflective abstractions and hyper-temporal, hyper-
spatial transpositions that in adherence to Deleuze ultimately enable a process of 
becoming-imperceptible:  
Love is a perpetual journey that does not go through space, an 
endless oscillating motion that remains unmoved. Love creates for 
itself a tension that disrupts every tense in time. Love has certain 
elements in common with eternal regression, since this exchange of 
reflections can neither be exhausted nor destroyed, but is not a 
regression. It is a direct durationless, locationless progression 
towards an ultimate state of ecstatic annihilation (Carter, 1972, 
202). 
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[CHAPTER 6] Transformation and Transpositions: Towards a 
Corporeal Transgender Poetics 
 
According to Claire Colebrook‟s reading of Deleuze‟s high Platonism and Angela 
Carter‟s conception of love, sexual and gender predicates may be enabling concepts: 
they do not necessarily fix the subject, but rather engender transformations and 
reconsiderations of subjectivity. This chapter further investigates sexual, gendered 
and transgender spaces as these are articulated in transgender discourse and further 
develops the idea of an overtly gendered and/or trans-gendered poetics. I engage with 
two literary transgender characters: Hedwig from John Cameron Mitchell and 
Stephen Trask‟s Hedwig and the Angry Inch and Myra/Myron from Gore Vidal‟s 
Myra Breckinridge and Myron.  Both characters are overtly gendered, although they 
are articulated as split subjectivities inhabiting disparate spaces of gender conflict. 
Both, however, eventually utilise their multiple directions to form themselves as less 
of a coherent individual space than a connective spatiality. Hedwig and Myra 
embrace their identities as characters of continual and multidimensional change and 
seize their opportunity to create „something beautiful and new‟ (Mitchell & Trask, 
74).  Gendered absolutes and transgender spatiality become the generators of new 
connections and new spaces. 
Transgender Spaces 
Chapter four establishes that the transgender discourse sometimes finds queer 
appropriations of transgender bodies problematic.
1
 The critical issue is posed in 
relation to experiential authenticity.
2
 The idea of transgender subjectivity relies on 
certain categories of gender experience and these are safeguarded by the subjects that 
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express an adherence to them.
3
 There is thus a specific transgender space formed, 
which similar to queer theory poses itself in opposition to hetero-normative and 
gender-normative discourses in society, but unlike queer theory emphasises the 
innate quality of gender identity.
4
 The corporeal body in transgender studies is a 
material although rewritable entity, but the subjective gender is a psychological fact.
5
 
Transgender studies are thus simultaneously in liaison with queer theory and in 
opposition to it. 
This ambiguous relationship is further complicated by the fact that 
transgender discourse inhabits a secondary position in relation to queer discourse in 
popular culture.
6
 In some cases, the voices of the transgender space thus express a 
similarly „other‟ position in relation to queer culture as the lesbian and gay activists 
quoted in chapter four express in relation to hetero-normative discourse or the 
feminist scholars express in relation to patriarchal discourse.
7
 Jordy Jones defines 
transsexual identity fiercely in opposition to queer values in an article criticising the 
film version of John Cameron Mitchell and Stephen Trask‟s punk rock musical 
Hedwig and the Angry Inch: 
Hedwig, which has established a reputation as a transgender film, 
and more specifically as a film about a transsexual, features a main 
character who has been largely misrecognized. The character of 
Hedwig is not actually a transsexual woman, nor is John Cameron 
Mitchell, the man who created the character Hedwig, and who has 
played her on stage and screen. Hedwig is, rather, an overt citation 
of a transsexual woman, and Mitchell, as Hedwig, is a non-
transsexual gay man in drag as his fantasy of a transsexual woman 
(2006, 450; original emphasis). 
Interestingly, Jones‟s reaction to the queering of popular culture takes a 
similar tone to radical feminist Janice G. Raymond‟s disclaim of the patriarchal 
values inherent in transgender identity formation in The Transsexual Empire. He 
Sellberg    223 
 
argues that the transgender body is being objectified, or made into a canvas for 
inherently queer or homosexual conflicts, in something which poses as a transgender 
film, but fails to fulfil the necessary requirement of true transgender experience 
(2006, 450). In Vested Interests Marjorie Garber notes that similar discourses of 
opposition were prevalent in 1980s and 1990s lesbian and gay activism: the fact that 
transgender and queer identities had historically been equated stirred the lesbian and 
gay subjects to overtly distinguish themselves from their transgender counterparts 
(64-66). Yet, despite these distinctions, transgender and lesbian and gay discourses 
also share many theoretical and political goals and often inhabit overlapping 
experiential spaces.  
In Jones‟s article this simultaneous opposition and association creates logical 
incoherencies, which are most visible in his ambivalent treatment of Judith Butler. 
Jones initially adheres to Butlerian performativity when establishing a conception of 
gay gender subjectivity, quoting Bodies that Matter in order to establish a conception 
of the fetishism he supposes to be inherent in the drag act and the performativity 
implied in gay gender formation (450). In relation to transgender subjectivity, 
however, he uses the same sources to argue against the empirical and theoretical 
bases of Butler‟s performatively constructed bodies (454). Although Jones discusses 
materiality and constructivism in general, the concept of performativity is logically 
acceptable in relation to queer bodies but flawed when used in connection to 
transgender corporeality. 
Jones constructs distinct and grossly generalised theoretical platforms for 
queer and transgender being and these are strictly limited and conceptually fixed. 
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Jones‟s concept of subjectivity is essentialist to the degree that he refuses to accept 
that a non-transsexual body attempts to represent a transsexual character (450). Yet, 
he presupposes that gay identity and gender formation is non-essential, emphasising 
the queerness of the superficiality in Butler‟s continual re-signification practice. 
According to Jones, the fact that Hedwig is re-constituted as a number of different 
characters throughout the film proves her to be queer, and thus a superficially 
constructed homosexual (451). Queer identity is thus portrayed as fiction and 
transsexuality as „true‟ gendered experience. In criticising the objectification of the 
transsexual subject, Jones objectifies what is constituted as its reverse group identity. 
He thus re-iterates the binary power struggle that landed transsexual subjectivity in a 
secondary position in the first place. 
Hedwig and the Angry Inch is discarded by Jordy Jones for being a 
homosexual man‟s rendition of a transgender subject. Yet, Gore Vidal, who is also 
openly gay is not criticised by the transgender community for his rendition of 
transgender subjectivity in Myra Breckinridge. Kate Bornstein states that: 
People have underrated Gore Vidal‟s Myra Breckinridge ... I think 
it has a lot to do with the point Vidal makes: that the existence of 
transgendered people – people who exist sexually for pleasure, and 
not procreation – strikes terror at the heart of our puritanical 
Eurocentric culture ... I think he was on the mark, and I‟d be proud 
to call Myra my sister (1995, 78). 
Myra, like Hedwig, is an overtly postmodern, continually changing and often 
caricatured rendition of gender and transgender. Yet, a prolific transgender activist 
like Kate Bornstein embraces her image.
8
 This is not primarily because of decisive 
differences between the characters, but because of a split in the transgender 
discourse‟s conception of identity. Jordy Jones represents a section of the 
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transgender discourse that emphasises the importance of a united transgender 
movement and a specific idea of transgender identity, whereas Kate Bornstein is 
more interested in the concept of gender transgressive identity formation.
9
 
Marjorie Garber, who is on Kate Bornstein‟s side of the fence also portrays 
Vidal‟s Myra Breckinridge as a transgender image of power (1992, 114). Myra, like 
one of Leslie Feinberg‟s Transgender Warriors is the model of transgender and/or 
feminine opposition to patriarchal society.
 10
 Bornstein argues that „Vidal positions 
Myra as the voice and agent of doom for the traditional American male‟ (1994, 78). 
The plot, which is narrated in diary form follows the newly transitioned MTF 
transsexual Myra as she penetrates a stronghold of patriarchal values, her uncle Buck 
Loner‟s Academy for young aspiring actors in Hollywood, and claims a new 
surgically feminine space. She states that „I am the New Woman whose astonishing 
history is a poignant amalgam of vulgar dreams and knife-sharp realities‟ (Vidal, 
1968, 4),
11
 and „I too want a world and mean to have it. This man [Buck Loner] – 
any man – is simply a means of getting it (which is Man)‟ (18). Myra portrays herself 
in superlative terms: „Myra Breckinridge is a dish‟ (5), possessing „superbly shaped 
breasts‟ (4) and „perfect thighs‟ (5). She uses these body parts and her seductive 
feminine wiles to manipulate her way into the inner sanctum of American 
masculinity, which in Myra Breckinridge is Buck Loner‟s Hollywood (Vidal, 1968, 
18), and literally rape the image of the American man, represented by the young 
Rusty Godowski (149-150). 
Myra is strong and ruthless. She becomes the woman she wants to be and she 
shapes the world around her in accordance with it and although Vidal‟s portrayal of 
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her is ambiguous, Kate Bornstein reads the image of the transsexual in this novel as 
powerful and triumphant. This is the reason why Bornstein celebrates the narrative 
and chooses to embrace its heroine. It is an affirmative image of transsexuality as a 
choice rather than an affliction.
12
 The transsexual character in Hedwig and the Angry 
Inch is more fraught. Hedwig does not initially wish to become a woman. She 
transitions in order to escape from a dire and restrictive East Berlin, only to find 
herself an abandoned housewife in a trailer in the American west when the Berlin 
wall falls one year later. Hedwig‟s femininity is also less fetishised and celebratory. 
She describes herself as a „monster‟ (Mitchell & Trask, 2000, 44) and a „freak‟ (35). 
She has „tits of clay‟ (44) and a „hideous beige shag‟ wig (42). Instead of Myra‟s 
narcissistic appreciation of her „too lovely for this world‟ body (Vidal, 1987, 41), 
Hedwig expresses disgust when she first catches a glimpse of her wigged female self: 
„I catch myself in a mirror and for the first time see clearly the horror hunkering on 
my head‟ (Mitchell & Trask, 2000, 46). 
Jordy Jones and Kate Bornstein‟s choice to read Hedwig and Myra from a 
perspective of transsexual identity is problematic. As mentioned above, both Myra 
and Hedwig are overtly stylised. Neither is truly portrayed as a complete subject – 
transsexual or not. Marjorie Garber notes that the image of the transsexual in Myra 
Breckinridge is idealised and radically inhuman. She is a „reified figure for blurred 
gender‟ (Garber, 1992, 114) which Vidal „readily appropriate[s] to problematize 
sexual stereotypes‟ (Garber, 1992, 114). The sexual stereotypes are also reified, 
however. Myra represents an element of the sexual indistinctness that outlines the 
distinctions. She thus becomes the „emblem of fear and desire – the fear and desire of 
the borderline and of technology‟ (Garber, 1992, 16), that holds up the binary 
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structure. Hedwig is similarly presented as an image of the borderline and of its 
threatening destruction. She is likened to the Berlin wall: „Hedwig is like that wall, / 
standing before you in the divide / between East and West, / Slavery and Freedom, / 
Man and Woman‟ (Mitchell & Trask, 2000, 15). She is an amalgamation of flesh and 
technology; reality and dream; life and death: „I rose from off of the doctor‟s slab / 
like Lazarus from the pit‟ (14). Her form is feared, „reviled‟ and „graffitied‟ (15), but 
without it the binaries could not survive: „There ain‟t much of a difference / between 
a bridge and a wall / Without me right in the middle, babe / you would be nothing at 
all‟ (15-16). 
From Third Sex to Nomadic Sex 
I will use the fictional transgender spaces formed by Myra Breckinridge and Hedwig 
to explore two different modes of transgender identity formation. Kate Bornstein‟s 
choice to identify with a character like Myra Breckinridge becomes less surprising 
when read in relation to the author‟s more general formulations of transgender 
subjectivity. Bornstein is more interested in the function of the transgender body than 
her subjective experience of it. She develops an idea of the transgender as a third 
space in the gender binary, based on Marjorie Garber‟s reading of the transgressive 
possibilities of transgender bodies (Bornstein, 1995, 118; Garber, 1992, 10). 
Bornstein quotes Garber‟s description of his „third‟ dimension of gender as „that 
which questions binary thinking and introduces crisis‟ (Bornstein, 1995, 118; Garber, 
1992, 11). Garber insists that the „third‟ is not a sex or a gender in the common 
sense: „The third is a mode of articulation, a way of describing a space of possibility‟ 
(1992, 11).
13
 One of the examples Garber gives to demonstrate the capacities of the 
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third space is Sophocles‟s introduction of a third speaker in Greek drama. This 
character did not play a singular or significant part, but was „added to the protagonist 
and antagonist, enabling a freer, more dynamic dramaturgy‟ (11). In this sense the 
„third‟ sex is a non-subjective entity that enables flexibility and change within the 
sexual binary. It „deconstructs the binary of self and other‟ (Garber, 1992, 12). 
Garber also refers to the „third‟ space inhabited by transgender bodies in 
terms of Lacan‟s construction of the „third‟ Symbolic dimension in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis (Lacan, 2002, 412-439).
 14
 This dimension is not a realm set apart 
from the first two binary dimensions of the Real and the Imaginary, but is rather the 
concept that disrupts the fantasy of completeness conjured by the first two 
dimensions‟ reflective positions (Lacan, 2002, 423). The Symbolic for Lacan is the 
realm of language and signification: it is where the direct relationship between reality 
and its images becomes disrupted and „the word‟ comes into being as a signifier 
(423). Garber‟s Lacanian transgender space is similar to Hedwig‟s insistence that she 
is not merely a wall, but also a bridge. The „third‟ space of gender disrupts the unity 
of the gender binary, but it also enables communication between the opposing 
camps. 
Judith Halberstam finds Garber‟s conceptualisation of transgender space too 
simplistic. She points out that „in all attempts to break a binary by producing a third 
term, Garber‟s third space tends to stabilize the other two‟ (1998, 26). Patrick Califia 
similarly accuses Kate Bornstein‟s usage of Garber‟s „third‟ gender of adhering to an 
overly simplistic view of the power relations within the gender binary (1997, 250). 
Califia complains that whereas Bornstein‟s approach is „well-meaning‟ (1997, 254), 
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it is a utopian and abstract construct that ignores the „real‟ experiences of sex and 
gender and the „deep ideological differences‟ between different activist camps (1997, 
254).
 15
 Califia is particularly critical of Bornstein‟s indication that the „third‟ space 
is a privileged position occupied exclusively by transgender bodies. Bornstein rejects 
both bisexuality and androgyny as concepts that „hold two sides in place by defining 
themselves in the middle of two given polar opposites‟ (1995, 133), but celebrates 
the transgender as a thoroughly transgressive concept. 
Patrick Califia‟s critique of Kate Bornstein is politically and socially justified. 
However, if Bornstein‟s cries for political and social change are put aside – and her 
attempts to reclaim simplistically formulated transgendered spaces are considered 
less literally – her analysis is not necessarily concerned with social and political 
realities. As Jay Prosser points out, Bornstein tends to cut and paste political agendas 
interchangeably with „bits and pieces of queer to produce a troubling performativity‟ 
(1998, 175). The result is certainly problematic but also intriguing. Kate Bornstein 
juxtaposes abstract discursive functions with real-life transgender experiences in a 
narrative that functions neither as a theoretical manifesto or a political agenda, but 
rather like an incoherent and inconclusive drama of theoretical and political self-
conceptualisation. This is how I choose to read Kate Bornstein – not as a transgender 
theorist but as the theorising, politicising and transgendering performance artist she 
overtly declares herself to be (1995, 143). As such, Bornstein‟s work has significant 
potential. Gender Outlaw and Bornstein‟s subsequent My Gender Workbook 
excellently portray processes of conceptualising, de-conceptualising and re-
conceptualising. Bornstein moves between discourses and spaces related to gender, 
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transgender, politics and queer theory, but she conclusively only adheres to one idea: 
the concept of continually transgressive, multi-dimensional personal performance.
16
 
Kate Bornstein‟s „third‟ transgender space adheres mainly to an idea of a 
radically performative, transgressive and multi-dimensional self. It is thus less of a 
location and more of a spatiality. Judith Halberstam argues that one of the major 
problems with Marjorie Garber‟s „third‟ space is that its position as a 
sexual/gendered other in relation to the gender binary clouds the fact that transgender 
is not a unitary concept: it closes down „the possibility that there may be a fourth, a 
fifth, sixth or one hundredth space beyond the binary‟ (1998, 27).  In Bornstein‟s 
Gender Outlaw, the actual spaces opened up by the author‟s conception of „third‟-
ness are multiple. When she argues that the „third‟ would be better considered an 
arena for the „transgressively gendered‟ (1995, 134), than a transgender space, she is 
not trying to do away with transgender; she is rather attempting to open up the 
concept of „third‟-ness to a wider possibility of identity formation. In My Gender 
Workbook she lists 107 different answers to the question „Who am I?‟, and she thus 
forms 107 different identity spaces that she considers to be driven by the „third‟ 
transgressive spatiality, indicating that there are as many more as there are gender 
transgressive people (80-89).  
Bornstein explores gender spatiality in terms of a „third‟ theatre, where actors 
take on numerous differently gendered roles and create new gender transgressive and 
sexually challenging spaces: „Transgender is simply identity consciously performed 
on the infrequently used playing field of gender‟ (124, my emphasis). Bornstein‟s 
conception of S/M is also channelled through the idea of radical performance:  
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Sadomasochism intersects gender at the point of performance. We 
perform our identities, which include gender, and we perform our 
relationships, which include sex ... S/M is simply a relationship 
more consciously performed within the forbidden arena of power. 
(1995, 124) 
Bornstein‟s S/M is a play of previously formulated and often reiterated identities 
performed in order to form new spaces. This idea of gender generated spatiality 
correlates with Claire Colebrook‟s suggestion to consider queerness in relation to 
Deleuze‟s high Platonism and the production of radically inhuman gendered ideas.
17
 
In My Gender Workbook, Bornstein quotes a chain of conversations she has during 
one evening signed onto an S/M internet chat room. She creates a number of 
radically gendered, transgendered, dominant and submissive personas in separate 
conversation windows with separate partners. Each of these encounters produces 
something different and as they are brought to a close at the end of the evening, 
Bornstein transcends her own spatial boundaries as their collective meeting point: 
I sign off. My screen goes dark. And everyone I was, all the 
different roles I was playing, they‟re floating out in front of me. All 
of my identities, everything I can be, is ready to be picked from 
some tree called me that never bears the same fruit twice. That‟s 
what I‟ve been talking about, honey. That‟s what happens when I 
post hard (1998, 224-225). 
The Spatiality of Hedwig 
Myra Breckinridge is not considered a space for Kate Bornstein so much as a means 
to spatiality. This is where Bornstein‟s approach differs from Jordy Jones‟s reading 
of fictional transgender characters. Jones considers Hedwig in John Cameron 
Mitchell and Steven Trask‟s Hedwig and the Angry Inch in terms of a fixed 
transgender category – something which the character does not consistently fit it into. 
According to a Deleuzean conception of subjectivity, consistency is not a necessary 
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requirement for identification, however. Jones acknowledges that Hedwig at certain 
points is a homosexual man, but I will argue that there are other points when she is a 
transsexual woman. The performances are caricatured, but the overlaps are often 
hazy. Neither Hedwig‟s homosexual nor her transsexual identities are fixed. They are 
transient; continually changing. At the end of the play they are both ultimately 
denied. 
Hedwig can neither be read as the coherent and stable subjectivity that Jones 
requires for transsexual subjectivity, nor as the superficial de-essentialised canvas 
that he deems her to be. I prefer to consider her in terms of a body travelling in time 
through a number of subjectified experiences and loci, similar to the type of 
Deleuzian nomadism that Rosi Braidotti describes in Metamorphoses and 
Transpositions.
18
 The body, for Braidotti, is a marker of subjectivity-in-becoming. It 
continually moves through essentialised and corporealised subjective „locations‟. 
These are not to be considered separate from each other, but rather as planes 
intermeshed by chains of memory (2002). Braidotti describes it in terms of speed 
perception: „Just like travellers can capture the “essential lines” of landscape or of a 
place in the speed of crossing it, this is not superficiality, but a way of framing the 
longitudinal and latitudinal forces that structure a certain spatio-temporal “moment”‟ 
(2006, 172).  This momentary subject-positioning is continually transposed. It is a 
recurrent conditioning of connective events that lead to new becomings. Cameron 
Mitchell‟s Hedwig becomes – and never ceases to be – a homosexual youth, like she 
becomes and never ceases to be a transsexual, as long as these concepts are not 
forced into a conception of mutual exclusivity. 
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Jones acknowledges that „[t]ranssexuality is not a fixed or closed category‟ 
(2006, 450). However, desire is a fixed and essentially binary concept in Jones‟s 
argument: „Transsexual subjectivity ... can be minimally defined as the articulation 
of a transsexual desire – and it is desire, more than anything else, that defines 
transsexuality‟ (450). In order for a person to be classed as transsexual, according to 
Jones, he/she must always have had the desire to belong to the opposite sex (450). By 
these standards Hedwig is insufficiently transsexual. Her initial incarnation, the 
homosexual youth Hansel growing up in East Berlin, never expresses a desire to be 
female. However, if desire were considered a more transient concept, Hedwig 
certainly harbours a transsexual desire to be differently gendered. Merely because 
she is no longer male, Jones assumes that Hedwig‟s body is female after she has 
gone through her „botched‟ sex change operation (Jones, 2006, 451; Mitchell & 
Trask, 43),
 19
 but in actual fact Hedwig is neither man nor woman: „The wound 
healed and I was left with a one inch mound of flesh where my penis used to be 
where my vagina never was‟ (45). Like a transsexual, Hedwig feels that her 
genderless „Barbie Doll-crotch‟ body is mismatched with her sense of identity (43), 
but it is „what I have to work with‟ (66). Throughout a large part of the narrative, 
Hedwig harbours an intense desire to be coherently gendered. It is unclear, however, 
what gender she would choose. 
Braidotti points out that the idea of nomadic subjectivity is not a matter of 
choice: „A “location”, in fact, is not a self-appointed and self-designed subject-
position‟ (2002, 12). It is rather a tracer of consciousness or an inconsistent and 
inconclusive subjective narrative-in-becoming. At the end of Hedwig and the Angry 
Inch, Hedwig removes her wig, smudges her make-up and draws the signature mark 
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of her male lover on her forehead. Jordy Jones reads this as the re-emergence of the 
homosexual man residing inside her all along (2006). In view of Braidotti‟s nomadic 
subjectivity, I would rather describe it as a moment frozen in time: the close of the 
play – and Hedwig‟s particular narrative. The traces of the familiar categories: the 
woman, the man and the lover, are all smudged over her face – in an unfamiliar 
pattern. As Hedwig herself describes it, she is „A collage / All sewn up‟ (71). In 
accordance with Braidotti, she ultimately considers her subjectivity in geographical 
terms: „you can trace the lines / Through Misery‟s design / That map across my 
body‟ (Mitchell & Trask, 70). 
Hedwig‟s body becomes a material signifier of her subjective journey. Her 
experiences and personas are displayed on her skin. Her body is literarily a map of 
her various adventures. This is how Rosi Braidotti characterises the space created by 
a Deleuzean nomadic methodology: „it works from minoritarian, positive and 
productive memory. What matters is the structure of the affective forces that make it 
perceivable to the viewer‟ (2006, 172). The visible characteristics make Hedwig 
communicable: „Precepts, affects and concepts are the key elements‟ (Braidotti, 
2006, 172). Similarly to Deleuze‟s high Platonism, Rosi Braidotti thus argues that 
Ideas of being are important tools in the process of transcendence.
20
 For Braidotti 
however, transcendence occurs because Ideas are spaces of possible communication 
and connection; „collectively shared and constructed, jointly occupied spatio-
temporal territory‟ (2002, 12). The concept of transition and „becoming‟ that Rosi 
Braidotti develops in Transpositions, relies on the revisitation and reiteration of 
shared conceptive constructions. She argues that „[t]hese multi-layered levels of 
affectivity are the building blocks for creative transpositions, which compose a plane 
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of actualization of relations, that is to say points of contact between self and 
surroundings‟ (2006, 172). Gender performance is an element within the active 
process of gendered transformation. The performance of generic roles is a means of 
communication between the individual subject and its others. When the subjective 
expression and experience becomes communicable; when it becomes a shared 
experiential space, the possibility of change is introduced. A shared space is 
transformed and transposed with every new input (Braidotti, 2006, 177). 
The caricatured character Hedwig embraces and embodies a number of such 
shared spaces throughout the play. The text plays with the notion that the character is 
nothing beyond her markers: she is eponymous with her own „personal hair system ... 
My head-wig‟ (Mitchell & Trask, 47). The narrative also engages directly with the 
philosophical discourses surrounding Plato‟s gendered Ideas. Hedwig and the Angry 
Inch uses Aristophanes‟s speech from Plato‟s The Symposium as a narrative frame. 
Mitchell acknowledges in a marketing interview that his authorial process started 
with the myth of the Platonic hermaphrodite (Crowther). In the play, Hedwig 
recounts how her mother told her about Aristophanes‟s idea of love as a bedtime 
story, when she was still the little boy called Hansel. The myth is related in the song 
„The Origin of Love‟, which serenades Hedwig‟s idea of an „other half‟ that has been 
shorn from her (31). She concludes that this initial differentiation is the source of 
love and love-making: 
You had a way so familiar, / But I could not recognize, / Cause you 
had blood on your face; / I had blood in my eyes. / But I could 
swear by your expression / That the pain down in your soul / Was 
the same as the one down in mine. / That‟s the pain, / Cuts a 
straight line / Down through the heart; / We called it love. / So we 
wrapped our arms around each other, / Trying to shove ourselves 
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back together. / We were making love, making love (Mitchell & 
Trask, 30-31). 
Hedwig describes the hermaphroditical being as a concept of pure difference, 
empowered by an urge for unity, which is performed in ritual sex acts. She 
determines that „[i]t is clear that I must find my other half‟ (31). In order to relate to 
the Platonic hermaphrodite, Hedwig realises that she will have to connect with 
another being, but she is uncertain what to look for: „is it a she or a he? Identical to 
me? Or somehow complimentary? Does my other half have what I don‟t?‟ (31-32). 
Hedwig contemplates the links between difference and sameness and decides that 
both need to be performed. She negotiates the ritualistic effects of this performance 
in relation to the act of becoming; „what about sex? Is that how we put ourselves 
back together again? ... can two people actually become one again?‟ (32, my 
emphasis). 
In adherence to Plato‟s philosophy of unifying love,
21
 Hedwig finds that 
cathartically „becoming one‟ is a process which is best conducted through continual 
progressions of ritual performance. Hedwig finds a lover, Tommy Gnosis, who she 
thinks may be her other half: „He‟s the one. The one who was taken. The one who 
left. The twin born by fission‟ (66). Tommy scorns her however, and makes himself 
a famous pop star using the songs they have written together. Hedwig then embarks 
on a tour of America, performing in the run-down backwaters of the towns where 
Tommy holds his concerts. The audience of the punk rock musical becomes cast as 
the unenthusiastic witnesses to Hedwig‟s illegitimate twin show that has been tailing 
Tommy Gnosis‟ all-American success. Hedwig curses and whines over the thankless 
person performing next door. She taught Tommy everything she knew about 
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performance, and appropriately gave him the name Gnosis, which is Greek for 
knowledge. Tommy, however, refuses to acknowledge that she has been part of 
either his life, or his success. Hedwig occasionally makes her audience aware of the 
applause from the other more appreciated concert next door, and of Tommy‟s voice 
from afar. Tommy and Hedwig thus perform alongside each other, without crossing 
paths throughout the main bulk of the show. 
Hedwig‟s relationship to Tommy is not fully revealed until she sheds her wig 
at the end of the play and exposes Tommy Gnosis to be a persona within herself. Her 
„other half‟ is literally her creation. Throughout the show Hedwig and Tommy have 
spoken about a media incident, in which the couple was found in a sexually 
compromising position, leading to a car accident. He says: „I realised there was only 
one person who had ever really been there for me in my life. And that person was 
me. The accident was a cry for help. I was yelling “Help!” to me‟ (35). The estranged 
Tommy Gnosis is a part of the character he and Hedwig made together, „me, the real 
me, the me I used to be‟ (42). Gnosis and Hedwig are both discovered to be 
performances, which have been made embodied. 
When Hedwig reunites with Tommy in Cameron Mitchell‟s one body, the 
stage directions state that two images of a male and a female face, which have been 
shown on a projector above the stage throughout the show, should be seen to merge 
into one single face (Mitchell & Trask, 79) In his article criticising Hedwig and the 
Angry Inch, Jordy Jones comes to the conclusion that Cameron Mitchell‟s concept is 
simple: he creates the Platonic hermaphrodite. According to Jones, the final image 
indicates that the musical creates a holistic and psychoanalytic rendering of 
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Aristophanes‟s speech in Plato‟s Symposium: „The origin ends at the ultimate 
destination: the halves made whole, the sexes united, ... the panic of self-loss through 
merger with the Other successfully managed, ... the One triumphant.‟ (2006, 451).  
Jones, however, fails to recognise the nature of the relationship between Hedwig and 
Gnosis in the first place. 
The persona performing on the stage next door is not Hedwig‟s other half, 
nor is the illegitimate gender-bender in the wig actually Hedwig: they are the 
creation that was made out of Hedwig‟s union with her other half. The subjective 
spaces created throughout the show are connected through the performative spatiality 
embodied in the final collage. Hedwig complains that the differentiations between 
the personas „cut me up into parts‟ (Mitchell & Trask, 70). These characteristics are 
all features of the emerging unity that is Hedwig. Despite its overt references to 
Aristophanes‟s speech in Plato‟s Symposium, Hedwig and the Angry Inch thus 
correlates closer with Socrates‟s speech on love and unity.
22
 Socrates states that love 
is created by the desire of the mortal to become immortal; it is the human desire for 
the divine (Plato, 2005, 56). In accordance with Socrates‟s speech, Hedwig tells 
Tommy that love is immortal. When Tommy asks how, Hedwig replies: 
(Hedwig:) „Well, perhaps because love creates something that was 
not there before.‟ 
(Tommy:) „What, like procreation?‟ 
(Hedwig:) „Yes, but not only.‟ 
He grabs my ass and he laughs. I don‟t.  
(Hedwig:) „Sometimes just creation. Don‟t move.‟ 
I paint a bold silver cross on his forehead. 
     (Trask & Mitchell, 64). 
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The silver cross becomes the marker of the created character; the pop star 
Tommy Gnosis. Like Socrates shows, love gives birth to knowledge (Gnosis), and to 
„something beautiful and new‟ (Trask & Mitchell, 74). This concept is immortal, 
because it is „More than a woman or a man‟ (Trask & Mitchell, 73): it is the multiply 
gendered form; the ideal drama of love, which is reiterated continually through time. 
Socrates argues that „This is the way that every mortal thing is maintained in 
existence, not by being completely the same, as divine things [the ideals] are, but ... 
leav[ing] behind another new thing of the same type‟ (Plato, 2005, 56, my emphasis). 
The fact that the punk rock musical Hedwig and the Angry Inch is performed on 
stage emphasises this idea, since the same show will inevitably be reiterated in 
different spaces and with different performing bodies. Hedwig remains in a continual 
process of subjective becoming. 
The Transformative Concept 
Hedwig is not a subjective space, but a transformative concept. She is the 
embodiment of the type of transgender transcendence that Kate Bornstein describes 
in Gender Outlaw and My Gender Workbook and she bears the characteristics of 
Rosi Braidotti‟s Deleuzean nomad. Her body carries the „essential lines‟ of her 
thoroughly conceptualised internality and thus becomes a means of affective 
connectivity. Materiality here comes to function as spatiality rather than space – and 
connectivity rather than connection. Hedwig‟s various identities-in-becoming are the 
means by which spaces are connected, conditioned, revisited and reconsidered, rather 
than specific spaces in themselves. Her urge to identify is an urge to become 
connected and a desire for affirmative reconsidering of previous conditions. 
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Connective experiences, whether painful or not, are revisited and reformed into 
possibilities for positive change. 
Hedwig‟s spatial and connective markers are equally material and transient. 
The play‟s first turn from painful gendered becoming to affirmative change takes 
place after Hedwig‟s surgical transformation has landed her a „Barbie Doll-crotch‟ 
(Trask & Mitchell, 43), a divorce and a caravan home in the American west. The 
character lifts herself from the „personal hell‟ of gendered no-man‟s land, through 
processes of gendered becoming: „I put on some make-up / and turn up the tape deck 
/ and pull the wig down on my head / suddenly I‟m Miss Midwest / Midnight 
Checkout Queen‟ (Mitchell & Trask, 47). She goes through repeated becomings of 
„Miss Behive 1963‟ (48),‟Miss Farah Fawcett from TV‟ (49) and finally „this punk 
rock star / of stage and screen‟ (52-53). Each of Hedwig‟s characters are building 
blocks of „the woman I‟ve become‟ (47), and she celebrates them as parts of her 
continual journey, aware that the personas are transformative and not reversible: „I‟m 
never turning back!‟ (53). 
Ritualistic dressing processes are common in MTF transgender 
autobiographies. They often feature as initial modes of becoming. Kate Bornstein 
states that this is „how I dress in the morning. That‟s how I shift from one phase in 
my life to the next – first I try on the accessories‟ (1995, 4). Erica Zander describes 
how putting on her best friend‟s stockings gave her „a warm sense of “rightness”‟ 
(2003, 13). Renée Richards recounts how she watched her mother putting on make-
up and getting dressed in the morning: „Once she was awake ... she wasted little time 
in beginning a transformation that always struck me as incredible‟ (1983, 8). Also 
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Jan Morris describes this act of gendered becoming in terms of „Images of magic‟ 
(2002, 144). The full transformative experience, however, is seen as a gradual 
process. In RitaLynn Sly‟s So You Want To Be A Woman this process is constructed 
as a ten-step programme with a neat calculation of costs for each step at the end of 
the book. Jan Morris describes it less rigidly as a process through which „I allowed 
myself to go further. I wore skirts for the first time, I experimented with cosmetics, I 
gradually developed the new persona which would one day be my only self‟ (102). 
Morris‟s Conundrum finishes when this „only self‟ has been formed; when 
she has „reached identity‟ (138). With the exception of Kate Bornstein, Julia Serano 
and Riki Anne Wilchins, the majority of the canonical transsexual MTF 
autobiographers tend to strictly locate their transformative processes prior to and 
throughout their surgical sex change, but not beyond.
23
 Erica Zander argues that this 
is one of the reasons why it is difficult to maintain a functioning transsexual 
movement: once the transsexual subject has had his/her final surgery, he/she wants to 
identify within the gender binary, not as a transsexual (22).
24
 Kate Bornstein and Riki 
Wilchins decisively claim that this was never an option for them. Bornstein and 
Wilchins both consider themselves „gender outlaws‟ (Bornstein, 1995, 69), residing 
in their radically other „genderhell‟ (Wilchins, 2006, 547).
25
  
With the exception of these self-pronounced queer transsexual 
autobiographers, the continual process of gendered becoming is more visible in non-
transsexual transgender bodies, where the interplay between biological sex and 
gendered otherness is not conclusively levelled. Sam Larsson‟s psychoanalytic study 
Det Andra Jaget vid Manlig Transvestism (The Other Self in Male Transvestism, my 
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translation) establishes that MTF transvestites tend to continually negotiate between 
overtly masculine and feminine subjective personas,
 26
 enabling a sensation of 
„transcendence‟ (1997, 378).
 
Virginia Prince, who despite her great influence on 
studies of transvestism prefers to identify as a „transgenderist‟ (Ekins & King, 2005, 
12),
 27
 considers transgender transcendence to be a perpetual process to move beyond 
society‟s sociological, psychological and philosophical limits: the transgender 
subjects or „transcendents‟ (1978a, 45), who refuse to be „reflected back into the 
swarming mass of conformity‟ belong to the few „individuals who have enough 
“escape velocity” to penetrate, climb over, and go beyond these barriers‟ (1978a, 40).  
Virginia Prince is wary that her definition of transgender transcendence may 
be perceived as a call for androgyny or gender elimination. She emphasises that she 
does not advocate a state of being that is firmly settled in-between the genders, or in 
a form of gender absence. Prince requires the full overt presence of both genders and 
all that they entail. She argues that the binaries constructed by society are necessary 
in the formation of a „fuller personality‟ (1978a, 41). In this form of transcendence, 
gender becomes the enabling power and the transgender body becomes a 
transformative concept, not because it has access to a „third‟ space outside gender, 
but because it has unlimited access within the binary. Prince does not advocate a 
form of anti-gender that affects the norm from beyond its boundaries: her 
„transcendent‟ bodies use their mobility to transpose and transform these boundaries.  
According to Prince‟s agenda, a character like Hedwig in Stephen Trask and 
John Cameron Mitchell‟s Hedwig and the Angry Inch may prove inadequately 
transgressive.
28
 Despite Prince‟s typical 1970s stance that sex and gender are 
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completely separate entities (1973, 29),
29
 she is adamant about her choice to cherish 
and flaunt both her feminine and masculine bodily markers (her breasts and her 
penis) and she firmly believes that other „transcendent‟ bodies should do so too 
(1978b, 54). Hedwig does not have a sexually marked body. Her „Barbie Doll-
crotch‟ and bare chest carry their corporeal gender insignia on the surface of the 
body, as prostheses. The body underneath is described as thoroughly androgynous. 
Her breasts are constructed from clay (Mitchell & Trask, 44), or tomatoes (72), and 
her genitalia are nothing but a blank de-gendered „one inch mound of flesh‟ (45); a 
sexually frustrated „angry inch‟ (45).  
Gore Vidal‟s Myra Breckinridge, on the other hand, is corporeally fully 
gendered.
30
 Throughout Myra Breckinridge she remains coherently feminine, 
although she uses a penile prosthesis to rape the young „stud‟ Rusty Godowski 
(1968, 147). In Myron, Gore Vidal‟s subsequent narrative of Myra‟s adventures, the 
heroine‟s gender coherence is more disrupted. Myra continually disappears and 
reappears; she blanks out for a few days and the radically masculine Myron 
Breckinridge takes over control of the body (1974).
31
 These two characters are 
portrayed as gendered polarities of one original subjectivity. Myra recounts how her 
previous incarnation, a sexually confused and gender dysphoric Myron Breckinridge 
contacted Dr Randolph Spenser Montag about his condition and was transformed 
into her present form. Myron was effeminate, homosexual and weak-minded, all 
traits which Dr Montag did not believe belonged in a male body: „There is no middle 
range‟ (1968, 86). He „convinced Myron that one ought to live in consistent 
accordance with one‟s essential nature‟ (1968, 87, original emphasis), and thus Myra 
was born as the distilled femininity of Myron‟s complex subjectivity. The Myron that 
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later reappears in Myron is no longer weak-minded and effeminate: he is a 
homophobic Republican „all American‟ (1974, 218) Christian Scientist with a wife, a 
ranch and a respectable job (1968, 211-213). Myron is portrayed as the distilled 
masculinity that was repressed and banished from Myra/Myron‟s body when Dr 
Montag performed his surgical and methodical gender polarisation.   
The new Myron first appears after Myra loses her breast implants in a traffic 
accident (1968, 210). Once more the significance of the bodily markers is 
emphasised. Myra‟s last words are: „Where are my breasts? Where are my breasts?‟ 
(1968, 210). The pivotal markers are not just gender specific – they are also insignia 
related to Myra‟s feminine sexuality. When Myra first wakes up at the hospital she 
has developed facial growth due to lack of hormone treatment and she is told that her 
hair has been cut off. This does not truly disturb her. It is the removal of her sexually 
charged breasts that reverts her to Myron‟s masculinity. Myron‟s definitive claim 
over the body is made through the surgical addition of a phallus (1974, 248). Myron 
and Myra subsequently perform their power struggle through the addition and 
removal of genitalia and mammaries on their body.
32
  
In opposition to Virginia Prince‟s denial that either sex or sexuality are 
related to gender identity,
 33
 Myra and Myron Breckinridge explore the sexuality of 
their gendered bodies. When Myron first appears, he is less concerned with his 
effeminate hips, legs and facial features than with his female genitalia and his lack of 
a functioning phallus. When Myra is subsequently resurrected, she notes: 
Between my still gorgeous legs, within that sacred precinct where 
the finest of Scandinavia‟s surgeons once fashioned a delicate 
vagina as cunningly contrived as the ear of a snail, that son of a 
bitch Myron has not only removed the delicate honeypot of every 
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real American boy‟s dreams, but replaced it with A Thing! A 
ghastly long thick tubular object ... This cock has got to go! For 
one thing the overall effect is ghastly, since Myron was obviously 
too cheap to buy a pair of balls (Vidal, 1974, 248). 
Whether male or female, Myra‟s and Myron‟s body is sexual, and as such it channels 
a great amount of power. Gore Vidal notes in one of his essays that sex always 
involves power (1999, 98).
 34
 Myra considers her subjective defeat of Myron and her 
sexual defeat of Rusty in a similar light: „Having already destroyed subjectively the 
masculine principle, I must now shatter it objectively in the person of Rusty‟ (1968, 
113). All the heterosexual relationships in Myra Breckinridge and Myron are power 
struggles: the radically feminine Myra and the hyper-masculine Myron consistently 
claim the position of the Master/Mistress. The concept of mastery is directly 
reflected by sexual penetration. The phallic device here becomes a dual mark of 
power: Myra with her strap-on dildo is powerfully and overtly female in her 
possession of Rusty; and Myron is masculine and conventionally powerful in his 
relationship with his wife. As one of the characters notes: „there‟s only room for one 
star in any bed‟ (1968, 73). This is portrayed in relation to the earlier effeminate 
Myron, or as Myra calls him „Myron the First‟ (1974, 277), who according to both 
Myron and Myra was a ‟fag‟ (1968, 66), who „invariably took it from behind‟ (1968, 
77). The polarised Myron and Myra are sexed extremes and thus become sexually 
powerful. This is portrayed as a reaction to the original Myron‟s impassivity:  
I had avenged Myron. A lifetime of being penetrated 
had brought him only misery. Now in the person of 
Rusty, I was able, as Woman Triumphant, to destroy 
the adored destroyer (Vidal, 1968, 150). 
The heterosexual relationships in Myra Breckinridge and Myron are similar 
to S/M exhibitions of power. However, Kate Bornstein points out that the categorical 
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nature of the polarised power struggles of mastery and submission played out in S/M 
often tend to obscure the gender binaries: „S/M play can accommodate any 
combinations of sex, power, and gender play. When the play reaches the point of 
almost purely dealing with power, then many S/M players agree that gender has in 
fact been done away with‟ (1995, 122). In Myra Breckinridge and Myron the power 
struggle is strictly gendered throughout. The concept of power is equated with 
gender: sex not only is power – power is sex. Rather than to evolve into a matter of 
pure power, Myra and Myron‟s contention progressively becomes more purely 
sexual. Myra‟s only mission is to crush „the masculine principle‟ (1968, 113), and 
Myron‟s primary pursuit is to suppress the image of the powerfully feminine in Myra 
(1974). If this binary power struggle were to dissolve, the concept of Myra/Myron 
would disappear. Myra indicates as much when she believes that she is on the brink 
of final victory: „But who am I? What do I feel? Do I exist at all? This is the 
unanswerable question‟ (1968, 113). 
The gendered absolutes are thus not portrayed as functioning subjectivities in 
Myra Breckinridge and Myron. Myra establishes that her role as the image of the 
„Woman Triumphant‟ (1968, 57) is to become the transformative element that leads 
the society she inhabits into a new age. She considers herself „the creatrix of this 
world‟ (1974, 333). Her ultimate goal is to form the basis for a society that is „more 
open, less limited, abandoning old-fashioned stereotypes of what is manly and what 
is feminine‟ (1968, 123). After she successfully destroys the masculinity of Rusty in 
Myra Breckinridge,
35
  Myra sets out to create a whole „new race of beautiful, sterile, 
fun-loving Amazons‟ (1974, 294). She produces silicon for breast implants in her 
closet, and subsequently implants breasts on young beautiful male victims after she 
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has abducted, raped and surgically castrated them in her hotel room (1974). At the 
end of the novel, Vidal indicates that Myra‟s mission partially succeeded, when the 
still chauvinistic and homophobic Myron announces that the next Republican 
President is a „fun-loving Amazon‟ (1974, 416). 
Transient Time and Space 
Despite their inhumanly absolute qualities, the polar extremes of masculinity and 
femininity are not portrayed as immovable in Myra Breckinridge and Myron. Myra 
and Myron are never stable entities, and neither are the times or spaces they inhabit. 
The shared body does not transform smoothly into the absolute feminine and the 
absolute masculine. Each transformation changes the body and its surroundings. It 
continually becomes something new. At the end of Myron, Myra transforms into one 
of her important role models; the influential Academy Award winning actress Maria 
Montez, and Montez subsequently develops into Myron. All the characters in the 
novel continually mould into reflections or amalgamations of one another. Despite 
his continued masculinity and conservatism, Myron remains devoid of a phallus until 
the end and his Republican friends – even the next Republican president – are 
similarly castrated and support this non-phallic and sterile type of masculinity. 
Myra‟s sexual relationships, especially in Myra Breckinridge, also transform 
over time. After her rape of Rusty, she admits:  
the very literalness of my victory deprived me of my anticipated 
glory. To my astonishment, I have now lost all interest in men. I 
have simply gone past them, as if I were a new creation, a mutant 
diverging from original stock to become something quite unlike its 
former self or any self known to the race (1968, 192). 
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At the beginning of the novel, Myra declares that she possesses „a means of 
exercising power over both sexes‟ (1968, 77), and that she intends to use it. While 
she is planning to destroy masculinity in the form of Rusty, she also attempts to 
reform his girlfriend, Mary-Ann‟s traditional sense of femininity. Myra attempts to 
seduce Mary-Ann, but she does not manage to exercise power over her (1968, 174). 
Although Myra is never aware of it, Vidal implies that Mary-Ann takes control and 
cleverly manipulates her seductress (1968, 185). Mary-Ann coyly protests but 
happily accepts Myra‟s offers to help her establish a semi-successful singing career, 
and to move into Myra‟s luxurious house. At the same time Vidal indicates that 
Mary-Ann plots to help Rusty gain his revenge on Myra by causing the car accident 
that has her transform into Myron (1968, 201-202). Mary-Ann also encourages 
Myra‟s progressive loss of femininity before the personality-shifting discovery of her 
missing breasts. Myra declares that „All I want now in the way of human power is to 
make Mary-Ann love me so that I might continue to love her – even without 
possessing her – to the end of my days‟ (1968, 192), but Mary-Ann is un-responsive: 
„If you were only a man, Myra, I would love you so!‟(1968, 192). 
At the start of the novel Myra‟s single object of desire is her own newly 
created feminine figure. Her diary is initially portrayed as a masturbatory fantasy; a 
description of what it is like „to be me, what it is like to possess superbly shaped 
breasts reminiscent of those sported by Jean Harlow‟ (1968, 4). She waxes lyrical as 
she recounts how her body is supported by: 
perfect thighs with hips resembling that archetypal mandolin from 
which the male principle draws forth music with prick of flesh so 
akin – in this simile – to pick of celluloid, blessed celluloid upon 
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which have been imprinted in our century all the dreams and 
shadows that have haunted the human race (1968, 5). 
The newly created Myra expresses an idea of self that is similar to an MTF 
transvestite‟s narcissistic fetishism.
36
 Sam Larsson notes that a number of his 
research subjects consider their female personas to be „some kind of an “inner sexual 
partner”‟ (1997, 483, original emphasis). The feminine persona in these MTF 
transvestites is a reflection of the subject‟s sexual desires (Larsson, 1997, 483). Myra 
is portrayed as a fully manifested reflection of her own erotic dreams. She is her own 
corporealised attempt to „work out in life all one‟s fantasies and so become entirely 
whole‟ (Vidal, 1968, 63). When Myra becomes progressively infatuated with Mary-
Ann, however, she attempts to recreate herself in terms of Mary-Ann‟s fantasies and 
desires (1968, 191). She begins to see herself from Mary-Ann‟s eyes. Myra‟s shock 
when she realises what she looks like after the traffic accident is only secondarily 
related to her own desires – her primary concern is Mary-Ann: „I hope Mary-Ann 
can bear the gruesome sight. I hope I can‟ (1968, 209). 
Myra/Myron‟s choice of gender in her sexual partner thus changes through 
the course of Myra Breckinridge. „Myron the First‟ desires men and he transfers this 
position to the newly formed Myra. She subsequently goes „past‟ men and turns her 
desire towards women (1968, 192), and this form of sexual attraction remains in the 
new Myron. The original Myron‟s attraction to men is posed as one of the reasons 
for his decision to become a woman and Myra‟s desire for Mary-Ann can certainly 
be conceived as one of the reasons for her transformation into a man. The 
transformative process can thus be read as a continual movement towards 
heterosexuality.  
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The interaction between Myra/Myron‟s gender- and sexual identities is not as 
simple as this, however. There is also a process that moves towards the disruption of 
heterosexuality. „Myron the First‟ is queer and despite Myra‟s conviction that her 
transformation into a woman will set this right, Myra also becomes queer. Already 
from the first few chapters of Myra Breckinridge, Myra‟s desire for other women is 
overtly present, although the character attempts to deny it: „Between a beautiful girl 
and an unattractive man ... I shall always be drawn, like any healthy-minded woman, 
to the girl‟ (1968, 87). Also the later hyper-masculine Myron avidly attempts to deny 
his interest in other men and equally desires and condemns the men he thinks may 
share his interest. Myron repeatedly observes the bodily features of a man called 
Maude, who despite Myron‟s conviction of the opposite finds Myron repulsive: 
„Maude gave me a suspicious look. I think he was wearing eyeliner and is a fag, an 
element I do not mind when they keep to themselves and do not prey on minors or 
solicit straight people like yours truly‟ (1974, 227). 
Myra/Myron retains a repressed and combated queer sexual identity 
throughout the continual changes between gender identities. The sexual identity even 
partially generates the gendered changes. These identity spaces thus take part in a 
complex spatial matrix. Judith Halberstam notes in Female Masculinity that this is 
not an uncommon occurrence in the transgender community: „one axis of 
identification is a luxury most people cannot afford‟ (159). Some FTM transsexuals 
who have previously identified as butch lesbians hold on to their queer identity 
although their gender identity changes, whereas others continue to be attracted to the 
gender they previously desired (Halberstam, 1998, 149). Richard Docter also states 
that some MTF transvestites are attracted to the opposite sex when they are dressed 
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as men and the same sex when they transform into their feminine persona (1988, 
102). Gender and sexuality are thus not separate entities, but they are not 
uncomplicatedly related: there is not one universal connection between gender and 
sexual identity and the numerous forms of mutual interaction are often complex. 
Judith Halberstam argues that gender and sexuality should be considered in 
relation to identity spaces. The interaction between transgender, homosexual and/or 
queer spaces that Halberstam constructs in Female Masculinity closely corresponds 
with Braidotti‟s conception of nomadic subjectivity. She argues that most bodies 
move within, express and harbour several gendered and sexual subjectivities 
(Halberstam, 1998, 142-173). Halberstam analyses numerous masculine gender 
identities that are specifically female: masculinities that do not exclude the presence 
of femininity or femaleness. Sexual identities like butch lesbian, stone butch or drag 
king are some of these, but the non-sexual concept of the tomboy is also a female 
masculinity (1998, 111-173). Different identities are here related to in terms of 
common spaces and positive performativity. Each body performs a number of 
identities and relates to numerous spaces. These are not mutually exclusive or 
separate unless provoked to be so by binaristic social discourses (1998, 75-110). 
They affect and interact with one another to create subjective spatialities that enable 
continual gendered becomings.   
Judith Halberstam‟s political project advocates a conception of queer 
becoming which she considers in terms of becoming-strange. Female Masculinity 
explores the possibilities of disrupting the myth of unilateral gendered coherence. 
Halberstam portrays the body as an arena for multiple gender possibilities. She uses 
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non-coherent „strangely‟ gendered portraits in art and cinema to emphasise its 
signifying potentials (1998, 29-43). Her conception is not solely related to identity 
spaces, but also to time. One of the major differences between being and becoming is 
the introduction of a temporal axis in the concept of subjectivity. Halbertsam‟s 
queerness requires a queerly gendered space and time. Queer temporality is 
portrayed as a sense of time that disrupts the linearity of cause and effect and 
displaces the procreative principle of a „biological clock‟ that measures the 
progressive movement of the body in time (Halberstam, 2005, 5). The idea of 
subjective becoming emphasises the future potentialities as well as the past of a 
body‟s movement through time and space. Bodies are never merely positioned or 
present; they are moving towards spaces and away from spaces (Grosz, 1999b, 22). 
This transitory quality represents the subject‟s power of his/her relationship to 
familiar social concepts such as gender. 
In the introduction to Doing Time, Rita Felski refers to Julia Kristeva‟s essay 
„Women‟s Time‟ where the linearity and coherence of time measurement is 
attributed to patriarchal constructs of subjectivity. This subjective history, which 
Kristeva argues to have dominated constructions of both masculine and feminine 
subjectivities, builds a strictly two-dimensional idea of the present in terms of a 
linear forwards movement determined on the movements of the past (1981, 19-20).  
Kristeva suggests that subjectivity in time within the third generation of feminism is 
a new temporal space: it should be considered according to connectivity fuelled by 
feminine circularity and multi-dimensionality in subjective narration (1981, 33-35). 
She argues that „female subjectivity would seem to provide a specific measure that 
essentially retains repetition and eternity from among the multiple modalities of time 
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known through the history of civilisations‟ (1981, 16, original emphasis).
37
 Time is 
thus a part of the feminine spatial construct, although it „goes beyond history as it is 
traditionally understood‟ (Felski, 2000, 16). It forms a space in gendered discourse 
„where new borders between what can and cannot be said can find the time to form‟ 
(Jardine, 1981, 12, original emphasis).  
Rita Felski is sceptical of the forced causality inherent in the gendering of 
time that Kristeva imposes. Gender has an impact on temporal constructs and these 
constructs have an impact on conceptions of gender, but they interact rather than 
contend (2000, 17). Kristeva‟s „Women‟s Time‟ poses the question: „What can 
“identity”, even “sexual identity,” mean in a new theoretical and scientific space 
where the very notion of identity is challenged?‟ (34). Felski‟s collection of essays 
Doing Time responds to this question by further investigating how the conceptions of 
time and space become reconsidered in this discursive arena (2000, 17). Kristeva 
argues that the temporal measurement considered in terms of female subjectivity „has 
so little to do with linear time (which passes) that the word “temporality” hardly fits‟ 
(1981, 16). The change of the gender of time thus causes a displacement of the 
spatio-temporal construct. In Felski‟s view, it is the change rather than the eventual 
gender that disrupts the myth of universal linearity in time. Felski suggests that the 
continual conceptions and re-conceptions of gendered constructs open the way for 
temporal multiplicity (2000, 23). 
Gore Vidal‟s Myron investigates the possibilities of multiple times and the 
possibilities of gender changes within the temporal construct. In Myron, the 
megalomaniac Myra grows more ambitious than her earlier self.  Whereas the Myra 
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in Myra Breckinridge challenges „man‟s eternal need for mastery over both space 
and distance‟ (1968, 18), the Myra in Myron challenges man‟s (Myron‟s) need of 
mastery over time and establishes a new women‟s time. Myron‟s Myra decides that 
new gendered becoming requires a reconsideration of traditional gendered spaces 
through time. She uses the space that she establishes to be the generator of traditional 
gender reiteration in Myra Breckinridge: Hollywood cinema. She manages to get 
hers and Myron‟s body transported (literally sucked into the television) onto the set 
of the 1948 production of Siren of Babylon, starring Bruce Cabot and Maria Montez. 
Myra plans to rewrite history by personally re-shaping the images that shaped 
history: „Once I have restored Hollywood to its ancient glory (and myself to what I 
was!), I shall very simply restructure the human race‟ (1974, 250).
38
 
Reality within the Siren of Babylon is limited. It is compared to the back-side 
of a mirror (1974, 238); the binary opposite of the Real. Myra/Myron and a small 
additional number of people from different future points in time, who have also been 
transported into the reiteration of this Hollywood moment are trapped within a 
certain parameter of the MGM studios. Their perception is continually disrupted by 
reality altering „CUT TO‟s which „is like being flung across a room by a giant hand‟ 
(1974, 228) or „FADE TO BLACK‟s followed by „FADE TO LIGHT‟s, the interval 
of which feels like „this awful weight pressing in on you from all sides like when 
you‟re deep under water and can‟t breathe‟ (1974, 226). Myra also notes that even if 
she leaves the actual set „all the while, back of everything, there is a giant screen 
hanging like in a drive-in movie against the blue-gray sky with the figures of Maria 
Montez and Bruce Cabot slowly acting out Siren of Babylon backwards from where 
we are‟ (1974, 283). 
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The group of people that have „fallen‟ into Siren of Babylon are known as 
„out-of-towners‟ to the 1948 „locals‟. They stay in the background and recurrently 
move back to the first day whenever the eight weeks of filming come to their end. 
Myra, however, refuses to adhere to this principle. She does not merely reiterate the 
Hollywood moment – she shapes it. The creation of the new race of fun-loving 
Amazons starts with a few „locals‟ and extras lured into her hotel room, but her 
project continually expands. As the final week of filming is approaching, Myra 
manages to transpose her and Myron‟s being into Maria Montez and in Montez‟s 
body she redirects the Hollywood industry and resurrects the glamorous and overtly 
feminine personas that were slowly drifting out of fashion: „All these marvellous 
things are beginning to happen, thanks to my being so well located in time and 
space‟ (1974, 408).  
Myra escapes the lack of agency exhibited by the „out-of-towners‟ who 
merely experience time in its circularity. She creates an alternative Myra-esque time 
line that parasitically interacts with the time line she diverged from; her personal 
creation of time. This is what Rita Felski refers to in her model of temporality: she 
advocates branching multiplicity rather than linearity or circularity. She quotes Ernst 
Bloch stating that „[n]ot all people exist in the same Now. They do so only 
externally, through the fact that they can be seen today‟ (Bloch, 1991, 97; Felski, 
2000, 23). She argues, however, that this binding „externality‟ is important – it is the 
means by which communication and agency is achieved. She thus forms a similar 
argument to Deleuzean feminists like Rosi Braidotti and Elizabeth Grosz. Different 
layers of time: personal, political and the larger cultural histories interact and 
transpose to form a rhizomatic temporality (Grosz, 2004, 257; Felski, 2000, 17).
39
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Rita Felski pays particular attention to transgender bodies in time. In her 
essay „Fin de Siècle, Fin de Sexe‟,
40
 she investigates a cultural „myth‟ reiterated by 
theorists like Judith Butler, Jean Baudrillard and Donna Haraway: the idea that the 
dissolution or transposition of the sexes could constitute the end of history (147).
41
 
This myth is to some degree reiterated in all the literary transgender portraits 
discussed in this and the previous chapter. The mutually transgendered Eve and 
Tristessa‟s sexual union „halts all clocks‟ (Carter, 1977, 148); Doctor Hoffman‟s 
time- and space-altering desire machines are solely operated by a beautiful 
hermaphrodite, because he/she represents „the inherent symmetry of divergent 
asymmetry‟ (Carter, 1972, 213); Myra is described as „the Embodiment of Necessary 
Mutancy‟ (Vidal, 1974, 258); and Hedwig‟s gendered collage of a body is „The 
automatist‟s undoing / The whole world starts unscrewing / As time collapses and 
space warps‟ (Mitchell & Trask, 71). 
Although Felski is critical of the inevitable lack of complexity following the 
application of the transgender as a „scholarly metaphor‟ (2000, 150), and denies the 
possibility or usefulness of „ending‟ history, she reaffirms the possibilities of the 
abstract idea of a time- and space-altering transgender function in „Fin de Siècle, Fin 
de Sexe‟.
42
 According to Felski, the transgender debate‟s vastly different views of 
what gender and transgender are, demonstrates the magnitude of its potential to 
become (150-151). The various negative responses to the idea of an abstract 
transgender function signifies the complexity that this concept harbours, and this 
complexity is the function that Felski refers to; it is the prevalent potentiality of the 
transgender concept. The „trans‟ in transgender signifies movement or connection 
and the concept‟s inherent repositioning of subjective space and reconsideration of 




  Thus the transgender function does not end history – it 
multiplies the concept of temporality. 
This expanding „Nebulous Time‟ (Carter, 1972, 189) is simultaneously a 
„molecular‟ time.
 44
 It is a mode of becoming formed around relationships. This 
chapter has demonstrated various spaces of belonging; gender identities, transgender 
identities, sexual identities that are opened up and reconsidered according to the 
terms of transgender becoming. This is as much a dissolution of the subjective unit as 
an establishment of a coherently gendered self. Riki Wilchins claims that during her 
transitive stage „[i]t hurt to be me, and it hurt to see me‟ (2006, 548). The subjective 
transposition causes wide-reaching transpositions. As mentioned in chapter four, 
Rosi Braidotti argues that the conception of gendered becoming is connected to the 
idea of becoming more and more connected. The differentiation of the gendered 
spaces connect them to other spaces (2006, 131-134), and thus produce not merely 
personal and specific, but social and general change. 
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[CONCLUSION] 
I would like to return to where this thesis started: Foucault‟s heterotopias and the 
shared identity spaces‟ capacity for change. „Of Other Spaces‟ states that „the last 
trait of the heterotopias is that they have a function in relation to all the space that 
remains‟ (Foucault, 27). Foucault argues that heterotopias channel and enable 
spatiality. They are thus not so much spaces as continually changing connective 
events. Deleuze and Guattari‟s processes of becoming operate in a similar manner.
1
 
He describes them as „lines of flight‟, „molecular connectivities‟ or „haecceities‟ 
(2007, 11; 303). They never develop linearily – they expand or „rupture‟ multi-
dimensionally (2007, 10). The rhizomatic structure of connections should be thought 
of in terms of „a map and not a tracing‟ (2007, 13, original emphasis). 
  According to Deleuze, „subjectivating‟ discourses deterritorialise and 
reterritorialise spaces (1999, 78-101; 2007, 10-11). It is a matter of developing 
ownership and rejecting it; shaping identity but never becoming quite identical. I 
have referred to this as spatiality rather than space, because it is a force of movement 
rather than a set point. Like Foucault‟s monsters, the processes of becoming 
encompass both the concepts that are being shaped and the energy that shape them.
2
 
Deleuze and Guattari also refer to the processes in terms of mutation and 
evolutionary biology (2007, 5-12). Subjectivity-in-becoming is a continual 
movement towards the radically other; the limits of the human. Through this 
subjectivating and spatialising motion it creates and recreates its own form (2007, 
287-301).   
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 One of the problems with the 1980s and 1990s development of queer identity 
spaces is the fact that they are safeguarded and formed as spaces rather than 
spatialising processes of formation: the various histories and founding narratives of 
self-fashioning and queerness discussed in this thesis are used to establish and 
strengthen a sense of stable and recognisable identity. This is neither a particularly 
queer nor an actively self-fashioning practice. Although it may produce „political‟ 
and „cultural change‟ (Halberstam, 2005, 6), the basic structure of the approach lacks 
a transformative ability.
3
 The identity spaces affirm and re-affirm a set sense of 
humanity rather than push its limits. The Renaissance hermaphrodites, the 
Shakespearean transvestites, Angela Carter‟s Platonic lovers, the bodies of Hedwig 
and Myra and the idea of the transgender body are all used as historical or literary 
blue-prints or idealised structures to build identities against.  
 These transgender characters function as identity spaces because they have 
certain mythic and iconic qualities. They are connective heterotopias, and as 
Foucault recognises, such spaces have the ability to channel an infinite amount of 
spatialising discourses (1986, 25). Although some of the 1980s and 1990s critical 
identity spaces formed in relation to these characters are inflexible, the spatialising 
potential of the transgender characters certainly is not. My first three chapters show 
that both the Renaissance hermaphrodites and the breeched heroines of 
Shakespeare‟s dramas are invested with an early modern conception of the 
monstrous, which at the time interacted in multiple social spheres simultaneously.
4
 
As Foucault‟s The Order of Things establishes, the discourse of monstrosity was 
even a pivotal transformative element in these spheres (171). 
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 The Renaissance monstrous hermaphrodites and transvestites are enablers of 
change. John Cameron Mitchell and Steven Task‟s Hedwig and the Angry Inch 
depicts the transgender body as a unifying „bridge‟; a means of connection and 
change within the sexual binary.
5
 The transgender and hermaphroditical characters in 
Angela Carter‟s novels are similarly portrayed as a transformative force.
6
 Gore 
Vidal‟s Myra/Myron Breckinridge changes the minds and the bodies of others even 
more often than he/she changes his own.
7
 All these examples demonstrate that the 
depictions of transgender bodies function as enablers of transformative spatiality 
both in contemporary and Renaissance literature and social discourse. They are 
spatialising forces, „ruptures‟ or „lines of flight‟ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2007, 10). 
The question remains of how the transgender bodies themselves can get 
something out of their enabling power. Although some dominant transgender 
academics, including Patrick Califia and Jay Prosser, complain that an abstract idea 
of the transgender body is an objectification of „real‟ transgender experience, Sandy 
Stone‟s „The Empire Strikes Back‟ suggests that such a concept can be made an asset 
to the transgender community: „we can seize upon the textual violence inscribed in 
the transsexual body and turn it into a reconstructive force‟ (2006, 230). „Real‟ 
experience is not a fixed concept to Stone. She argues that it is time for transsexuals 
to let themselves be „read‟ – to move towards becoming the radically other bodies 
they have been portrayed as. In the process of what Moira Gatens calls „doubling‟, 
transsexuals might use the objectified image of themselves and take part in a 
connective network that enables them to further change: they should move towards 
becoming-posttranssexual (Stone, 2006, 232; Gatens, 1996, 40-43). 
Sellberg    261 
 
So, what does this posttranssexualising spatiality entail? How does it affect 
the discourses of gender and sexuality encountered in this thesis? Sandy Stone‟s 
manifesto attempts to remove the transsexual body from a position where it is merely 
a „screen‟ on which other social discourses are projected (2006, 229), or a 
transformative heterotopia channelling other movements. Stone wants to give the 
transgender body a chance to take advantage of its own potential – to truly be a body 
in transition (2006, 330). Rosi Braidotti acknowledges this process to involve 
connection and communication. The choice to be „read‟ as a transgender body; the 
overt signifaction of a „rupture‟ also leads to „asignification‟ (Deleuze & Guattari, 
2007, 10). Rhizomatic affect is the means by which the subjective becomes general 
and the general becomes subjective. As Braidotti expresses it: it is the becoming of 
„the affective being of the middle, the interconnection, the Relation‟ (2006, 129). 
This is where I wish to end this thesis. A nomadic subjectivity-in-becoming 
never functions as a singular moving unit. It is part of a network of connections and 
interconnections that continually transforms in relation to the multiple dimensions of 
the structure. If the aim of queer theory is to enable social and political change, then 
it needs to focus on the connectivity of sexuality and gender development between 
individuals rather than subjective performances (Butler, 1999a) or individual acts of 
resistance (Warner, 1993, xxvi). As Angela Carter, Gore Vidal and Kate Bornstein 
have shown, sexuality and gender are formed concomitantly, in mirroring interaction 
and complex identity dances. Sometimes these dances require ritualistic and overtly 
gendered parts, which are simultaneously played and provoked. Kate Bornstein 
argues that gender could take a lesson from S/M: like sexual games, identification 
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and gendering must be developed in relation to other people – they must be 
„consensual‟ (1995, 123). 
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 Halberstam is critical of these simple deconstructive practices, however (2005, 4-5).  
2
 Foucault claims that this took place in the seventeenth century (1996b, 346). See also Foucault, The 
Order of Things. Foucault‟s The Archaeology of Knowledge further establishes that the basics of 
Western logic and linguistic or discursive categorisation depend on spatial units. 
3
 See for example Sedgwick‟s argument that her struggle against breast cancer and her obesity has 
made her queer in Tendencies despite the fact that she is only attracted to men [See ch. 4, p.166] ; 
Sullivan‟s classification of different types of queer (2003) and Halberstam‟s position on queerness as 
an infinite well of new sexual- and gender identities (1998, 26-27). See also Judith Butler‟s argument 
that transpeople are not queer because they identify with defined gender categories This exclusive 
statement performs a classifying act at the same time as it argues against classification. [See ch. 4, 
pp.150-151] 
4
 Halberstam refers to the highway and the urban space as queer (2005, 36; 97) and Kate Bornstein 
refers to the internet and the stage as queer (1995, 164; 1998, 206). 
5
 Halberstam, Marjorie Garber and Jay Prosser discuss the queer or transgender problematics 
connected  to gender-specific public bathrooms (Halberstam, 1998, 26; Garber, 1992, 14; Edelman, 
1993, 564)   
6
 [See ch. 4, pp.166-170] 
7
 Foucault further points out that the same heterotopia may be invested with different values in 
different discourses and different periods in time (1986, 25).  
8
 See also Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex and Stephen Greenblatt, „Fiction and Friction‟. 
9
 These characters are referred to as „transvestites‟ in for example Garber‟s Vested Interests, Peter 
Stallybrass‟s „Transvestism and the “body beneath”‟, Stephen Orgel‟s Impersonations and Stephen 
Greenblatt‟s „Fiction and Friction‟. It is important to note that they would not have been called that in 
early modern society, however. The term „transvestite‟ was first coined in the early twentieth century 
by the German sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld in „The Transvestites‟ in 1910.  
10
 Katherine E. Kelly claims that Harley Granville-Barker first coined this expression in Prefaces to 
Shakespeare in 1946. It refers to the young actors who are cast to play the female parts in Renaissance 
drama (Kelly, 1990, 81). Kelly refers to „boy actresses‟  in „The Queen‟s Two Bodies‟, as does 
Kathleen McLuskie in „The Act, the Role, and the Actor‟. 
11
 The characters Viola/Cesario,  Rosalind/Ganymede, Portia/Balthazar and Nerissa/Clerk are termed 
as such for example in Kelly‟s „The Queen‟s Two Bodies‟, Orgel‟s Impersonations, Garber‟s Vested 
Interests  and Steve Brown‟s „The Boyhood of Shakespeare‟s Heroines‟.  
12
  See for example Greenblatt, „Fiction and Friction‟; Orgel, Impersonations; Callaghan, Shakespeare 
Without Women; Belsey, „Disrupting Sexual Difference‟; Traub, „Desire and the Differences it 
Makes‟; Kelly, „The Queen‟s Two Bodies: Shakespeare‟s Boy Actress in Breeches‟; Rackin, 
„Adrogyny, Mimesis and the Marriage of the Boy Heroine on the English Renaissance Stage‟; 
Thomas Neely, „Lovesickness, Gender and Subjectivity: Twelfth Night and As You Like It‟; 
Pequigney, „The Two Antonios and Same-Sex Love in Twelfth Night and The Merchant of Venice’; 
Digangi, The Homoerotics of Early Modern Drama and Garber, Vested Interests.  
13
 See for example  Angela Carter, The Passion of New Eve and The Infernal Pleasure Machines of 
Doctor Hoffman; Jeanette Winterson, The Powerbook; Donna Haraway, „A Manifesto for Cyborgs‟; 
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble and Jean Baudrillard, „Transsexuality‟. 
14
 Patrick Califia‟s Sex Changes,  Jordy Jones‟s „Gender Without Genitals‟ and Sandy Stone‟s „The 
Empire Strikes Back‟ all argue that queer theory objectifies transgender bodies. [See ch. 4, pp.153-
154] 
15
 [See ch. 5] 
16
 See Sedgwick, Beyond Men and Epistemology of the Closet; Chedgzoy, Shakespeare’s Queer 
Children; Freccero, Queer/Early/Modern; Garber, Vested Interests; Belsey, Desire; Laqueur, Making 
Sex and Angela Carter, Wise Children.  
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17
 Chedgzoy here refers to Freud‟s idea of the „family romance‟, an eroticised power struggle within 
the nuclear family unit that ratifies the patriarchal supremacy. See Freud, „Family Romances‟. 
18
 Belsey divides her book into two parts on „Desire Now‟ and „Desire in Other Times‟, where the 
latter includes Arthurian romance and the poetry of John Donne. She claims that one of the goals of 
her project is to show that Enlightenment values are not the only influence on modern culture: „to 
know for sure, at least from time to time, that the Cartesian Cogito is neither in control nor an origin‟ 
(1994, 20). 
19
 See also Between Men, where Sedgwick outlines the continually shifting boundaries between male-
male social and sexual bonds from Shakespeare to Oscar Wilde. 
20
 I return to the concept of the founding narrative and explore it more thoroughly in chapter 4. [See 
ch. 4, pp.165-184] 
21
 [See ch. 1, pp.26-30] 
22
 Although Goldberg does not cite the specific thesis by Burckhardt that he derives this idea from, he 
most certainly refers to The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. Burckhardt does form a similar 
argument in his Judgements on History and Historians, however.  
23
 Dympna Callaghan‟s Shakespeare Without Women, Jean E. Howard‟s introduction to Shakespeare 
Reproduced, Valerie Wayne‟s introduction to The Matter of Difference and Jonathan Goldberg‟s 
Sodometries also express similar objectives (Callaghan, 2000b, 47; Howard, 1987, 3; Wayne, 1991, 1; 
Goldberg, 1992, 24).They all describe the Renaissance as a space through which they can channel 
modern social discourses. 
24
 Grosz argues that it is „neither fully “present”, a thing in itself, nor is it a pure abstraction, a 
metaphysical assumption that can be ignored in everyday practise‟ (2004, 5). 
25
 I argue this in spite of the fact that theorists like Judith Halberstam, Jay Prosser and Patrick Califia 
criticise Donna Haraway, Jean Baudrillard and Rita Felski for making similar arguments. Halberstam, 
Prosser and Califia consider abstract arguments about gender transgression to be a conceptual hi-
jacking of inherently transgender corporeal space. Sandy Stone acknowledges this criticism, but she 
suggests that there are other ways to read Haraway, Baudrillard and Felski‟s work. Conceptual 
characters can give rise to more than one space. Transgender concerns are not necessarily excluded 
when a more abstract connotation of the transgender body is invoked – and the space created can be 
used by the transgender discourse as well as queer or feminist discourse as a means of empowerment 
(2006, 230). [See ch. 5, pp. 256-257] 
26
 Baudrillard argues that the idea of transsexuality thus signals the end of sexual difference and the 
end of history in „Transsexuality‟.  
27
 Although the relationships and definitions of concepts like sex and gender are fervently debated by 
theorists like Judith Butler and Moira Gatens, I only include dictionary definitions here. The academic 
debates on sex and gender will be investigated throughout the rest of the thesis, however. 
28
 Halberstam argues that the stone butch is „possibly the only sexual identity defined almost solely in 
terms of what practises she does not engage in‟ (1998, 123) The stone butch is hard and impermeable. 
There are numerous other categorised types of butch identities, such as strict butch, drag butch, soft 







 These two terms are often used interchangeably. However, cultural materialism explicitly 
differentiates itself from new historicism, by the adherence to Marxist analyses, but numerous self-
proclaimed new historicist writers, including Stephen Grenblatt, Louis Montrose and Catherine 
Gallagher also rely on Marxist analyses, see e.g. Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, 
Shakespearean Negotiations, „Resonance and Wonder‟, „The Improvisation of Power‟; Gallagher, 
„Marxism and the New Historicism‟; Montrose, „Professing the Renaissance: The Poetics and Politics 
of Culture‟. The two terms are also used if not interchangeably, usually in conjunction with one 
another in works theorising the critical schools of the 1980s and 1990s: the introduction to Kiernan 
Ryan‟s compilation of essays New Historicism and Cultural Materialism – A Reader claims that new 
historicism and cultural materialism are terms differentiated mainly by location; as American and 
British factions of one movement (ix-x); Scott Wilson‟s Cultural Materialism maintains this claim 
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(viii) although the analysis treats new historicism as a sub-movement of cultural materialism (53-82); 
Thomas Healy‟s New Latitudes recognises that there are expressed differences, but effaces the term 
cultural materialism in favour of what he similarly to Ryan calls its „distinctly American Guise‟ (61) 
new historicism (57-83); Claire Colebrook‟s New Literary Histories makes no direct distinction, but 
indicates that new historicism develops out of a wider ranging concept of cultural materialism (138-
235), as does Judith Lowder Newton‟s „History as Usual?‟ (152-153). 
2
 See for example Stephen Orgel‟s Impersonations; Alan Bray‟s Homosexuality in Renaissance 
England; Gregory W. Bredbeck‟s Sodomy and Interpretation; Jonathan Goldberg‟s Sodometries; 
Bruce R. Smith‟s Homosexual Desire in Shakespeare’s England; Alan Haynes‟s Untam'd Desire: Sex 
in Elizabethan England; Valerie Traub‟s Desire & Anxiety: Circulations of Sexuality in 
Shakespearean Drama and Mario Digangi‟s The Homoerotics of Early Modern Drama. There are also 
several compilations of essays specifically dedicated to Renaissance sexuality and desire, including 
Goldberg‟s Queering the Renaissance, Susan Zimmerman‟s Erotic Politics: Desire on the 
Renaissance Stage and a large section of Dympna Callaghan‟s A Feminist Companion to 
Shakespeare. 
3
 More recent new historicist/cultural materialist work engages with a wider variety of material, from 
a less restricted time span. See for example Hilda L. Smith‟s All Men and Both Sexes; Carolyn 
Dinshaw‟s Getting Medieval; or Catherine Gallagher‟s The Body Economic. 
4
 The works on Renaissance sexuality above all refer to Stephen Greenblatt‟s „Fiction and Friction‟ in 
Shakespearean Negotiations and/or Renaissance Self-Fashioning. They also reference, cross-reference 
and respond to each other throughout. On top of this there is noticeable focus on a select group of 
writers in the new historicist/cultural materialist readers. Essays by Stephen Greenblatt, Jonathan 
Goldberg, Catherine Gallagher, Stephen Orgel, Peter Stallybrass, Jean E. Howard, Valerie Traub, Lisa 
Jardine, Bruce R. Smith, Catherine Belsey and Susan Zimmerman appear recurrently in 1980s and 
1990s readers and compilations of Renaissance criticism such as e.g. Zimmerman‟s Erotic Politics: 
Desire on the Renaissance Stage; Callaghan‟s A Feminist Companion to Shakespeare; Ryan‟s New 
Historicism and Cultural Materialism – A Reader; Callaghan, Traub and Kaplan‟s Feminist Readings 
of Early Modern Culture; Veeser‟s The New Historicism and The New Historicism – A Reader. 
5
 See for example Greenblatt, „Fiction and Friction‟; Orgel, Impersonations; Callaghan, Shakespeare 
Without Women; Belsey, „Disrupting Sexual Difference‟; Traub, „Desire and the Differences it 
Makes‟; Kelly, „The Queen‟s Two Bodies: Shakespeare‟s Boy Actress in Breeches‟; Rackin, 
„Adrogyny, Mimesis and the Marriage of the Boy Heroine on the English Renaissance Stage‟; 
Thomas Neely, „Lovesickness, Gender and Subjectivity: Twelfth Night and As You Like It‟; 
Pequigney, „The Two Antonios and Same-Sex Love in Twelfth Night and The Merchant of Venice’; 
Digangi, The Homoerotics of Early Modern Drama and Garber, Vested Interests.  
6
 See for example Montrose‟s „Professing the Renaissance‟ and Greenblatt„s „Towards a Poetics of 
Culture‟. 
7
 Goldberg refers to Jacob Burckhardt‟s  interpretation of the origin of Western modernity in the essay 
The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, published in 1860. John Jeffries Martin acknowledges 
that the Renaissance in the late nineteenth century almost acquired a mythical status due to this idea 
(2003). As Jeffries Martin notes, this mysticism remains both in popular culture and in academic 
readings of Renaissance culture (2003, 1). It is particularly visible in new historicist interpretations of 
the transvestite body. [See intro, p.10] 
8
 See Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams on „the Oedipus complex‟, where identity is argued to be 
formed when a child comes to terms with an initial desire towards the parent of the opposite sex and 
rejection of the parent of the same sex. The implication is that new historicism obsesses over the 
Renaissance, because it is constructed as a historical cradle; a parental period, from which the 
specifics of our own place in time and space may be identified. See discussion of „Saint Foucault‟ 
below. Scott Wilson makes a similar point in Cultural Materialism, arguing that Greenblatt‟s method 
in Learning to Curse functions „as a therapeutic response to trauma‟ (60). 
9
 A number of new historicist scholars, including Laqueur, Orgel, Bredbeck, Smith and Goldberg 
discuss the difference between a modern internalised conception of sexuality and a Renaissance idea 
of sexuality as performative (Laqueur, 1990; Orgel, 1996; Bredbeck, 1991; Smith, 1991; Goldberg, 
1992). This division is often attributed to Michel Foucault‟s claim that modern sexuality emerged 
somewhere between the late seventeenth century and the „twilight‟ (1998, 1) of the „Victorian 
Regime‟ (1998, 1) in The History of Sexuality.  
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10
 See [See intro, pp.16-17] 
11
 The gendering of modern, as well as early modern English is, however, far less obvious than in 
languages like Latin, French and German. 
12
 There is ample debate among feminist and gender scholars of the Renaissance about the relationship 
between the conception of the „sexed‟ and the „gendered‟ in early modern discourse. See discussion 
below of  Laqueur, Making Sex; Orgel, Impersonations; Traub, Desire & Anxiety and „Gendering 
Mortality in Early modern England‟; and Belsey, „Disrupting Sexual Difference‟. See also for 
example Jardine, Still Harping on Daughters and „Twins and Travesties‟; Stallybrass, „Transvestism 
and the “body beneath”‟ 
13
 There is a great amount of critical disagreement over the actual connotations of effeminacy. Stephen 
Orgel and Thomas Laqueur both discuss it in relation to The Oxford English Dictionary definitions. 
For a further discussion of the critical debate around the word, see chapter 3. [See ch. 3, pp.118-124] 
14
 See discussion of Laqueur, Orgel and Greenblatt and the homological sex thesis in chapter 2. [See 
ch.2, pp.64-75] 
15
 See for example Greenblatt, „Fiction and Friction‟; Orgel, Impersonations; Laqueur, Making Sex; 
Levine, Men in Women’s Clothing; Traub, „Desire and the Differences it Makes‟; Jardine, „Twins and 
Travesties‟. 
16
 See chapter 2 on the early modern gender debate. [See ch. 2, p. 64-83] The general indeterminacy of 
the genders is, according to Orgel‟s Impersonations, especially visible in a couple of comical 
pamphlets, entitled  Haec Vir and Hic Mulier, which deride the idea of an effeminate man and a 
masculine woman, respectively. See discussion of The Roaring Girl in chapter 3. [See ch. 3, pp.136-
142] 
17
 See for example Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations, p. 1; Orgel, Impersonations, p. 2; 
Zimmerman, Erotic Politics, p. 2-3, etc. 
18
 Richard Strier makes a similar point in Resistant Structures: „The phrase, “the new historicism” is 
fundamentally ambiguous. It takes its force from the contrast it establishes with something else, “the 
old ---,” but this is precisely where the ambiguity comes in. What is the contrasting term?‟ (67). Judith 
Lowder Newton notes in „History as Usual?‟ that for the feminist movement the „new‟-ness of new  
historicism presents an opportunity to establish a „New Women‟s History‟ (1989, 154). 
19
 „New –ism‟ movements, including new historicism, new criticism, new functionalism, etc., 
similarly to „post –ism‟s declare both a distance from and an adherence to an earlier „ism‟ through 
their names. They are thus bound to both continue along the same lines as the previous movement to 
some extent, and to radically transform it. Greenblatt, himself, questions whether new historicism‟s 
success is „due entirely to the felicitous conjunction of two marketable signs: “new” and “ism”‟ (1990, 
3). 
20
 See Strier, Resistant Structures, pp 67-68. 
21
 See Montrose‟s „Professing the Renaissance‟; Greenblatt„s „Towards a Poetics of Culture‟ and the 
introductions to Renaissance Self-Fashioning and Shakespearean Negotiations. Scott Wilson 
acknowledges that Greenblatt rejects the idea of writing a manifesto, arguing that new historicism is a 
„practice rather than a doctrine‟ (Greenblatt quoted in Strier, 54). Healy claims that the doctrinal 
grounds to the movement are found in Montrose‟s writing rather than Greenblatt‟s (1992, 66) and 
Claire Colebrook similarly suggests that the one text of Greenblatt‟s that comes close to a manifesto is 
„Towards a Poetics of Culture‟ (1997, 25). I disagree with Healy and Colebrook on this point. 
Although informal in their tone, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, Shakespearean Negotiations, Learning 
to Curse, „wonder and resonance‟ and the introduction to Power and Forms all exhibit continuous 
passages where the author attempts to position himself and his methods in relation to the past and the 
reading of the past. See the discussion of Greenblatt and the manifest(o)ing of the dead below for a 
further elaboration of this point. [See ch. 1, pp.56-63] 
22
 See Wilson, pp 60-66; Healy, pp 67-69 and Colebrook, 23-26 on new historicism‟s usage of critical 
theory. 
23
 Jean E. Howard discusses this idea in The Stage and Social Struggle in Early Modern England, pp. 
3-5. 
24
 Neither Wilson nor Strier find this fact a serious problem within new historicism, however, because 
as Strier exclaims: „Why should we expect a good literary or cultural critic – or even an outstanding 
one like Stephen Greenblatt – to be a competent philosopher as well?‟ (1995, 68). 
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25
 Healy also acknowledges that new historicism „seems to ignore many of the premises it claims to 
operate on‟ (68). Richard Strier argues that the problem with new historicism‟s methodology is that it 
insists on a constant polemic – external and internal. When new historicism attempts to theorise itself; 
polemicise within itself, it deconstructs its own stances. See Strier, 67-79.  
26
 In his 1989 essay „Co-optation‟, Gerald Graff comments on the growing interest in „radical‟ 
criticism (including new historicism) in literature departments throughout the USA. See also Goldberg 
& Menon, „Queering History‟; Fish, „Commentary: The Young and the Restless‟ and Howard, „The 
Early Modern and the Homoerotic Turn in Political Criticism‟, for discussions on the 
institutionalisation of new historicism and its bias in the teaching of Renaissance literature. For 
prolific anthologies of criticism that include a significant amount of  new historicist contributions, see 
for example The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism; Shakespeare: An Anthology of Criticism 
and Theory 1945-2000 the Oxford and Cambridge Companions to English Literature; etc. Stephen 
Greenblatt is also the executive editor of The Norton Anthology of English Literature. For indicative 
readers and „how-to‟ guides see e.g. Ryan, New Historicism and Cultural Materialism – A Reader; 
Veeser, The New Historicism; Greenblatt and Gallagher, Practicing New Historicism. 
27
 I will sustain that new historicism is firmly grounded in psychoanalysis and the ideas of Lacan, 
although Greenblatt, himself effusively rejects psychoanalysis in „Psychoanalysis and Renaissance 
Culture‟ as a „crippled‟ (216) and „anachronistic‟ (210) theoretical movement. Elizabeth Jane 
Bellamy‟s review essay of Greenblatt‟s essay argues that Greenblatt‟s rejection of psychoanalysis is 
undermined by the fact that the „self‟ in Renaissance Self-Fashioning is presented in psychoanalytical 
terms (2005, 9-10). Scott Wilson also argues that Greenblatt‟s later discussions of Foucauldian power 
struggles are closely related to the treatment of transgression in psychoanalysis – more so than to the 
ideas of power developed by Foucault (63-65). 
28
 See e.g. Belsey, „Disrupting Sexual Difference‟ or Desire, which has a full chapter on 
psychoanalytic theory.  See also Traub‟s work, including Desire & Anxiety, „Desire and the 
Differences it Makes‟ and „The (In)significance of Lesbian Desire in Early Modern England‟. 
29
 See for example Jankowski, „...in the Lesbian Void: Woman-Woman Eroticism in Shakespeare‟s 
Plays‟; Traub, „Desire and the Differences it Makes‟ and Thomas Neely, „Lovesickness, Gender and 
Subjectivity: Twelfth Night and As You Like It‟. 
30
 See Lacan, Ecrits, particularly „The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience‟, pp 75-81 and „The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious‟, pp 412-
441. 
31
 See Orgel, Impersonations; Laqueur, Making Sex; Rackin, „Adrogyny, Mimesis and the Marriage of 
the Boy Heroine on the English Renaissance Stage‟ and Jankowski, „...in the Lesbian Void: Woman-
Woman Eroticism in Shakespeare‟s Plays‟. See also the discussion of the arguments developed in 
these works below. [See ch. 1, pp.48-56]  
32
 Laqueur‟s Making Sex and Orgel‟s Impersonations attempt to form an idea of Renaissance 
subjectivity as a concept of self before psychoanalysis. Elizabeth Jane Bellamy argues in „Desires and 
Disavowals‟ that Stephen Greenblatt's rejection of psychoanalysis in readings of the Renaissance in 
„Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture‟ has done a lot of harm in readings of Renaissance culture. 
She acknowledges that David Aers‟s „A Whisper in the Ear of Early Modernists; or, Reflections on 
Literary Critics Writing the “History of the Subject”‟ and Lee Patterson‟s „On the Margin: 
Postmodernism, Ironic History, and Medieval Studies‟ and Greenblatt‟s own „Psychoanalysis and 
Renaissance Culture‟ avoid psychoanalytic readings where such are both enlightening and thoroughly 
historically defendable. 
33
 See for example Lowder Newton, „History as Usual?‟, p. 153; Traub, „Desire and the Differences it 
Makes‟, p. 91; Rackin, „Adrogyny, Mimesis and the Marriage of the Boy Heroine on the English 
Renaissance Stage‟, p. 39, note 10; Laqueur, Making Sex, p. 124. 
34
 See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Madness and Civilisation, etc. Foucault argues that a member 
of society is always under the control of the dominant discourses of that society (1991, 202). This idea 
is developed from Althusser‟s discussion of ISA‟s (Ideological State Apparatuses), discourses and 
ideas maintaining the power structure in society in Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.  
35
 Icon Books‟ „Postmodern Encounters‟ series acknowledges Foucault to be the initiator as well as 
the embodiment of queer theory in its title Foucault and Queer Theory. For a discussion of Foucault‟s 
influencing ideas see William B. Turner A Genealogy of Queer Theory, ch 1 and Carla Freccero, 
Queer/Early/Modern, pp. 32-41.  
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36
 Turner makes a similar point to this in A Genealogy of Queer Theory. In the chapter entitled 
„Foucault Didn‟t Know What He Was Doing. And Neither Do I‟, Turner argues that Foucault‟s 
changes of mind and direction were part of his refusal to conform with any type of „ostensibly 
consistent, uniform identity‟ (36). 
37
 Foucault is quoted as one coherent voice and there is no effort made to try to connect the different 
statements. For example Laqueur moves happily between quotations about sexuality from The History 
of Sexuality and history and science from The Order of Things throughout Making Sex. Halperin refers 
to numerous of Foucault‟s famous works including The History of Sexuality and Foucault‟s interviews 
on power/knowledge in One Hundred Years of Homosexuality and Bredbeck similarly uses The 
History of Sexuality and Foucault‟s interviews on power structures together in Sodomy and 
Interpretation.  
38
 It should be acknowledged that Foucault‟s reading of Greco-Roman sexual behaviour is 
considerably less idealised and generalising than the objective and methodology of volume 1 may lead 
the reader to expect. Volume 2, The Use of Pleasure analyses ancient conceptions of the subject‟s 
relationship to pleasures, such as food and sex, from a social, moral and political perspective. Volume 
3: The Care of the Self traces different facets of ancient subject-hood in relation to gender formation, 
the body and sexual politics.  
39
 Mohr constructs a rather weak argument against social constructivism in the formation of sexual 
identities in Gay Ideas, but his observation of the near divine status of Foucault within queer criticism 
is apt. David Halperin, whose work One Hundred Years of Homosexuality is directly attacked in Gay 
Ideas, responds to Mohr‟s accusation in Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography which is an in-
depth analysis of the construction of critical canonicity in queer theory. In this study Halperin agrees 
that there has been a great amount of rather uncritical usages of Foucault in queer scholarship, but he 
denies that he has personally been guilty of such simplistic appropriations.  
40
 Jean E. Howard comments approvingly on the rising popularity of Renaissance sexualities and the 
surge of criticism within the field in her 1998 review essay, „The early modern and the homoerotic 
turn in political criticism‟ (105). 
41
 Ironically, this idea reiterates the „old‟ historicist conceptions of the Renaissance, formulated by 
Jacob Burckhardt in The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. Burckhardt claims that Renaissance 
signalled „The Discovery of Man‟ (198): the modern subject‟s conception of himself as a subject 
(198-213). 
42
 Claire Colebrook notes that „self-fashioning became a point of convergence for many later new 
historicist enquiries‟ (1997, 198). It is important to note that Renaissance Self-fashioning is not 
merely the basis for new historicist discussions of Renaissance gender – it is considered to be the 
initiator of new historicism in literary studies (Strier, 69). 
43
 Jonathan Sawday argues in The Body Emblazoned that the „Self‟ also was a negative concept in 17
th
 
century culture, however (159). 
44
 See Greenblatt, „Fiction and Friction‟, pp. 91-93; Orgel, Impersonations, pp. 28-29; Stallybrass, 
„Transvestism and the “body beneath”‟, p. 64; Kelly, „The Queen‟s Two Bodies‟, pp. 81-83 and 
Jardine, Still Harping on Daughters, pp. 141-168 on the formation of identity through clothing. 
45
 See Orgel, Impersonations, ch 2-3; Laqueur, Making Sex, ch 3-4. Greenblatt also infers a similar 
notion in „Fiction and Friction‟.  
46
 As noted above, this is specifically the case for the new historicist texts of the 1980s and early 
1990s. Susan Zimmerman‟s introduction to Erotic Politics argues that this is a problem that she hopes 
may soon be remedied (1992, 7) and more recent work does indeed focus on a number of literary or 
textual mediums. See for example  Hilda L. Smith‟s All Men and Both Sexes; Carolyn Dinshaw‟s 
Getting Medieval; or Catherine Gallagher‟s The Body Economic 
47
 This has been contested, however. Denise A. Walen discusses a number of instances especially 
from Twelfth Night and As You Like It where she discerns specific traces of female homoerotics 
(2002). 
48
 This essay is included in Valerie Wayne‟s The Matter of Difference. 
49
 Valerie Traub‟s essay „Gendering Mortality in Early modern England‟ also engages with early 
modern anatomy sources. She offers a more wide-ranging and in-depth analysis than either Laqueur, 
Orgel or Greenblatt, pondering over the gender implications of a science that treads closely to the 
concepts of desire, art and death. There are a number of other more nuanced works and collections of 
essays that engage with sixteenth and seventeenth-century anatomy. See e.g. Jonathan Sawday‟s The 
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Body Emblazoned; James J. Sheehan (ed) & Morton Sosna (ed), The Boundaries of Humanity; David 
Hillman (ed) & Carla Mazzio (ed), The Body in Parts; and to some extent Susan Zimmerman‟s The 
Early Modern Corpse and Shakespeare’s Theatre. 
50
 A number of other authors, including Jean E. Howard, Valerie Wayne and Jonathan Goldberg also 
express similar objectives in their texts (Howard, 1987, 3; Wayne, 1991, 1; Goldberg, 1992, 24). 
Howard argues that this is a conscious choice: „Genealogy ... is less important than what is done with 
the space opened up by prior work‟ (1987, 3). 
51
 See chapter 4 on the narrativisation of the self. [See ch. 4, pp.165-184] 
52
 [See intro, pp.9-10] 
53
 See e.g. Renaissance Self-fashioning; Shakespearean Negotiations and Learning to Curse.  
54
 Freud treats trauma as a founding event, from which discourses of desire, pain and sometimes 
pleasure emerge. See Freud, Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis. 
55
 See „The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience‟ 
(Lacan, 1977, pp. 75-81)  
56
 See chapter 4 for further discussion on the narrativisation of the self. [See ch. 4, pp.165-184] 
57
 See for example Freud‟s Five Lectures on Psyychoanalysis, „Beyond the Pleasure Principle‟, „The 
Unconscious‟ and „Repression‟ in which he argues that the subject‟s previous traumas need to be 
outlined in order to be overcome. An encyclopedia article included in volume 18 of The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud refers to this as Freud‟s cathartic 
technique – trauma is dispersed through revelation (Strachey, 2001, 235-239). The introduction to the 






 [See ch. 1, pp.47-48] 
2
 [See ch. 1, pp.59-60] 
3
 All the early modern sources in this chapter are referred to according to their original publication 
dates. 
4
 For further extrapolation on this point, see Laqueur and Greenblatt (Laqueur, 1990, 98; Greenblatt, 
1988, 85). 
5
 Laqueur, Valerie Traub and Jonathan Sawday all agree that social-political discourses are at least as 
prominent as the medical details in the illustrative Renaissance dissection engravings (Laqueur,1990, 
70-94; Traub, 1996a; Sawday, 16-38). Traub and Laqueur specifically discuss the image of femininity 
emerging in the illustrations. Traub argues that they straddle the boundaries between pornography and 
science (1996a, 82) 
6
 I am refering to Jaqcues Lacan‟s stance on subject formation, which considers femininity in terms of 
phallic lack: femininity is the binary opposite that defines the concept of masculine phallic being 
(2006, 671-702). For further discussion of this, see for example Hélène Cixous‟s „The Laugh of the 
Medusa‟ and Irigaray‟s This Sex Which Is Not One. [See ch. 1, note 8] 
7
 Aristotle argues in his Physics that all beings strive towards the perfection of their kind (1999, 33-36; 
192b8-b18). In the  Metaphysics he additionally acknowledges that men and women are not of 
different kinds (1998, 311-312; I.9 1058a), so Orgel argues that since the male form in general is 
described as stronger and more capable than the female, the Aristotelian function of perfection would 
push all humans to strive towards masculinity. The Galenic idea of sexual differentiation as different 
values on the same scale demonstrates this idea (Orgel, 1996, 21). 
8
 Patricia Parker also discusses the various accounts of this incidence thoroughly in „Gender Ideology, 
Gender Change: The Case of Marie Germaine‟. She points out that Laqueur and Greenblatt 
consciously choose to retell the anecdotes in Montaigne‟s essay on „The Force of Imagination‟ where 
the author describes a movement from female imperfection to male perfection: the text is „preoccupied 
not with the imperfection of women but with anecdotes of men who, on their wedding night or at 
equally inopportune times, also find that they lack the required “instrument”‟ (Parker, 1993, 344). 
Presumably, Helkiah Crooke and Ambroise Paré also „choose‟ to retell the particular stories of 
female-to-male sex changes, because they do not mention incidents of movements in the opposite 
direction (Crooke, 1615, 250; Paré, 1634, 975). 
9
 In Paré‟s text Marie is 14 at the time of her sex change (1634, 975). 
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10
 Tribadism signifies female/female penetration by use of an unusually enlarged clitoris. 
11
 Quoted in Greenblatt, „Fiction and Friction‟, p. 74. 
12
 Greenblatt claims that this is the common practice, although he finds it strange: „Perhaps at the 
trial‟s end the judges had not the vaguest idea what Marin‟s sex really was‟ (1988, 75). He notes that 
he only knows one other early modern case of hermaphrodism that was brought to trial, and similar 
consequences followed then (1988, 178). 
13
 Greenblatt  and Laqueur give detailed accounts of the trial (Greenblatt, 1988, 74-75; Laqueur, 1990, 
136-137). Greenblatt acknowledges that Duval never discloses whether or not Marie/Marin‟s gender 
would be her/his choice, but states that the traditional custom in such a case would be to let her/him 
choose. He does not substantiate this claim, however (1988, 75). 
14
 [See ch. 4, pp.146-148] 
15
 See chapter 4 on Judith Butler‟s idea of drag in Gender Trouble. [See ch. 4, pp.149-150] Butler 
argues that the gap between the performer‟s „real‟ gender and his/her drag performance of gender 
destabilises the cultural fantasy of stable gender essence and reveals the performativity of gender in 
general (1999a, 174-177). 
16
 Grosz refers to Ferdinand de Saussure‟s division of signifiers into binary opposites. She describes 
how Lacan transfers this structure onto the body (1990, 93-98). See chapter 4 for further discussion of 
Elizabeth Grosz‟s conception of corporeality. [See ch. 4, pp.172-173] 
17
 See Lisa Jardine, Still Harping on Daughters (Brighton: Harvester P, 1983), ch 5, 141-168. 
18
 Peggy Tine Cohen-Kettenis and  Friedemann Pfӓfflin state that young transsexuals are usually not 
allowed to start hormone treatment or prepare for surgery before they legally come of age in Western 
societies. Germany and Holland have made exceptions in some cases (2003, 165-166). 
19
 Patricia Parker further argues in „The Case of Marie Germain‟ that the medical archive is not a 
particularly stable ground for interpretations of early modern gender and sexuality. She points out that 
Paré was not scientific writer in the modern sense of the word. According to Foucault the thorough 
differentiation between the sciences and the humanities was not developed until the late eighteenth 
century (2002, 235-237). Paré recounts exciting tales of strange and excitingly „virile‟ phenomena. 
Like Montaigne, they are storytellers – writers eager to please their audiences and to establish 
themselves as „virilising‟ social persona (Parker, 1993).  
20
 See for example Kathryn M. Brammall‟s „Monstrous Metamorphosis‟ and Steven Mullaney‟s 
„Strange Things, Gross Terms, Curious Customs‟ for a further discussion of the dialogue between 
discourses of science and discourses of monsters and monstrosity in early modern Europe. See also 
Arnold I. Davidson‟s „The Horror of Monsters‟; Katherine Park and Lorraine Daston‟s „Unnatural 
Conceptions‟ and Paula Findlen‟s „Jokes of Nature and Jokes of Knowledge‟ for an account of Paré‟s 
pivotal position within this debate. 
21
 This argument is derived from book VII.33 of Pliny‟s Natural History, but Paré‟s interpretation is 
rather skewed. Pliny states that although hermaphrodites were ‟Once considered portents, now they 
are sources of enterainment‟ (80). Helkiah Crooke‟s Mikromosgraphia also refers to Pliny in his 
account of hermaphrodites, without invoking any portentous implications (249). 
22
 See Arnold I. Davidson‟s „The Horror of Monsters‟; Katherine Park and Lorraine Daston‟s 
„Unnatural Conceptions‟ and Paula Findlen‟s „Jokes of Nature and Jokes of Knowledge‟ for further 
discussion of the mediaeval and early modern vogue for monstrosity. 
23
 This passage is quoted both in Laqueur (1990, 93-94) and Greenblatt (1988, 81-82), neither of them 
consider it to disrupt their interpretation of the Renaissance sexual anatomy, however. 
24
 Crooke mistakenly attributes this conclusion to Aristotle, whereas this is only actually established in 
Galen‟s On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body (628). Aristotle in fact comes to the same 
conclusion as Crooke: he expressly states that sexual difference is an important function in nature, and 
that the female sex is as natural as the male (1998, 311-312; I.9 1058a).  
25
 Again, Crooke misreads Aristotle. The sexual theory in the Physics establishes that the female sex is 
not monstrous (1998, 311-312; I.9 1058a). See Ian Maclean‟s The Renaissance Notion of Woman on 
the juxtaposition of Galen and Aristotle.  
26
 Sawday‟s The Body Emblazoned affirms this reading of Crooke‟s Mikromosgraphia. Sawday shows 
that Orgel is not the only reader who was confused by the form of the work, however: many of 
Crooke‟s fellow physicians complained that the section „of the parts belonging to generation‟ was 
incorrect and that much of it was direct translation (1995, 225-226).  
27
 Orgel merely quotes the last part of this section (1996, 23). 
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28
 See for example Sawday, The Body Emblazoned; Traub, „Gendering Mortality in Early Modern 
Anatomies‟; Zimmermann, „The Early Modern Corpse and Shakespeare‟s Theatre‟; Kern Paster, 
Humouring the Body. 
29
 Zimmermann argues that the continuous religious reforms of the time and the fluctuations of the 
conception of the religious subject influenced the idea of the early modern body. Like the religious 
interpretations, it multiplied and redeveloped (2005, 24-66) 
30
 Orgel also refers extensively to Jonas Barish‟s The Antitheatrical Prejudice (1996, 26-27). 
31
 Traub, Sawday and Zimmermann establish that the teachings of Vesalius were important for 
conceptions of the body at the time. These portray the body as a „miniature of the divine workmanship 
of God, and that its form corresponded to the greater form of the macrocosm‟ (Sawday, 23).  
32
 Deuteronomy 22:5: „The woman shall not wear that which pertaineth unto a man, neither shall a 
man put on a woman‟s garment: for all that do so are abomination unto the LORD thy God‟. (King 
James Bible, 210) Stubbes writes of Deuteronomy 22: „what man so euer weareth womans apparel is 
accursed, and what woman weareth mans apparel is accursed also‟ (Stubbes, Anatomie of Abuses, F5v). 
33
 Arnold I. Davidson notes in „The Horror of Monsters‟ that the term „abomination‟ is often read 
synonymously with monstrosity, not merely in the anti-theatrical tracts, but in early modern society in 
general (40).  
34
 See Barish on the anti-theatrical writers‟ reiteration of a Platonic essence (1981, 5-37). 
35
 See Barish‟s The Antitheatrical Prejudice; J.W. Binns‟s „Women or Transvestites on the 
Elizabethan Stage?‟; Ursula K. Heise‟s „Transvestism and the Stage Controversy‟and Michael 
O‟Connell‟s „The Idolatrous Eye‟. 
36
 [See ch. 1, p.27] 
37
 See Kathryn M. Brammall‟s „Monstrous Metamorphosis‟ for a discription of the strictness of class, 
gender, religious and political categories in Tudor society and a discussion of how the discourse of 
monstrosity disrupted the general norms. See also and Paula Findlen‟s „Jokes of Nature and Jokes of 
Knowledge‟ for an account of the impact the discourse of monstrosity had on conceptions of science 
and physical and corporeal reality. 
38
 [See intro, pp.3-4] 
39
 Foucault‟s history of histories shares certain features with his account of the early modern paradigm 
shift in constructions of sexual identities in The History of Sexuality 1. [See ch. 1, pp.37-44] Unlike 
The History of Sexuality, The Order of Things does not create a temporal chasm between a knowable 
present and a mysterious past, however: it refers to a complex web of paradigm shifts throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
40
 See chapter 1 and chapter 4 on the formation of a critical identity through identity and/or founding 
narratives in New Historicism and queer studies. 
41
 [See intro, pp.3-7] 
42
 Foucault makes a similar argument in The History of Sexuality 1 and Orgel and Laqueur echo this 
idea in Impersonations and Making Sex by continually referring to the chasm between past and 
present identity. However, The Order of Things avoids that type of binary logic by constructing the 
discourse of identity and self-hood as a continual process of becoming (375-407). 
43
 See chapter 4 for a discussion of the concept of becoming. [See ch. 4, pp.172-178] 
44
 Orgel similarly argues that the Renaissance mind was a seat of „fragility‟ (1996, 27), with a 
radically unstable essence, which results in a belief in „the metamorphic quality of our sinful nature‟ 
(1996, 27). 
45
 Levine argues that although the monstrous transvestite actors described by the anti-theatrical writers 
slip between non-essential selves, there is something „essential and clearly monstrous locked “inside” 
him‟ (1994, 24). This inherent monstrosity is a premonition of essential identities to come (1994, 24-
25). 
46
 See for example James J. Sheehan and Morton Sosna‟s collection The Boundaries of Humanity; 
Armand Marie Leroi‟s Mutants and Lorraine Daston  and Katherine Park‟s Wonders and the Order of 
Nature and „Unnatural Conceptions‟.   
47
 There are a number of studies, including Levine‟s Men in Women’s Clothing, Greenblatt‟ „Wonder‟, 
Walker Bynum‟s „Wonder‟, that evoke the discourse of monstrosity, but not in connection with 
sexuality and gender.  
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48
 Foucault treats monstrosity and the limits of the „normal‟ not merely in The Order of Things, but 
also peripherally in The History of Sexuality and Discipline and Punish, and pivotally throughout 
Madness and Civilisation. 
49
 This pamphlet named „Of two wonderful popish monsters‟ was published in English in 1579 
(Davidson, 1991, 37). 
50
 Davidson recounts this development in relation to Paré and Thomas Aquinas (1991, 41-53). 
51
 See also Sawday‟s analysis of the religiously uncanny Renaissance body that emerged through the 
corporealisation of didacticism (1995, 141-183). 
52
 Political and social discourses used monstrosity in a similarly didactic way. See William E. Burns‟s 
An Age of Wonders and Sawday‟s chapter on the uncanny body in The Body Emblazoned (141-183). 
See also Evelleen Richards‟s „A Political Anatomy of Monsters‟, for a similar example in later 
discourses. 
53
 Lorraine Daston‟s „Marvelous Facts and Miraculous Evidence‟; Paula Findlen‟s „Jokes of Nature 
and Jokes of Knowledge‟ and Arnold I. Davidson‟s „The Horror of Monsters‟ also acknowledge a 
determinate shift (Daston, 1991, 124; Findlen, 1990, 326; Davidson, 1991, 60). 
54
 Most quotations of Bacon‟s Novum Organum (London, 1620) are from The Novum Organum of 
Francis Bacon (London, 1667, ESTC R38681), the first English translation of Bacon‟s original Latin. 
55
 Katherine Park and Lorraine Daston also quote this passage from the Novum Organum in 
„Unnatural Conceptions‟ but their translation is taken from The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. Basil 
Montagu (London, 1831), which calls the tract „Novum Organon‟ and constructs the argument rather 
differently: „a compilation, or particular natural history, must be made of all the monsters and 
prodigious births of nature; of every thing, in short which is new, rare and unusual in nature‟ (1831, 
138; Park & Daston, 20). 
56
 The traces of this can be found e.g. in Crooke‟s and Browne‟s work. In his Physics, Aristotle sets up 
a system based on classification according to which all the animals and plants should be divided into 
species. Each species has a perfect form (quidditas or an essence). This form is determined according 
to specific traits (qualities): the types of looks and behaviours that are most common in a species 
become the perfection of their kind. The more perfect traits a creature exhibits (the better the 
actualisation of their potential), the more perfect an example of its species it will be (1999, 33-36; 
192b8-b18) Roy Porter‟s The Flesh in the Age of Reason describes the Aristotelian tradition as „All 
that old Aristotelian talk (potentials and actualisations, substance and accidents, qualities and 
quiddities)‟ (51). 
57
 Park and Daston‟s „Unnatural Conceptions‟ notes that „Bacon was at pains to distinguish his history 
of marvels from ”books of fabulous experiments and secrets” which served up as jumble of fact and 
fable to “curious and vain wits”‟ (Park & Daston, 45; Bacon, 1831, 139). However, they also note that 
Bacon‟s agenda became increasingly popular in scientific circles throughout the seventeenth century 
(1981, 43-51).  
58
 The 1831 translation of Novum Organum in The Works reads: „the passage from the miracles to art 
is easy; for if nature be once seized in her variation, and the cause be manifest, it will be easy to lead 
her by art to such deviation as she was first led by chance‟ (138). The 1667 translation is less clear 
about the transition from divine power to human power, however. It merely states that „the properties 
and qualities, which are found to be miracles in nature, may be reduced, and comprehended under 
some form or certain Law, so all irregularity and singularity might be found to depend upon some 
common form‟ (30). 
59
 Ambroise Paré argues that hermaphrodites „did alwaies shew or portend some monstrous thing‟ 
(1634, 975), whereas Crooke merely treats them as natural deviations (1615, 250). 
60
 Although he does include causes that would not seem „natural‟ to a modern scientist, such as what 
Montaigne calls „the force of imagination‟ (1680, 34), these are described in a scientific fashion 
without allusion to supernatural interaction. Gail Kern Paster and Roy Porter argue that these types of 
scientific arguments were often accepted among natural scientists and medical professionals as part of 
the natural order (Kern Paster, 11-21; Porter, 44-61). See also Thomas Wright‟s The Passions of the 
Mind in General (1604) and Robert Burton‟s The anatomy of melancholy (1624). 
61
 See book 4 and 5 of Mikromosgraphia, in which Crooke uses sexual monstrosity as a primary 
example in every reference to the word „monster‟. 
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62
 See Alan Bray‟s Homosexuality in Renaissance England; Gregory W. Bredbeck‟s Sodomy and 
Interpretation; Bruce R. Smith‟s Homosexual Desire in Shakespeare‟s England and Jonathan 
Goldberg‟s Sodometries on the discourses surrounding sodomy in early modern England. 
63
 See chapter 1 for a discussion of the methodologies outlined by Greenblatt and Montrose. [See ch. 
1, pp.25-34] It should be noted that Caroline Walker Bynum makes a similar argument about the 
similarities between the teachings of the mediaeval theological thinkers and the radical literary critics 
appearing in the 1960s, with what she calls „a penchant for the strange‟(1997, 1).  
64
 [See ch. 1, p. 29] 
65
 See Foucault‟s The Archeology of Knowledge on the search for origins inherent within academic 
research and language. 
66
 [See ch. 1, pp.59-63] Sawday recognises the Cartesian subject to be the origin of the psychoanalytic 
division between self and „other‟ (Sawday, 166). 
67






 [See ch. 1, pp.56-63] 
2
 [See intro] 
3
 [See ch. 1, pp. 46-47] 
4
 [See ch. 2, pp.88-97] 
5
[See ch. 1, pp.56-63] 
6
 [See ch. 1, pp.37-44] 
7
 In Twelfth Night these are: I.iv.24-34 (p. 20); I.iv.158-161 (p. 29); I.v.184-185 (pp. 30-31); V.i.257-
262 (p. 145); V.i.326-327 (p. 149); V.i.384-387 (p. 153). In As You Like It they are: III.ii195-198 (pp. 
70-71); III.ii.219-220 (p. 71); Epilogue.214-217 (pp. 131). 
8
 [See ch. 1, pp.56-63] 
9
 Laqueur has written extensively on this subject, see e.g. „Orgasm, Generation, and the Politics of 
Reproductive Biology‟ and Solitary Sex. In Making Sex, Laqueur recounts that he encountered the 
Renaissance concept of the orgasm as a nineteenth-century scholar, expecting there to be doubt about 
the existence of a female orgasm, as there was in late Victorian medical texts (1990, vii). Instead he 
finds that some early modern thinkers regarded the female orgasm as a necessary component in 
conception. The female orgasm‟s existence makes him draw parallels between the modern and the 
early modern perception, whereas its necessity „surprised‟ (1990, vii) him. The argument is 
immediately constructed on conceptions of similarity and difference. Moreover, Laqueur is convinced 
that the modern conception of the female orgasm harbours an absolute truth: „Experience must have 
shown that pregnancy often takes place without it‟ (1990, vii, my emphasis). 
10
 [See ch. 2, pp.64-88] 
11
 [See intro, pp.12-16] 
12
 [See ch. 2, pp.64-88] 
13
 [See intro, pp.12-16] 
14
 [See ch. 2, pp.88-97] 
15
 There is an ample amount of criticism discussing this concept. See for example Phyllis Rackin‟s 
„Adrogyny, Mimesis and the Marriage of the Boy Heroine on the English Renaissance Stage‟; 
Theodora A. Jankowski, „...in the Lesbian Void‟; Tracey Sedinger‟s ‟The Epistemology of 
Crossdressing‟; Katherine Kelly‟s „The Queen‟s Two Bodies‟; Marjorie Garber‟s Vested Interests; 
Mario Digangi‟s The Homoerotics of Early Modern Drama; Valerie Traub‟s ‟The Insignificance of 
Lesbian Desire‟; Peter Stallybrass‟s „Transvestism and the “body beneath”‟; Kathleen McLuskie‟s 
‟The Act, the Role, and the Actor‟; Lisa Jardine‟s ‟Boy Actors. Female Roles, and Elizabethan 
Eroticism‟, Jean E. Howard‟s The Stage and Social Struggle and Steve Brown‟s „The Boyhood of 
Shakespeare‟s Heroines‟. 
16
Garber makes a similar argument about the ‟breeched‟ heroines in Twelfth Night and As You Like It: 
she calls it the ‟transvestite effect‟ (1992, 36-37). 
17
 This passage is from 767b-c of Plutarch‟s „Dialogue of Love‟ (Foucault, 1986, 204). 
18
 In adherence to Orgel and Greenblatt‟s discussion of this, Dympna Callaghan considers connections 
between portrayals of the boy and the eunuch in Twelfth Night (2000b, 44-46). 
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19
 See Orgel and Garber on the catalysing effect of Viola and Rosalind (Orgel, 1996, 57; Garber, 
1992, 36-37) 
20
 Garber  and Traub also acknowledge this (Garber, 1992, 77; Traub, 1992b, 102; 1992, 157). 
21
 Orgel, Greenblatt, Digangi, Rackin, Kelly and Garber all discuss this fact (Orgel, 1996; Greenblatt, 
1988; Digangi, 1997; Rackin, 1987; Kelly, 1990; Garber, 1992). 
22
 [See ch. 2, pp.64-88] 
23
 The anecdotes from his anatomy sources merely suggest movements from female to male . [See ch. 
2, pp.64-88] 
24
 This quotation is originally from Puttenham, English Poesie II 
25
 Neither Laqueur nor Orgel discuss „effeminacy‟ in relation to Twelfth Night, although the concept is 
often alluded to in the play. Jean E. Howard argues that Orsino‟s odd behaviour is merely accepted 
because he is  „protected by his rank and gender‟ (1993, 115), thus implying that  Orsino‟s retained 
masculinity is central to the plot. 
26
 Orgel quotes William Perkins who claims that lavish clothes are unsuitable for men because they 
render their gender identity more dubious: „wanton and excessive apparel ... maketh a confusion of 
such degrees and callings as God hath ordained‟ (Perkins quoted in Orgel, 1996, 27). These are, 
however , perfectly acceptable in women (Orgel, 1996, 27) 
27
 See ch VI, „Discouerie of Passions in Apparrell‟ and ch X „Of What Persons have Different 
Passions‟. [See ch. 1, p.48; ch. 2, p.74] 
28
 Once more, Viola‟s youth is equated with femininity here. 
29
 Greenblatt uses this quotation as an example, although it is not directed towards Viola, but her 
brother Sebastian in Twelfth Night. 
30
 [See ch. 1, pp.45-48] 
31
 Orgel points out that Viola asks to be presented as a „eunuch‟ to Orsino (TN, 10; I.ii.56), a middle-
sexed creature „that can sing both high and low‟ (TN, 45; II.iii.42; Orgel, 1996, 54-56). 
32
 Greenblatt‟s transvestites are expressly men and women: the sexual friction can only be produced 
by definite femininity and masculinity (1988, 90-93). 
33
 Jankowski‟s „...in the Lesbian Void‟; Katherine Kelly‟s „The Queen‟s Two Bodies‟; Jardine‟s 
„Cultural Confusion ‟; Joseph Pequigney‟s „The Two Antonios‟ and Karen Newman‟ s „Portia‟s Ring‟ 
also discuss this episode extensively. 
34
 [See ch. 1, p.29] 
35
 [See ch. 2, pp.97-105] 
36
 [See ch. 2, pp.83-88] 
37
 [See ch. 2, pp.83-88] 
38
 The effect of gender performance here is strikingly similar to Judith Butler‟s description of the 
effect of drag. (1999a, 174-177). [See ch. 2, p.73; ch. 4, pp.149-150] 
39
Nietzsche argues in The Birth of Tragedy that Greek tragedy is built on a tension between structured 
Appoline forces and destructive Dionysiac forces. One of the typical Appoline forces Nietzsche 
mentions is music (102). My reading of Nietzsche is conceived in relation to Andrew Ford‟s 
„Katharsis: The Ancient Problem‟, in which the cathartic qualities of the musical effects and their 
disruptions in Ancient Greek drama are invoked.  
40
 I am aware that this idea seems to echo the concept of a „third sex‟, established by Sandra M. 
Gilbert in her article on transvestism, „Costumes of the Mind: Transvestism as Metaphor in Modern 
Literature‟ and treated extensively by Marjorie Garber in Vested Interests. However, unlike Gilbert‟s 
„third sex‟ it is not, a separately sexed being. [See ch. 6, pp.227-228] 
41
 Consider for example the notable difference between the transvestite characters in Twelfth Night, As 
You Like It and The Merchant of Venice. 
42
 Orgel discusses this play extensively in relation to gender norms, sexuality and political discourses 
in Impersonations and „The Subtexts of The Roaring Girl‟. Jean E. Howard engages with it in a 
similar manner in „Sex and social conflict: The Erotics of The Roaring Girl‟. They both consider the 
difficulties in marking Moll Cutpurse as gender deviant, as well as the erotic power relations 
connected to her person, but neither Orgel nor Howard discuss her particular type of monstrosity or 
the ways it functions. Marjorie Garber and Dympna Callaghan touch upon it, however, noting that 
Moll is a „codpiece daughter‟ (RG, 49; II.ii.89-90); an early form of the erotic figure that Garber refers 
to as „the phallic woman‟ (1992, 122).  
43
 This is interesting, considering the fact that Middleton and Dekker‟s title overtly refers to Moll. 
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44
 All references from The Roaring Girl are from the 1976 New Mermaid edition, which is the same 
edition that Howard uses. 
45
 Moll has authority over the other characters: they respect or fear her. She is aware of this power and 
consciously uses it to „enable‟ all the final marriages in the play (Dekker &Middleton). 
46
 Moll‟s gender is overtly referred to as a female masculinity here. This concept of identity is 







 [See ch. 4, pp.165-184] 
2
 [See ch. 1, pp.37-44] 
3
 See for example Patrick Higgins‟s A Queer Reader; Annamarie  Jagose‟s Queer Theory: An 
Introduction; Lee Edelman‟s  No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive; Nikki Sullivan‟s A 
Critical Introduction to Queer Theory; Riki Wilchins‟s Queer Theory, Gender Theory: An Instant 
Primer; Michael Warner‟s Fear of a Queer Planet. 
4
 Judith Butler questions the connotations and the limits of queer in Bodies that Matter (225-226). She 
notes that it is unclear what exactly the term stands for and how it is related to the older use of „queer‟ 
as a derogatory term for the differently sexed or gendered. 
5
 [See ch. 1, pp.37-44] 
6
 Jagose notes that de Lauretis abandoned the movement only three years later, however (1996, 127) 
7
 Foucault never identified with queer theory. He died of AIDS in 1985, long before the instigation of 
the term. For example Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Diana Fuss, David Halperin, Esther Newton, Gayle 
Rubin, Adrienne Rich all wrote extensively before the wider instigation of the term. Judith Butler can 
also to some degree be included in this group: only the 1999 preface to Gender Trouble acknowledges 
the term „queer‟. Butler definitively refers to herself as part of queer theory in Bodies the Matter and 
„Against Proper Objects‟, however. 
8
 See for example Patrick Higgins‟s A Queer Reader; Annamarie  Jagose‟s Queer Theory: An 
Introduction; Lee Edelman‟s  No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive; Nikki Sullivan‟s A 
Critical Introduction to Queer Theory; Riki Wilchins‟s Queer Theory,Gender Theory: An Instant 
Primer; Michael Warner‟s Fear of a Queer Planet;  queertheory.com; „Queer Theory‟ on 
theory.org.uk; „Queer Theory‟ on wikipedia.org. 
9
 Compare for example the work of Elizabeth Grosz and Sara Ahmed versus the early work of Judith 
Butler: Grosz and Ahmed consider gender identity in terms of corporeality, whereas Butler‟s Gender 
Trouble and Bodies that Matter emphasise the incorporeality of gender. 
10
 The queer theory resource on theory.org.uk even shows a mind map with links to profiles on the 
most important queer personas: Foucault, Butler and Madonna. The website also pretends to offer 
Foucault and Butler action figures for purchase. 
11
 See chapter 1 on Saint Foucault and the queer utopia. [See ch. 1, pp.34-44] 
12  Interestingly, the theoretical bases of these works encounter the idea of identity and sexuality from 
widely different and often incoherent directions. The History of Sexuality trilogy is less about specific 
sexual identities than an attempt to historicise the concept of sexuality, and to outline the Greco-
Roman relationships to bodies and society before the invention of sexual identity. As established in 
chapter 1, Foucault‟s analyses of identity formation are based on the cultural materialist theories of 
Althusser, Benjamin and Adorno. Butler, however, develops her conception of gendered identity from 
a strictly psychoanalytic tradition, the very basis of which Foucault expressly despised. [See ch. 1, 
pp.37-44] 
13
 Foucault argues that the concept of the „self‟ is constructed in contrast to and in alliance with the 
multiple normalising discourses controlling society and the social masses (1991, 135-169). He thus 
does not allow for an essential personal identity untouched by these discourses. Judith Butler similarly 
argues that gender is performative and regulated by the gender norms of society, and thus not 
dependent on an essential biological sex (1999a). 
14
 Butler here challenges the classical philosophical construction of a mind/body division. However, 
she also challenges Lacanian constructions of the subject and second-wave feminism based on ideas 
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of the „essentially feminine‟ in the works of Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous and Julia Kristeva (1991; 
1993). 
15
 See for example the chapter „The Lesbian Phallus‟ (Butler, 1993, 57-92). 
16
 See for example Bodies that Matter, pp. 230-231. 
17
 Butler here fiercely defends herself against the accusation that her theory of performativity and her 
idea of liberated being denies the possibility of political agency. She agrees that identities are 
necessary at times for this purpose, but she sustains that internality should be questioned (1993, 222-
242). 
18
 I will extrapolate on the incoherence of this in the section below. [See ch. 4, pp.165-171] 
19
 This is a basic division, but the stance is expressed with many slight variations in the different 
introductions, readers and guides to queer theory. Depending on the particular goals of the works, the 
concept of non-identification is more or less emphasised. Sometimes the „queer‟ is used as more of an 
umbrella term; as an inclusive non-normativity, for example in Nikki Sullivan‟s A Critical 
Introduction to Queer Theory. Other times it is used as a point of resistance to any normalising 
discourses, as in Riki Wilchins‟s Gender Theory, Queer Theory and Annamarie Jagose‟s Queer 
Theory: An Introduction. 
20
 See for example Patrick Higgins‟s A Queer Reader; Annamarie  Jagose‟s Queer Theory: An 
Introduction; Lee Edelman‟s  No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive; Nikki Sullivan‟s A 
Critical Introduction to Queer Theory; Riki Wilchins‟s Queer Theory, Gender Theory: An Instant 
Primer and Michael Warner‟s Fear of a Queer Planet. 
21
 It has been especially problematic for lesbian- or gay-identified people, especially lesbian and gay 
activists (Jagose, 1996; Watney, 1992; Sedgwick, 1993; Edelman, 1994; Warner, 1993; Halperin, 
1995 and Sullivan, 2003). The resistance is more surprising to some, however: Jagose‟s Queer 
Theory: An Introduction has a chapter on contestations of queer, which starts with„[a]lthough queer 
can be described as a logical development in twentieth-century gay and lesbian politics and 
scholarship, its progress has not been uncontentious‟ (1996, 101). Halperin argues that there is a sense 
that „trendy and glamorously unspecified sexual outlaws‟ stigmatise the people adhering to an „old-
fashioned, essentialized, rigidly defined, specifically sexual (namely lesbian or gay) identity‟ (1995, 
65, original emphasis). 
22
 See for example Patrick Califia‟s Sex Changes; Jordy Jones‟s „Gender Without Genitals‟, Jay 
Prosser‟s Second Skins and Henry E. Rubin‟s „Trans Studies‟. 
23
 Interestingly, drag sometimes comes to stand for transvestism in early queer writing. See for 
example Meyer‟s introduction to the Politics and Poetics of Camp; Fabio Cleto‟s introduction to 
Camp and  Kate Davy‟s „Fe/male Impersonation‟. Jagose‟s index in Queer Theory: An Introduction 
has an entry on transvestism, but directs the reader to passages on drag. 
24
 [See intro, pp.17-19] 
25
 Despite the fact that she does not want to include transgender in queer studies, Butler shows an 
interest in the development of transgender identity in other parts of her work. See for example „Doing 
Justice to Someone‟ and „Never Mind the Bollocks‟. 
26
 Henry S. Rubin and Judith Halberstam also discuss and criticise Butler‟s usage of Paris Is Burning 
(Rubin, 1999; Halberstam, 1995). 
27
 Jacob Hale and Nikki Sullivan have also written extensively on Boys Don’t Cry, and both recognise 
the problematics in relation to the portrayal of Brandon Teena‟s gender identity, but neither question 
what role the popularity of queer theory has played in the formation of the character (Hale, 1998; 
Sullivan, 2003). 
28
 Halberstam notes that „The Brandon Archive‟ also describes Brandon Teena as „a fantasy guy‟ and 
„every woman‟s dream‟ (2005, 28). She argues that he „lived up to and even played into the romantic 
ideals that his girlfriends cultivated about masculinity‟ (2005, 28). 
29
 Halberstam notes that there are rumours that Hilary Swank, who stars in Boys Don’t Cry as Brandon 
Teena, refused to shoot the lesbian love scene because it was inconsistent with her character, but 
Peirce still persistently stuck to the queer agenda and replaced Swank with a body double (2005, 90). 
30
 [See ch. 5, pp.185-200] 
31
 See for example Annamarie  Jagose‟s Queer Theory: An Introduction; Nikki Sullivan‟s A Critical 
Introduction to Queer Theory and Riki Wilchins‟s Queer Theory, Gender Theory: An Instant Primer 
32
 Braidotti writes this before Butler‟s latest two books on gender discourses, Undoing Gender and 
Giving an Account of Oneself were published, but in Giving an Account of Oneself Butler affirms that 
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she finds Friedrich Hegel‟s conceptions of the „I‟s‟ relationship to its surroundings important to her 
work (2006, 26-30). Hegel constructs an idea of a binary power relationship between master and slave 
personas in his Phenomenology of Spirit. Braidotti refers here to Butler‟s use of binary logic.  
33
 See for example Patrick Califia‟s Sex Changes; Jay Prosser‟s Second Skins; Bernice L. Hausman‟s  
„Body, Technology and Gender‟; Kate Bornstein‟s Gender Outlaw and Leslie Feinberg‟s Stone Butch 
Blues. 
34
 [See ch. 4, pp.178-184] 
35
 See for example Claire Colebrook‟s Gender; Leslie Heywood‟s The Women’s Movement Today; 
Linda J. Nicholson‟s Feminism/Postmodernism; Catherine Beasley‟s What is Feminism? In all of 
these Butler is recognised to be a third-wave feminist, or postmodern feminist. 
36
 Chris Beasley argues that the postmodern feminisms emphasise plurality in opposition to the earlier 
emphasis on unity (1999, 81). Beasley includes queer theory under the umbrella of these feminisms 
(1999, 96-100). Claire Colebrook, on the other hand, distinguishes third-wave feminism as the 
movement that challenged the sex-gender distinction present in second-wave feminist work (2004, 
146). 
37
 This is not a definitive distinction, however. See Iris van der Tuin on the „jumping generations‟ of 
feminism (2009b) 
38
 The more extreme forms of third-wave feminism, such as the feminism that Judith Butler‟s early 
work belongs to, emphasise the constructivity and performativity of all gendered difference. Other 
forms of third-wave feminism, such as corporeal feminism emphasise that there is a physical element 
in gender identification, and tone down the idea of fictionality connected to social construction: if all 
conceptions are socially constructed, then the fact that sexual difference is considered important in our 
culture makes it important. This is developed differently by Genevieve Lloyd, Moira Gatens, 
Elizabeth Grosz and Rosi Braidotti. [See ch. 4, pp.172-176] 
39
 The rejection of essentialism is expressed to different degrees. Some third-wave feminist writing, 
like Thinking Fragments by Jane Flax and Beyond Feminist Aesthetics by Rita Felski express a certain 
distrust of essential gender, whereas Judith Butler‟s Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter are 
actively anti-essentialist. 
40
 See for example Sandy Stone‟s „The Empire Strikes Back‟ and Jay Prosser‟s Second Skins. 
41
 See Jordy Jones‟s „Gender Without Genitals‟ for a critique of the fictionalisation of transgender 
bodies and Janice Raymond‟s The Transsexual Empire for an attack on the fictionalisation of gender 
that she feels is inherent in the transgender movement. 
42
 Chris Beasley acknowledges that feminism is often recognised as that which is spoken by women 
(1999, 33). Male feminist writers are thus controversial, as are feminists who are not 
unproblematically read as women. Vikki Bell also describes various ways in which feminism creates 
sense of ownership over their suffering (2000). 
43
 Sandy Stone discusses this in „The Empire Strikes Back‟. See also Patrick Califia‟s Sex Changes; 
Jay Prosser‟s Second Skins and Judith Halberstam‟s Female Masculinity. When I speak of 
autobiographical terms here, I do not mean to say that these works are necessarily autobiographies, 
but they use personal experiences of gender dysphoria or heteronormativity within the narratives. See 
chapter 6 for a further discussion of autobiographical transgender narrative. [See ch. 6, pp.227-231] It 
should be noted that many third-wave feminists use autobiographical narratives too, see for example 
Gloria Anzáldua‟s Borderlands/La Frontera and Sara Ahmed‟s Differences that Matter. 
44
 A number of transgender works include reactions to Raymond. The most obvious one is Sandy 
Stone‟s „The Empire Strikes Back‟, which is a direct response to the attack, but also Patrick Califia‟s 
Sex Changes; Jay Prosser‟s Second Skins; Kate Bornstein‟s Gender Outlaw; Riki Wilchins‟s Read My 
Lips; Julia Serano‟s Whipping Girl and Erica Zander‟s Transactions discuss it. [See ch. 4, pp.181] 
45
 See for example Patrick Califia‟s Sex Changes; Jay Prosser‟s Second Skins and Judith Halberstam‟s 
Female Masculinity. 
46
 Jordy Jones and Jay Prosser express similar experiences of being objectified (Jones, 2006, 450-451; 
Prosser, 1998, 200-204). [See ch. 6, pp.222-224] 
47
 Foucault argues that this type of exclusivity is a typical sign of a heterotopia (1986, 26). [See intro, 
pp.3-6] 
48
 Gayle Rubin discusses the territorial border wars within lesbian and gay theory and politics in 
„Thinking Sex‟. 
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49
 See Butler‟s preface to Gender Trouble; Anzaldúa‟s Borderlands/La Frontera; Halberstam‟s 
Female Masculinity and Bornstein‟s Gender Outlaw. 
50
 See Rubin‟s „Thinking Sex‟ and Bell‟s „Owned Suffering‟ for further discussion of this idea. 
51
 Sedgwick claims that she is a straight queer. Jagose comments on and rejects the heterosexual queer 
movement, arguing that it is „marked by an almost painful tentativeness and self-reflexivity‟ (1996, 
114). Yet, she quotes Sedgwick‟s works throughout her text. 
52
 Halberstam also sporadically recounts episodes of gender confusion from her own life, in order to 
demonstrate certain principles. See for example her discussion of „The Bathroom Problem‟ (1998, 20-
29)  
53
 See Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter. Butler critiques Lacan in both, but particularly in the 
latter. 
54
 A number of postmodern theorists, especially postmodern feminists have attempted to challenge 
this division. See for example Alice Jardine, Elspeth Probyn and Sara Ahmed. This is one of the 
reasons the feminist canon gives for including autobiographical material in theoretical and critical 
texts. See for example Jardine, Gynesis; Ahmed, Differences that Matter; Lloyd, Being in Time. 
55
 See chapter 1 for a discussion of Lacan and the „real‟. [See ch. 1, pp.60-62] 
56
 I will discuss Moira Gatens‟s ideas of corporeality and sexual difference further in chapter 5. [See 
ch. 5, pp.213] 
57
 I will discuss Deleuze‟s conception of differentiation more thoroughly in chapter 5. [See ch. 5, 
pp.210-220] Claire Colebrook comments on the rather idealising idea of „woman‟ that is signified by 
Deleuze and Guattari‟s becoming-woman. She urges her readers to consider this concept more in 
terms of an abstract other, than anything actually feminine (2008b, 7). Rosi Braidotti relates to the 
concept similarly in Transpositions (50-59). 
58
 Halberstam notes that there are stories about problematic bathroom experiences in numerous 
transgender accounts in Female Masculinity. She subsequently recounts a bathroom experience of her 
own (20-29). 
59
 The great exception is Leslie Feinberg, who has written both the autobiographical  Journal of a 
Transsexual (1980) and the novel Stone Butch Blues (1993). Feinberg does not unproblematically 
identify as transgender, however, but rather as a „gender warrior‟ or a „stone butch‟ (Halberstam, 
1998, 118; Prosser, 1998, 190) 
60
 See for example Jason Cromwell‟s Transmen & FTMs and Patrick Califia‟s Sex Changes and Jay 
Prosser‟s Second Skins, which are academic, although their introductions all recount a formative FTM 
event in the authors‟ lives. See also From the Inside Out, edited by Morty Diamond, which is a 
collection of shorter autobiographical FTM narratives and S/he, a collection of poems by Minnie 
Bruce Pratt about her partner, Leslie Feinberg. 
61
 The autobiographical FTM works that have been produced, like Feinberg‟s Journal of a 
Transsexual are infamously difficult to get hold of. Except for Prosser‟s Second Skins, and 
Halberstam‟s specifically FTM oriented Female Masculinity, the academic analyses of  transgender 
autobiography largely ignore it. Neither Haussman nor Garber acknowledge Feinberg, and Califia 
only mentions Stone Butch Blues in passing. 
62
 MTF transsexuals as well as FTMs often relate stories of having traumatic experiences when they 
start hormone treatment. This is usually not the centre of the narrative, however. See for example Julia 
Serano‟s Whipping Girl and Erica Zander‟s Transactions. 
63
 See for example Jan Morris‟s Conundrum; Renée Richards‟s Second Serve; Kate Bornstein‟s 
Gender Outlaw and Erica Zander‟s Transactions. 
64
 Julia Serano argues that both Hausman and Prosser‟s analyses objectify transgender subjects for 
queer agendas. She recognises that Prosser attempts to de-academicise transgender and to introduce 
transgender perspectives, but according to Serano he still dismisses transsexual‟s personal accounts in 
favour of theoretical constructs (2007, 208-210). 
65
 Garber, Prosser and Califia also engage with the novel Man into Woman by Niels Hoyer about the 
painter Einar Wegener‟s development into Lili Elbe. Einar Wegener/Lili Elbe lived her dream of 
being a „real‟ woman for a year before she died of complications from her sex change operation in the 
1920s  (Hoyer, 1933). 
66
 Judith Halberstam‟s In a Queer Time and Space requests a new focus in the reception of 
transgender fiction and cinema. She prefers to look at affirmative portraits of transgender subjectivity, 
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rather than the classical accounts of socially induced pain and trauma, thus establishing an idea of 
transgender identity as a functional concept rather than an affliction (2004, 92-96).  
67






 See Sara Ahmed‟s Differences that Matter; Kate Chedgzoy‟s Shakespeare’s Queer Children and 
Marjorie Garber‟s Vested Interests. See also Brian McHale‟s Postmodern Fiction; Gerardine 
Meaney‟s  (Un)like Subjects  and Jane Gallop‟s „The Liberated Woman‟. 
2
 See for example Susan Lanser‟s „Queering Narratology‟; Carol Guess‟s „Que(e)rying Lesbian 
Identity‟; Antje Lindenmeyer‟s „Postmodern Concepts of the Body‟; Brueggemann and Moddelmog‟s 
„Coming-Out Pedagogy‟; Richard Hobbs‟s Writing on the Body and Mary Farwell‟s Heterosexual 
Plots and Lesbian Narratives. These texts all use Written on the Body to demonstrate queer 
methodology and Butlerian performative theory. 
3
 [See ch. 4, pp.146-148] Butler refers specifically to the psychoanalytic discourses of Jacques Lacan 
and Luce Irigaray (1999a;1993). 
4
 All the works by Jeanette Winterson and Angela Carter are referred to according to their original 
publication date. 
5
 Brueggemann and Moddelmog note that it always becomes clear to their groups of undergraduate 
students that they need to know the gender of their narrator. 
6
 [See ch. 4, pp.149-150] 
7
 This account is remarkably similar to the Iphis episode from Ovid‟s Metamorphoses (1984, 50-61; 
IX.666-797). [See ch. 2, p.71] 
8
 It has been used for this in numerous texts, particularly in works on postmodern subjectivity. See for 
example Sue-Ellen Case‟s The Domain-Matrix and Sara Ahmed‟s Differences that Matter. 
9
 Haraway states that „a cyborg  is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism‟ (1990, 
191). 
10
 This echoes some of the claims made by transgender autobiographers such as Kate Bornstein and 
Riki Wilchins. [See ch. 4, pp.180-184] 
11
 Jeanette Winterson‟s other two overtly queer novels, Sexing the Cherry and The Passion also 
develop similar spaces. See for example Chloë Taylor Merleau‟s „Postmodern Ethics‟ and Christy L. 
Burns‟s „Jeanette Winterson‟s Recovery of the Postmodern Word‟ on the similarities between these 
texts. 
12
 Carter and Winterson are mentioned as the two main examples of the same queer feminist type of 
writing in Sally Robinson‟s „What‟s Contemporary about Contemporary Women‟s Fiction‟. Merja 
Makinen and Alison Lee also compare Carter to Winterson in their articles on The Passion of New 
Eve and Richard Hobbs‟ study Writing on the Body compares The Passion of New Eve and Written on 
the Body throughout. 
13
 However, some of Carter‟s contemporary pre-Butlerian readership also read her from a specifically 
queer, gender-defying perspective.
 
See for example Paulina Palmer‟s „From “Coded Mannequin” to 
Bird Woman‟ (1987). 
14
 See for example Aidan Day‟s The Rational Glass; Ricarda Schmidt‟s „The Journey of the Subject in 
Angela Carter‟s Fiction‟; Christina Britzolakis‟s „Angela Carter‟s Fetishism‟; and Paulina Palmer‟s 
„From „Coded Mannequin‟ to Bird Woman‟ 
15
 See for example The Short Oxford History of English Literature; The Oxford Companion to English 
Literature; Gina Wisker‟s Angela Carter: A Beginner’s Guide and Andrew Hock Soon Ng‟s 
„Subjecting Spaces: Angela Carter‟s Love‟. 
16
 As Gina Wisker recognises, the only works that come close are The Magic Toyshop and The Bloody 
Chamber (or Burning Your Boats, in which it is also collected). 
17
 See for example the entry on Angela Carter in The Oxford Companion to English Literature, p. 176. 
18
 Lorna Sage argues that Wise Children is the climatic finale of Carter‟s critique of patriarchy, but 
both Sarah Gamble and Christina Britzolakis note that it is radically different from the author‟s earlier 
work (Gamble, 1997, 181; Britzolakis, 1997, 55-56), in Britzolakis‟s case this is described in terms of 
disappointment. 
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19
 Sarah Gamble, Kate Webb and Aidan Day point out that in contrast to the earlier books, Wise 
Children loosely adheres to (and thus challenges) a conventional generic form: classical comedy. It 
thus follows a linear narrative, which is unambiguously comical (Gamble, 1997; Webb, 2000; Day, 
1998).  
20
 It merely pre-dates Donna Haraway by a year and Judith Butler by five years. As Paulina Palmer 
and Mary Russo point out, it also overtly engages with Bakhtin‟s critically popular idea of the 
„Carnivalesque‟ (Palmer, 1987; Russo, 1994; Bakhtin, 1968). Finally, it coincides with the rising 
interest in proto-queer gender and sexuality in Shakespearean drama. [See ch. 1, pp.45-56] 
21
 For example Sarah Gamble, Lorna Sage, Yvonne Martinsson, Aidan Day, Paulina Palmer and Mary 
Russo comment on this (Gamble, 1997, 159; Sage, 1994, 48; Martinsson, 1996, 92; Day, 1998, 178; 
Palmer, 1987, 201; Russo, 1994, 166) 
22
 See especially Mary Russo‟s The Female Grotesque for a further discussion of Fevvers‟s 
monstrosity. See also Gamble, Sage, Martinsson, Day, Palmer, Linden Peach  and Marina Warner on 
critiquing of patriarchy from the margins in Nights at the Circus (Russo, 1994; Gamble, 1997; Sage, 
1994; Martinsson, 1996; Day, 1998; Palmer, 1987; Peach, 1998; Warner, 1994). 
23
 Especially Marina Warner comments on this in „Bottle Blonde, Double Drag‟. 
24
 See for example  Russo, Gamble, Sage, Martinsson, Day, Palmer and Peach  on the utopian aspects 
of Nights at the Circus (Russo, 1994; Gamble, 1997; Sage, 1994; Martinsson, 1996; Day, 1998; 
Palmer, 1987; Peach, 1998). 
25
 Russo, Warner and Peach point out that the feminist utopia in Nights at the Circus can equally be 
read as dystopian. 
26
 See for example Gamble, Sceats, Sage, Martinsson, Day, Warner and Peach  (Gamble, 1997; 
Sceats, 2000; Sage, 1994; Martinsson, 1996; Day, 1998; Warner, 1994; Peach, 1998) 
27
 Day, Schmidt, Lee and Hobbs all describe this scene as deeply problematic (Day, 1998; Schmidt, 
1990; Lee, 1996; Hobbs, 2004). Heather L. Johnson comments on the controversy surrounding it, but 
nevertheless she thinks that the scene is „supposed to espouse a positive reading‟ (2000, 133). 
28
 Interestingly, Day especially refers to a passage from The Sadeian Woman, which is a work that 
rather overtly advocates sexual difference as a means of liberation [See ch. 5, pp.216-217]: 
„consolatory notions seem to me a fair definition of myth ... Mother goddesses are just as silly a notion 
as father gods ... Myth deals in false universals, to dull the pain of particular circumstances‟ (Carter, 
1979, 6; Day, 1998, 125). Again, Day does not question the libratory power of the semi-divine 
Fevvers (1998, 175-180) 
29
 Schmidt, Sceats and Day agree that it is an uncouth forerunner of Nights at the Circus. Alison Lee 
argues that it is an early and  less sophisticated treatment of the issues that Jeanette Winterson raises in 
Written on the Body (Schmidt, 1990; Day, 1998; Lee, 1996) .  
30
 Aidan Day suggests that the dystopian and satiric atmosphere in the rest of the novel could also be 
read into this scene (1998, 124) and Elaine Jordan argues that Eve(lyn) is still an essentially masculine 
and flawed narrator at this point (1994, 203). Richard Hobbs also notes that „Eve‟s narrative does not 
connote truth‟ (2004, 46). 
31
 See the discussions of the Platonic Hermaphrodite in Aidan Day‟s The Rational Glass, p. 124; 
Ricarda Schmidt‟s „The Journey of the Subject in Angela Carter‟s Fiction‟, p. 94, Sarah Sceats‟s 
Food, Consumption and the Body, p. 55 and David Punter‟s The Hidden Script: Writing and the 
Unconscious, p. 28. 
32
 See for example Aidan Day‟s The Rational Glass; Ricarda Schmidt‟s „The Journey of the Subject in 
Angela Carter‟s Fiction‟; Christina Britzolakis‟s „Angela Carter‟s Fetishism‟; Richard Hobbs‟s 
Writing on the Body; Alison Lee‟s „Angela Carter‟s New Eve(lyn)‟; Mary Russo‟s The Female 
Grotesque; Lucie Armitt‟s Theorising the Fantastic and Linden Peach‟s Angela Carter. 
33
 Haraway refers to Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse about the formation of the subject and 
especially the female other. [See ch. 1, pp.60-62] 
34
 Haraway‟s cyborgs are referred to as „hopeful monsters‟ by, among others, Lucie Armitt. It denotes 
the idea of transgressively mutating „hopeful monsters‟ in evolutionary theory. [See ch. 2, pp.88-9] 
35
 Heather L. Johnson considers Eve and Tristessa in relation to transgender subjectivity formation 
and the idea of queerness developed by Kate Bornstein in „Unexpected Geometries‟. This reading is 
definitely more successful. Johnson argues the The Passion of New Eve highlights the tension between 
interior and exterior subjectivities (1997, 166). 
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36
 This reference is discussed in other critical approaches to The Passion of New Eve, however. See for 
example Roberta Rubenstein‟s „Intersexions‟, p. 110, and Alison Lee‟s „Angela Carter‟s New 
Eve(lyn)‟, p. 86. 
37
 See Heywood‟s Apology for Actors (1612), p. 45 and Freud‟s Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(1920), pp. 57-58. 
38
 Both Freud and Heywood note that the story is told by Aristophanes, but they both quote the ideas it 
invokes as the word of Plato (Freud, 2001, 57-58; Heywood, 1830, 45)  
39
 [See ch. 1, pp. 34-36] 
40
 „The Cave Simile‟ in Plato‟s The Republic describes the relationship between abstract „ideas‟ and 
physical forms. Physical beings are mere simulacra of a set of perfect concepts or ideas (Plato, 2003, 
240-248). 
41
 Aidan Day, Roberta Rubenstein, and Elaine Jordan also discuss this passage in libratory terms (Day, 
1998; Rubenstein, 1993; Jordan, 1994) 
42
 Carter forms a similarly idealised notion of love in The Sadeian Woman. She implies that the 
Sadeian terror and its intricate power contentions, inherently indicate the forceful nature of love. The 
struggles to intellectualise the Sadeian game and to keep love absent from the procedures, invoke the 
powerful hold the possibility of its appearance has on the tyrant. Carter writes: „only the possibility of 
love could awake the libertine to perfect, immaculate terror‟ (1979, 150). 
43
 [See ch. 4, pp.149-150] 
44
 See Andrew Hock Soon Ng‟s article on Angela Carter‟s novella „Love‟ and the author‟s 
mythological construction of Love as a unifying concept (2008). See also The Sadeian Woman, 
Doctor Hoffman, „A Souvenir of Japan‟, „Reflections‟ and „Flesh and the Mirror‟ from Fireworks. In 
all these stories Carter a portrays love in terms of binary tensions. In Doctor Hoffman and 
„Reflections‟ this tension is controlled by a hermaphrodite. 
45
 Heather L. Johnson also considers the gender play in The Passion of New Eve in ritualistic terms. 
She comments on the fact that Tristessa and Eve exchange genders – neither is ever de-gendered and 
they are never the same gender at the one time (Johnson, 1997).  
46
 Colebrook particularly recognises Luce Irigaray‟s anti-platonic influence from Martin Heidegger in 
Speculum of the Other Woman, where she argues against the idea of a singular underlying form or 
pattern, in favour of subjective representation. Deleuze establishes in The Logic of Sense that the 
denunciation of Platonism dates back to Hegel and Kant (253). 
47
 Deleuze discusses this in his chapter on „The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy‟ in The Logic of 
Sense (253-279). 
48
 See Undoing Gender and Giving an Account of Oneself. 
49
 In The Logic of Sense Deleuze discusses Nietzsche‟s claim to perform a „reverse Platonism‟ (253). 
Deleuze‟s Platonism is a re-consideration of Nietzsche‟s critique (253-279). 
50
 Plato argues that the „ideal‟ can never be truly conceptualised, it has to be imagined as the defining 
and conjoining structure behind its living incarnations (2003, 189-192). 
51
 Deleuze gives examples primarily from Nietzsche‟s reverse Platonism and Lucretius‟s affirmative 
Platonism and acknowledges that this binary construction is unchallenged in both (1990, 279) 
52
 [See ch. 4, pp.172-174] 
53
 Sally Robinson and Linden Peach both argue that Doctor Hoffman is a rewriting of the Oedipus 
story (Robinson, 2000; Peach, 1998). Freud‟s „pleasure principle‟ dictates that all subjects seek 
pleasure and avoid pain. The „reality principle‟, on the other hand, makes the subject defer pleasure 
when it is necessary because of obstacles in his/her reality. The subject‟s initial „id‟ only listens to the 
pleasure principle, but as he/she develops an ego the reality principle becomes more prevalent (Freud, 
2001). Brian McCabe‟s Postmodern Fiction argues that Carter‟s novel concludes that neither the 
reality principle nor the pleasure principle can prevail without the other. They are part of a binary 
relationship (1987, 144). 
54
 Lyndon Peach and Sally Robinson also comment on the fact that the women in Doctor Hoffman do 
not exist in their own right, but only as reflections of male desire (Peach, 1998, 103; Robinson, 1991, 
101). The logic of desire is rather two-dimensional in both these analyses, however. Neither critic 
recognises the ritualistic aspect of desire in the novel, or the degree to which Desiderio is constructed 
through Albertina.  
55
 See chapter 1 on Lacan and the Real. [See ch. 1, pp.60-62] Susan Rubin Suleiman‟s essay „The Fate 
of the Surrealist Imagination‟ investigates the degree to which Doctor Hoffman plays with traditional 
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notion of reality, and the tension it constructs between reality and surreality, but she rather dubiously 
concludes that Carter tries to demonstrate the differences between female and male reality. 
56
 These include Lorna Sage. She tries to vindicate Carter, however, and argues, on dubious grounds, 
that Carter‟s persistence in writing about de Sade must have indicated a denial of her own painful 
experiences of sexed power struggles. Sarah Gamble, Merja Makinen and Sally Keenan also discuss 
the feminist controversy stirred by Angela Carter‟s The Sadeian Woman (Gamble, 1997; Makinen, 
1997; Keenan, 1997). Gamble notes that Andrea Dworkins calls it a „pseudofeminist literary essay‟ 
and Susanne Kappeler argues that it is a „misreading‟ of an unequivocally evil de Sade (Gamble, 
1997, 99; Dworkin, 1981, 84; Kappeler, 1986, 135). Gamble herself argues that The Sadeian Woman 
is not supposed to be read morally: it is an exploration of power and erotic extremism (1997, 103). 
Sarah Sceats and Sarah Gamble  note that Carter initiates the study with a quotation from Foucault‟s 
Madness and Civilisation and thus argue that the author  attempts to demonstrate that desire and 
power are the formative elements in subjective development (Sceats, 2000, 44; Gamble, 1997, 103). 
57
 [See ch. 1, note 8] Carter argues that de Sade only allows Eugénie a limited liberation, however. De 
Sade indicates that the mother is about to climax, but she faints before she experiences any pleasure. If 
the mother had been allowed to enjoy her daughter‟s rape, Carter claims that the liberation would have 
been complete. She concludes that de Sade is too misogynistic for this: „Transcendence would have 
crept in. He might even have to make room for hope‟ (1979, 129).  
58
 Freud‟s „death drive‟ is related to the „pleasure principle‟. It is a drive that steers the subject towards 
a return to the initial „id‟; subject deletion; or transcendent „jouissance‟ in Cixous, Kristeva and 
Irigaray‟s terms. The death drive occupies a binary opposite position to „eros‟, which is a tendency 
towards subject coherence, love and connection (Freud, 2001). This idea is somewhat similar to 
Nietzsche‟s conception of Apolline and Dionysiac forces. [See ch. 3, p.135]. 
59
 [See ch. 6, pp.227-231] See also Sue-Ellen Case‟s „Toward a Butch-Femme Aesthetic‟ on the 
ritualistic and aesthetic qualities of performative gender roles. 
60





 [See ch. 4, 148-160] 
2
 See for example Patrick Califia‟s Sex Changes; Jordy Jones‟s „Gender Without Genitals‟, Jay 
Prosser‟s Second Skins and Henry E. Rubin‟s „Trans Studies‟. 
3
 I am referring to categories like TV, TS, TG, DQ, DK etc. [See intro, pp.17-19] See Sandy Stone‟s 
„The Empire Strikes Back‟ on the territorialisation of authenticate experience at work in transgender 
autobiographies. She argues that similar processes are behind the various „histories‟ of the 
homosexual or transgender subject that have been produced: The obvious examples are Foucault‟s 
The History of Sexuality and the various other „histories‟ discussed in chapter 1 and 2. There are also 
more transgender-oriented „histories‟, like Leslie Feinberg‟s Transgender Warriors and the essays in 
Gilbert Herdt‟s Third Sex, Third Gender about the cultural history of the transgender, and Joan 
Roughgarden‟s Evolution’s Rainbow about the natural history and the spread of homosexual and 
transgender phenomena in biology. 
4
 [See ch. 4, pp.160-165] 
5
 I use the term „transgender studies‟ generally here, but as I discuss below, there are obviously a 
number of transgender scholars who do not adhere to this distinction. I discuss some of them in 
chapter 4; for example Riki Wilchins, Kate Bornstein and Judith Halberstam. Other scholars, like 
Virginia Prince develop hybrid gender identities. 
6
 [See ch. 4, pp.153-157] 
7
 [See ch. 4, pp.160-165] 
8
 This is especially curious considering that Myra Breckinridge  - and  even more so Myron, Gore 
Vidal‟s second installation in the narrative of Myra - overtly satirises the philosophy and psychology 
behind transsexual subjectivity, indicating that gender identity cannot be so definitely segregated. 
Both Myra Breckinridge and Myron are also political critiques. Myra Breckinridge challenges the 
censorship legislature at the time (1968). The novel escaped being banned, but it was termed 
„pornography‟ by numerous reviews (1999b). At the time of Myron‟s publication, a Supreme Court 
anti-pornography ruling had just appeared, and Vidal had to „clean up‟ his new novel to avoid it 
getting banned: „I thought for a long time, what are the cleanest words I can find? And I discovered 
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that I couldn‟t come up with any cleaner words than the names of the five Supreme Court justices and 
two other good citizens who have taken on the task of cleansing this country of pornography‟ (1999b). 
The first edition of Myron uses these names instead of the „dirty words‟: „For example, a cock 
becomes a Rehnquist. And a cunt becomes a whizzer white...‟ (1999b, 243). These terms have been 
changed back in the edition used here. 
9
 I generalise hugely here by arguing that there is one definitive partition within the transgender 
discourse. Obviously there are numerous differences between transgender theorists. For the sake of 
this argument, I will concentrate on one particular division, however. Sandy Stone describes it in 
terms of one objectifying discourse that considers the idea of the transgender body in terms of its 
transgressive signification and one subjectifying discourse that attempts to establish a specific 
transgender experience of subjectivity (2006). Both discourses form identity spaces, but the first 
discourse forms a transgressive or queer space, whereas the second forms an idea of an essentially 
transgender space. The first group includes writers like Kate Bornstein, Riki Wilchins, Judith 
Halberstam, Marjorie Garber and Rita Felski, whereas the second space is inhabited by for example 
Patrick Califia, Leslie Feinberg, Jay Prosser. Needless to say, the clash with queer theory often occurs 
in connections with the second group. However, none of the members of the first group are 
uncomplicatedly queer. Although Bornstein, Wilchins and Halberstam embrace the term „queer‟, they 
are critical of the Butlerian identity described in chapter 4. [See ch. 4, pp.146-148] 
10
 [See ch. 4, pp.160-165] 
11
 All quotations from Myra Breckinridge refer to the original year of publication. 
12
 Kate Bornstein argues against the conception of transsexuality as an affliction throughout Gender 
Outlaw and her subsequent The Gender Workbook. Judith Halberstam also discusses the pathologising 
of trans-issues in In a Queer Time and Space. [See ch. 4, note 66] 
13
 Garber bases her idea of the „third sex‟ on an idea developed in Sandra M. Gilbert „Costumes of the 
Mind‟ (Garber, 1992, 9; Gilbert, 1980, 394). Gilbert Herdt also explores the notion of a third sex or 
third gender in history in his introduction to Third Sex, Third Gender. Julia Epstein refers to it as an 
in-between state in „Either/Or-Neither/Both‟.  
14
 [See ch. 1, pp.60-62] 
15
 Nikki Sullivan also acknowledges that Bornstein‟s idea of the transsexual is utopian and 
generalising, and thus falls into the trap that Rita Felski describes as transgender‟s „elevation to the 
status of universal signifier‟ which „subverts established distinctions ... but at the risk of 
homogenizing differences that matter politically‟ (1996, 347).  Whereas Bornstein attempts to be 
inclusive by suggesting that the word transgender be used inclusively to refer to anyone 
„transgressively gendered‟ (1994, 134), she deprives the term of its politically specific signifying 
power (Sullivan, 2003, 116). 
16
 [See ch. 4, pp.160-165] 
17
 [See ch. 5, pp.210-220] 
18
 [See ch. 4, pp.172-175] 
19
 Jones argues that Hedwig‟s new body signifies Cameron Mitchell‟s “horror and fascination of 
phallic lack”, reducing femininity to a crude psychoanalytic other (2006, 451). 
20
 It is important to note that Braidotti does not consider this to be a Platonic methodology. She argues 
that her engagement with Deleuze and Spinoza is a move „against all Platonistic and classical 
humanist denials of embodiment‟ (2006, 158). However, Braidotti‟s reference to Plato simply equates 
the philosopher with Enlightenment humanism. She does not account for Deleuze‟s continued 
engagement with Plato. 
21
 [See ch. 5, pp.204-210] 
22
 [See ch. 5, p.206] 
23
 See for example Renée Richards‟s Second Serve, Jan Morris‟s Conundrum, Christine Jorgensen‟s A 
Personal Autobiography. 
24
 Despite this complaint, Zander‟s own autobiography also ends with the final surgery. However, her 
dedication indicates that she is not sure if this operation has truly made her a woman: „I‟m beginning 
to realize this is a question I will never be able to answer‟ (5). Like Kate Bornstein and Riki Wilchins, 
Zander claims that she never ceased to identify as a transsexual. 
25
 In Bornstein‟s work, particularly, this is not merely a question of „passing‟. Bornstein states that she 
is unable to fully identify as a woman, in view of her male past. She argues that her subjectivity is a 
juxtaposition of everything she has been and everything she may become (1994, 3-4). 
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26
 Larsson establishes that a great amount of male transvestites spend their professional life in 
traditionally masculine positions. They are often engineers, mechanics or physicists (1997, 124). The 
female roles are often hyper-feminised and overtly eroticised (1997, 322). According to Larsson, the 
male role become conceived of as a „commonsense reality‟ (1997, 374, my translation), whereas the 
female role is considered „liberating‟ (374, my translation); a form of transcendence. Larson thus 
concludes that transvestism is a gendered interplay between the Real and the Imaginary that enables 
experiences of „subjective transgression‟ (1997, 374, my translation). 
27
 See definition of transgenderist. [See intro, p.18]  All references to Virginia Prince refer to the 
original year of publication. Prince officially changed her name, had breast enlargement surgery and 
wore feminine attire, but she never wished to have sexual reassignment surgery (Ekins & King, 2005, 
12). She was even adamantly politically opposed to sex change surgery (1978b, 34). She did not wish 
to identify with transvestism because she objected to the fact that it was „generally defined in its most 
primitive manifestation‟ (1973, 31), which is the traditional psychoanalytic idea of transvestite 
fetishism; „sexual arousal from wearing feminine attire.‟ (1973, 31). 
28
 This is importantly different from Jordy Jones‟s argument that Hedwig is insufficiently transsexual 
(2006, 450). 
29
 [See ch. 4, pp.147]. (Prince, 1973, 29-32) 
30
 The critique constructed in Myra Breckinridge and Myron also establishes that a life as a full man or 
a full female is impossible. Like Virginia Prince argues, such a division is construed as incomplete: 
„In effect we all become HALF HUMANS!‟ (Prince, 1978a, 41). 
31
 All quotations from Myra Breckinridge refer to the original year of publication. 
32
 Throughout Myron, Myra adds breast implants and Myron removes them. Myra manages to rid 
herself of Myron‟s phallus, which he is unable to restore, but Myra is also unable to restore a new 
vagina.  
33
 Virginia Prince enforced this idea to the point that she insisted that the transvestite organisation she 
formed, Full Personality Expression (FPE) was exclusively for heterosexual transvestites (Ekins & 
King, 7). She argues that practically all transvestites are firmly heterosexual, and that the few that are 
not are a different, sexual rather than gender based class of crossdressers (1973, 31). She thus denies 
possibilities of sexual overlap and ignores ample epistemological evidence that some transvestites 
prefer sexual intercourse with men when they are dressed as women (Docter, 1988; Larsson, Lilja & 
Fossum, 112). 
34
 Vidal obviously echoes Foucault in this statement. [See ch. 1, pp.37-44] 
35
 Myron points out that he is sad to say that Myra‟s effemination of Rusty seemingly was successful. 
He regretfully states that Rusty now is „a complete homosexual‟ (1968, 212).  
36
 Psychoanalytic description and sources: Richard Docter, Magnus Hirschfield, Harry Benjamin. 
37
 Felski is sceptical of directly gendering time. Kristeva‟s account of femininity is mythically lodged 
in biologistic ideas of feminity. She refers to female subjectivity and temporality in reproductive 
terms. It feeds into the binaristic construct of a „phallocentrically structured, forward moving time‟ 
(Felski, 2000, 18) versus a „gynocentric, recurrent time‟ (18). 
38
 Vidal states in an interview that he believes the Hollywood of the 1940‟s, „when everybody went to 
the movies‟ to have had the capacity to radically change the course of history (1999b, 248). 
39
 The pattern of connections through which the becomings interact is termed a „Rhizome‟ in Deleuze 
and Guattari‟s A Thousand Plateaus. Each new „line‟ of becoming, or „line of flight‟ from a state of 
being transforms the existential whole (11-12). It is a multi-dimensional and interactive idea of time 
and space as a continually mutating „assemblage‟ (2004, 4). 
40
 This essay is included in Doing Time. 
41
 [See intro, 12-16] 
42
 In Felski‟s earlier version of this article, she criticises Baudrillard and Haraway‟s abstract use of 
transgenderism as a trope for the breakdown of identity, arguing that theorists are „homogenizing 
differences that matter politically: the differences between men and women, the difference between 
those who occasionally play with the trope of transsexuality and those others for whom it is a matter 
of life and death‟ (2006, 572). Her discussion is however, itself pointedly lacking of transgender input. 
Judith Halberstam criticises Felski in both Female Masculinity and In a Queer Time and Space for 
first attempting to engage with the subjective reality of transgenderism and then abstracting this 
complex phenomenon (1998, 166-167; 2005, 98-99). Jay Prosser similarly criticises Felski for using 
the concept of transsexuality as though it signified the same thing as the transgender umbrella 
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concept: „That Felski‟s essay itself does not distinguish between transgendered and transsexual 
certainly suggests the need for their distinction‟ (1998, 201). Felski responds to this criticism by 
including a section on transgender discourse and demonstrating the particular ways in which 
Halberstam and Prosser generalise about transgender identities in the later version of „Fin de Siècle, 
Fin de Sexe‟ (2000, 149-150) 
43
 Erica Zander argues in TransActions that most transgender autobiographies start with „Already 
when I was a little girl...‟(13), but this account is always to some degree a reconsideration and 
reshaping of subjective events. The autobiographers mould their past so that it fits into the 
construction of a transgender identity.  
44
 Deleuze argues that „all becomings are molecular‟ (2007, 303). They are all connected in the 





The connection between these theorists is not arbitrary. Deleuze and Foucault have participated in 
several shared interviews and Deleuze has written a book about his interpretation of Foucault‟s 
theories – including his conception of „subjectivation‟ and space (1999). Eleanor Kaufman describes 
their connection thus: „Deleuze and Foucault are not so much individual writers and thinkers as they 
are a mode or a configuration or even a constellation‟ (2001, 70). 
2
 [See ch. 2, pp.88-97] 
3
 See Claire Colebrook‟s „How Queer Can You Go?‟ about the need to queer queer theory.   
4
 [See ch. 2, pp.88-105; ch. 3, pp.131-142] 
5
 [See ch. 6, pp.226-235] 
6
 [See ch. 5, pp.204-220] 
7
 [See ch. 6, pp.253-257] 
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